diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
51 files changed, 1396 insertions, 676 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile index 806bd19af7f2..5706b74c857f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile @@ -57,9 +57,9 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \ $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h -$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \ +$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \ $(src)/Makefile $(call cmd,make-caps) -$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h \ +$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \ $(src)/Makefile $(call cmd,make-rlim) diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index b81ea10a17a3..60f0c76a27d3 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ audit: if (!permtest) error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL, - target, 0, info, error); + target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error); out: aa_put_profile(hat); @@ -848,7 +848,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec, audit: if (!permtest) error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request, - name, hname, 0, info, error); + name, hname, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error); aa_put_namespace(ns); aa_put_profile(target); diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index cf19d4093ca4..cd21ec5b90af 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask) static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; - uid_t fsuid = current_fsuid(); + kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid(); if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); @@ -76,8 +76,10 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.denied); } if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { - audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", fsuid); - audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", sa->aad->fs.ouid); + audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, fsuid)); + audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, sa->aad->fs.ouid)); } if (sa->aad->fs.target) { @@ -103,7 +105,7 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) */ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms, gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name, - const char *target, uid_t ouid, const char *info, int error) + const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error) { int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; struct common_audit_data sa; @@ -201,7 +203,7 @@ static struct file_perms compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, */ perms.kill = 0; - if (current_fsuid() == cond->uid) { + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), cond->uid)) { perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(dfa, state)); perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_user_audit(dfa, state)); perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state)); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index 4b7e18951aea..69d8cae634e7 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { const char *target; u32 request; u32 denied; - uid_t ouid; + kuid_t ouid; } fs; }; }; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h index f98fd4701d80..967b2deda376 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ struct path; /* need to make conditional which ones are being set */ struct path_cond { - uid_t uid; + kuid_t uid; umode_t mode; }; @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask) int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms, gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name, - const char *target, uid_t ouid, const char *info, int error); + const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error); /** * struct aa_file_rules - components used for file rule permissions diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 8ea39aabe948..8c2a7f6b35e2 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode) return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, path->mnt, path->dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD); } -static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) +static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) { struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid, path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index cf5fd220309b..813200384d97 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -724,6 +724,8 @@ fail: */ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) { + struct aa_profile *p; + AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile); if (!profile) @@ -751,7 +753,27 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch); aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa); - aa_put_profile(profile->replacedby); + /* put the profile reference for replacedby, but not via + * put_profile(kref_put). + * replacedby can form a long chain that can result in cascading + * frees that blows the stack because kref_put makes a nested fn + * call (it looks like recursion, with free_profile calling + * free_profile) for each profile in the chain lp#1056078. + */ + for (p = profile->replacedby; p; ) { + if (atomic_dec_and_test(&p->base.count.refcount)) { + /* no more refs on p, grab its replacedby */ + struct aa_profile *next = p->replacedby; + /* break the chain */ + p->replacedby = NULL; + /* now free p, chain is broken */ + free_profile(p); + + /* follow up with next profile in the chain */ + p = next; + } else + break; + } kzfree(profile); } diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 61095df8b89a..b14a30c234b8 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -74,8 +74,8 @@ static int cap_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) return 0; } -static int cap_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type, - unsigned long flags, void *data) +static int cap_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) { return 0; } @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int cap_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode) return 0; } -static int cap_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) +static int cap_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c index 442204cc22d9..842c254396db 100644 --- a/security/device_cgroup.c +++ b/security/device_cgroup.c @@ -26,12 +26,12 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(devcgroup_mutex); /* - * whitelist locking rules: + * exception list locking rules: * hold devcgroup_mutex for update/read. * hold rcu_read_lock() for read. */ -struct dev_whitelist_item { +struct dev_exception_item { u32 major, minor; short type; short access; @@ -41,7 +41,11 @@ struct dev_whitelist_item { struct dev_cgroup { struct cgroup_subsys_state css; - struct list_head whitelist; + struct list_head exceptions; + enum { + DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW, + DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY, + } behavior; }; static inline struct dev_cgroup *css_to_devcgroup(struct cgroup_subsys_state *s) @@ -74,12 +78,12 @@ static int devcgroup_can_attach(struct cgroup *new_cgrp, /* * called under devcgroup_mutex */ -static int dev_whitelist_copy(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig) +static int dev_exceptions_copy(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig) { - struct dev_whitelist_item *wh, *tmp, *new; + struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp, *new; - list_for_each_entry(wh, orig, list) { - new = kmemdup(wh, sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL); + list_for_each_entry(ex, orig, list) { + new = kmemdup(ex, sizeof(*ex), GFP_KERNEL); if (!new) goto free_and_exit; list_add_tail(&new->list, dest); @@ -88,64 +92,60 @@ static int dev_whitelist_copy(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig) return 0; free_and_exit: - list_for_each_entry_safe(wh, tmp, dest, list) { - list_del(&wh->list); - kfree(wh); + list_for_each_entry_safe(ex, tmp, dest, list) { + list_del(&ex->list); + kfree(ex); } return -ENOMEM; } -/* Stupid prototype - don't bother combining existing entries */ /* * called under devcgroup_mutex */ -static int dev_whitelist_add(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, - struct dev_whitelist_item *wh) +static int dev_exception_add(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, + struct dev_exception_item *ex) { - struct dev_whitelist_item *whcopy, *walk; + struct dev_exception_item *excopy, *walk; - whcopy = kmemdup(wh, sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!whcopy) + excopy = kmemdup(ex, sizeof(*ex), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!excopy) return -ENOMEM; - list_for_each_entry(walk, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) { - if (walk->type != wh->type) + list_for_each_entry(walk, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) { + if (walk->type != ex->type) continue; - if (walk->major != wh->major) + if (walk->major != ex->major) continue; - if (walk->minor != wh->minor) + if (walk->minor != ex->minor) continue; - walk->access |= wh->access; - kfree(whcopy); - whcopy = NULL; + walk->access |= ex->access; + kfree(excopy); + excopy = NULL; } - if (whcopy != NULL) - list_add_tail_rcu(&whcopy->list, &dev_cgroup->whitelist); + if (excopy != NULL) + list_add_tail_rcu(&excopy->list, &dev_cgroup->exceptions); return 0; } /* * called under devcgroup_mutex */ -static void dev_whitelist_rm(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, - struct dev_whitelist_item *wh) +static void dev_exception_rm(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, + struct dev_exception_item *ex) { - struct dev_whitelist_item *walk, *tmp; + struct dev_exception_item *walk, *tmp; - list_for_each_entry_safe(walk, tmp, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) { - if (walk->type == DEV_ALL) - goto remove; - if (walk->type != wh->type) + list_for_each_entry_safe(walk, tmp, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) { + if (walk->type != ex->type) continue; - if (walk->major != ~0 && walk->major != wh->major) + if (walk->major != ex->major) continue; - if (walk->minor != ~0 && walk->minor != wh->minor) + if (walk->minor != ex->minor) continue; -remove: - walk->access &= ~wh->access; + walk->access &= ~ex->access; if (!walk->access) { list_del_rcu(&walk->list); kfree_rcu(walk, rcu); @@ -153,6 +153,22 @@ remove: } } +/** + * dev_exception_clean - frees all entries of the exception list + * @dev_cgroup: dev_cgroup with the exception list to be cleaned + * + * called under devcgroup_mutex + */ +static void dev_exception_clean(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup) +{ + struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(ex, tmp, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) { + list_del(&ex->list); + kfree(ex); + } +} + /* * called from kernel/cgroup.c with cgroup_lock() held. */ @@ -165,25 +181,17 @@ static struct cgroup_subsys_state *devcgroup_create(struct cgroup *cgroup) dev_cgroup = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev_cgroup), GFP_KERNEL); if (!dev_cgroup) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev_cgroup->whitelist); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev_cgroup->exceptions); parent_cgroup = cgroup->parent; - if (parent_cgroup == NULL) { - struct dev_whitelist_item *wh; - wh = kmalloc(sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!wh) { - kfree(dev_cgroup); - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - } - wh->minor = wh->major = ~0; - wh->type = DEV_ALL; - wh->access = ACC_MASK; - list_add(&wh->list, &dev_cgroup->whitelist); - } else { + if (parent_cgroup == NULL) + dev_cgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW; + else { parent_dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(parent_cgroup); mutex_lock(&devcgroup_mutex); - ret = dev_whitelist_copy(&dev_cgroup->whitelist, - &parent_dev_cgroup->whitelist); + ret = dev_exceptions_copy(&dev_cgroup->exceptions, + &parent_dev_cgroup->exceptions); + dev_cgroup->behavior = parent_dev_cgroup->behavior; mutex_unlock(&devcgroup_mutex); if (ret) { kfree(dev_cgroup); @@ -197,13 +205,9 @@ static struct cgroup_subsys_state *devcgroup_create(struct cgroup *cgroup) static void devcgroup_destroy(struct cgroup *cgroup) { struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup; - struct dev_whitelist_item *wh, *tmp; dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup); - list_for_each_entry_safe(wh, tmp, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) { - list_del(&wh->list); - kfree(wh); - } + dev_exception_clean(dev_cgroup); kfree(dev_cgroup); } @@ -249,59 +253,87 @@ static int devcgroup_seq_read(struct cgroup *cgroup, struct cftype *cft, struct seq_file *m) { struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup); - struct dev_whitelist_item *wh; + struct dev_exception_item *ex; char maj[MAJMINLEN], min[MAJMINLEN], acc[ACCLEN]; rcu_read_lock(); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &devcgroup->whitelist, list) { - set_access(acc, wh->access); - set_majmin(maj, wh->major); - set_majmin(min, wh->minor); - seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(wh->type), + /* + * To preserve the compatibility: + * - Only show the "all devices" when the default policy is to allow + * - List the exceptions in case the default policy is to deny + * This way, the file remains as a "whitelist of devices" + */ + if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) { + set_access(acc, ACC_MASK); + set_majmin(maj, ~0); + set_majmin(min, ~0); + seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(DEV_ALL), maj, min, acc); + } else { + list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, &devcgroup->exceptions, list) { + set_access(acc, ex->access); + set_majmin(maj, ex->major); + set_majmin(min, ex->minor); + seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(ex->type), + maj, min, acc); + } } rcu_read_unlock(); return 0; } -/* - * may_access_whitelist: - * does the access granted to dev_cgroup c contain the access - * requested in whitelist item refwh. - * return 1 if yes, 0 if no. - * call with devcgroup_mutex held +/** + * may_access - verifies if a new exception is part of what is allowed + * by a dev cgroup based on the default policy + + * exceptions. This is used to make sure a child cgroup + * won't have more privileges than its parent or to + * verify if a certain access is allowed. + * @dev_cgroup: dev cgroup to be tested against + * @refex: new exception */ -static int may_access_whitelist(struct dev_cgroup *c, - struct dev_whitelist_item *refwh) +static int may_access(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, + struct dev_exception_item *refex) { - struct dev_whitelist_item *whitem; + struct dev_exception_item *ex; + bool match = false; - list_for_each_entry(whitem, &c->whitelist, list) { - if (whitem->type & DEV_ALL) - return 1; - if ((refwh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(whitem->type & DEV_BLOCK)) + list_for_each_entry(ex, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) { + if ((refex->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEV_BLOCK)) continue; - if ((refwh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !(whitem->type & DEV_CHAR)) + if ((refex->type & DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEV_CHAR)) continue; - if (whitem->major != ~0 && whitem->major != refwh->major) + if (ex->major != ~0 && ex->major != refex->major) continue; - if (whitem->minor != ~0 && whitem->minor != refwh->minor) + if (ex->minor != ~0 && ex->minor != refex->minor) continue; - if (refwh->access & (~whitem->access)) + if (refex->access & (~ex->access)) continue; - return 1; + match = true; + break; } + + /* + * In two cases we'll consider this new exception valid: + * - the dev cgroup has its default policy to allow + exception list: + * the new exception should *not* match any of the exceptions + * (behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW, !match) + * - the dev cgroup has its default policy to deny + exception list: + * the new exception *should* match the exceptions + * (behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY, match) + */ + if ((dev_cgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY) == match) + return 1; return 0; } /* * parent_has_perm: - * when adding a new allow rule to a device whitelist, the rule + * when adding a new allow rule to a device exception list, the rule * must be allowed in the parent device */ static int parent_has_perm(struct dev_cgroup *childcg, - struct dev_whitelist_item *wh) + struct dev_exception_item *ex) { struct cgroup *pcg = childcg->css.cgroup->parent; struct dev_cgroup *parent; @@ -309,17 +341,28 @@ static int parent_has_perm(struct dev_cgroup *childcg, if (!pcg) return 1; parent = cgroup_to_devcgroup(pcg); - return may_access_whitelist(parent, wh); + return may_access(parent, ex); +} + +/** + * may_allow_all - checks if it's possible to change the behavior to + * allow based on parent's rules. + * @parent: device cgroup's parent + * returns: != 0 in case it's allowed, 0 otherwise + */ +static inline int may_allow_all(struct dev_cgroup *parent) +{ + return parent->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW; } /* - * Modify the whitelist using allow/deny rules. + * Modify the exception list using allow/deny rules. * CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed for this. It's at least separate from CAP_MKNOD * so we can give a container CAP_MKNOD to let it create devices but not - * modify the whitelist. + * modify the exception list. * It seems likely we'll want to add a CAP_CONTAINER capability to allow * us to also grant CAP_SYS_ADMIN to containers without giving away the - * device whitelist controls, but for now we'll stick with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * device exception list controls, but for now we'll stick with CAP_SYS_ADMIN * * Taking rules away is always allowed (given CAP_SYS_ADMIN). Granting * new access is only allowed if you're in the top-level cgroup, or your @@ -329,28 +372,44 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup, int filetype, const char *buffer) { const char *b; - char *endp; - int count; - struct dev_whitelist_item wh; + char temp[12]; /* 11 + 1 characters needed for a u32 */ + int count, rc; + struct dev_exception_item ex; + struct cgroup *p = devcgroup->css.cgroup; + struct dev_cgroup *parent = cgroup_to_devcgroup(p->parent); if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - memset(&wh, 0, sizeof(wh)); + memset(&ex, 0, sizeof(ex)); b = buffer; switch (*b) { case 'a': - wh.type = DEV_ALL; - wh.access = ACC_MASK; - wh.major = ~0; - wh.minor = ~0; - goto handle; + switch (filetype) { + case DEVCG_ALLOW: + if (!may_allow_all(parent)) + return -EPERM; + dev_exception_clean(devcgroup); + rc = dev_exceptions_copy(&devcgroup->exceptions, + &parent->exceptions); + if (rc) + return rc; + devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW; + break; + case DEVCG_DENY: + dev_exception_clean(devcgroup); + devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + return 0; case 'b': - wh.type = DEV_BLOCK; + ex.type = DEV_BLOCK; break; case 'c': - wh.type = DEV_CHAR; + ex.type = DEV_CHAR; break; default: return -EINVAL; @@ -360,11 +419,19 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup, return -EINVAL; b++; if (*b == '*') { - wh.major = ~0; + ex.major = ~0; b++; } else if (isdigit(*b)) { - wh.major = simple_strtoul(b, &endp, 10); - b = endp; + memset(temp, 0, sizeof(temp)); + for (count = 0; count < sizeof(temp) - 1; count++) { + temp[count] = *b; + b++; + if (!isdigit(*b)) + break; + } + rc = kstrtou32(temp, 10, &ex.major); + if (rc) + return -EINVAL; } else { return -EINVAL; } @@ -374,11 +441,19 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup, /* read minor */ if (*b == '*') { - wh.minor = ~0; + ex.minor = ~0; b++; } else if (isdigit(*b)) { - wh.minor = simple_strtoul(b, &endp, 10); - b = endp; + memset(temp, 0, sizeof(temp)); + for (count = 0; count < sizeof(temp) - 1; count++) { + temp[count] = *b; + b++; + if (!isdigit(*b)) + break; + } + rc = kstrtou32(temp, 10, &ex.minor); + if (rc) + return -EINVAL; } else { return -EINVAL; } @@ -387,13 +462,13 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup, for (b++, count = 0; count < 3; count++, b++) { switch (*b) { case 'r': - wh.access |= ACC_READ; + ex.access |= ACC_READ; break; case 'w': - wh.access |= ACC_WRITE; + ex.access |= ACC_WRITE; break; case 'm': - wh.access |= ACC_MKNOD; + ex.access |= ACC_MKNOD; break; case '\n': case '\0': @@ -404,15 +479,31 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup, } } -handle: switch (filetype) { case DEVCG_ALLOW: - if (!parent_has_perm(devcgroup, &wh)) + if (!parent_has_perm(devcgroup, &ex)) return -EPERM; - return dev_whitelist_add(devcgroup, &wh); + /* + * If the default policy is to allow by default, try to remove + * an matching exception instead. And be silent about it: we + * don't want to break compatibility + */ + if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) { + dev_exception_rm(devcgroup, &ex); + return 0; + } + return dev_exception_add(devcgroup, &ex); case DEVCG_DENY: - dev_whitelist_rm(devcgroup, &wh); - break; + /* + * If the default policy is to deny by default, try to remove + * an matching exception instead. And be silent about it: we + * don't want to break compatibility + */ + if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY) { + dev_exception_rm(devcgroup, &ex); + return 0; + } + return dev_exception_add(devcgroup, &ex); default: return -EINVAL; } @@ -457,75 +548,81 @@ struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys = { .destroy = devcgroup_destroy, .subsys_id = devices_subsys_id, .base_cftypes = dev_cgroup_files, + + /* + * While devices cgroup has the rudimentary hierarchy support which + * checks the parent's restriction, it doesn't properly propagates + * config changes in ancestors to their descendents. A child + * should only be allowed to add more restrictions to the parent's + * configuration. Fix it and remove the following. + */ + .broken_hierarchy = true, }; -int __devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) +/** + * __devcgroup_check_permission - checks if an inode operation is permitted + * @dev_cgroup: the dev cgroup to be tested against + * @type: device type + * @major: device major number + * @minor: device minor number + * @access: combination of ACC_WRITE, ACC_READ and ACC_MKNOD + * + * returns 0 on success, -EPERM case the operation is not permitted + */ +static int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor, + short access) { struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup; - struct dev_whitelist_item *wh; + struct dev_exception_item ex; + int rc; - rcu_read_lock(); + memset(&ex, 0, sizeof(ex)); + ex.type = type; + ex.major = major; + ex.minor = minor; + ex.access = access; + rcu_read_lock(); dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current); + rc = may_access(dev_cgroup, &ex); + rcu_read_unlock(); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) { - if (wh->type & DEV_ALL) - goto found; - if ((wh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) - continue; - if ((wh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode)) - continue; - if (wh->major != ~0 && wh->major != imajor(inode)) - continue; - if (wh->minor != ~0 && wh->minor != iminor(inode)) - continue; - - if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && !(wh->access & ACC_WRITE)) - continue; - if ((mask & MAY_READ) && !(wh->access & ACC_READ)) - continue; -found: - rcu_read_unlock(); - return 0; - } + if (!rc) + return -EPERM; - rcu_read_unlock(); + return 0; +} - return -EPERM; +int __devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) +{ + short type, access = 0; + + if (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) + type = DEV_BLOCK; + if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode)) + type = DEV_CHAR; + if (mask & MAY_WRITE) + access |= ACC_WRITE; + if (mask & MAY_READ) + access |= ACC_READ; + + return __devcgroup_check_permission(type, imajor(inode), iminor(inode), + access); } int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev) { - struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup; - struct dev_whitelist_item *wh; + short type; if (!S_ISBLK(mode) && !S_ISCHR(mode)) return 0; - rcu_read_lock(); - - dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current); - - list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) { - if (wh->type & DEV_ALL) - goto found; - if ((wh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !S_ISBLK(mode)) - continue; - if ((wh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !S_ISCHR(mode)) - continue; - if (wh->major != ~0 && wh->major != MAJOR(dev)) - continue; - if (wh->minor != ~0 && wh->minor != MINOR(dev)) - continue; - - if (!(wh->access & ACC_MKNOD)) - continue; -found: - rcu_read_unlock(); - return 0; - } + if (S_ISBLK(mode)) + type = DEV_BLOCK; + else + type = DEV_CHAR; - rcu_read_unlock(); + return __devcgroup_check_permission(type, MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev), + ACC_MKNOD); - return -EPERM; } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 49a464f5595b..dfb26918699c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc); hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; - hmac_misc.uid = inode->i_uid; - hmac_misc.gid = inode->i_gid; + hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid); + hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc); crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 8901501425f4..eb5484504f50 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK XATTR_NAME_SMACK, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE + XATTR_NAME_IMA, +#endif XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL }; diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 399641c3e846..d82a5a13d855 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ #include "integrity.h" static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT; -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(integrity_iint_lock); +static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock); static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly; int iint_initialized; @@ -35,8 +35,6 @@ static struct integrity_iint_cache *__integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode) struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; struct rb_node *n = integrity_iint_tree.rb_node; - assert_spin_locked(&integrity_iint_lock); - while (n) { iint = rb_entry(n, struct integrity_iint_cache, rb_node); @@ -63,9 +61,9 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode) if (!IS_IMA(inode)) return NULL; - spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); + read_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode); - spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); + read_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); return iint; } @@ -74,59 +72,53 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { iint->version = 0; iint->flags = 0UL; + iint->ima_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint); } /** - * integrity_inode_alloc - allocate an iint associated with an inode + * integrity_inode_get - find or allocate an iint associated with an inode * @inode: pointer to the inode + * @return: allocated iint + * + * Caller must lock i_mutex */ -int integrity_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) +struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode) { struct rb_node **p; - struct rb_node *new_node, *parent = NULL; - struct integrity_iint_cache *new_iint, *test_iint; - int rc; + struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL; + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, *test_iint; - new_iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS); - if (!new_iint) - return -ENOMEM; + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); + if (iint) + return iint; - new_iint->inode = inode; - new_node = &new_iint->rb_node; + iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS); + if (!iint) + return NULL; - mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */ - spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); + write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); p = &integrity_iint_tree.rb_node; while (*p) { parent = *p; test_iint = rb_entry(parent, struct integrity_iint_cache, rb_node); - rc = -EEXIST; if (inode < test_iint->inode) p = &(*p)->rb_left; - else if (inode > test_iint->inode) - p = &(*p)->rb_right; else - goto out_err; + p = &(*p)->rb_right; } + iint->inode = inode; + node = &iint->rb_node; inode->i_flags |= S_IMA; - rb_link_node(new_node, parent, p); - rb_insert_color(new_node, &integrity_iint_tree); + rb_link_node(node, parent, p); + rb_insert_color(node, &integrity_iint_tree); - spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); - mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */ - - return 0; -out_err: - spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); - mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); /* i_flags */ - iint_free(new_iint); - - return rc; + write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); + return iint; } /** @@ -142,10 +134,10 @@ void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode) if (!IS_IMA(inode)) return; - spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); + write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode); rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &integrity_iint_tree); - spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); + write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); iint_free(iint); } @@ -157,7 +149,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo) memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint); iint->version = 0; iint->flags = 0UL; - mutex_init(&iint->mutex); + iint->ima_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index b9c1219924f1..d232c73647ae 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ config IMA select CRYPTO_SHA1 select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86 + select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC64 help The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash @@ -55,3 +56,18 @@ config IMA_LSM_RULES default y help Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules. + +config IMA_APPRAISE + bool "Appraise integrity measurements" + depends on IMA + default n + help + This option enables local measurement integrity appraisal. + It requires the system to be labeled with a security extended + attribute containing the file hash measurement. To protect + the security extended attributes from offline attack, enable + and configure EVM. + + For more information on integrity appraisal refer to: + <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net> + If unsure, say N. diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index 5f740f6971e1..3f2ca6bdc384 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ ima_policy.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o +ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index e7c99fd0d223..6ee8826662cc 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 }; extern int ima_initialized; extern int ima_used_chip; extern char *ima_hash; +extern int ima_appraise; /* IMA inode template definition */ struct ima_template_data { @@ -107,11 +108,14 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) } /* LIM API function definitions */ +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function); int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename); +void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + const unsigned char *filename); int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode); void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show); @@ -123,14 +127,45 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode); struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode); /* IMA policy related functions */ -enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK }; +enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK, POST_SETATTR }; -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask); +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, + int flags); void ima_init_policy(void); void ima_update_policy(void); ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *); void ima_delete_rules(void); +/* Appraise integrity measurements */ +#define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01 +#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIX 0x02 + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE +int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename); +int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); +void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); + +#else +static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, + const unsigned char *filename) +{ + return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; +} + +static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, + enum ima_hooks func) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file) +{ +} +#endif + /* LSM based policy rules require audit */ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 032ff03ad907..b356884fb3ef 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -9,13 +9,17 @@ * License. * * File: ima_api.c - * Implements must_measure, collect_measurement, store_measurement, - * and store_template. + * Implements must_appraise_or_measure, collect_measurement, + * appraise_measurement, store_measurement and store_template. */ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/slab.h> - +#include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/xattr.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> #include "ima.h" + static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima"; /* @@ -93,7 +97,7 @@ err_out: } /** - * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy. + * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy. * @inode: pointer to inode to measure * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE) * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP) @@ -105,15 +109,22 @@ err_out: * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * - * Return 0 to measure. For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy, - * or other error, return an error code. -*/ -int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function) + * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask. + * + */ +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function) { - int must_measure; + int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE; + + if (!ima_appraise) + flags &= ~IMA_APPRAISE; - must_measure = ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask); - return must_measure ? 0 : -EACCES; + return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, flags); +} + +int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function) +{ + return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, IMA_MEASURE); } /* @@ -129,16 +140,24 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function) int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) { - int result = -EEXIST; + struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; + const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name; + int result = 0; - if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) { + if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) { u64 i_version = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_version; - memset(iint->digest, 0, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); - result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->digest); - if (!result) + iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST; + result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->ima_xattr.digest); + if (!result) { iint->version = i_version; + iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED; + } } + if (result) + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, + filename, "collect_data", "failed", + result, 0); return result; } @@ -167,6 +186,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct ima_template_entry *entry; int violation = 0; + if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED) + return; + entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); if (!entry) { integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename, @@ -174,7 +196,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, return; } memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template)); - memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); + memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); strcpy(entry->template.file_name, (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ? file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename); @@ -185,3 +207,33 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if (result < 0) kfree(entry); } + +void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + const unsigned char *filename) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + char hash[(IMA_DIGEST_SIZE * 2) + 1]; + int i; + + if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED) + return; + + for (i = 0; i < IMA_DIGEST_SIZE; i++) + hex_byte_pack(hash + (i * 2), iint->ima_xattr.digest[i]); + hash[i * 2] = '\0'; + + ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, + AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE); + if (!ab) + return; + + audit_log_format(ab, "file="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, filename); + audit_log_format(ab, " hash="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, hash); + + audit_log_task_info(ab, current); + audit_log_end(ab); + + iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED; +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bdc8ba1d1d27 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -0,0 +1,263 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2011 IBM Corporation + * + * Author: + * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. + */ +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/xattr.h> +#include <linux/magic.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> + +#include "ima.h" + +static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) +{ + if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0) + ima_appraise = 0; + else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) + ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX; + return 1; +} + +__setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup); + +/* + * ima_must_appraise - set appraise flag + * + * Return 1 to appraise + */ +int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) +{ + if (!ima_appraise) + return 0; + + return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE); +} + +static void ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) +{ + iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST; + __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr, + sizeof iint->ima_xattr, 0); +} + +/* + * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement + * + * Call evm_verifyxattr() to verify the integrity of 'security.ima'. + * Assuming success, compare the xattr hash with the collected measurement. + * + * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise + */ +int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry; + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL; + enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + const char *op = "appraise_data"; + char *cause = "unknown"; + int rc; + + if (!ima_appraise) + return 0; + if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) + return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + + if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED) + return iint->ima_status; + + rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)&xattr_value, + 0, GFP_NOFS); + if (rc <= 0) { + if (rc && rc != -ENODATA) + goto out; + + cause = "missing-hash"; + status = + (inode->i_size == 0) ? INTEGRITY_PASS : INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; + goto out; + } + + status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint); + if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) { + if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) + || (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) + cause = "missing-HMAC"; + else if (status == INTEGRITY_FAIL) + cause = "invalid-HMAC"; + goto out; + } + + switch (xattr_value->type) { + case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: + rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest, + IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (rc) { + cause = "invalid-hash"; + status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + print_hex_dump_bytes("security.ima: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + xattr_value, sizeof(*xattr_value)); + print_hex_dump_bytes("collected: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr, + sizeof iint->ima_xattr); + break; + } + status = INTEGRITY_PASS; + break; + case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: + iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG; + rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, + xattr_value->digest, rc - 1, + iint->ima_xattr.digest, + IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { + status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + } else if (rc) { + cause = "invalid-signature"; + status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + } else { + status = INTEGRITY_PASS; + } + break; + default: + status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + cause = "unknown-ima-data"; + break; + } + +out: + if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) { + if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) && + (!xattr_value || + xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) { + ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint); + status = INTEGRITY_PASS; + } + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename, + op, cause, rc, 0); + } else { + iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISED; + } + iint->ima_status = status; + kfree(xattr_value); + return status; +} + +/* + * ima_update_xattr - update 'security.ima' hash value + */ +void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry; + int rc = 0; + + /* do not collect and update hash for digital signatures */ + if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG) + return; + + rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file); + if (rc < 0) + return; + + ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint); +} + +/** + * ima_inode_post_setattr - reflect file metadata changes + * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * + * Changes to a dentry's metadata might result in needing to appraise. + * + * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller + * to lock the inode's i_mutex. + */ +void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + int must_appraise, rc; + + if (!ima_initialized || !ima_appraise || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) + || !inode->i_op->removexattr) + return; + + must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR); + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); + if (iint) { + if (must_appraise) + iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISE; + else + iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED); + } + if (!must_appraise) + rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA); + return; +} + +/* + * ima_protect_xattr - protect 'security.ima' + * + * Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'. + */ +static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) +{ + if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0) { + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + + if (!ima_initialized || !ima_appraise || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return; + + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); + if (!iint) + return; + + iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK; + return; +} + +int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) +{ + int result; + + result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_len); + if (result == 1) { + ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode); + result = 0; + } + return result; +} + +int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) +{ + int result; + + result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); + if (result == 1) { + ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode); + result = 0; + } + return result; +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c index 7a57f6769e9c..c586faae8fd6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c @@ -39,8 +39,9 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno); audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u", - current->pid, current_cred()->uid, - audit_get_loginuid(current), + current->pid, + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_cred()->uid), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); audit_log_task_context(ab); audit_log_format(ab, " op="); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index 9b3ade7468b2..b21ee5b5495a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest) struct scatterlist sg[1]; loff_t i_size, offset = 0; char *rbuf; - int rc; + int rc, read = 0; rc = init_desc(&desc); if (rc != 0) @@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest) rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } + if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) { + file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ; + read = 1; + } i_size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode); while (offset < i_size) { int rbuf_len; @@ -80,6 +84,8 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest) kfree(rbuf); if (!rc) rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest); + if (read) + file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ; out: crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm); return rc; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index be8294915cf7..73c9a268253e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -22,12 +22,19 @@ #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/mman.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/ima.h> #include "ima.h" int ima_initialized; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE +int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; +#else +int ima_appraise; +#endif + char *ima_hash = "sha1"; static int __init hash_setup(char *str) { @@ -52,7 +59,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file) struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; - int rc; + int must_measure; bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false; unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL; @@ -67,8 +74,8 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file) goto out; } - rc = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK); - if (rc < 0) + must_measure = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK); + if (!must_measure) goto out; if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) @@ -100,17 +107,21 @@ out: } static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, - struct inode *inode, - struct file *file) + struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; - mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); - if (mode & FMODE_WRITE && - atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 && - iint->version != inode->i_version) - iint->flags &= ~IMA_MEASURED; - mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); + if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE)) + return; + + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); + if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 && + iint->version != inode->i_version) { + iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK; + if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE) + ima_update_xattr(iint, file); + } + mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); } /** @@ -140,28 +151,37 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL; - int rc = 0; + int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise; if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return 0; - rc = ima_must_measure(inode, mask, function); - if (rc != 0) - return rc; -retry: - iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); - if (!iint) { - rc = integrity_inode_alloc(inode); - if (!rc || rc == -EEXIST) - goto retry; - return rc; - } + /* Determine if in appraise/audit/measurement policy, + * returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT bitmask. */ + action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, function); + if (!action) + return 0; - mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); + must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE; - rc = iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED ? 1 : 0; - if (rc != 0) + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); + + iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); + if (!iint) + goto out; + + /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask + * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_APPRAISED, + * IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED) */ + iint->flags |= action; + action &= ~((iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK) >> 1); + + /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */ + if (!action) { + if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED) + rc = iint->ima_status; goto out; + } rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file); if (rc != 0) @@ -177,11 +197,18 @@ retry: pathname = NULL; } } - ima_store_measurement(iint, file, !pathname ? filename : pathname); + if (action & IMA_MEASURE) + ima_store_measurement(iint, file, + !pathname ? filename : pathname); + if (action & IMA_APPRAISE) + rc = ima_appraise_measurement(iint, file, + !pathname ? filename : pathname); + if (action & IMA_AUDIT) + ima_audit_measurement(iint, !pathname ? filename : pathname); kfree(pathbuf); out: - mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); - return rc; + mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); + return (rc && must_appraise) ? -EACCES : 0; } /** @@ -197,14 +224,14 @@ out: */ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) { - int rc; + int rc = 0; if (!file) return 0; if (prot & PROT_EXEC) rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP); - return 0; + return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0; } /** @@ -228,7 +255,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ? bprm->filename : bprm->interp, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); - return 0; + return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0; } /** @@ -249,7 +276,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC), FILE_CHECK); - return 0; + return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 1a9583008aae..c7dacd2eab7a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -24,22 +24,29 @@ #define IMA_MASK 0x0002 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004 #define IMA_UID 0x0008 +#define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010 -enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE }; +#define UNKNOWN 0 +#define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ +#define DONT_MEASURE 0x0002 +#define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */ +#define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008 +#define AUDIT 0x0040 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE }; -struct ima_measure_rule_entry { +struct ima_rule_entry { struct list_head list; - enum ima_action action; + int action; unsigned int flags; enum ima_hooks func; int mask; unsigned long fsmagic; - uid_t uid; + kuid_t uid; + kuid_t fowner; struct { void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */ int type; /* audit type */ @@ -48,7 +55,7 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry { /* * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be - * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid + * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner */ /* @@ -57,7 +64,7 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry { * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building * and running executables. */ -static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { +static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = { {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, @@ -71,23 +78,45 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0, + {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, }; -static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules); -static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules); -static struct list_head *ima_measure; +static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = { + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,.flags = IMA_FOWNER}, +}; + +static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules); +static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules); +static struct list_head *ima_rules; -static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex); +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex); static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata; -static int __init default_policy_setup(char *str) +static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) { ima_use_tcb = 1; return 1; } -__setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup); +__setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup); + +static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; +static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str) +{ + ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1; + return 1; +} +__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup); /** * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule. @@ -98,7 +127,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup); * * Returns true on rule match, false on failure. */ -static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule, +static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask) { struct task_struct *tsk = current; @@ -112,7 +141,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule, if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic) return false; - if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != cred->uid) + if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid)) + return false; + if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid)) return false; for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; @@ -163,39 +194,61 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule, * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list * change.) */ -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask) +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, + int flags) { - struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry; + struct ima_rule_entry *entry; + int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1); + + list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) { + + if (!(entry->action & actmask)) + continue; + + if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask)) + continue; - list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) { - bool rc; + action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK; + if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK) + actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1); + else + actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1); - rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask); - if (rc) - return entry->action; + if (!actmask) + break; } - return 0; + + return action; } /** * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules. * - * ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the - * the new measure_policy_rules. + * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the + * the new ima_policy_rules. */ void __init ima_init_policy(void) { - int i, entries; + int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries; /* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */ - if (ima_use_tcb) - entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules); - else - entries = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < entries; i++) - list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules); - ima_measure = &measure_default_rules; + measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0; + appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ? + ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0; + + for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) { + if (i < measure_entries) + list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, + &ima_default_rules); + else { + int j = i - measure_entries; + + list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[j].list, + &ima_default_rules); + } + } + + ima_rules = &ima_default_rules; } /** @@ -212,8 +265,8 @@ void ima_update_policy(void) int result = 1; int audit_info = 0; - if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) { - ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules; + if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) { + ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules; cause = "complete"; result = 0; } @@ -224,14 +277,19 @@ void ima_update_policy(void) enum { Opt_err = -1, Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure, + Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise, + Opt_audit, Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type, Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, - Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid + Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner }; static match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_measure, "measure"}, {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"}, + {Opt_appraise, "appraise"}, + {Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"}, + {Opt_audit, "audit"}, {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"}, {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"}, {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"}, @@ -242,10 +300,11 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"}, {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"}, {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"}, + {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; -static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, +static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type) { int result; @@ -269,7 +328,7 @@ static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value) audit_log_format(ab, " "); } -static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) +static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) { struct audit_buffer *ab; char *p; @@ -277,7 +336,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE); - entry->uid = -1; + entry->uid = INVALID_UID; + entry->fowner = INVALID_UID; entry->action = UNKNOWN; while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) { substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; @@ -306,11 +366,35 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) entry->action = DONT_MEASURE; break; + case Opt_appraise: + ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise"); + + if (entry->action != UNKNOWN) + result = -EINVAL; + + entry->action = APPRAISE; + break; + case Opt_dont_appraise: + ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise"); + + if (entry->action != UNKNOWN) + result = -EINVAL; + + entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE; + break; + case Opt_audit: + ima_log_string(ab, "action", "audit"); + + if (entry->action != UNKNOWN) + result = -EINVAL; + + entry->action = AUDIT; + break; case Opt_func: ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from); if (entry->func) - result = -EINVAL; + result = -EINVAL; if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = FILE_CHECK; @@ -361,20 +445,37 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) case Opt_uid: ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from); - if (entry->uid != -1) { + if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) { result = -EINVAL; break; } result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); if (!result) { - entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum; - if (entry->uid != lnum) + entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum); + if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum)) result = -EINVAL; else entry->flags |= IMA_UID; } break; + case Opt_fowner: + ima_log_string(ab, "fowner", args[0].from); + + if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) { + result = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); + if (!result) { + entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum); + if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum)) + result = -EINVAL; + else + entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER; + } + break; case Opt_obj_user: ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from); result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, @@ -426,7 +527,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) } /** - * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules + * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules * @rule - ima measurement policy rule * * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers. @@ -436,12 +537,12 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) { const char *op = "update_policy"; char *p; - struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry; + struct ima_rule_entry *entry; ssize_t result, len; int audit_info = 0; /* Prevent installed policy from changing */ - if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) { + if (ima_rules != &ima_default_rules) { integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, op, "already exists", -EACCES, audit_info); @@ -474,9 +575,9 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) return result; } - mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex); - list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules); - mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex); + mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex); + list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules); + mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex); return len; } @@ -484,12 +585,12 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) /* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */ void ima_delete_rules(void) { - struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp; + struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp; - mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex); - list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) { + mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex); + list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) { list_del(&entry->list); kfree(entry); } - mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex); + mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex); } diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 7a25ecec5aaa..e9db763a875e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -15,8 +15,22 @@ #include <linux/integrity.h> #include <crypto/sha.h> +/* iint action cache flags */ +#define IMA_MEASURE 0x0001 +#define IMA_MEASURED 0x0002 +#define IMA_APPRAISE 0x0004 +#define IMA_APPRAISED 0x0008 +/*#define IMA_COLLECT 0x0010 do not use this flag */ +#define IMA_COLLECTED 0x0020 +#define IMA_AUDIT 0x0040 +#define IMA_AUDITED 0x0080 + /* iint cache flags */ -#define IMA_MEASURED 0x01 +#define IMA_DIGSIG 0x0100 + +#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT) +#define IMA_DONE_MASK (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED \ + | IMA_COLLECTED) enum evm_ima_xattr_type { IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01, @@ -34,9 +48,9 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache { struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */ struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */ u64 version; /* track inode changes */ - unsigned char flags; - u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */ + unsigned short flags; + struct evm_ima_xattr_data ima_xattr; + enum integrity_status ima_status; enum integrity_status evm_status; }; diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 2d1bb8af7696..9e1e005c7596 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -773,8 +773,8 @@ static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, * * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. */ -static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, - size_t datalen) +static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL; char *datablob = NULL; @@ -782,16 +782,17 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, char *master_desc = NULL; char *decrypted_datalen = NULL; char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; int ret; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (!datablob) return -ENOMEM; datablob[datalen] = 0; - memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); + memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &format, &master_desc, &decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv); if (ret < 0) @@ -834,16 +835,17 @@ static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) * * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. */ -static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) +static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data; struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload; char *buf; char *new_master_desc = NULL; const char *format = NULL; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; int ret = 0; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; buf = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -851,7 +853,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) return -ENOMEM; buf[datalen] = 0; - memcpy(buf, data, datalen); + memcpy(buf, prep->data, datalen); ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL); if (ret < 0) goto out; diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c index 61ab7c82ebb1..d67c97bb1025 100644 --- a/security/keys/gc.c +++ b/security/keys/gc.c @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at) if (gc_at <= now || test_bit(KEY_GC_REAP_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags)) { kdebug("IMMEDIATE"); - queue_work(system_nrt_wq, &key_gc_work); + schedule_work(&key_gc_work); } else if (gc_at < key_gc_next_run) { kdebug("DEFERRED"); key_gc_next_run = gc_at; @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at) void key_schedule_gc_links(void) { set_bit(KEY_GC_KEY_EXPIRED, &key_gc_flags); - queue_work(system_nrt_wq, &key_gc_work); + schedule_work(&key_gc_work); } /* @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype) set_bit(KEY_GC_REAP_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags); kdebug("schedule"); - queue_work(system_nrt_wq, &key_gc_work); + schedule_work(&key_gc_work); kdebug("sleep"); wait_on_bit(&key_gc_flags, KEY_GC_REAPING_KEYTYPE, key_gc_wait_bit, @@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ maybe_resched: } if (gc_state & KEY_GC_REAP_AGAIN) - queue_work(system_nrt_wq, &key_gc_work); + schedule_work(&key_gc_work); kleave(" [end %x]", gc_state); return; diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index 22ff05269e3d..8bbefc3b55d4 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -52,8 +52,7 @@ struct key_user { atomic_t usage; /* for accessing qnkeys & qnbytes */ atomic_t nkeys; /* number of keys */ atomic_t nikeys; /* number of instantiated keys */ - uid_t uid; - struct user_namespace *user_ns; + kuid_t uid; int qnkeys; /* number of keys allocated to this user */ int qnbytes; /* number of bytes allocated to this user */ }; @@ -62,8 +61,7 @@ extern struct rb_root key_user_tree; extern spinlock_t key_user_lock; extern struct key_user root_key_user; -extern struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid, - struct user_namespace *user_ns); +extern struct key_user *key_user_lookup(kuid_t uid); extern void key_user_put(struct key_user *user); /* diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 50d96d4e06f2..a15c9da8f971 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ #include <linux/workqueue.h> #include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/err.h> -#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include "internal.h" struct kmem_cache *key_jar; @@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ void __key_check(const struct key *key) * Get the key quota record for a user, allocating a new record if one doesn't * already exist. */ -struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid, struct user_namespace *user_ns) +struct key_user *key_user_lookup(kuid_t uid) { struct key_user *candidate = NULL, *user; struct rb_node *parent = NULL; @@ -67,13 +66,9 @@ try_again: parent = *p; user = rb_entry(parent, struct key_user, node); - if (uid < user->uid) + if (uid_lt(uid, user->uid)) p = &(*p)->rb_left; - else if (uid > user->uid) - p = &(*p)->rb_right; - else if (user_ns < user->user_ns) - p = &(*p)->rb_left; - else if (user_ns > user->user_ns) + else if (uid_gt(uid, user->uid)) p = &(*p)->rb_right; else goto found; @@ -102,7 +97,6 @@ try_again: atomic_set(&candidate->nkeys, 0); atomic_set(&candidate->nikeys, 0); candidate->uid = uid; - candidate->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns); candidate->qnkeys = 0; candidate->qnbytes = 0; spin_lock_init(&candidate->lock); @@ -131,7 +125,6 @@ void key_user_put(struct key_user *user) if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&user->usage, &key_user_lock)) { rb_erase(&user->node, &key_user_tree); spin_unlock(&key_user_lock); - put_user_ns(user->user_ns); kfree(user); } @@ -229,7 +222,7 @@ serial_exists: * key_alloc() calls don't race with module unloading. */ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, - uid_t uid, gid_t gid, const struct cred *cred, + kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags) { struct key_user *user = NULL; @@ -253,16 +246,16 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen; /* get hold of the key tracking for this user */ - user = key_user_lookup(uid, cred->user_ns); + user = key_user_lookup(uid); if (!user) goto no_memory_1; /* check that the user's quota permits allocation of another key and * its description */ if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) { - unsigned maxkeys = (uid == 0) ? + unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ? key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys; - unsigned maxbytes = (uid == 0) ? + unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ? key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes; spin_lock(&user->lock); @@ -380,7 +373,7 @@ int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen) /* contemplate the quota adjustment */ if (delta != 0 && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) { - unsigned maxbytes = (key->user->uid == 0) ? + unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(key->user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ? key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes; spin_lock(&key->user->lock); @@ -412,8 +405,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve); * key_construction_mutex. */ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, - const void *data, - size_t datalen, + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, struct key *keyring, struct key *authkey, unsigned long *_prealloc) @@ -431,7 +423,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, /* can't instantiate twice */ if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { /* instantiate the key */ - ret = key->type->instantiate(key, data, datalen); + ret = key->type->instantiate(key, prep); if (ret == 0) { /* mark the key as being instantiated */ @@ -482,22 +474,37 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, struct key *keyring, struct key *authkey) { + struct key_preparsed_payload prep; unsigned long prealloc; int ret; + memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep)); + prep.data = data; + prep.datalen = datalen; + prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; + if (key->type->preparse) { + ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + } + if (keyring) { ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description, &prealloc); if (ret < 0) - return ret; + goto error_free_preparse; } - ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, data, datalen, keyring, authkey, + ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey, &prealloc); if (keyring) __key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc); +error_free_preparse: + if (key->type->preparse) + key->type->free_preparse(&prep); +error: return ret; } @@ -598,7 +605,7 @@ void key_put(struct key *key) key_check(key); if (atomic_dec_and_test(&key->usage)) - queue_work(system_nrt_wq, &key_gc_work); + schedule_work(&key_gc_work); } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_put); @@ -706,7 +713,7 @@ void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype) * if we get an error. */ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, - const void *payload, size_t plen) + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); int ret; @@ -722,7 +729,7 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, down_write(&key->sem); - ret = key->type->update(key, payload, plen); + ret = key->type->update(key, prep); if (ret == 0) /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); @@ -774,6 +781,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, unsigned long flags) { unsigned long prealloc; + struct key_preparsed_payload prep; const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct key_type *ktype; struct key *keyring, *key = NULL; @@ -789,8 +797,9 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, } key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate) - goto error_2; + if (!ktype->match || !ktype->instantiate || + (!description && !ktype->preparse)) + goto error_put_type; keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref); @@ -798,18 +807,37 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR); if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring) - goto error_2; + goto error_put_type; + + memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep)); + prep.data = payload; + prep.datalen = plen; + prep.quotalen = ktype->def_datalen; + if (ktype->preparse) { + ret = ktype->preparse(&prep); + if (ret < 0) { + key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); + goto error_put_type; + } + if (!description) + description = prep.description; + key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + if (!description) + goto error_free_prep; + } ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, ktype, description, &prealloc); - if (ret < 0) - goto error_2; + if (ret < 0) { + key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); + goto error_free_prep; + } /* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have * to modify the keyring */ ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_WRITE); if (ret < 0) { key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); - goto error_3; + goto error_link_end; } /* if it's possible to update this type of key, search for an existing @@ -840,25 +868,27 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, perm, flags); if (IS_ERR(key)) { key_ref = ERR_CAST(key); - goto error_3; + goto error_link_end; } /* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */ - ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, payload, plen, keyring, NULL, - &prealloc); + ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, NULL, &prealloc); if (ret < 0) { key_put(key); key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); - goto error_3; + goto error_link_end; } key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref)); - error_3: +error_link_end: __key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc); - error_2: +error_free_prep: + if (ktype->preparse) + ktype->free_preparse(&prep); +error_put_type: key_type_put(ktype); - error: +error: return key_ref; found_matching_key: @@ -866,10 +896,9 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, * - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned */ __key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc); - key_type_put(ktype); - key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, payload, plen); - goto error; + key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep); + goto error_free_prep; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update); @@ -888,6 +917,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_create_or_update); */ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) { + struct key_preparsed_payload prep; struct key *key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); int ret; @@ -900,18 +930,31 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) /* attempt to update it if supported */ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (key->type->update) { - down_write(&key->sem); - - ret = key->type->update(key, payload, plen); - if (ret == 0) - /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ - clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); + if (!key->type->update) + goto error; - up_write(&key->sem); + memset(&prep, 0, sizeof(prep)); + prep.data = payload; + prep.datalen = plen; + prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; + if (key->type->preparse) { + ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; } - error: + down_write(&key->sem); + + ret = key->type->update(key, &prep); + if (ret == 0) + /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ + clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); + + up_write(&key->sem); + + if (key->type->preparse) + key->type->free_preparse(&prep); +error: return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update); diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 3364fbf46807..5d34b4e827d6 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type, * Extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a * new key to the specified keyring or update a matching key in that keyring. * + * If the description is NULL or an empty string, the key type is asked to + * generate one from the payload. + * * The keyring must be writable so that we can attach the key to it. * * If successful, the new key's serial number is returned, otherwise an error @@ -72,10 +75,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type, if (ret < 0) goto error; - description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE); - if (IS_ERR(description)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(description); - goto error; + description = NULL; + if (_description) { + description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE); + if (IS_ERR(description)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(description); + goto error; + } + if (!*description) { + kfree(description); + description = NULL; + } } /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */ @@ -569,8 +579,8 @@ okay: ret = snprintf(tmpbuf, PAGE_SIZE - 1, "%s;%d;%d;%08x;%s", key->type->name, - key->uid, - key->gid, + from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), key->uid), + from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), key->gid), key->perm, key->description ?: ""); @@ -766,15 +776,25 @@ error: * * If successful, 0 will be returned. */ -long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) +long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group) { struct key_user *newowner, *zapowner = NULL; struct key *key; key_ref_t key_ref; long ret; + kuid_t uid; + kgid_t gid; + + uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), user); + gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), group); + ret = -EINVAL; + if ((user != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid)) + goto error; + if ((group != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid)) + goto error; ret = 0; - if (uid == (uid_t) -1 && gid == (gid_t) -1) + if (user == (uid_t) -1 && group == (gid_t) -1) goto error; key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, @@ -792,27 +812,27 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { /* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */ - if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && key->uid != uid) + if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(key->uid, uid)) goto error_put; /* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other * than one of those that the current process subscribes to */ - if (gid != (gid_t) -1 && gid != key->gid && !in_group_p(gid)) + if (group != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(gid, key->gid) && !in_group_p(gid)) goto error_put; } /* change the UID */ - if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && uid != key->uid) { + if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(uid, key->uid)) { ret = -ENOMEM; - newowner = key_user_lookup(uid, current_user_ns()); + newowner = key_user_lookup(uid); if (!newowner) goto error_put; /* transfer the quota burden to the new user */ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) { - unsigned maxkeys = (uid == 0) ? + unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ? key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys; - unsigned maxbytes = (uid == 0) ? + unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ? key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes; spin_lock(&newowner->lock); @@ -846,7 +866,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) } /* change the GID */ - if (gid != (gid_t) -1) + if (group != (gid_t) -1) key->gid = gid; ret = 0; @@ -897,7 +917,7 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm) down_write(&key->sem); /* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */ - if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current_fsuid()) { + if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid())) { key->perm = perm; ret = 0; } @@ -1486,7 +1506,6 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void) oldwork = NULL; parent = me->real_parent; - task_lock(parent); /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */ if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm) goto unlock; @@ -1507,18 +1526,18 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void) /* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be * SUID/SGID */ - if (pcred->uid != mycred->euid || - pcred->euid != mycred->euid || - pcred->suid != mycred->euid || - pcred->gid != mycred->egid || - pcred->egid != mycred->egid || - pcred->sgid != mycred->egid) + if (!uid_eq(pcred->uid, mycred->euid) || + !uid_eq(pcred->euid, mycred->euid) || + !uid_eq(pcred->suid, mycred->euid) || + !gid_eq(pcred->gid, mycred->egid) || + !gid_eq(pcred->egid, mycred->egid) || + !gid_eq(pcred->sgid, mycred->egid)) goto unlock; /* the keyrings must have the same UID */ if ((pcred->tgcred->session_keyring && - pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) || - mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) + !uid_eq(pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid)) || + !uid_eq(mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid)) goto unlock; /* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */ @@ -1530,7 +1549,6 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void) if (!ret) newwork = NULL; unlock: - task_unlock(parent); write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); rcu_read_unlock(); if (oldwork) diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 81e7852d281d..6e42df15a24c 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static inline unsigned keyring_hash(const char *desc) * operations. */ static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, - const void *data, size_t datalen); + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); static int keyring_match(const struct key *keyring, const void *criterion); static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring); static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring); @@ -121,12 +121,12 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring) * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if given any data. */ static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, - const void *data, size_t datalen) + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { int ret; ret = -EINVAL; - if (datalen == 0) { + if (prep->datalen == 0) { /* make the keyring available by name if it has one */ keyring_publish_name(keyring); ret = 0; @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ error: /* * Allocate a keyring and link into the destination keyring. */ -struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, +struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags, struct key *dest) { @@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check) &keyring_name_hash[bucket], type_data.link ) { - if (keyring->user->user_ns != current_user_ns()) + if (!kuid_has_mapping(current_user_ns(), keyring->user->uid)) continue; if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags)) diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c index 0b4d019e027d..efcc0c855a0d 100644 --- a/security/keys/permission.c +++ b/security/keys/permission.c @@ -36,33 +36,27 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); - if (key->user->user_ns != cred->user_ns) - goto use_other_perms; - /* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */ - if (key->uid == cred->fsuid) { + if (uid_eq(key->uid, cred->fsuid)) { kperm = key->perm >> 16; goto use_these_perms; } /* use the third 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller has a group * membership in common with */ - if (key->gid != -1 && key->perm & KEY_GRP_ALL) { - if (key->gid == cred->fsgid) { + if (gid_valid(key->gid) && key->perm & KEY_GRP_ALL) { + if (gid_eq(key->gid, cred->fsgid)) { kperm = key->perm >> 8; goto use_these_perms; } - ret = groups_search(cred->group_info, - make_kgid(current_user_ns(), key->gid)); + ret = groups_search(cred->group_info, key->gid); if (ret) { kperm = key->perm >> 8; goto use_these_perms; } } -use_other_perms: - /* otherwise use the least-significant 8-bits */ kperm = key->perm; diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index 30d1ddfd9cef..217b6855e815 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c @@ -88,14 +88,14 @@ __initcall(key_proc_init); */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS -static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n) +static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct seq_file *p, struct rb_node *n) { - struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); + struct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p); n = rb_next(n); while (n) { struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node); - if (key->user->user_ns == user_ns) + if (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, key->user->uid)) break; n = rb_next(n); } @@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) return seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops); } -static struct key *find_ge_key(key_serial_t id) +static struct key *find_ge_key(struct seq_file *p, key_serial_t id) { - struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); + struct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p); struct rb_node *n = key_serial_tree.rb_node; struct key *minkey = NULL; @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static struct key *find_ge_key(key_serial_t id) return NULL; for (;;) { - if (minkey->user->user_ns == user_ns) + if (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, minkey->user->uid)) return minkey; n = rb_next(&minkey->serial_node); if (!n) @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos) if (*_pos > INT_MAX) return NULL; - key = find_ge_key(pos); + key = find_ge_key(p, pos); if (!key) return NULL; *_pos = key->serial; @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos) { struct rb_node *n; - n = key_serial_next(v); + n = key_serial_next(p, v); if (n) *_pos = key_node_serial(n); return n; @@ -254,8 +254,8 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) atomic_read(&key->usage), xbuf, key->perm, - key->uid, - key->gid, + from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->uid), + from_kgid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->gid), key->type->name); #undef showflag @@ -270,26 +270,26 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS */ -static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct rb_node *n) +static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n) { while (n) { struct key_user *user = rb_entry(n, struct key_user, node); - if (user->user_ns == current_user_ns()) + if (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, user->uid)) break; n = rb_next(n); } return n; } -static struct rb_node *key_user_next(struct rb_node *n) +static struct rb_node *key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n) { - return __key_user_next(rb_next(n)); + return __key_user_next(user_ns, rb_next(n)); } -static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct rb_root *r) +static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_root *r) { struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r); - return __key_user_next(n); + return __key_user_next(user_ns, n); } /* @@ -309,10 +309,10 @@ static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos) spin_lock(&key_user_lock); - _p = key_user_first(&key_user_tree); + _p = key_user_first(seq_user_ns(p), &key_user_tree); while (pos > 0 && _p) { pos--; - _p = key_user_next(_p); + _p = key_user_next(seq_user_ns(p), _p); } return _p; @@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos) static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos) { (*_pos)++; - return key_user_next((struct rb_node *)v); + return key_user_next(seq_user_ns(p), (struct rb_node *)v); } static void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v) @@ -334,13 +334,13 @@ static int proc_key_users_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { struct rb_node *_p = v; struct key_user *user = rb_entry(_p, struct key_user, node); - unsigned maxkeys = (user->uid == 0) ? + unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ? key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys; - unsigned maxbytes = (user->uid == 0) ? + unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ? key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes; seq_printf(m, "%5u: %5d %d/%d %d/%d %d/%d\n", - user->uid, + from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), user->uid), atomic_read(&user->usage), atomic_read(&user->nkeys), atomic_read(&user->nikeys), diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 178b8c3b130a..86468f385fc8 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -34,8 +34,7 @@ struct key_user root_key_user = { .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(root_key_user.lock), .nkeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2), .nikeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2), - .uid = 0, - .user_ns = &init_user_ns, + .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, }; /* @@ -48,11 +47,13 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void) struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring; char buf[20]; int ret; + uid_t uid; cred = current_cred(); user = cred->user; + uid = from_kuid(cred->user_ns, user->uid); - kenter("%p{%u}", user, user->uid); + kenter("%p{%u}", user, uid); if (user->uid_keyring) { kleave(" = 0 [exist]"); @@ -67,11 +68,11 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void) * - there may be one in existence already as it may have been * pinned by a session, but the user_struct pointing to it * may have been destroyed by setuid */ - sprintf(buf, "_uid.%u", user->uid); + sprintf(buf, "_uid.%u", uid); uid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true); if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) { - uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1, + uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID, cred, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL); if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) { @@ -82,12 +83,12 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void) /* get a default session keyring (which might also exist * already) */ - sprintf(buf, "_uid_ses.%u", user->uid); + sprintf(buf, "_uid_ses.%u", uid); session_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true); if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) { session_keyring = - keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, (gid_t) -1, + keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID, cred, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL); if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring); diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 000e75017520..66e21184b559 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, goto error_link; /* record the UID and GID */ - sprintf(uid_str, "%d", cred->fsuid); - sprintf(gid_str, "%d", cred->fsgid); + sprintf(uid_str, "%d", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid)); + sprintf(gid_str, "%d", from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid)); /* we say which key is under construction */ sprintf(key_str, "%d", key->serial); @@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, kenter(""); - user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid(), current_user_ns()); + user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); if (!user) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 60d4e3f5e4bb..85730d5a5a59 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include "internal.h" -static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, const void *, size_t); +static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, + struct key_preparsed_payload *); static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *); static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *); @@ -42,10 +43,9 @@ struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = { * Instantiate a request-key authorisation key. */ static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key, - const void *data, - size_t datalen) + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *) data; + key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data; return 0; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 2d5d041f2049..e13fcf7636f7 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -369,38 +369,6 @@ static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd, } /* - * get a random value from TPM - */ -static int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_buf *tb, unsigned char *buf, uint32_t len) -{ - int ret; - - INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM); - store32(tb, len); - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, sizeof tb->data); - if (!ret) - memcpy(buf, tb->data + TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE, len); - return ret; -} - -static int my_get_random(unsigned char *buf, int len) -{ - struct tpm_buf *tb; - int ret; - - tb = kmalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tb) - return -ENOMEM; - ret = tpm_get_random(tb, buf, len); - - kfree(tb); - return ret; -} - -/* * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR. * * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed. @@ -413,8 +381,8 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - ret = my_get_random(hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) + ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) return ret; return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0; } @@ -429,8 +397,8 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; int ret; - ret = tpm_get_random(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) + ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) return ret; INIT_BUF(tb); @@ -524,8 +492,8 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, if (ret < 0) goto out; - ret = tpm_get_random(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) + ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) goto out; ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL); datsize = htonl(datalen); @@ -634,8 +602,8 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE); - ret = tpm_get_random(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - if (ret < 0) { + ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) { pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); return ret; } @@ -927,22 +895,24 @@ static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) * * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. */ -static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, - size_t datalen) +static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL; struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; char *datablob; int ret = 0; int key_cmd; + size_t key_len; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (!datablob) return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); + memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); datablob[datalen] = '\0'; options = trusted_options_alloc(); @@ -974,8 +944,9 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); break; case Opt_new: - ret = my_get_random(payload->key, payload->key_len); - if (ret < 0) { + key_len = payload->key_len; + ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload->key, key_len); + if (ret != key_len) { pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); goto out; } @@ -1011,17 +982,18 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) /* * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values */ -static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) +static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data; struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; struct trusted_key_options *new_o; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; char *datablob; int ret = 0; if (!p->migratable) return -EPERM; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1038,7 +1010,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) goto out; } - memcpy(datablob, data, datalen); + memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); datablob[datalen] = '\0'; ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o); if (ret != Opt_update) { diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index c7660a25a3e4..55dc88939185 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -58,13 +58,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_logon); /* * instantiate a user defined key */ -int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) +int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct user_key_payload *upayload; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; int ret; ret = -EINVAL; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) goto error; ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen); @@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ int user_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) /* attach the data */ upayload->datalen = datalen; - memcpy(upayload->data, data, datalen); + memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen); rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload); ret = 0; @@ -92,13 +93,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_instantiate); * update a user defined key * - the key's semaphore is write-locked */ -int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) +int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct user_key_payload *upayload, *zap; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; int ret; ret = -EINVAL; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data) + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) goto error; /* construct a replacement payload */ @@ -108,7 +110,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) goto error; upayload->datalen = datalen; - memcpy(upayload->data, data, datalen); + memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen); /* check the quota and attach the new data */ zap = upayload; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 860aeb349cb3..8dcd4ae10a5f 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -136,11 +136,23 @@ int __init register_security(struct security_operations *ops) int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED + int rc; + rc = yama_ptrace_access_check(child, mode); + if (rc) + return rc; +#endif return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode); } int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED + int rc; + rc = yama_ptrace_traceme(parent); + if (rc) + return rc; +#endif return security_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent); } @@ -264,8 +276,8 @@ int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) return security_ops->sb_statfs(dentry); } -int security_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, - char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) +int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) { return security_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data); } @@ -434,7 +446,7 @@ int security_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode) return security_ops->path_chmod(path, mode); } -int security_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) +int security_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode))) return 0; @@ -561,6 +573,9 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, ret = security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); if (ret) return ret; + ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); + if (ret) + return ret; return evm_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); } @@ -596,6 +611,9 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) ret = security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name); if (ret) return ret; + ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); + if (ret) + return ret; return evm_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); } @@ -761,6 +779,9 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) { +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED + yama_task_free(task); +#endif security_ops->task_free(task); } @@ -876,6 +897,12 @@ int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) { +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED + int rc; + rc = yama_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); + if (rc != -ENOSYS) + return rc; +#endif return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); } diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 6c77f63c7591..61a53367d029 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2088,15 +2088,19 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm)); } +static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd) +{ + return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0; +} + /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files) { struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; struct tty_struct *tty; - struct fdtable *fdt; - long j = -1; int drop_tty = 0; + unsigned n; tty = get_current_tty(); if (tty) { @@ -2123,58 +2127,19 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, no_tty(); /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ - spin_lock(&files->file_lock); - for (;;) { - unsigned long set, i; - int fd; - - j++; - i = j * BITS_PER_LONG; - fdt = files_fdtable(files); - if (i >= fdt->max_fds) - break; - set = fdt->open_fds[j]; - if (!set) - continue; - spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); - for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) { - if (set & 1) { - file = fget(i); - if (!file) - continue; - if (file_has_perm(cred, - file, - file_to_av(file))) { - sys_close(i); - fd = get_unused_fd(); - if (fd != i) { - if (fd >= 0) - put_unused_fd(fd); - fput(file); - continue; - } - if (devnull) { - get_file(devnull); - } else { - devnull = dentry_open( - &selinux_null, - O_RDWR, cred); - if (IS_ERR(devnull)) { - devnull = NULL; - put_unused_fd(fd); - fput(file); - continue; - } - } - fd_install(fd, devnull); - } - fput(file); - } - } - spin_lock(&files->file_lock); + n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred); + if (!n) /* none found? */ + return; - } - spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); + devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred); + if (IS_ERR(devnull)) + devnull = NULL; + /* replace all the matching ones with this */ + do { + replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0); + } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0); + if (devnull) + fput(devnull); } /* @@ -2483,9 +2448,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); } -static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name, +static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, - char *type, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) { diff --git a/security/selinux/netlink.c b/security/selinux/netlink.c index 8a77725423e0..14d810ead420 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netlink.c +++ b/security/selinux/netlink.c @@ -113,13 +113,12 @@ static int __init selnl_init(void) { struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = { .groups = SELNLGRP_MAX, + .flags = NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV, }; - selnl = netlink_kernel_create(&init_net, NETLINK_SELINUX, - THIS_MODULE, &cfg); + selnl = netlink_kernel_create(&init_net, NETLINK_SELINUX, &cfg); if (selnl == NULL) panic("SELinux: Cannot create netlink socket."); - netlink_set_nonroot(NETLINK_SELINUX, NL_NONROOT_RECV); return 0; } diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 298e695d6822..3a6e8731646c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS, "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u", new_value, selinux_enforcing, - audit_get_loginuid(current), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); selinux_enforcing = new_value; if (selinux_enforcing) @@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, goto out; audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS, "selinux=0 auid=%u ses=%u", - audit_get_loginuid(current), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); } @@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ static int sel_mmap_policy(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma) return -EACCES; } - vma->vm_flags |= VM_RESERVED; + vma->vm_flags |= VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP; vma->vm_ops = &sel_mmap_policy_ops; return 0; @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, out1: audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD, "policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u", - audit_get_loginuid(current), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); out: mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 4321b8fc8863..b4feecc3fe01 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -2440,7 +2440,7 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values) sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), !!values[i], policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state, - audit_get_loginuid(current), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); } if (values[i]) diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 8221514cc997..38be92ce901e 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -408,8 +408,8 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem * being mounted on, an error code otherwise. */ -static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, - char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) +static int smack_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) { struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->dentry->d_sb->s_security; struct smk_audit_info ad; @@ -1691,40 +1691,19 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting * @p: task to wait for * - * Returns 0 if current can wait for p, error code otherwise + * Returns 0 */ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) { - struct smk_audit_info ad; - char *sp = smk_of_current(); - char *tsp = smk_of_forked(task_security(p)); - int rc; - - /* we don't log here, we can be overriden */ - rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, NULL); - if (rc == 0) - goto out_log; - /* - * Allow the operation to succeed if either task - * has privilege to perform operations that might - * account for the smack labels having gotten to - * be different in the first place. - * - * This breaks the strict subject/object access - * control ideal, taking the object's privilege - * state into account in the decision as well as - * the smack value. + * Allow the operation to succeed. + * Zombies are bad. + * In userless environments (e.g. phones) programs + * get marked with SMACK64EXEC and even if the parent + * and child shouldn't be talking the parent still + * may expect to know when the child exits. */ - if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || - has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) - rc = 0; - /* we log only if we didn't get overriden */ - out_log: - smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); - smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p); - smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad); - return rc; + return 0; } /** @@ -2705,9 +2684,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size) { - int rc; struct task_smack *tsp; - struct task_smack *oldtsp; struct cred *new; char *newsmack; @@ -2737,21 +2714,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known) return -EPERM; - oldtsp = p->cred->security; new = prepare_creds(); if (new == NULL) return -ENOMEM; - tsp = new_task_smack(newsmack, oldtsp->smk_forked, GFP_KERNEL); - if (tsp == NULL) { - kfree(new); - return -ENOMEM; - } - rc = smk_copy_rules(&tsp->smk_rules, &oldtsp->smk_rules, GFP_KERNEL); - if (rc != 0) - return rc; + tsp = new->security; + tsp->smk_task = newsmack; - new->security = tsp; commit_creds(new); return size; } diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index b1b768e4049a..99929a50093a 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ enum smk_inos { SMK_LOAD_SELF2 = 15, /* load task specific rules with long labels */ SMK_ACCESS2 = 16, /* make an access check with long labels */ SMK_CIPSO2 = 17, /* load long label -> CIPSO mapping */ + SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ = 18, /* set rules with subject label to '-' */ }; /* @@ -1992,6 +1993,77 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_access2_ops = { }; /** + * smk_write_revoke_subj - write() for /smack/revoke-subject + * @file: file pointer + * @buf: data from user space + * @count: bytes sent + * @ppos: where to start - must be 0 + */ +static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char *data = NULL; + const char *cp = NULL; + struct smack_known *skp; + struct smack_rule *sp; + struct list_head *rule_list; + struct mutex *rule_lock; + int rc = count; + + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + if (count == 0 || count > SMK_LONGLABEL) + return -EINVAL; + + data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL); + if (data == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { + rc = -EFAULT; + goto free_out; + } + + cp = smk_parse_smack(data, count); + if (cp == NULL) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto free_out; + } + + skp = smk_find_entry(cp); + if (skp == NULL) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto free_out; + } + + rule_list = &skp->smk_rules; + rule_lock = &skp->smk_rules_lock; + + mutex_lock(rule_lock); + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, rule_list, list) + sp->smk_access = 0; + + mutex_unlock(rule_lock); + +free_out: + kfree(data); + kfree(cp); + return rc; +} + +static const struct file_operations smk_revoke_subj_ops = { + .write = smk_write_revoke_subj, + .read = simple_transaction_read, + .release = simple_transaction_release, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; + +/** * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock * @sb: the empty superblock * @data: unused @@ -2037,6 +2109,9 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) "access2", &smk_access2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, [SMK_CIPSO2] = { "cipso2", &smk_cipso2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + [SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ] = { + "revoke-subject", &smk_revoke_subj_ops, + S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, /* last one */ {""} }; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/audit.c b/security/tomoyo/audit.c index 7ef9fa3e37e0..c1b00375c9ad 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/audit.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/audit.c @@ -168,9 +168,14 @@ static char *tomoyo_print_header(struct tomoyo_request_info *r) stamp.day, stamp.hour, stamp.min, stamp.sec, r->profile, tomoyo_mode[r->mode], tomoyo_yesno(r->granted), gpid, tomoyo_sys_getpid(), tomoyo_sys_getppid(), - current_uid(), current_gid(), current_euid(), - current_egid(), current_suid(), current_sgid(), - current_fsuid(), current_fsgid()); + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()), + from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_gid()), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_euid()), + from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_egid()), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_suid()), + from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_sgid()), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_fsuid()), + from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_fsgid())); if (!obj) goto no_obj_info; if (!obj->validate_done) { @@ -191,15 +196,19 @@ static char *tomoyo_print_header(struct tomoyo_request_info *r) tomoyo_buffer_len - 1 - pos, " path%u.parent={ uid=%u gid=%u " "ino=%lu perm=0%o }", (i >> 1) + 1, - stat->uid, stat->gid, (unsigned long) - stat->ino, stat->mode & S_IALLUGO); + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, stat->uid), + from_kgid(&init_user_ns, stat->gid), + (unsigned long)stat->ino, + stat->mode & S_IALLUGO); continue; } pos += snprintf(buffer + pos, tomoyo_buffer_len - 1 - pos, " path%u={ uid=%u gid=%u ino=%lu major=%u" " minor=%u perm=0%o type=%s", (i >> 1) + 1, - stat->uid, stat->gid, (unsigned long) - stat->ino, MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, stat->uid), + from_kgid(&init_user_ns, stat->gid), + (unsigned long)stat->ino, + MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev), mode & S_IALLUGO, tomoyo_filetype(mode)); if (S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) { dev = stat->rdev; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c index 2e0f12c62938..f89a0333b813 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c @@ -925,7 +925,9 @@ static bool tomoyo_manager(void) if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded) return true; - if (!tomoyo_manage_by_non_root && (task->cred->uid || task->cred->euid)) + if (!tomoyo_manage_by_non_root && + (!uid_eq(task->cred->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) || + !uid_eq(task->cred->euid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID))) return false; exe = tomoyo_get_exe(); if (!exe) diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h index 75e4dc1c02a0..d4f166bc3508 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.h +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h @@ -561,8 +561,8 @@ struct tomoyo_address_group { /* Subset of "struct stat". Used by conditional ACL and audit logs. */ struct tomoyo_mini_stat { - uid_t uid; - gid_t gid; + kuid_t uid; + kgid_t gid; ino_t ino; umode_t mode; dev_t dev; @@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ int tomoyo_init_request_info(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, const u8 index); int tomoyo_mkdev_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path, const unsigned int mode, unsigned int dev); -int tomoyo_mount_permission(char *dev_name, struct path *path, +int tomoyo_mount_permission(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data_page); int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file); diff --git a/security/tomoyo/condition.c b/security/tomoyo/condition.c index 986330b8c73e..63681e8be628 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/condition.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/condition.c @@ -813,28 +813,28 @@ bool tomoyo_condition(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, unsigned long value = 0; switch (index) { case TOMOYO_TASK_UID: - value = current_uid(); + value = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()); break; case TOMOYO_TASK_EUID: - value = current_euid(); + value = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_euid()); break; case TOMOYO_TASK_SUID: - value = current_suid(); + value = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_suid()); break; case TOMOYO_TASK_FSUID: - value = current_fsuid(); + value = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_fsuid()); break; case TOMOYO_TASK_GID: - value = current_gid(); + value = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_gid()); break; case TOMOYO_TASK_EGID: - value = current_egid(); + value = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_egid()); break; case TOMOYO_TASK_SGID: - value = current_sgid(); + value = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_sgid()); break; case TOMOYO_TASK_FSGID: - value = current_fsgid(); + value = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, current_fsgid()); break; case TOMOYO_TASK_PID: value = tomoyo_sys_getpid(); @@ -970,13 +970,13 @@ bool tomoyo_condition(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, case TOMOYO_PATH2_UID: case TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_UID: case TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_UID: - value = stat->uid; + value = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, stat->uid); break; case TOMOYO_PATH1_GID: case TOMOYO_PATH2_GID: case TOMOYO_PATH1_PARENT_GID: case TOMOYO_PATH2_PARENT_GID: - value = stat->gid; + value = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, stat->gid); break; case TOMOYO_PATH1_INO: case TOMOYO_PATH2_INO: diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c index fe00cdfd0267..390c646013cb 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c @@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ static bool tomoyo_check_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, char *dev_name, +static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, + const char *dev_name, struct path *dir, const char *type, unsigned long flags) { @@ -183,7 +184,7 @@ static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, char *dev_name, * * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. */ -int tomoyo_mount_permission(char *dev_name, struct path *path, +int tomoyo_mount_permission(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data_page) { diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index c2d04a50f76a..a2ee362546ab 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -373,13 +373,15 @@ static int tomoyo_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode) * * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. */ -static int tomoyo_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) +static int tomoyo_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) { int error = 0; - if (uid != (uid_t) -1) - error = tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN, path, uid); - if (!error && gid != (gid_t) -1) - error = tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP, path, gid); + if (uid_valid(uid)) + error = tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN, path, + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid)); + if (!error && gid_valid(gid)) + error = tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP, path, + from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid)); return error; } @@ -406,8 +408,8 @@ static int tomoyo_path_chroot(struct path *path) * * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. */ -static int tomoyo_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, - char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) +static int tomoyo_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) { return tomoyo_mount_permission(dev_name, path, type, flags, data); } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/util.c b/security/tomoyo/util.c index 867558c98334..2952ba576fb9 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/util.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/util.c @@ -949,18 +949,13 @@ bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename, const char *tomoyo_get_exe(void) { struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; - struct vm_area_struct *vma; const char *cp = NULL; if (!mm) return NULL; down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); - for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { - if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) { - cp = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&vma->vm_file->f_path); - break; - } - } + if (mm->exe_file) + cp = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&mm->exe_file->f_path); up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); return cp; } diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig index 51d6709d8bbd..20ef5143c0c0 100644 --- a/security/yama/Kconfig +++ b/security/yama/Kconfig @@ -11,3 +11,11 @@ config SECURITY_YAMA Further information can be found in Documentation/security/Yama.txt. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + +config SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED + bool "Yama stacked with other LSMs" + depends on SECURITY_YAMA + default n + help + When Yama is built into the kernel, force it to stack with the + selected primary LSM. diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c index 0cc99a3ea42d..b4c29848b49d 100644 --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static void yama_ptracer_del(struct task_struct *tracer, * yama_task_free - check for task_pid to remove from exception list * @task: task being removed */ -static void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task) +void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task) { yama_ptracer_del(task, task); } @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task) * Return 0 on success, -ve on error. -ENOSYS is returned when Yama * does not handle the given option. */ -static int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, +int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) { int rc; @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, if (arg2 == 0) { yama_ptracer_del(NULL, myself); rc = 0; - } else if (arg2 == PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY) { + } else if (arg2 == PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY || (int)arg2 == -1) { rc = yama_ptracer_add(NULL, myself); } else { struct task_struct *tracer; @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer, * * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error. */ -static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, +int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { int rc; @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, * * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error. */ -static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) +int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { int rc; @@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) return rc; } +#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED static struct security_operations yama_ops = { .name = "yama", @@ -332,6 +333,7 @@ static struct security_operations yama_ops = { .task_prctl = yama_task_prctl, .task_free = yama_task_free, }; +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL static int yama_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, @@ -378,13 +380,17 @@ static struct ctl_table yama_sysctl_table[] = { static __init int yama_init(void) { +#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED if (!security_module_enable(&yama_ops)) return 0; +#endif printk(KERN_INFO "Yama: becoming mindful.\n"); +#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED if (register_security(&yama_ops)) panic("Yama: kernel registration failed.\n"); +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL if (!register_sysctl_paths(yama_sysctl_path, yama_sysctl_table)) |