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* fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS ioctlEric Biggers2019-08-133-5/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a root-only variant of the FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl which removes all users' claims of the key, not just the current user's claim. I.e., it always removes the key itself, no matter how many users have added it. This is useful for forcing a directory to be locked, without having to figure out which user ID(s) the key was added under. This is planned to be used by a command like 'sudo fscrypt lock DIR --all-users' in the fscrypt userspace tool (http://github.com/google/fscrypt). Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: allow unprivileged users to add/remove keys for v2 policiesEric Biggers2019-08-134-34/+341
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow the FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY and FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctls to be used by non-root users to add and remove encryption keys from the filesystem-level crypto keyrings, subject to limitations. Motivation: while privileged fscrypt key management is sufficient for some users (e.g. Android and Chromium OS, where a privileged process manages all keys), the old API by design also allows non-root users to set up and use encrypted directories, and we don't want to regress on that. Especially, we don't want to force users to continue using the old API, running into the visibility mismatch between files and keyrings and being unable to "lock" encrypted directories. Intuitively, the ioctls have to be privileged since they manipulate filesystem-level state. However, it's actually safe to make them unprivileged if we very carefully enforce some specific limitations. First, each key must be identified by a cryptographic hash so that a user can't add the wrong key for another user's files. For v2 encryption policies, we use the key_identifier for this. v1 policies don't have this, so managing keys for them remains privileged. Second, each key a user adds is charged to their quota for the keyrings service. Thus, a user can't exhaust memory by adding a huge number of keys. By default each non-root user is allowed up to 200 keys; this can be changed using the existing sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys'. Third, if multiple users add the same key, we keep track of those users of the key (of which there remains a single copy), and won't really remove the key, i.e. "lock" the encrypted files, until all those users have removed it. This prevents denial of service attacks that would be possible under simpler schemes, such allowing the first user who added a key to remove it -- since that could be a malicious user who has compromised the key. Of course, encryption keys should be kept secret, but the idea is that using encryption should never be *less* secure than not using encryption, even if your key was compromised. We tolerate that a user will be unable to really remove a key, i.e. unable to "lock" their encrypted files, if another user has added the same key. But in a sense, this is actually a good thing because it will avoid providing a false notion of security where a key appears to have been removed when actually it's still in memory, available to any attacker who compromises the operating system kernel. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: v2 encryption policy supportEric Biggers2019-08-139-194/+741
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*): - Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined: - Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF. - Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added. - Key identifiers (see below). - Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor. - The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring. The following UAPI additions are made: - The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix. - A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions. - The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway. This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys: capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies. (*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: add an HKDF-SHA512 implementationEric Biggers2019-08-134-0/+199
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add an implementation of HKDF (RFC 5869) to fscrypt, for the purpose of deriving additional key material from the fscrypt master keys for v2 encryption policies. HKDF is a key derivation function built on top of HMAC. We choose SHA-512 for the underlying unkeyed hash, and use an "hmac(sha512)" transform allocated from the crypto API. We'll be using this to replace the AES-ECB based KDF currently used to derive the per-file encryption keys. While the AES-ECB based KDF is believed to meet the original security requirements, it is nonstandard and has problems that don't exist in modern KDFs such as HKDF: 1. It's reversible. Given a derived key and nonce, an attacker can easily compute the master key. This is okay if the master key and derived keys are equally hard to compromise, but now we'd like to be more robust against threats such as a derived key being compromised through a timing attack, or a derived key for an in-use file being compromised after the master key has already been removed. 2. It doesn't evenly distribute the entropy from the master key; each 16 input bytes only affects the corresponding 16 output bytes. 3. It isn't easily extensible to deriving other values or keys, such as a public hash for securely identifying the key, or per-mode keys. Per-mode keys will be immediately useful for Adiantum encryption, for which fscrypt currently uses the master key directly, introducing unnecessary usage constraints. Per-mode keys will also be useful for hardware inline encryption, which is currently being worked on. HKDF solves all the above problems. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: add FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS ioctlEric Biggers2019-08-133-0/+85
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS. Given a key specified by 'struct fscrypt_key_specifier' (the same way a key is specified for the other fscrypt key management ioctls), it returns status information in a 'struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg'. The main motivation for this is that applications need to be able to check whether an encrypted directory is "unlocked" or not, so that they can add the key if it is not, and avoid adding the key (which may involve prompting the user for a passphrase) if it already is. It's possible to use some workarounds such as checking whether opening a regular file fails with ENOKEY, or checking whether the filenames "look like gibberish" or not. However, no workaround is usable in all cases. Like the other key management ioctls, the keyrings syscalls may seem at first to be a good fit for this. Unfortunately, they are not. Even if we exposed the keyring ID of the ->s_master_keys keyring and gave everyone Search permission on it (note: currently the keyrings permission system would also allow everyone to "invalidate" the keyring too), the fscrypt keys have an additional state that doesn't map cleanly to the keyrings API: the secret can be removed, but we can be still tracking the files that were using the key, and the removal can be re-attempted or the secret added again. After later patches, some applications will also need a way to determine whether a key was added by the current user vs. by some other user. Reserved fields are included in fscrypt_get_key_status_arg for this and other future extensions. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctlEric Biggers2019-08-135-5/+432
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl removes an encryption key that was added by FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It wipes the secret key itself, then "locks" the encrypted files and directories that had been unlocked using that key -- implemented by evicting the relevant dentries and inodes from the VFS caches. The problem this solves is that many fscrypt users want the ability to remove encryption keys, causing the corresponding encrypted directories to appear "locked" (presented in ciphertext form) again. Moreover, users want removing an encryption key to *really* remove it, in the sense that the removed keys cannot be recovered even if kernel memory is compromised, e.g. by the exploit of a kernel security vulnerability or by a physical attack. This is desirable after a user logs out of the system, for example. In many cases users even already assume this to be the case and are surprised to hear when it's not. It is not sufficient to simply unlink the master key from the keyring (or to revoke or invalidate it), since the actual encryption transform objects are still pinned in memory by their inodes. Therefore, to really remove a key we must also evict the relevant inodes. Currently one workaround is to run 'sync && echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches'. But, that evicts all unused inodes in the system rather than just the inodes associated with the key being removed, causing severe performance problems. Moreover, it requires root privileges, so regular users can't "lock" their encrypted files. Another workaround, used in Chromium OS kernels, is to add a new VFS-level ioctl FS_IOC_DROP_CACHE which is a more restricted version of drop_caches that operates on a single super_block. It does: shrink_dcache_sb(sb); invalidate_inodes(sb, false); But it's still a hack. Yet, the major users of filesystem encryption want this feature badly enough that they are actually using these hacks. To properly solve the problem, start maintaining a list of the inodes which have been "unlocked" using each master key. Originally this wasn't possible because the kernel didn't keep track of in-use master keys at all. But, with the ->s_master_keys keyring it is now possible. Then, add an ioctl FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It finds the specified master key in ->s_master_keys, then wipes the secret key itself, which prevents any additional inodes from being unlocked with the key. Then, it syncs the filesystem and evicts the inodes in the key's list. The normal inode eviction code will free and wipe the per-file keys (in ->i_crypt_info). Note that freeing ->i_crypt_info without evicting the inodes was also considered, but would have been racy. Some inodes may still be in use when a master key is removed, and we can't simply revoke random file descriptors, mmap's, etc. Thus, the ioctl simply skips in-use inodes, and returns -EBUSY to indicate that some inodes weren't evicted. The master key *secret* is still removed, but the fscrypt_master_key struct remains to keep track of the remaining inodes. Userspace can then retry the ioctl to evict the remaining inodes. Alternatively, if userspace adds the key again, the refreshed secret will be associated with the existing list of inodes so they remain correctly tracked for future key removals. The ioctl doesn't wipe pagecache pages. Thus, we tolerate that after a kernel compromise some portions of plaintext file contents may still be recoverable from memory. This can be solved by enabling page poisoning system-wide, which security conscious users may choose to do. But it's very difficult to solve otherwise, e.g. note that plaintext file contents may have been read in other places than pagecache pages. Like FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is initially restricted to privileged users only. This is sufficient for some use cases, but not all. A later patch will relax this restriction, but it will require introducing key hashes, among other changes. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctlEric Biggers2019-08-139-13/+447
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked". Why we need this ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring. Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache. Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest. Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose. On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]). By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control. Why not use the add_key() syscall ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches: - Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried. - Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace. - Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it. Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier. However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes. References: [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939 [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116 [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715 [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128 [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: rename keyinfo.c to keysetup.cEric Biggers2019-08-134-4/+4
| | | | | | | | Rename keyinfo.c to keysetup.c since this better describes what the file does (sets up the key), and it matches the new file keysetup_v1.c. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: move v1 policy key setup to keysetup_v1.cEric Biggers2019-08-134-322/+369
| | | | | | | | | | In preparation for introducing v2 encryption policies which will find and derive encryption keys differently from the current v1 encryption policies, move the v1 policy-specific key setup code from keyinfo.c into keysetup_v1.c. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: refactor key setup code in preparation for v2 policiesEric Biggers2019-08-132-112/+146
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Do some more refactoring of the key setup code, in preparation for introducing a filesystem-level keyring and v2 encryption policies: - Now that ci_inode exists, don't pass around the inode unnecessarily. - Define a function setup_file_encryption_key() which handles the crypto key setup given an under-construction fscrypt_info. Don't pass the fscrypt_context, since everything is in the fscrypt_info. [This will be extended for v2 policies and the fs-level keyring.] - Define a function fscrypt_set_derived_key() which sets the per-file key, without depending on anything specific to v1 policies. [This will also be used for v2 policies.] - Define a function fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key() which takes the raw master key, thus separating finding the key from using it. [This will also be used if the key is found in the fs-level keyring.] Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: rename fscrypt_master_key to fscrypt_direct_keyEric Biggers2019-08-132-69/+68
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In preparation for introducing a filesystem-level keyring which will contain fscrypt master keys, rename the existing 'struct fscrypt_master_key' to 'struct fscrypt_direct_key'. This is the structure in the existing table of master keys that's maintained to deduplicate the crypto transforms for v1 DIRECT_KEY policies. I've chosen to keep this table as-is rather than make it automagically add/remove the keys to/from the filesystem-level keyring, since that would add a lot of extra complexity to the filesystem-level keyring. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: add ->ci_inode to fscrypt_infoEric Biggers2019-08-132-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add an inode back-pointer to 'struct fscrypt_info', such that inode->i_crypt_info->ci_inode == inode. This will be useful for: 1. Evicting the inodes when a fscrypt key is removed, since we'll track the inodes using a given key by linking their fscrypt_infos together, rather than the inodes directly. This avoids bloating 'struct inode' with a new list_head. 2. Simplifying the per-file key setup, since the inode pointer won't have to be passed around everywhere just in case something goes wrong and it's needed for fscrypt_warn(). Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_* definitions, not FS_*Eric Biggers2019-08-136-43/+46
| | | | | | | | | Update fs/crypto/ to use the new names for the UAPI constants rather than the old names, then make the old definitions conditional on !__KERNEL__. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_ prefix for uapi constantsEric Biggers2019-08-132-43/+62
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Prefix all filesystem encryption UAPI constants except the ioctl numbers with "FSCRYPT_" rather than with "FS_". This namespaces the constants more appropriately and makes it clear that they are related specifically to the filesystem encryption feature, and to the 'fscrypt_*' structures. With some of the old names like "FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID", it was not immediately clear that the constant had anything to do with encryption. This is also useful because we'll be adding more encryption-related constants, e.g. for the policy version, and we'd otherwise have to choose whether to use unclear names like FS_POLICY_V1 or inconsistent names like FS_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_V1. For source compatibility with existing userspace programs, keep the old names defined as aliases to the new names. Finally, as long as new names are being defined anyway, I skipped defining new names for the fscrypt mode numbers that aren't actually used: INVALID (0), AES_256_GCM (2), AES_256_CBC (3), SPECK128_256_XTS (7), and SPECK128_256_CTS (8). Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fs, fscrypt: move uapi definitions to new header <linux/fscrypt.h>Eric Biggers2019-08-134-51/+66
| | | | | | | | | | | | More fscrypt definitions are being added, and we shouldn't use a disproportionate amount of space in <linux/fs.h> for fscrypt stuff. So move the fscrypt definitions to a new header <linux/fscrypt.h>. For source compatibility with existing userspace programs, <linux/fs.h> still includes the new header. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: use ENOPKG when crypto API support missingEric Biggers2019-08-131-9/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | Return ENOPKG rather than ENOENT when trying to open a file that's encrypted using algorithms not available in the kernel's crypto API. This avoids an ambiguity, since ENOENT is also returned when the file doesn't exist. Note: this is the same approach I'm taking for fs-verity. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: improve warnings for missing crypto API supportEric Biggers2019-08-131-5/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Users of fscrypt with non-default algorithms will encounter an error like the following if they fail to include the needed algorithms into the crypto API when configuring the kernel (as per the documentation): Error allocating 'adiantum(xchacha12,aes)' transform: -2 This requires that the user figure out what the "-2" error means. Make it more friendly by printing a warning like the following instead: Missing crypto API support for Adiantum (API name: "adiantum(xchacha12,aes)") Also upgrade the log level for *other* errors to KERN_ERR. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: improve warning messages for unsupported encryption contextsEric Biggers2019-08-131-3/+15
| | | | | | | | | | When fs/crypto/ encounters an inode with an invalid encryption context, currently it prints a warning if the pair of encryption modes are unrecognized, but it's silent if there are other problems such as unsupported context size, format, or flags. To help people debug such situations, add more warning messages. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: make fscrypt_msg() take inode instead of super_blockEric Biggers2019-08-135-35/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | Most of the warning and error messages in fs/crypto/ are for situations related to a specific inode, not merely to a super_block. So to make things easier, make fscrypt_msg() take an inode rather than a super_block, and make it print the inode number. Note: This is the same approach I'm taking for fsverity_msg(). Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: clean up base64 encoding/decodingEric Biggers2019-08-131-17/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some minor cleanups for the code that base64 encodes and decodes encrypted filenames and long name digests: - Rename "digest_{encode,decode}()" => "base64_{encode,decode}()" since they are used for filenames too, not just for long name digests. - Replace 'while' loops with more conventional 'for' loops. - Use 'u8' for binary data. Keep 'char' for string data. - Fully constify the lookup table (pointer was not const). - Improve comment. No actual change in behavior. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: remove loadable module related codeEric Biggers2019-08-133-26/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Since commit 643fa9612bf1 ("fscrypt: remove filesystem specific build config option"), fs/crypto/ can no longer be built as a loadable module. Thus it no longer needs a module_exit function, nor a MODULE_LICENSE. So remove them, and change module_init to late_initcall. Reviewed-by: Chandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* Linux 5.3-rc3v5.3-rc3Linus Torvalds2019-08-051-1/+1
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* Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-20190805' of git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmddLinus Torvalds2019-08-054-24/+63
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull tpm fixes from Jarkko Sakkinen: "Two bug fixes that did not make into my first pull request" * tag 'tpmdd-next-20190805' of git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd: tpm: tpm_ibm_vtpm: Fix unallocated banks tpm: Fix null pointer dereference on chip register error path
| * tpm: tpm_ibm_vtpm: Fix unallocated banksNayna Jain2019-08-044-17/+47
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The nr_allocated_banks and allocated banks are initialized as part of tpm_chip_register. Currently, this is done as part of auto startup function. However, some drivers, like the ibm vtpm driver, do not run auto startup during initialization. This results in uninitialized memory issue and causes a kernel panic during boot. This patch moves the pcr allocation outside the auto startup function into tpm_chip_register. This ensures that allocated banks are initialized in any case. Fixes: 879b589210a9 ("tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read") Reported-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
| * tpm: Fix null pointer dereference on chip register error pathMilan Broz2019-08-041-7/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If clk_enable is not defined and chip initialization is canceled code hits null dereference. Easily reproducible with vTPM init fail: swtpm chardev --tpmstate dir=nonexistent_dir --tpm2 --vtpm-proxy BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000 ... Call Trace: tpm_chip_start+0x9d/0xa0 [tpm] tpm_chip_register+0x10/0x1a0 [tpm] vtpm_proxy_work+0x11/0x30 [tpm_vtpm_proxy] process_one_work+0x214/0x5a0 worker_thread+0x134/0x3e0 ? process_one_work+0x5a0/0x5a0 kthread+0xd4/0x100 ? process_one_work+0x5a0/0x5a0 ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 ret_from_fork+0x19/0x24 Fixes: 719b7d81f204 ("tpm: introduce tpm_chip_start() and tpm_chip_stop()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.1+ Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
* | Merge tag 'mtd/fixes-for-5.3-rc3' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-08-052-4/+13
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mtd/linux Pull MTD fixes from Miquel Raynal: "NAND: - Fix Micron driver as some chips enable internal ECC correction during their discovery while they advertize they do not have any. Hyperbus: - Restrict the build to only ARM64 SoCs (and compile testing) which is what should have been done since the beginning. - Fix Kconfig issue by selection something instead of implying it" * tag 'mtd/fixes-for-5.3-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mtd/linux: mtd: hyperbus: Add hardware dependency to AM654 driver mtd: hyperbus: Kconfig: Fix HBMC_AM654 dependencies mtd: rawnand: micron: handle on-die "ECC-off" devices correctly
| * mtd: hyperbus: Add hardware dependency to AM654 driverJean Delvare2019-08-031-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The hbmc-am654 driver is for the TI AM654, which is an ARM64 SoC, so don't propose this driver on other architectures unless build-testing. Fixes: b07079f1642c ("mtd: hyperbus: Add driver for TI's HyperBus memory controller") Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Cc: Vignesh Raghavendra <vigneshr@ti.com> Cc: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
| * mtd: hyperbus: Kconfig: Fix HBMC_AM654 dependenciesVignesh Raghavendra2019-08-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On x86_64, when CONFIG_OF is not disabled: WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for MUX_MMIO Depends on [n]: MULTIPLEXER [=y] && (OF [=n] || COMPILE_TEST [=n]) Selected by [y]: - HBMC_AM654 [=y] && MTD [=y] && MTD_HYPERBUS [=y] due to config HBMC_AM654 tristate "HyperBus controller driver for AM65x SoC" select MULTIPLEXER select MUX_MMIO Fix this by making HBMC_AM654 imply MUX_MMIO instead of select so that dependencies are taken care of. MUX_MMIO is optional for functioning of driver. Fixes: b07079f1642c ("mtd: hyperbus: Add driver for TI's HyperBus memory controller") Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Vignesh Raghavendra <vigneshr@ti.com> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
| * mtd: rawnand: micron: handle on-die "ECC-off" devices correctlyMarco Felsch2019-08-031-3/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some devices are not supposed to support on-die ECC but experience shows that internal ECC machinery can actually be enabled through the "SET FEATURE (EFh)" command, even if a read of the "READ ID Parameter Tables" returns that it is not. Currently, the driver checks the "READ ID Parameter" field directly after having enabled the feature. If the check fails it returns immediately but leaves the ECC on. When using buggy chips like MT29F2G08ABAGA and MT29F2G08ABBGA, all future read/program cycles will go through the on-die ECC, confusing the host controller which is supposed to be the one handling correction. To address this in a common way we need to turn off the on-die ECC directly after reading the "READ ID Parameter" and before checking the "ECC status". Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: dbc44edbf833 ("mtd: rawnand: micron: Fix on-die ECC detection logic") Signed-off-by: Marco Felsch <m.felsch@pengutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com> Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
* | Merge tag 'powerpc-5.3-3' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-08-049-5/+53
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux Pull powerpc fixes from Michael Ellerman: "Some more powerpc fixes for 5.3: - Wire up the new clone3 syscall. - A fix for the PAPR SCM nvdimm driver, to fix a crash when firmware gives us a device that's attached to a non-online NUMA node. - A fix for a boot failure on 32-bit with KASAN enabled. - Three fixes for implicit fall through warnings, some of which are errors for us due to -Werror. Thanks to: Aneesh Kumar K.V, Christophe Leroy, Kees Cook, Santosh Sivaraj, Stephen Rothwell" * tag 'powerpc-5.3-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: powerpc/kasan: fix early boot failure on PPC32 drivers/macintosh/smu.c: Mark expected switch fall-through powerpc/spe: Mark expected switch fall-throughs powerpc/nvdimm: Pick nearby online node if the device node is not online powerpc/kvm: Fall through switch case explicitly powerpc: Wire up clone3 syscall
| * | powerpc/kasan: fix early boot failure on PPC32Christophe Leroy2019-07-311-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Due to commit 4a6d8cf90017 ("powerpc/mm: don't use pte_alloc_kernel() until slab is available on PPC32"), pte_alloc_kernel() cannot be used during early KASAN init. Fix it by using memblock_alloc() instead. Fixes: 2edb16efc899 ("powerpc/32: Add KASAN support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.2+ Reported-by: Erhard F. <erhard_f@mailbox.org> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/da89670093651437f27d2975224712e0a130b055.1564552796.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
| * | drivers/macintosh/smu.c: Mark expected switch fall-throughStephen Rothwell2019-07-311-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Mark switch cases where we are expecting to fall through. This patch fixes the following warning (Building: powerpc): drivers/macintosh/smu.c: In function 'smu_queue_i2c': drivers/macintosh/smu.c:854:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] cmd->info.devaddr &= 0xfe; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~ drivers/macintosh/smu.c:855:2: note: here case SMU_I2C_TRANSFER_STDSUB: ^~~~ Fixes: 0365ba7fb1fa ("[PATCH] ppc64: SMU driver update & i2c support") Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190730143704.060a2606@canb.auug.org.au
| * | powerpc/spe: Mark expected switch fall-throughsMichael Ellerman2019-07-301-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Mark switch cases where we are expecting to fall through. Fixes errors such as below, seen with mpc85xx_defconfig: arch/powerpc/kernel/align.c: In function 'emulate_spe': arch/powerpc/kernel/align.c:178:8: error: this statement may fall through ret |= __get_user_inatomic(temp.v[3], p++); ^~ Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190730141917.21817-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
| * | powerpc/nvdimm: Pick nearby online node if the device node is not onlineAneesh Kumar K.V2019-07-301-2/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, nvdimm subsystem expects the device numa node for SCM device to be an online node. It also doesn't try to bring the device numa node online. Hence if we use a non-online numa node as device node we hit crashes like below. This is because we try to access uninitialized NODE_DATA in different code paths. cpu 0x0: Vector: 300 (Data Access) at [c0000000fac53170] pc: c0000000004bbc50: ___slab_alloc+0x120/0xca0 lr: c0000000004bc834: __slab_alloc+0x64/0xc0 sp: c0000000fac53400 msr: 8000000002009033 dar: 73e8 dsisr: 80000 current = 0xc0000000fabb6d80 paca = 0xc000000003870000 irqmask: 0x03 irq_happened: 0x01 pid = 7, comm = kworker/u16:0 Linux version 5.2.0-06234-g76bd729b2644 (kvaneesh@ltc-boston123) (gcc version 7.4.0 (Ubuntu 7.4.0-1ubuntu1~18.04.1)) #135 SMP Thu Jul 11 05:36:30 CDT 2019 enter ? for help [link register ] c0000000004bc834 __slab_alloc+0x64/0xc0 [c0000000fac53400] c0000000fac53480 (unreliable) [c0000000fac53500] c0000000004bc818 __slab_alloc+0x48/0xc0 [c0000000fac53560] c0000000004c30a0 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x3c0/0x6b0 [c0000000fac535d0] c000000000cfafe4 devm_kmalloc+0x74/0xc0 [c0000000fac53600] c000000000d69434 nd_region_activate+0x144/0x560 [c0000000fac536d0] c000000000d6b19c nd_region_probe+0x17c/0x370 [c0000000fac537b0] c000000000d6349c nvdimm_bus_probe+0x10c/0x230 [c0000000fac53840] c000000000cf3cc4 really_probe+0x254/0x4e0 [c0000000fac538d0] c000000000cf429c driver_probe_device+0x16c/0x1e0 [c0000000fac53950] c000000000cf0b44 bus_for_each_drv+0x94/0x130 [c0000000fac539b0] c000000000cf392c __device_attach+0xdc/0x200 [c0000000fac53a50] c000000000cf231c bus_probe_device+0x4c/0xf0 [c0000000fac53a90] c000000000ced268 device_add+0x528/0x810 [c0000000fac53b60] c000000000d62a58 nd_async_device_register+0x28/0xa0 [c0000000fac53bd0] c0000000001ccb8c async_run_entry_fn+0xcc/0x1f0 [c0000000fac53c50] c0000000001bcd9c process_one_work+0x46c/0x860 [c0000000fac53d20] c0000000001bd4f4 worker_thread+0x364/0x5f0 [c0000000fac53db0] c0000000001c7260 kthread+0x1b0/0x1c0 [c0000000fac53e20] c00000000000b954 ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x68 The patch tries to fix this by picking the nearest online node as the SCM node. This does have a problem of us losing the information that SCM node is equidistant from two other online nodes. If applications need to understand these fine-grained details we should express then like x86 does via /sys/devices/system/node/nodeX/accessY/initiators/ With the patch we get # numactl -H available: 2 nodes (0-1) node 0 cpus: node 0 size: 0 MB node 0 free: 0 MB node 1 cpus: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 node 1 size: 130865 MB node 1 free: 129130 MB node distances: node 0 1 0: 10 20 1: 20 10 # cat /sys/bus/nd/devices/region0/numa_node 0 # dmesg | grep papr_scm [ 91.332305] papr_scm ibm,persistent-memory:ibm,pmemory@44104001: Region registered with target node 2 and online node 0 Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190729095128.23707-1-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
| * | powerpc/kvm: Fall through switch case explicitlySantosh Sivaraj2019-07-291-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implicit fallthrough warning was enabled globally which broke the build. Make it explicit with a `fall through` comment. Signed-off-by: Santosh Sivaraj <santosh@fossix.org> Reviewed-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190729055536.25591-1-santosh@fossix.org
| * | powerpc: Wire up clone3 syscallMichael Ellerman2019-07-294-1/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Wire up the new clone3 syscall added in commit 7f192e3cd316 ("fork: add clone3"). This requires a ppc_clone3 wrapper, in order to save the non-volatile GPRs before calling into the generic syscall code. Otherwise we hit the BUG_ON in CHECK_FULL_REGS in copy_thread(). Lightly tested using Christian's test code on a Power8 LE VM. Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190724140259.23554-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
* | | MAINTAINERS: Add Geert as Renesas SoC Co-MaintainerGeert Uytterhoeven2019-08-041-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | At the end of the v5.3 upstream kernel development cycle, Simon will be stepping down from his role as Renesas SoC maintainer. Starting with the v5.4 development cycle, Geert is taking over this role. Add Geert as a co-maintainer, and add his git repository and branch. Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Reviewed-by: Niklas Söderlund <niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se> Acked-by: Simon Horman <horms+renesas@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | Merge tag 'kbuild-fixes-v5.3-2' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-08-047-43/+58
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild Pull Kbuild fixes from Masahiro Yamada: - detect missing missing "WITH Linux-syscall-note" for uapi headers - fix needless rebuild when using Clang - fix false-positive cc-option in Kconfig when using Clang - avoid including corrupted .*.cmd files in the modpost stage - fix warning of 'make vmlinux' - fix {m,n,x,g}config to not generate the broken .config on the second save operation. - some trivial Makefile fixes * tag 'kbuild-fixes-v5.3-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: kconfig: Clear "written" flag to avoid data loss kbuild: Check for unknown options with cc-option usage in Kconfig and clang lib/raid6: fix unnecessary rebuild of vpermxor*.c kbuild: modpost: do not parse unnecessary rules for vmlinux modpost kbuild: modpost: remove unnecessary dependency for __modpost kbuild: modpost: handle KBUILD_EXTRA_SYMBOLS only for external modules kbuild: modpost: include .*.cmd files only when targets exist kbuild: initialize CLANG_FLAGS correctly in the top Makefile kbuild: detect missing "WITH Linux-syscall-note" for uapi headers
| * | | kconfig: Clear "written" flag to avoid data lossM. Vefa Bicakci2019-08-041-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Prior to this commit, starting nconfig, xconfig or gconfig, and saving the .config file more than once caused data loss, where a .config file that contained only comments would be written to disk starting from the second save operation. This bug manifests itself because the SYMBOL_WRITTEN flag is never cleared after the first call to conf_write, and subsequent calls to conf_write then skip all of the configuration symbols due to the SYMBOL_WRITTEN flag being set. This commit resolves this issue by clearing the SYMBOL_WRITTEN flag from all symbols before conf_write returns. Fixes: 8e2442a5f86e ("kconfig: fix missing choice values in auto.conf") Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.19+ Signed-off-by: M. Vefa Bicakci <m.v.b@runbox.com> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
| * | | kbuild: Check for unknown options with cc-option usage in Kconfig and clangStephen Boyd2019-07-311-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If the particular version of clang a user has doesn't enable -Werror=unknown-warning-option by default, even though it is the default[1], then make sure to pass the option to the Kconfig cc-option command so that testing options from Kconfig files works properly. Otherwise, depending on the default values setup in the clang toolchain we will silently assume options such as -Wmaybe-uninitialized are supported by clang, when they really aren't. A compilation issue only started happening for me once commit 589834b3a009 ("kbuild: Add -Werror=unknown-warning-option to CLANG_FLAGS") was applied on top of commit b303c6df80c9 ("kbuild: compute false-positive -Wmaybe-uninitialized cases in Kconfig"). This leads kbuild to try and test for the existence of the -Wmaybe-uninitialized flag with the cc-option command in scripts/Kconfig.include, and it doesn't see an error returned from the option test so it sets the config value to Y. Then the Makefile tries to pass the unknown option on the command line and -Werror=unknown-warning-option catches the invalid option and breaks the build. Before commit 589834b3a009 ("kbuild: Add -Werror=unknown-warning-option to CLANG_FLAGS") the build works fine, but any cc-option test of a warning option in Kconfig files silently evaluates to true, even if the warning option flag isn't supported on clang. Note: This doesn't change cc-option usages in Makefiles because those use a different rule that includes KBUILD_CFLAGS by default (see the __cc-option command in scripts/Kbuild.incluide). The KBUILD_CFLAGS variable already has the -Werror=unknown-warning-option flag set. Thanks to Doug for pointing out the different rule. [1] https://clang.llvm.org/docs/DiagnosticsReference.html#wunknown-warning-option Cc: Peter Smith <peter.smith@linaro.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
| * | | lib/raid6: fix unnecessary rebuild of vpermxor*.cMasahiro Yamada2019-07-311-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following four files are every time rebuilt: UNROLL lib/raid6/vpermxor1.c UNROLL lib/raid6/vpermxor2.c UNROLL lib/raid6/vpermxor4.c UNROLL lib/raid6/vpermxor8.c Fix the suffixes in the targets. Fixes: 72ad21075df8 ("lib/raid6: refactor unroll rules with pattern rules") Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
| * | | kbuild: modpost: do not parse unnecessary rules for vmlinux modpostMasahiro Yamada2019-07-312-36/+42
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since commit ff9b45c55b26 ("kbuild: modpost: read modules.order instead of $(MODVERDIR)/*.mod"), 'make vmlinux' emits a warning, like this: $ make defconfig vmlinux [ snip ] LD vmlinux.o cat: modules.order: No such file or directory MODPOST vmlinux.o MODINFO modules.builtin.modinfo KSYM .tmp_kallsyms1.o KSYM .tmp_kallsyms2.o LD vmlinux SORTEX vmlinux SYSMAP System.map When building only vmlinux, KBUILD_MODULES is not set. Hence, the modules.order is not generated. For the vmlinux modpost, it is not necessary at all. Separate scripts/Makefile.modpost for the vmlinux/modules stages. This works more efficiently because the vmlinux modpost does not need to include .*.cmd files. Fixes: ff9b45c55b26 ("kbuild: modpost: read modules.order instead of $(MODVERDIR)/*.mod") Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
| * | | kbuild: modpost: remove unnecessary dependency for __modpostMasahiro Yamada2019-07-311-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | __modpost is a phony target. The dependency on FORCE is pointless. All the objects have been built in the previous stage, so the dependency on the objects are not necessary either. Count the number of modules in a more straightforward way. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
| * | | kbuild: modpost: handle KBUILD_EXTRA_SYMBOLS only for external modulesMasahiro Yamada2019-07-311-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | KBUILD_EXTRA_SYMBOLS makes sense only when building external modules. Moreover, the modpost sets 'external_module' if the -e option is given. I replaced $(patsubst %, -e %,...) with simpler $(addprefix -e,...) while I was here. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
| * | | kbuild: modpost: include .*.cmd files only when targets existMasahiro Yamada2019-07-311-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If a build rule fails, the .DELETE_ON_ERROR special target removes the target, but does nothing for the .*.cmd file, which might be corrupted. So, .*.cmd files should be included only when the corresponding targets exist. Commit 392885ee82d3 ("kbuild: let fixdep directly write to .*.cmd files") missed to fix up this file. Fixes: 392885ee82d3 ("kbuild: let fixdep directly write to .*.cmd") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.0+ Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
| * | | kbuild: initialize CLANG_FLAGS correctly in the top MakefileMasahiro Yamada2019-07-301-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CLANG_FLAGS is initialized by the following line: CLANG_FLAGS := --target=$(notdir $(CROSS_COMPILE:%-=%)) ..., which is run only when CROSS_COMPILE is set. Some build targets (bindeb-pkg etc.) recurse to the top Makefile. When you build the kernel with Clang but without CROSS_COMPILE, the same compiler flags such as -no-integrated-as are accumulated into CLANG_FLAGS. If you run 'make CC=clang' and then 'make CC=clang bindeb-pkg', Kbuild will recompile everything needlessly due to the build command change. Fix this by correctly initializing CLANG_FLAGS. Fixes: 238bcbc4e07f ("kbuild: consolidate Clang compiler flags") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.0+ Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
| * | | kbuild: detect missing "WITH Linux-syscall-note" for uapi headersMasahiro Yamada2019-07-291-0/+6
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | UAPI headers licensed under GPL are supposed to have exception "WITH Linux-syscall-note" so that they can be included into non-GPL user space application code. Unfortunately, people often miss to add it. Break 'make headers' when any of exported headers lacks the exception note so that the 0-day bot can easily catch it. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
* | | Merge tag 'safesetid-maintainers-correction-5.3-rc2' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-08-041-0/+6
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://github.com/micah-morton/linux Pull SafeSetID maintainer update from Micah Morton: "Add entry in MAINTAINERS file for SafeSetID LSM" * tag 'safesetid-maintainers-correction-5.3-rc2' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux: Add entry in MAINTAINERS file for SafeSetID LSM
| * | | Add entry in MAINTAINERS file for SafeSetID LSMMicah Morton2019-08-011-0/+6
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This LSM was added in v5.1 and needs an entry in the MAINTAINERS file. Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
* | | Merge tag 'xtensa-20190803' of git://github.com/jcmvbkbc/linux-xtensaLinus Torvalds2019-08-041-0/+1
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull Xtensa fix from Max Filippov: "Fix build for xtensa cores with coprocessors that was broken by entry/return abstraction patch" * tag 'xtensa-20190803' of git://github.com/jcmvbkbc/linux-xtensa: xtensa: fix build for cores with coprocessors
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