summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c161
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c25
-rw-r--r--security/keys/permission.c11
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c98
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c18
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key_auth.c12
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/exports.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c116
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c6
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_access.c4
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c77
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c6
13 files changed, 280 insertions, 258 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index fb4e240720d8..fa61679f8c73 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective;
+ NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current_cap();
return 0;
}
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
{
/* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
- if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap))
+ if (cap_raised(tsk->cred->cap_effective, cap))
return 0;
return -EPERM;
}
@@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
/* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
- if (cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
+ if (cap_issubset(child->cred->cap_permitted,
+ current->cred->cap_permitted))
return 0;
if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
return 0;
@@ -76,8 +77,8 @@ int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
- /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
- if (cap_issubset(current->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted))
+ if (cap_issubset(current->cred->cap_permitted,
+ parent->cred->cap_permitted))
return 0;
if (has_capability(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
return 0;
@@ -87,10 +88,12 @@ int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
+ struct cred *cred = target->cred;
+
/* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
- *effective = target->cap_effective;
- *inheritable = target->cap_inheritable;
- *permitted = target->cap_permitted;
+ *effective = cred->cap_effective;
+ *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
+ *permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
return 0;
}
@@ -122,24 +125,26 @@ int cap_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
+ const struct cred *cred = current->cred;
+
if (cap_inh_is_capped()
&& !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
- cap_combine(current->cap_inheritable,
- current->cap_permitted))) {
+ cap_combine(cred->cap_inheritable,
+ cred->cap_permitted))) {
/* incapable of using this inheritable set */
return -EPERM;
}
if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
- cap_combine(current->cap_inheritable,
- current->cap_bset))) {
+ cap_combine(cred->cap_inheritable,
+ cred->cap_bset))) {
/* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
return -EPERM;
}
/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
if (!cap_issubset (*permitted,
- cap_combine (current->cap_permitted,
- current->cap_permitted))) {
+ cap_combine (cred->cap_permitted,
+ cred->cap_permitted))) {
return -EPERM;
}
@@ -155,9 +160,11 @@ void cap_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- current->cap_effective = *effective;
- current->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
- current->cap_permitted = *permitted;
+ struct cred *cred = current->cred;
+
+ cred->cap_effective = *effective;
+ cred->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
+ cred->cap_permitted = *permitted;
}
static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -211,8 +218,8 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
* pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
*/
bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i] =
- (current->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) |
- (current->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable);
+ (current->cred->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) |
+ (current->cred->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable);
if (permitted & ~bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted.cap[i]) {
/*
@@ -354,8 +361,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current_uid() == 0) {
/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted = cap_combine(
- current->cap_bset, current->cap_inheritable
- );
+ current->cred->cap_bset,
+ current->cred->cap_inheritable);
bprm->cap_effective = (bprm->e_uid == 0);
ret = 0;
}
@@ -366,44 +373,39 @@ int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
{
- kernel_cap_t pP = current->cap_permitted;
- kernel_cap_t pE = current->cap_effective;
- uid_t uid;
- gid_t gid;
+ struct cred *cred = current->cred;
- current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
-
- if (bprm->e_uid != uid || bprm->e_gid != gid ||
+ if (bprm->e_uid != cred->uid || bprm->e_gid != cred->gid ||
!cap_issubset(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted,
- current->cap_permitted)) {
+ cred->cap_permitted)) {
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
current->pdeath_signal = 0;
if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
- bprm->e_uid = uid;
- bprm->e_gid = gid;
+ bprm->e_uid = cred->uid;
+ bprm->e_gid = cred->gid;
}
if (cap_limit_ptraced_target()) {
bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted = cap_intersect(
bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted,
- current->cap_permitted);
+ cred->cap_permitted);
}
}
}
- current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
- current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
+ cred->suid = cred->euid = cred->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
+ cred->sgid = cred->egid = cred->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
/* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
* in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
* capability rules */
if (!is_global_init(current)) {
- current->cap_permitted = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
+ cred->cap_permitted = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
if (bprm->cap_effective)
- current->cap_effective = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
+ cred->cap_effective = bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted;
else
- cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
+ cap_clear(cred->cap_effective);
}
/*
@@ -418,27 +420,30 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
*/
- if (!cap_isclear(current->cap_effective)) {
- if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, current->cap_effective) ||
- (bprm->e_uid != 0) || (current->uid != 0) ||
+ if (!cap_isclear(cred->cap_effective)) {
+ if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_effective) ||
+ (bprm->e_uid != 0) || (cred->uid != 0) ||
issecure(SECURE_NOROOT))
- audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, &pP, &pE);
+ audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, &cred->cap_permitted,
+ &cred->cap_effective);
}
- current->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+ cred->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
}
int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- if (current_uid() != 0) {
+ const struct cred *cred = current->cred;
+
+ if (cred->uid != 0) {
if (bprm->cap_effective)
return 1;
if (!cap_isclear(bprm->cap_post_exec_permitted))
return 1;
}
- return (current_euid() != current_uid() ||
- current_egid() != current_gid());
+ return (cred->euid != cred->uid ||
+ cred->egid != cred->gid);
}
int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
@@ -501,25 +506,27 @@ int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (int old_ruid, int old_euid,
int old_suid)
{
- uid_t euid = current_euid();
+ struct cred *cred = current->cred;
if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) &&
- (current_uid() != 0 && euid != 0 && current_suid() != 0) &&
+ (cred->uid != 0 && cred->euid != 0 && cred->suid != 0) &&
!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
- cap_clear (current->cap_permitted);
- cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
+ cap_clear (cred->cap_permitted);
+ cap_clear (cred->cap_effective);
}
- if (old_euid == 0 && euid != 0) {
- cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
+ if (old_euid == 0 && cred->euid != 0) {
+ cap_clear (cred->cap_effective);
}
- if (old_euid != 0 && euid == 0) {
- current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
+ if (old_euid != 0 && cred->euid == 0) {
+ cred->cap_effective = cred->cap_permitted;
}
}
int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
int flags)
{
+ struct cred *cred = current->cred;
+
switch (flags) {
case LSM_SETID_RE:
case LSM_SETID_ID:
@@ -541,16 +548,16 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
*/
if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
- if (old_fsuid == 0 && current_fsuid() != 0) {
- current->cap_effective =
+ if (old_fsuid == 0 && cred->fsuid != 0) {
+ cred->cap_effective =
cap_drop_fs_set(
- current->cap_effective);
+ cred->cap_effective);
}
- if (old_fsuid != 0 && current_fsuid() == 0) {
- current->cap_effective =
+ if (old_fsuid != 0 && cred->fsuid == 0) {
+ cred->cap_effective =
cap_raise_fs_set(
- current->cap_effective,
- current->cap_permitted);
+ cred->cap_effective,
+ cred->cap_permitted);
}
}
break;
@@ -575,7 +582,8 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
*/
static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
{
- if (!cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
+ if (!cap_issubset(p->cred->cap_permitted,
+ current->cred->cap_permitted) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
@@ -610,7 +618,7 @@ static long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
return -EPERM;
if (!cap_valid(cap))
return -EINVAL;
- cap_lower(current->cap_bset, cap);
+ cap_lower(current->cred->cap_bset, cap);
return 0;
}
@@ -633,6 +641,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
{
+ struct cred *cred = current->cred;
long error = 0;
switch (option) {
@@ -640,7 +649,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
if (!cap_valid(arg2))
error = -EINVAL;
else
- error = !!cap_raised(current->cap_bset, arg2);
+ error = !!cap_raised(cred->cap_bset, arg2);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
@@ -667,9 +676,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
* capability-based-privilege environment.
*/
case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
- if ((((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
- & (current->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
- || ((current->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
+ if ((((cred->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
+ & (cred->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
+ || ((cred->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS
& ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
|| (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0)) { /*[4]*/
@@ -682,11 +691,11 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
*/
error = -EPERM; /* cannot change a locked bit */
} else {
- current->securebits = arg2;
+ cred->securebits = arg2;
}
break;
case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
- error = current->securebits;
+ error = cred->securebits;
break;
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
@@ -701,10 +710,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
else if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
error = -EPERM;
else if (arg2)
- current->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+ cred->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
else
- current->securebits &=
- ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
+ cred->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
break;
default:
@@ -719,11 +727,12 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
{
- cap_set_init_eff(p->cap_effective);
- cap_clear(p->cap_inheritable);
- cap_set_full(p->cap_permitted);
- p->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT;
- return;
+ struct cred *cred = p->cred;
+
+ cap_set_init_eff(cred->cap_effective);
+ cap_clear(cred->cap_inheritable);
+ cap_set_full(cred->cap_permitted);
+ p->cred->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT;
}
int cap_syslog (int type)
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index fcce331eca72..8833b447adef 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
* assumed before calling this */
ret = -EPERM;
- instkey = current->request_key_auth;
+ instkey = current->cred->request_key_auth;
if (!instkey)
goto error;
@@ -932,8 +932,8 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
/* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
* instantiation of the key */
if (ret == 0) {
- key_put(current->request_key_auth);
- current->request_key_auth = NULL;
+ key_put(current->cred->request_key_auth);
+ current->cred->request_key_auth = NULL;
}
error2:
@@ -960,7 +960,7 @@ long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
* assumed before calling this */
ret = -EPERM;
- instkey = current->request_key_auth;
+ instkey = current->cred->request_key_auth;
if (!instkey)
goto error;
@@ -983,8 +983,8 @@ long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
/* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
* instantiation of the key */
if (ret == 0) {
- key_put(current->request_key_auth);
- current->request_key_auth = NULL;
+ key_put(current->cred->request_key_auth);
+ current->cred->request_key_auth = NULL;
}
error:
@@ -999,6 +999,7 @@ error:
*/
long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
{
+ struct cred *cred = current->cred;
int ret;
switch (reqkey_defl) {
@@ -1018,10 +1019,10 @@ long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
set:
- current->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl;
+ cred->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE:
- return current->jit_keyring;
+ return cred->jit_keyring;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
default:
@@ -1086,8 +1087,8 @@ long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id)
/* we divest ourselves of authority if given an ID of 0 */
if (id == 0) {
- key_put(current->request_key_auth);
- current->request_key_auth = NULL;
+ key_put(current->cred->request_key_auth);
+ current->cred->request_key_auth = NULL;
ret = 0;
goto error;
}
@@ -1103,8 +1104,8 @@ long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id)
goto error;
}
- key_put(current->request_key_auth);
- current->request_key_auth = authkey;
+ key_put(current->cred->request_key_auth);
+ current->cred->request_key_auth = authkey;
ret = authkey->serial;
error:
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index 3b41f9b52537..baf3d5f31e71 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
struct task_struct *context,
key_perm_t perm)
{
+ struct cred *cred = context->cred;
struct key *key;
key_perm_t kperm;
int ret;
@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
/* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */
- if (key->uid == context->fsuid) {
+ if (key->uid == cred->fsuid) {
kperm = key->perm >> 16;
goto use_these_perms;
}
@@ -37,14 +38,14 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
/* use the third 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller has a group
* membership in common with */
if (key->gid != -1 && key->perm & KEY_GRP_ALL) {
- if (key->gid == context->fsgid) {
+ if (key->gid == cred->fsgid) {
kperm = key->perm >> 8;
goto use_these_perms;
}
- task_lock(context);
- ret = groups_search(context->group_info, key->gid);
- task_unlock(context);
+ spin_lock(&cred->lock);
+ ret = groups_search(cred->group_info, key->gid);
+ spin_unlock(&cred->lock);
if (ret) {
kperm = key->perm >> 8;
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 1c793b7090a7..b0904cdda2e7 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ struct key_user root_key_user = {
*/
int install_user_keyrings(void)
{
- struct user_struct *user = current->user;
+ struct user_struct *user = current->cred->user;
struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
char buf[20];
int ret;
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int install_thread_keyring(void)
sprintf(buf, "_tid.%u", tsk->pid);
- keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
+ keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->cred->uid, tsk->cred->gid, tsk,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
@@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ int install_thread_keyring(void)
}
task_lock(tsk);
- old = tsk->thread_keyring;
- tsk->thread_keyring = keyring;
+ old = tsk->cred->thread_keyring;
+ tsk->cred->thread_keyring = keyring;
task_unlock(tsk);
ret = 0;
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ int install_process_keyring(void)
if (!tsk->signal->process_keyring) {
sprintf(buf, "_pid.%u", tsk->tgid);
- keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
+ keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->cred->uid, tsk->cred->gid, tsk,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
if (tsk->signal->session_keyring)
flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;
- keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
+ keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, tsk->cred->uid, tsk->cred->gid, tsk,
flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
@@ -292,14 +292,14 @@ int copy_thread_group_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
*/
int copy_keys(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- key_check(tsk->thread_keyring);
- key_check(tsk->request_key_auth);
+ key_check(tsk->cred->thread_keyring);
+ key_check(tsk->cred->request_key_auth);
/* no thread keyring yet */
- tsk->thread_keyring = NULL;
+ tsk->cred->thread_keyring = NULL;
/* copy the request_key() authorisation for this thread */
- key_get(tsk->request_key_auth);
+ key_get(tsk->cred->request_key_auth);
return 0;
@@ -322,8 +322,8 @@ void exit_thread_group_keys(struct signal_struct *tg)
*/
void exit_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- key_put(tsk->thread_keyring);
- key_put(tsk->request_key_auth);
+ key_put(tsk->cred->thread_keyring);
+ key_put(tsk->cred->request_key_auth);
} /* end exit_keys() */
@@ -337,8 +337,8 @@ int exec_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
/* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
task_lock(tsk);
- old = tsk->thread_keyring;
- tsk->thread_keyring = NULL;
+ old = tsk->cred->thread_keyring;
+ tsk->cred->thread_keyring = NULL;
task_unlock(tsk);
key_put(old);
@@ -373,10 +373,11 @@ int suid_keys(struct task_struct *tsk)
void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */
- if (tsk->thread_keyring) {
- down_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
- tsk->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->fsuid;
- up_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
+ BUG_ON(!tsk->cred);
+ if (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {
+ down_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
+ tsk->cred->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->cred->fsuid;
+ up_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
}
} /* end key_fsuid_changed() */
@@ -388,10 +389,11 @@ void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */
- if (tsk->thread_keyring) {
- down_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
- tsk->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->fsgid;
- up_write(&tsk->thread_keyring->sem);
+ BUG_ON(!tsk->cred);
+ if (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {
+ down_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
+ tsk->cred->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->cred->fsgid;
+ up_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
}
} /* end key_fsgid_changed() */
@@ -426,9 +428,9 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
/* search the thread keyring first */
- if (context->thread_keyring) {
+ if (context->cred->thread_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
- make_key_ref(context->thread_keyring, 1),
+ make_key_ref(context->cred->thread_keyring, 1),
context, type, description, match);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -493,9 +495,9 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
}
}
/* or search the user-session keyring */
- else if (context->user->session_keyring) {
+ else if (context->cred->user->session_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
- make_key_ref(context->user->session_keyring, 1),
+ make_key_ref(context->cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
context, type, description, match);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -517,20 +519,20 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
* search the keyrings of the process mentioned there
* - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method
*/
- if (context->request_key_auth &&
+ if (context->cred->request_key_auth &&
context == current &&
type != &key_type_request_key_auth
) {
/* defend against the auth key being revoked */
- down_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem);
+ down_read(&context->cred->request_key_auth->sem);
- if (key_validate(context->request_key_auth) == 0) {
- rka = context->request_key_auth->payload.data;
+ if (key_validate(context->cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {
+ rka = context->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description,
match, rka->context);
- up_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem);
+ up_read(&context->cred->request_key_auth->sem);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
@@ -547,7 +549,7 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
break;
}
} else {
- up_read(&context->request_key_auth->sem);
+ up_read(&context->cred->request_key_auth->sem);
}
}
@@ -580,15 +582,16 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
{
struct request_key_auth *rka;
struct task_struct *t = current;
- key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
+ struct cred *cred = t->cred;
struct key *key;
+ key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
int ret;
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
switch (id) {
case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
- if (!t->thread_keyring) {
+ if (!cred->thread_keyring) {
if (!create)
goto error;
@@ -599,7 +602,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
}
}
- key = t->thread_keyring;
+ key = cred->thread_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
@@ -628,7 +631,8 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- ret = install_session_keyring(t->user->session_keyring);
+ ret = install_session_keyring(
+ cred->user->session_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
@@ -641,25 +645,25 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
break;
case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:
- if (!t->user->uid_keyring) {
+ if (!cred->user->uid_keyring) {
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
- key = t->user->uid_keyring;
+ key = cred->user->uid_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
- if (!t->user->session_keyring) {
+ if (!cred->user->session_keyring) {
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
- key = t->user->session_keyring;
+ key = cred->user->session_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
@@ -670,7 +674,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
goto error;
case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
- key = t->request_key_auth;
+ key = cred->request_key_auth;
if (!key)
goto error;
@@ -679,19 +683,19 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
break;
case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
- if (!t->request_key_auth)
+ if (!cred->request_key_auth)
goto error;
- down_read(&t->request_key_auth->sem);
- if (t->request_key_auth->flags & KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) {
+ down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
+ if (cred->request_key_auth->flags & KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
key = NULL;
} else {
- rka = t->request_key_auth->payload.data;
+ rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
key = rka->dest_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
}
- up_read(&t->request_key_auth->sem);
+ up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
if (!key)
goto error;
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
@@ -791,7 +795,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);
if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {
/* not found - try and create a new one */
- keyring = keyring_alloc(name, tsk->uid, tsk->gid, tsk,
+ keyring = keyring_alloc(name, tsk->cred->uid, tsk->cred->gid, tsk,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 8e9d93b4a402..3e9b9eb1dd28 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
/* we specify the process's default keyrings */
sprintf(keyring_str[0], "%d",
- tsk->thread_keyring ? tsk->thread_keyring->serial : 0);
+ tsk->cred->thread_keyring ?
+ tsk->cred->thread_keyring->serial : 0);
prkey = 0;
if (tsk->signal->process_keyring)
@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
sskey = rcu_dereference(tsk->signal->session_keyring)->serial;
rcu_read_unlock();
} else {
- sskey = tsk->user->session_keyring->serial;
+ sskey = tsk->cred->user->session_keyring->serial;
}
sprintf(keyring_str[2], "%d", sskey);
@@ -232,11 +233,11 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
} else {
/* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we
* find one that we actually have */
- switch (tsk->jit_keyring) {
+ switch (tsk->cred->jit_keyring) {
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
- if (tsk->request_key_auth) {
- authkey = tsk->request_key_auth;
+ if (tsk->cred->request_key_auth) {
+ authkey = tsk->cred->request_key_auth;
down_read(&authkey->sem);
rka = authkey->payload.data;
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
}
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
- dest_keyring = key_get(tsk->thread_keyring);
+ dest_keyring = key_get(tsk->cred->thread_keyring);
if (dest_keyring)
break;
@@ -268,11 +269,12 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
- dest_keyring = key_get(tsk->user->session_keyring);
+ dest_keyring =
+ key_get(tsk->cred->user->session_keyring);
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
- dest_keyring = key_get(tsk->user->uid_keyring);
+ dest_keyring = key_get(tsk->cred->user->uid_keyring);
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 1762d44711d5..2125579d5d73 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -164,22 +164,22 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of
* another process */
- if (current->request_key_auth) {
+ if (current->cred->request_key_auth) {
/* it is - use that instantiation context here too */
- down_read(&current->request_key_auth->sem);
+ down_read(&current->cred->request_key_auth->sem);
/* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're
* servicing is already instantiated */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
- &current->request_key_auth->flags))
+ &current->cred->request_key_auth->flags))
goto auth_key_revoked;
- irka = current->request_key_auth->payload.data;
+ irka = current->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
rka->context = irka->context;
rka->pid = irka->pid;
get_task_struct(rka->context);
- up_read(&current->request_key_auth->sem);
+ up_read(&current->cred->request_key_auth->sem);
}
else {
/* it isn't - use this process as the context */
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
return authkey;
auth_key_revoked:
- up_read(&current->request_key_auth->sem);
+ up_read(&current->cred->request_key_auth->sem);
kfree(rka->callout_info);
kfree(rka);
kleave("= -EKEYREVOKED");
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
index 64af2d3409ef..cf02490cd1eb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/exports.c
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_string_to_sid);
int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid)
{
if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9f6da154cc82..328308f2882a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -167,21 +167,21 @@ static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
return -ENOMEM;
tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- task->security = tsec;
+ task->cred->security = tsec;
return 0;
}
static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
- task->security = NULL;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->cred->security;
+ task->cred->security = NULL;
kfree(tsec);
}
static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
{
int rc = 0, i;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
@@ -1353,8 +1353,8 @@ static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
- tsec1 = tsk1->security;
- tsec2 = tsk2->security;
+ tsec1 = tsk1->cred->security;
+ tsec2 = tsk2->cred->security;
return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
}
@@ -1374,7 +1374,7 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
int rc;
- tsec = tsk->security;
+ tsec = tsk->cred->security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
ad.tsk = tsk;
@@ -1405,7 +1405,7 @@ static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- tsec = tsk->security;
+ tsec = tsk->cred->security;
return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
@@ -1426,7 +1426,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
- tsec = tsk->security;
+ tsec = tsk->cred->security;
isec = inode->i_security;
if (!adp) {
@@ -1466,7 +1466,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct file *file,
u32 av)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->cred->security;
struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
@@ -1503,7 +1503,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
struct avc_audit_data ad;
int rc;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
dsec = dir->i_security;
sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
@@ -1540,7 +1540,7 @@ static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- tsec = ctx->security;
+ tsec = ctx->cred->security;
return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
}
@@ -1561,7 +1561,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
u32 av;
int rc;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
dsec = dir->i_security;
isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
@@ -1606,7 +1606,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
int rc;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
@@ -1659,7 +1659,7 @@ static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
- tsec = tsk->security;
+ tsec = tsk->cred->security;
sbsec = sb->s_security;
return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
perms, ad);
@@ -1758,8 +1758,8 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
return rc;
if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
- struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *csec = child->cred->security;
return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
}
@@ -1874,7 +1874,7 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
if (rc)
return rc;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
@@ -2025,7 +2025,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (bsec->set)
return 0;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
isec = inode->i_security;
/* Default to the current task SID. */
@@ -2090,7 +2090,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
int atsecure = 0;
if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
@@ -2214,7 +2214,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
bsec = bprm->security;
sid = bsec->sid;
@@ -2243,7 +2243,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
rcu_read_lock();
tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
- sec = tracer->security;
+ sec = tracer->cred->security;
ptsid = sec->sid;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -2274,7 +2274,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
int rc, i;
unsigned long flags;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
bsec = bprm->security;
if (bsec->unsafe) {
@@ -2521,7 +2521,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
int rc;
char *namep = NULL, *context;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
dsec = dir->i_security;
sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
@@ -2706,7 +2706,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
@@ -2918,7 +2918,7 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
@@ -2995,7 +2995,8 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
{
int rc = 0;
- u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
+ u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)
+ (current->cred->security))->sid;
if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
@@ -3107,7 +3108,7 @@ static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
fsec = file->f_security;
fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
@@ -3125,7 +3126,7 @@ static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
- tsec = tsk->security;
+ tsec = tsk->cred->security;
fsec = file->f_security;
if (!signum)
@@ -3188,12 +3189,12 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
int rc;
- tsec1 = current->security;
+ tsec1 = current->cred->security;
rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
if (rc)
return rc;
- tsec2 = tsk->security;
+ tsec2 = tsk->cred->security;
tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
@@ -3251,7 +3252,7 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->cred->security;
*secid = tsec->sid;
}
@@ -3343,7 +3344,7 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
else
perm = signal_to_av(sig);
- tsec = p->security;
+ tsec = p->cred->security;
if (secid)
rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
else
@@ -3375,7 +3376,7 @@ static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
- tsec = p->security;
+ tsec = p->cred->security;
tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
return;
@@ -3384,7 +3385,7 @@ static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
struct inode *inode)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->cred->security;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
isec->sid = tsec->sid;
@@ -3632,7 +3633,7 @@ static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
struct avc_audit_data ad;
int err = 0;
- tsec = task->security;
+ tsec = task->cred->security;
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
@@ -3656,7 +3657,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
if (kern)
goto out;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
@@ -3677,7 +3678,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
@@ -3723,7 +3724,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
u32 sid, node_perm;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
if (family == PF_INET) {
@@ -4764,7 +4765,7 @@ static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
u16 sclass)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->cred->security;
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -4814,7 +4815,7 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
isec = ipc_perms->security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
@@ -4845,7 +4846,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
if (rc)
return rc;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
@@ -4871,7 +4872,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
@@ -4917,7 +4918,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
struct avc_audit_data ad;
int rc;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
msec = msg->security;
@@ -4965,7 +4966,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
struct avc_audit_data ad;
int rc;
- tsec = target->security;
+ tsec = target->cred->security;
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
msec = msg->security;
@@ -4992,7 +4993,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
if (rc)
return rc;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
@@ -5018,7 +5019,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
@@ -5091,7 +5092,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
if (rc)
return rc;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
@@ -5117,7 +5118,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
@@ -5224,7 +5225,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
return error;
}
- tsec = p->security;
+ tsec = p->cred->security;
if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
sid = tsec->sid;
@@ -5308,7 +5309,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
- tsec = p->security;
+ tsec = p->cred->security;
if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
tsec->exec_sid = sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
@@ -5361,7 +5362,8 @@ boundary_ok:
rcu_read_lock();
tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
if (tracer != NULL) {
- struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *ptsec =
+ tracer->cred->security;
u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
rcu_read_unlock();
error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
@@ -5405,7 +5407,7 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
unsigned long flags)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->cred->security;
struct key_security_struct *ksec;
ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -5439,7 +5441,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
- tsec = ctx->security;
+ tsec = ctx->cred->security;
ksec = key->security;
/* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
@@ -5683,7 +5685,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
/* Set the security state for the initial task. */
if (task_alloc_security(current))
panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
- tsec = current->security;
+ tsec = current->cred->security;
tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 69c9dccc8cf0..10715d1330b9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int task_has_security(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- tsec = tsk->security;
+ tsec = tsk->cred->security;
if (!tsec)
return -EACCES;
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 8f17f542a116..d7db76617b0e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, u32 sid)
{
int rc = 0;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
char *ctx_str = NULL;
u32 str_len;
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
*/
int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
int rc = 0;
if (ctx) {
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
*/
int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->cred->security;
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
int rc = 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 79ff21ed4c3b..b6dd4fc0fb0b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode)
{
int rc;
- rc = smk_access(current->security, obj_label, mode);
+ rc = smk_access(current->cred->security, obj_label, mode);
if (rc == 0)
return 0;
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode)
* only one that gets privilege and current does not
* have that label.
*/
- if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != current->security)
+ if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != current->cred->security)
return rc;
if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 6e2dc0bab70d..791da238d049 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- rc = smk_access(current->security, ctp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+ rc = smk_access(current->cred->security, ctp->cred->security,
+ MAY_READWRITE);
if (rc != 0 && capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
return rc;
@@ -124,7 +125,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- rc = smk_access(ptp->security, current->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+ rc = smk_access(ptp->cred->security, current->cred->security,
+ MAY_READWRITE);
if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
return rc;
@@ -141,7 +143,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
static int smack_syslog(int type)
{
int rc;
- char *sp = current->security;
+ char *sp = current->cred->security;
rc = cap_syslog(type);
if (rc != 0)
@@ -373,7 +375,7 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
*/
static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
{
- inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current->security);
+ inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current->cred->security);
if (inode->i_security == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
@@ -818,7 +820,7 @@ static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
*/
static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
- file->f_security = current->security;
+ file->f_security = current->cred->security;
return 0;
}
@@ -916,7 +918,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
*/
static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
{
- file->f_security = current->security;
+ file->f_security = current->cred->security;
return 0;
}
@@ -941,7 +943,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
*/
file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
- rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
return rc;
@@ -984,7 +986,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
*/
static int smack_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- tsk->security = current->security;
+ tsk->cred->security = current->cred->security;
return 0;
}
@@ -999,7 +1001,7 @@ static int smack_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
*/
static void smack_task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
{
- task->security = NULL;
+ task->cred->security = NULL;
}
/**
@@ -1011,7 +1013,7 @@ static void smack_task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
*/
static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
}
/**
@@ -1022,7 +1024,7 @@ static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
*/
static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+ return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_READ);
}
/**
@@ -1033,7 +1035,7 @@ static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
*/
static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+ return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_READ);
}
/**
@@ -1045,7 +1047,7 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
*/
static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- *secid = smack_to_secid(p->security);
+ *secid = smack_to_secid(p->cred->security);
}
/**
@@ -1061,7 +1063,7 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
if (rc == 0)
- rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
return rc;
}
@@ -1078,7 +1080,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
if (rc == 0)
- rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
return rc;
}
@@ -1090,7 +1092,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
*/
static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+ return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_READ);
}
/**
@@ -1108,7 +1110,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
if (rc == 0)
- rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
return rc;
}
@@ -1120,7 +1122,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
*/
static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+ return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_READ);
}
/**
@@ -1131,7 +1133,7 @@ static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
*/
static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
}
/**
@@ -1154,13 +1156,13 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
* can write the receiver.
*/
if (secid == 0)
- return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ return smk_curacc(p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
/*
* If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
* specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
* we can't take privilege into account.
*/
- return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
}
/**
@@ -1173,7 +1175,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
{
int rc;
- rc = smk_access(current->security, p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_access(current->cred->security, p->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
if (rc == 0)
return 0;
@@ -1204,7 +1206,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
- isp->smk_inode = p->security;
+ isp->smk_inode = p->cred->security;
}
/*
@@ -1223,7 +1225,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
*/
static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
- char *csp = current->security;
+ char *csp = current->cred->security;
struct socket_smack *ssp;
ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
@@ -1448,7 +1450,7 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
*/
static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
- msg->security = current->security;
+ msg->security = current->cred->security;
return 0;
}
@@ -1484,7 +1486,7 @@ static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
- isp->security = current->security;
+ isp->security = current->cred->security;
return 0;
}
@@ -1593,7 +1595,7 @@ static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
- isp->security = current->security;
+ isp->security = current->cred->security;
return 0;
}
@@ -1697,7 +1699,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
{
struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
- kisp->security = current->security;
+ kisp->security = current->cred->security;
return 0;
}
@@ -1852,7 +1854,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
struct super_block *sbp;
struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
struct inode_smack *isp;
- char *csp = current->security;
+ char *csp = current->cred->security;
char *fetched;
char *final;
struct dentry *dp;
@@ -2009,7 +2011,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
- cp = kstrdup(p->security, GFP_KERNEL);
+ cp = kstrdup(p->cred->security, GFP_KERNEL);
if (cp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -2055,7 +2057,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
if (newsmack == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
- p->security = newsmack;
+ p->cred->security = newsmack;
return size;
}
@@ -2288,8 +2290,8 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
return;
ssp = sk->sk_security;
- ssp->smk_in = current->security;
- ssp->smk_out = current->security;
+ ssp->smk_in = current->cred->security;
+ ssp->smk_out = current->cred->security;
ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
rc = smack_netlabel(sk);
@@ -2362,7 +2364,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk,
unsigned long flags)
{
- key->security = tsk->security;
+ key->security = tsk->cred->security;
return 0;
}
@@ -2403,10 +2405,11 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
/*
* This should not occur
*/
- if (context->security == NULL)
+ if (context->cred->security == NULL)
return -EACCES;
- return smk_access(context->security, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+ return smk_access(context->cred->security, keyp->security,
+ MAY_READWRITE);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
@@ -2726,7 +2729,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
/*
* Set the security state for the initial task.
*/
- current->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+ current->cred->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
/*
* Initialize locks
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index c21d8c8bf0c7..c5ca279e0506 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ static void smk_cipso_doi(void)
audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info.sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
- audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->security);
+ audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->cred->security);
rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(NULL, &audit_info);
if (rc != 0)
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient)
audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
audit_info.sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
- audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->security);
+ audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->cred->security);
if (oldambient != NULL) {
rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(oldambient, &audit_info);
@@ -843,7 +843,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
- char *sp = current->security;
+ char *sp = current->cred->security;
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-12-30 01:46:29 +0100