diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/inode.c | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 239 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 7 |
9 files changed, 109 insertions, 177 deletions
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c index f7496c6a022b..c3a793881d04 100644 --- a/security/inode.c +++ b/security/inode.c @@ -156,15 +156,8 @@ static int create_by_name(const char *name, mode_t mode, * block. A pointer to that is in the struct vfsmount that we * have around. */ - if (!parent ) { - if (mount && mount->mnt_sb) { - parent = mount->mnt_sb->s_root; - } - } - if (!parent) { - pr_debug("securityfs: Ah! can not find a parent!\n"); - return -EFAULT; - } + if (!parent) + parent = mount->mnt_sb->s_root; mutex_lock(&parent->d_inode->i_mutex); *dentry = lookup_one_len(name, parent, strlen(name)); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index c41afe6639a0..47fb65d1fcbd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const char *cause, int result, int info); /* Internal IMA function definitions */ -void ima_iintcache_init(void); int ima_init(void); void ima_cleanup(void); int ima_fs_init(void); @@ -131,7 +130,7 @@ void iint_free(struct kref *kref); void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu); /* IMA policy related functions */ -enum ima_hooks { PATH_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK }; +enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK }; int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask); void ima_init_policy(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 3cd58b60afd2..2a5e0bcf3887 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -95,12 +95,12 @@ err_out: * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy. * @inode: pointer to inode to measure * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE) - * @function: calling function (PATH_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP) + * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP) * * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. - * func: PATH_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP + * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c index fa592ff1ac1c..0d83edcfc402 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c @@ -52,9 +52,6 @@ int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL; int rc = 0; - if (!ima_initialized) - return 0; - iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS); if (!iint) return -ENOMEM; @@ -118,8 +115,6 @@ void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode) { struct ima_iint_cache *iint; - if (!ima_initialized) - return; spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock); iint = radix_tree_delete(&ima_iint_store, (unsigned long)inode); spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock); @@ -141,9 +136,11 @@ static void init_once(void *foo) kref_set(&iint->refcount, 1); } -void __init ima_iintcache_init(void) +static int __init ima_iintcache_init(void) { iint_cache = kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache), 0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once); + return 0; } +security_initcall(ima_iintcache_init); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index a89f44d5e030..294b005d6520 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ * * File: ima_main.c * implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap, - * and ima_path_check. + * and ima_file_check. */ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/file.h> @@ -84,6 +84,36 @@ out: return found; } +/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR. + * + * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write, + * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error. + * + * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results + * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. + * + * In either case invalidate the PCR. + */ +enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS }; +static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error, + struct ima_iint_cache *iint, + struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *filename) +{ + switch (error) { + case TOMTOU: + if (iint->readcount > 0) + ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr", + "ToMToU"); + break; + case OPEN_WRITERS: + if (iint->writecount > 0) + ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr", + "open_writers"); + break; + } +} + /* * Update the counts given an fmode_t */ @@ -99,6 +129,47 @@ static void ima_inc_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, fmode_t mode) } /* + * ima_counts_get - increment file counts + * + * Maintain read/write counters for all files, but only + * invalidate the PCR for measured files: + * - Opening a file for write when already open for read, + * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. + * - Opening a file for read when already open for write, + * could result in a file measurement error. + * + */ +void ima_counts_get(struct file *file) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; + int rc; + + if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return; + iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode); + if (!iint) + return; + mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); + rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK); + if (rc < 0) + goto out; + + if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) { + ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode, dentry->d_name.name); + goto out; + } + ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode, dentry->d_name.name); +out: + ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode); + mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); + + kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free); +} + +/* * Decrement ima counts */ static void ima_dec_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode, @@ -153,123 +224,6 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free); } -/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR. - * - * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write, - * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error. - * - * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results - * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. - * - * In either case invalidate the PCR. - */ -enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS }; -static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error, - struct ima_iint_cache *iint, - struct inode *inode, - const unsigned char *filename) -{ - switch (error) { - case TOMTOU: - if (iint->readcount > 0) - ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr", - "ToMToU"); - break; - case OPEN_WRITERS: - if (iint->writecount > 0) - ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr", - "open_writers"); - break; - } -} - -static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, - const unsigned char *filename) -{ - int rc = 0; - - ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode); - - rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file); - if (!rc) - ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename); - return rc; -} - -/** - * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. - * @path: contains a pointer to the path to be measured - * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE - * - * Measure the file being open for readonly, based on the - * ima_must_measure() policy decision. - * - * Keep read/write counters for all files, but only - * invalidate the PCR for measured files: - * - Opening a file for write when already open for read, - * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error. - * - Opening a file for read when already open for write, - * could result in a file measurement error. - * - * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures. - * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.) - */ -int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask) -{ - struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode; - struct ima_iint_cache *iint; - struct file *file = NULL; - int rc; - - if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) - return 0; - iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode); - if (!iint) - return 0; - - mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); - - rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK); - if (rc < 0) - goto out; - - if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0)) - ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode, - path->dentry->d_name.name); - - if ((mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)) != MAY_READ) - goto out; - - ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode, - path->dentry->d_name.name); - if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) { - struct dentry *dentry = dget(path->dentry); - struct vfsmount *mnt = mntget(path->mnt); - - file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY | O_LARGEFILE, - current_cred()); - if (IS_ERR(file)) { - int audit_info = 0; - - integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, - dentry->d_name.name, - "add_measurement", - "dentry_open failed", - 1, audit_info); - file = NULL; - goto out; - } - rc = get_path_measurement(iint, file, dentry->d_name.name); - } -out: - mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); - if (file) - fput(file); - kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free); - return 0; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_path_check); - static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, int mask, int function) { @@ -297,33 +251,6 @@ out: return rc; } -/* - * ima_counts_get - increment file counts - * - * - for IPC shm and shmat file. - * - for nfsd exported files. - * - * Increment the counts for these files to prevent unnecessary - * imbalance messages. - */ -void ima_counts_get(struct file *file) -{ - struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; - struct ima_iint_cache *iint; - - if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) - return; - iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode); - if (!iint) - return; - mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); - ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode); - mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); - - kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_counts_get); - /** * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement. * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL) @@ -369,11 +296,31 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return 0; } +/** + * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. + * @file: pointer to the file to be measured + * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE + * + * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision. + * + * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures. + * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.) + */ +int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) +{ + int rc; + + rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, + mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC), + FILE_CHECK); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); + static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; - ima_iintcache_init(); error = ima_init(); ima_initialized = 1; return error; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index e1278399b345..4759d0f99335 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0, + {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, }; @@ -282,8 +282,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) break; case Opt_func: audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from); - if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0) - entry->func = PATH_CHECK; + if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0) + entry->func = FILE_CHECK; + /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */ + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0) + entry->func = FILE_CHECK; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0) entry->func = FILE_MMAP; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 24e060be9fa5..122b748d0f4c 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -666,8 +666,6 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) void security_file_free(struct file *file) { security_ops->file_free_security(file); - if (file->f_dentry) - ima_file_free(file); } int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 7a374c2eb043..9a2ee845e9d4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2365,7 +2365,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i; rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur); } - update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur); + update_rlimit_cpu(current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur); } } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index 8a00ade85166..2aceebf5f354 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -80,9 +80,8 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm); /* * Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain. - * '1' is the result of open_to_namei_flags(O_RDONLY). */ - return tomoyo_check_open_permission(domain, &bprm->file->f_path, 1); + return tomoyo_check_open_permission(domain, &bprm->file->f_path, O_RDONLY); } static int tomoyo_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length, @@ -184,10 +183,6 @@ static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred) { int flags = f->f_flags; - - if ((flags + 1) & O_ACCMODE) - flags++; - flags |= f->f_flags & (O_APPEND | O_TRUNC); /* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */ if (current->in_execve) return 0; |