22 files changed, 102 insertions, 140 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index bd6a910f6528..53a0070ff5df 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int __aafs_setup_d_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 
 	inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
 	inode->i_mode = mode;
-	inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode_set_ctime_current(inode);
+	simple_inode_init_ts(inode);
 	inode->i_private = data;
 	if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
 		inode->i_op = iops ? iops : &simple_dir_inode_operations;
@@ -1557,7 +1557,8 @@ void __aafs_profile_migrate_dents(struct aa_profile *old,
 		if (new->dents[i]) {
 			struct inode *inode = d_inode(new->dents[i]);
 
-			inode->i_mtime = inode_set_ctime_current(inode);
+			inode_set_mtime_to_ts(inode,
+					      inode_set_ctime_current(inode));
 		}
 		old->dents[i] = NULL;
 	}
@@ -2543,7 +2544,7 @@ static int aa_mk_null_file(struct dentry *parent)
 
 	inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
 	inode->i_mode = S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO;
-	inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode_set_ctime_current(inode);
+	simple_inode_init_ts(inode);
 	init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO,
 			   MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
 	d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 108eccc5ada5..3fa325d5efac 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ fail:
  * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
  * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
  */
-static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
 	struct aa_label *new_label = cred_label(bprm->cred);
@@ -756,7 +756,7 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  * apparmor_bprm_committed_creds() - do cleanup after new creds committed
  * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
  */
-static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	/* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */
 	aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current));
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 8b8846073e14..913ec8d0eb63 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -89,10 +89,10 @@ void __aa_loaddata_update(struct aa_loaddata *data, long revision)
 		struct inode *inode;
 
 		inode = d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR]);
-		inode->i_mtime = inode_set_ctime_current(inode);
+		inode_set_mtime_to_ts(inode, inode_set_ctime_current(inode));
 
 		inode = d_inode(data->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION]);
-		inode->i_mtime = inode_set_ctime_current(inode);
+		inode_set_mtime_to_ts(inode, inode_set_ctime_current(inode));
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index bc0521104197..8e8c630ce204 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
  * constructed by execve().
  */
-static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file,
+static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file,
 			 bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
  *
  * Return: 0 if successful, -ve on error.
  */
-int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
+int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file)
 {
 	/* Process setpcap binaries and capabilities for uid 0 */
 	const struct cred *old = current_cred();
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index 3aa75fffa8c9..9e7cde913667 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode,
 
 	inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
 	inode->i_mode = mode;
-	inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode_set_ctime_current(inode);
+	simple_inode_init_ts(inode);
 	inode->i_private = data;
 	if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
 		inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 232191ee09e3..b6e074ac0227 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
 	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
 	depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
 	depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS || LOAD_PPC_KEYS
-	select INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING if LOAD_PPC_KEYS
-	select INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX if LOAD_PPC_KEYS
 	help
 	 If set, provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys (MOK) may
 	 be added. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys.  Unlike keys
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index ecddc807c536..a6bd817efc1a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -29,9 +29,11 @@ config IMA
 	  to learn more about IMA.
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+if IMA
+
 config IMA_KEXEC
 	bool "Enable carrying the IMA measurement list across a soft boot"
-	depends on IMA && TCG_TPM && HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
+	depends on TCG_TPM && HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
 	default n
 	help
 	   TPM PCRs are only reset on a hard reboot.  In order to validate
@@ -43,7 +45,6 @@ config IMA_KEXEC
 
 config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
 	int
-	depends on IMA
 	range 8 14
 	default 10
 	help
@@ -53,7 +54,7 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
 
 config IMA_LSM_RULES
 	bool
-	depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK || SECURITY_APPARMOR)
+	depends on AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK || SECURITY_APPARMOR)
 	default y
 	help
 	  Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
@@ -61,7 +62,6 @@ config IMA_LSM_RULES
 choice
 	prompt "Default template"
 	default IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
-	depends on IMA
 	help
 	  Select the default IMA measurement template.
 
@@ -80,14 +80,12 @@ endchoice
 
 config IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE
 	string
-	depends on IMA
 	default "ima-ng" if IMA_NG_TEMPLATE
 	default "ima-sig" if IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE
 
 choice
 	prompt "Default integrity hash algorithm"
 	default IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
-	depends on IMA
 	help
 	   Select the default hash algorithm used for the measurement
 	   list, integrity appraisal and audit log.  The compiled default
@@ -117,7 +115,6 @@ endchoice
 
 config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH
 	string
-	depends on IMA
 	default "sha1" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1
 	default "sha256" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256
 	default "sha512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512
@@ -126,7 +123,6 @@ config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH
 
 config IMA_WRITE_POLICY
 	bool "Enable multiple writes to the IMA policy"
-	depends on IMA
 	default n
 	help
 	  IMA policy can now be updated multiple times.  The new rules get
@@ -137,7 +133,6 @@ config IMA_WRITE_POLICY
 
 config IMA_READ_POLICY
 	bool "Enable reading back the current IMA policy"
-	depends on IMA
 	default y if IMA_WRITE_POLICY
 	default n if !IMA_WRITE_POLICY
 	help
@@ -147,7 +142,6 @@ config IMA_READ_POLICY
 
 config IMA_APPRAISE
 	bool "Appraise integrity measurements"
-	depends on IMA
 	default n
 	help
 	  This option enables local measurement integrity appraisal.
@@ -269,7 +263,7 @@ config IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
 config IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
 	bool "Create IMA machine owner blacklist keyrings (EXPERIMENTAL)"
 	depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-	depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	depends on INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	default n
 	help
 	   This option creates an IMA blacklist keyring, which contains all
@@ -279,7 +273,7 @@ config IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
 
 config IMA_LOAD_X509
 	bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring"
-	depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	depends on INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	default n
 	help
 	   File signature verification is based on the public keys
@@ -304,7 +298,6 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
 
 config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
 	bool
-	depends on IMA
 	depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y
 	default y
 
@@ -323,7 +316,8 @@ config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
 
 config IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE
 	bool "Disable htable to allow measurement of duplicate records"
-	depends on IMA
 	default n
 	help
 	   This option disables htable to allow measurement of duplicate records.
+
+endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
index 3e7bee30080f..3265d744d5ce 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ struct modsig {
 	 * storing the signature.
 	 */
 	int raw_pkcs7_len;
-	u8 raw_pkcs7[];
+	u8 raw_pkcs7[] __counted_by(raw_pkcs7_len);
 };
 
 /*
@@ -65,10 +65,11 @@ int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
 	buf_len -= sig_len + sizeof(*sig);
 
 	/* Allocate sig_len additional bytes to hold the raw PKCS#7 data. */
-	hdr = kzalloc(sizeof(*hdr) + sig_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	hdr = kzalloc(struct_size(hdr, raw_pkcs7, sig_len), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!hdr)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	hdr->raw_pkcs7_len = sig_len;
 	hdr->pkcs7_msg = pkcs7_parse_message(buf + buf_len, sig_len);
 	if (IS_ERR(hdr->pkcs7_msg)) {
 		rc = PTR_ERR(hdr->pkcs7_msg);
@@ -77,7 +78,6 @@ int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
 	}
 
 	memcpy(hdr->raw_pkcs7, buf + buf_len, sig_len);
-	hdr->raw_pkcs7_len = sig_len;
 
 	/* We don't know the hash algorithm yet. */
 	hdr->hash_algo = HASH_ALGO__LAST;
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 3c1e7122076b..471cf36dedc0 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -109,13 +109,6 @@ extern void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
 extern key_ref_t find_key_to_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 				    const struct keyring_index_key *index_key);
 
-extern struct key *keyring_search_instkey(struct key *keyring,
-					  key_serial_t target_id);
-
-extern int iterate_over_keyring(const struct key *keyring,
-				int (*func)(const struct key *key, void *data),
-				void *data);
-
 struct keyring_search_context {
 	struct keyring_index_key index_key;
 	const struct cred	*cred;
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
index c6fc50d67214..fee1ab2c734d 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
@@ -44,13 +44,12 @@ static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = {
 #endif
 };
 
-DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init);
 DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_seal, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->seal);
 DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_unseal,
 			*trusted_key_sources[0].ops->unseal);
 DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_get_random,
 			*trusted_key_sources[0].ops->get_random);
-DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_exit, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->exit);
+static void (*trusted_key_exit)(void);
 static unsigned char migratable;
 
 enum {
@@ -359,20 +358,17 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
 		if (!get_random)
 			get_random = kernel_get_random;
 
-		static_call_update(trusted_key_init,
-				   trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init);
-		static_call_update(trusted_key_seal,
-				   trusted_key_sources[i].ops->seal);
-		static_call_update(trusted_key_unseal,
-				   trusted_key_sources[i].ops->unseal);
-		static_call_update(trusted_key_get_random,
-				   get_random);
-		static_call_update(trusted_key_exit,
-				   trusted_key_sources[i].ops->exit);
-		migratable = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->migratable;
-
-		ret = static_call(trusted_key_init)();
-		if (!ret)
+		ret = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init();
+		if (!ret) {
+			static_call_update(trusted_key_seal, trusted_key_sources[i].ops->seal);
+			static_call_update(trusted_key_unseal, trusted_key_sources[i].ops->unseal);
+			static_call_update(trusted_key_get_random, get_random);
+
+			trusted_key_exit = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->exit;
+			migratable = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->migratable;
+		}
+
+		if (!ret || ret != -ENODEV)
 			break;
 	}
 
@@ -388,7 +384,8 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
 
 static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
 {
-	static_call_cond(trusted_key_exit)();
+	if (trusted_key_exit)
+		(*trusted_key_exit)();
 }
 
 late_initcall(init_trusted);
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
index ac3e270ade69..aa3d477de6db 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
@@ -65,24 +65,16 @@ static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
 	int ret;
 	struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg;
 	struct tee_param param[4];
-	struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL;
+	struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL;
 
 	memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
 	memset(&param, 0, sizeof(param));
 
-	reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, p->key,
-						 p->key_len);
-	if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) {
-		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n");
-		return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in);
-	}
-
-	reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, p->blob,
-						  sizeof(p->blob));
-	if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) {
-		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n");
-		ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out);
-		goto out;
+	reg_shm = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, p->key,
+					      sizeof(p->key) + sizeof(p->blob));
+	if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) {
+		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "shm register failed\n");
+		return PTR_ERR(reg_shm);
 	}
 
 	inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_SEAL;
@@ -90,13 +82,13 @@ static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
 	inv_arg.num_params = 4;
 
 	param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT;
-	param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in;
+	param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm;
 	param[0].u.memref.size = p->key_len;
 	param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;
 	param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT;
-	param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out;
+	param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm;
 	param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->blob);
-	param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;
+	param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = sizeof(p->key);
 
 	ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param);
 	if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) {
@@ -107,11 +99,7 @@ static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
 		p->blob_len = param[1].u.memref.size;
 	}
 
-out:
-	if (reg_shm_out)
-		tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out);
-	if (reg_shm_in)
-		tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in);
+	tee_shm_free(reg_shm);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -124,24 +112,16 @@ static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
 	int ret;
 	struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg;
 	struct tee_param param[4];
-	struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL;
+	struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL;
 
 	memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg));
 	memset(&param, 0, sizeof(param));
 
-	reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, p->blob,
-						 p->blob_len);
-	if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) {
-		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n");
-		return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in);
-	}
-
-	reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, p->key,
-						  sizeof(p->key));
-	if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) {
-		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n");
-		ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out);
-		goto out;
+	reg_shm = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, p->key,
+					      sizeof(p->key) + sizeof(p->blob));
+	if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) {
+		dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "shm register failed\n");
+		return PTR_ERR(reg_shm);
 	}
 
 	inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_UNSEAL;
@@ -149,11 +129,11 @@ static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
 	inv_arg.num_params = 4;
 
 	param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT;
-	param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in;
+	param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm;
 	param[0].u.memref.size = p->blob_len;
-	param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;
+	param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = sizeof(p->key);
 	param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT;
-	param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out;
+	param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm;
 	param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->key);
 	param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;
 
@@ -166,11 +146,7 @@ static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
 		p->key_len = param[1].u.memref.size;
 	}
 
-out:
-	if (reg_shm_out)
-		tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out);
-	if (reg_shm_in)
-		tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in);
+	tee_shm_free(reg_shm);
 
 	return ret;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 23b129d482a7..dcb3e7014f9b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -957,7 +957,7 @@ int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
+int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, const struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb);
 }
@@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
  */
-int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
+int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file);
 }
@@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@ int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  * open file descriptors to which access will no longer be granted when the
  * attributes are changed.  This is called immediately before commit_creds().
  */
-void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+void security_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);
 }
@@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@ void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  * process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal state.  This is called
  * immediately after commit_creds().
  */
-void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+void security_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm);
 }
@@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount);
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
+int security_sb_kern_mount(const struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb);
 }
@@ -3957,7 +3957,7 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx);
 
 /**
- * security_inode_notifysecctx() - Nofify the LSM of an inode's security label
+ * security_inode_notifysecctx() - Notify the LSM of an inode's security label
  * @inode: inode
  * @ctx: secctx
  * @ctxlen: length of secctx
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index d30348fbe0df..61abc1e094a8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -77,3 +77,13 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG
 	  This enables debugging code designed to help SELinux kernel
 	  developers, unless you know what this does in the kernel code you
 	  should leave this disabled.
+
+	  To fine control the messages to be printed enable
+	  CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG and see
+	  Documentation/admin-guide/dynamic-debug-howto.rst for additional
+	  information.
+
+	  Example usage:
+
+		echo -n 'file "security/selinux/*" +p' > \
+			/proc/dynamic_debug/control
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index 836379639058..c47519ed8156 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o
 
 ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include
 
+ccflags-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG) += -DDEBUG
+
 selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o \
 	     netnode.o netport.o status.o \
 	     ss/ebitmap.o ss/hashtab.o ss/symtab.o ss/sidtab.o ss/avtab.o \
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 2aa0e219d721..feda711c6b7b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1937,7 +1937,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 
 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
-			       struct super_block *sb,
+			       const struct super_block *sb,
 			       u32 perms,
 			       struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
@@ -2139,7 +2139,7 @@ static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 	return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
 }
 
-static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
+static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, const struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -2455,7 +2455,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 /*
  * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
  */
-static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
 	struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
@@ -2501,7 +2501,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
  * due to exec
  */
-static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
 	u32 osid, sid;
@@ -2721,7 +2721,7 @@ out_bad_option:
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
+static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(const struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 6fa640263216..6c596ae7fef9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1198,7 +1198,7 @@ static struct inode *sel_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, umode_t mode)
 
 	if (ret) {
 		ret->i_mode = mode;
-		ret->i_atime = ret->i_mtime = inode_set_ctime_current(ret);
+		simple_inode_init_ts(ret);
 	}
 	return ret;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 86d98a8e291b..8751a602ead2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
  *	Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
  */
 
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
@@ -66,8 +67,7 @@ static inline u32 avtab_hash(const struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask)
 }
 
 static struct avtab_node*
-avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, u32 hvalue,
-		  struct avtab_node *prev,
+avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_node **dst,
 		  const struct avtab_key *key, const struct avtab_datum *datum)
 {
 	struct avtab_node *newnode;
@@ -89,15 +89,8 @@ avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, u32 hvalue,
 		newnode->datum.u.data = datum->u.data;
 	}
 
-	if (prev) {
-		newnode->next = prev->next;
-		prev->next = newnode;
-	} else {
-		struct avtab_node **n = &h->htable[hvalue];
-
-		newnode->next = *n;
-		*n = newnode;
-	}
+	newnode->next = *dst;
+	*dst = newnode;
 
 	h->nel++;
 	return newnode;
@@ -137,7 +130,8 @@ static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key,
 			break;
 	}
 
-	newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, key, datum);
+	newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, prev ? &prev->next : &h->htable[hvalue],
+				    key, datum);
 	if (!newnode)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -177,7 +171,8 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
 		    key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
 			break;
 	}
-	return avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, key, datum);
+	return avtab_insert_node(h, prev ? &prev->next : &h->htable[hvalue],
+				 key, datum);
 }
 
 /* This search function returns a node pointer, and can be used in
@@ -298,13 +293,7 @@ int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
 	u32 nslot = 0;
 
 	if (nrules != 0) {
-		u32 shift = 1;
-		u32 work = nrules >> 3;
-		while (work) {
-			work >>= 1;
-			shift++;
-		}
-		nslot = 1 << shift;
+		nslot = nrules > 3 ? rounddown_pow_of_two(nrules / 2) : 2;
 		if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS)
 			nslot = MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS;
 
@@ -349,7 +338,7 @@ void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag)
 	}
 
 	pr_debug("SELinux: %s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
-	       "longest chain length %d sum of chain length^2 %llu\n",
+	       "longest chain length %d, sum of chain length^2 %llu\n",
 	       tag, h->nel, slots_used, h->nslot, max_chain_len,
 	       chain2_len_sum);
 }
@@ -477,11 +466,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	set = 0;
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
-		if (key.specified & spec_order[i])
-			set++;
-	}
+	set = hweight16(key.specified & (AVTAB_XPERMS | AVTAB_TYPE | AVTAB_AV));
 	if (!set || set > 1) {
 		pr_err("SELinux:  avtab:  more than one specifier\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index ac5cdddfbf78..c05d8346a94a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -107,10 +107,12 @@ int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
 void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
 {
 	u32 i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+	u64 chain2_len_sum;
 	struct hashtab_node *cur;
 
 	slots_used = 0;
 	max_chain_len = 0;
+	chain2_len_sum = 0;
 	for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
 		cur = h->htable[i];
 		if (cur) {
@@ -123,11 +125,14 @@ void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
 
 			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
 				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+
+			chain2_len_sum += (u64)chain_len * chain_len;
 		}
 	}
 
 	info->slots_used = slots_used;
 	info->max_chain_len = max_chain_len;
+	info->chain2_len_sum = chain2_len_sum;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
index f9713b56d3d0..09b0a3744937 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ struct hashtab {
 struct hashtab_info {
 	u32 slots_used;
 	u32 max_chain_len;
+	u64 chain2_len_sum;
 };
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 2d528f699a22..595a435ea9c8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static u32 role_trans_hash(const void *k)
 {
 	const struct role_trans_key *key = k;
 
-	return key->role + (key->type << 3) + (key->tclass << 5);
+	return jhash_3words(key->role, key->type, (u32)key->tclass << 16 | key->tclass, 0);
 }
 
 static int role_trans_cmp(const void *k1, const void *k2)
@@ -684,9 +684,9 @@ static void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name)
 	struct hashtab_info info;
 
 	hashtab_stat(h, &info);
-	pr_debug("SELinux: %s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest chain length %d\n",
+	pr_debug("SELinux: %s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest chain length %d, sum of chain length^2 %llu\n",
 		 hash_name, h->nel, info.slots_used, h->size,
-		 info.max_chain_len);
+		 info.max_chain_len, info.chain2_len_sum);
 }
 
 static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
index d8ead463b8df..732fd8e22a12 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ struct sidtab_str_cache {
 	struct list_head lru_member;
 	struct sidtab_entry *parent;
 	u32 len;
-	char str[];
+	char str[] __counted_by(len);
 };
 
 #define index_to_sid(index) ((index) + SECINITSID_NUM + 1)
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 25006fddc964..255f1b470295 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
  *
  * @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
  */
-static void tomoyo_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static void tomoyo_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	/* Clear old_domain_info saved by execve() request. */
 	struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current);