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* lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality modeDavid Howells2019-08-203-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Disallow the use of certain perf facilities that might allow userspace to access kernel data. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality modeDavid Howells2019-08-203-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel has been locked down in confidentiality mode. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com> cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality modeDavid Howells2019-08-203-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Disallow the creation of perf and ftrace kprobes when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by preventing their registration. This prevents kprobes from being used to access kernel memory to steal crypto data, but continues to allow the use of kprobes from signed modules. Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com> Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcoreDavid Howells2019-08-203-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | Disallow access to /proc/kcore when the kernel is locked down to prevent access to cryptographic data. This is limited to lockdown confidentiality mode and is still permitted in integrity mode. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace moduleDavid Howells2019-08-203-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The testmmiotrace module shouldn't be permitted when the kernel is locked down as it can be used to arbitrarily read and write MMIO space. This is a runtime check rather than buildtime in order to allow configurations where the same kernel may be run in both locked down or permissive modes depending on local policy. Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)David Howells2019-08-203-5/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware parameters (such as io ports, iomem addresses, irqs, dma channels, fixed dma buffers and other types). Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIALDavid Howells2019-08-203-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Lock down TIOCSSERIAL as that can be used to change the ioport and irq settings on a serial port. This only appears to be an issue for the serial drivers that use the core serial code. All other drivers seem to either ignore attempts to change port/irq or give an error. Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com> Cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked downDavid Howells2019-08-203-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | Prohibit replacement of the PCMCIA Card Information Structure when the kernel is locked down. Suggested-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked downLinn Crosetto2019-08-201-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | >From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt): If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an instrumented, modified one. When lockdown is enabled, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if the kernel is locked down. Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <lcrosetto@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked downJosh Boyer2019-08-207-7/+49
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which makes it possible for a user to modify the workings of hardware. Reject the option when the kernel is locked down. This requires some reworking of the existing RSDP command line logic, since the early boot code also makes use of a command-line passed RSDP when locating the SRAT table before the lockdown code has been initialised. This is achieved by separating the command line RSDP path in the early boot code from the generic RSDP path, and then copying the command line RSDP into boot params in the kernel proper if lockdown is not enabled. If lockdown is enabled and an RSDP is provided on the command line, this will only be used when parsing SRAT (which shouldn't permit kernel code execution) and will be ignored in the rest of the kernel. (Modified by Matthew Garrett in order to handle the early boot RSDP environment) Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett2019-08-203-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading. Disable it if the kernel is locked down. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett2019-08-203-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if the kernel is locked down, since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. Based on a patch by Kees Cook. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett2019-08-203-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock it down by default. This also implicitly locks down the KDADDIO, KDDELIO, KDENABIO and KDDISABIO console ioctls. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett2019-08-205-3/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked downJosh Boyer2019-08-203-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model, so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the kernel is locked down. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net Cc: pavel@ucw.cz cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked downJiri Bohac2019-08-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When KEXEC_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not load images through kexec_file systemcall if the kernel is locked down. [Modified by David Howells to fit with modifications to the previous patch and to return -EPERM if the kernel is locked down for consistency with other lockdowns. Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA integration, which will be replaced by integrating with the IMA architecture policy patches.] Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCEJiri Bohac2019-08-2015-34/+88
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with kexec_file_load(). Currently, the only way to force the signature verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This prevents loading usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime. This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE. Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be loaded. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature. Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* lockdown: Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec rebootDave Young2019-08-201-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original kernel. secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot. Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett2019-08-203-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The kexec_load() syscall permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It makes sense to disable kexec_load() in this situation. This does not affect kexec_file_load() syscall which can check for a signature on the image to be booted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* lockdown: Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett2019-08-203-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allowing users to read and write to core kernel memory makes it possible for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions, and also to steal cryptographic information. Disallow /dev/mem and /dev/kmem from being opened this when the kernel has been locked down to prevent this. Also disallow /dev/port from being opened to prevent raw ioport access and thus DMA from being used to accomplish the same thing. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked downDavid Howells2019-08-205-7/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid signatures that we can verify. I have adjusted the errors generated: (1) If there's no signature (ENODATA) or we can't check it (ENOPKG, ENOKEY), then: (a) If signatures are enforced then EKEYREJECTED is returned. (b) If there's no signature or we can't check it, but the kernel is locked down then EPERM is returned (this is then consistent with other lockdown cases). (2) If the signature is unparseable (EBADMSG, EINVAL), the signature fails the check (EKEYREJECTED) or a system error occurs (eg. ENOMEM), we return the error we got. Note that the X.509 code doesn't check for key expiry as the RTC might not be valid or might not have been transferred to the kernel's clock yet. [Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA integration. This will be replaced with integration with the IMA architecture policy patchset.] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: Add a static lockdown policy LSMMatthew Garrett2019-08-207-5/+236
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy, distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David Howells. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: Add a "locked down" LSM hookMatthew Garrett2019-08-203-0/+45
| | | | | | | | | | | Add a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be permitted. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: Support early LSMsMatthew Garrett2019-08-205-9/+62
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later. Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator isn't initialised yet). (Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when !CONFIG_SECURITY) Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Linux 5.2v5.2Linus Torvalds2019-07-081-1/+1
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* Merge tag 'for-linus-20190706' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-blockLinus Torvalds2019-07-061-0/+7
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull block fix from Jens Axboe: "Just a single fix for a patch from Greg KH, which reportedly break block debugfs locations for certain setups. Trivial enough that I think we should include it now, rather than wait and release 5.2 with it, since it's a regression in this series" * tag 'for-linus-20190706' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: blk-mq: fix up placement of debugfs directory of queue files
| * blk-mq: fix up placement of debugfs directory of queue filesGreg Kroah-Hartman2019-07-061-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the blk-mq debugfs file creation logic was "cleaned up" it was cleaned up too much, causing the queue file to not be created in the correct location. Turns out the check for the directory being present is needed as if that has not happened yet, the files should not be created, and the function will be called later on in the initialization code so that the files can be created in the correct location. Fixes: 6cfc0081b046 ("blk-mq: no need to check return value of debugfs_create functions") Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
* | Merge tag 'mips_fixes_5.2_2' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-07-067-15/+29
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mips/linux Pull MIPS fixes from Paul Burton: "A few more MIPS fixes: - Fix a silly typo in virt_addr_valid which led to completely bogus behavior (that happened to stop tripping up hardened usercopy despite being broken). - Fix UART parity setup on AR933x systems. - A build fix for non-Linux build machines. - Have the 'all' make target build DTBs, primarily to fit in with the behavior of scripts/package/builddeb. - Handle an execution hazard in TLB exceptions that use KScratch registers, which could inadvertently clobber the $1 register on some generally higher-end out-of-order CPUs. - A MAINTAINERS update to fix the path to the NAND driver for Ingenic systems" * tag 'mips_fixes_5.2_2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mips/linux: MAINTAINERS: Correct path to moved files MIPS: Add missing EHB in mtc0 -> mfc0 sequence. MIPS: have "plain" make calls build dtbs for selected platforms MIPS: fix build on non-linux hosts MIPS: ath79: fix ar933x uart parity mode MIPS: Fix bounds check virt_addr_valid
| * | MAINTAINERS: Correct path to moved filesPaul Cercueil2019-06-241-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The driver was moved in commit 1838a7b31fcb ("mtd: rawnand: Move drivers for Ingenic SoCs to subfolder"). Signed-off-by: Paul Cercueil <paul@crapouillou.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
| * | MIPS: Add missing EHB in mtc0 -> mfc0 sequence.Dmitry Korotin2019-06-241-9/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a missing EHB (Execution Hazard Barrier) in mtc0 -> mfc0 sequence. Without this execution hazard barrier it's possible for the value read back from the KScratch register to be the value from before the mtc0. Reproducible on P5600 & P6600. The hazard is documented in the MIPS Architecture Reference Manual Vol. III: MIPS32/microMIPS32 Privileged Resource Architecture (MD00088), rev 6.03 table 8.1 which includes: Producer | Consumer | Hazard ----------|----------|---------------------------- mtc0 | mfc0 | any coprocessor 0 register Signed-off-by: Dmitry Korotin <dkorotin@wavecomp.com> [paul.burton@mips.com: - Commit message tweaks. - Add Fixes tags. - Mark for stable back to v3.15 where P5600 support was introduced.] Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Fixes: 3d8bfdd03072 ("MIPS: Use C0_KScratch (if present) to hold PGD pointer.") Fixes: 829dcc0a956a ("MIPS: Add MIPS P5600 probe support") Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+
| * | MIPS: have "plain" make calls build dtbs for selected platformsCedric Hombourger2019-06-201-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | scripts/package/builddeb calls "make dtbs_install" after executing a plain make (i.e. no build targets specified). It will fail if dtbs were not built beforehand. Match the arm64 architecture where DTBs get built by the "all" target. Signed-off-by: Cedric Hombourger <Cedric_Hombourger@mentor.com> [paul.burton@mips.com: s/builddep/builddeb] Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.1+
| * | MIPS: fix build on non-linux hostsKevin Darbyshire-Bryant2019-06-202-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | calc_vmlinuz_load_addr.c requires SZ_64K to be defined for alignment purposes. It included "../../../../include/linux/sizes.h" to define that size, however "sizes.h" tries to include <linux/const.h> which assumes linux system headers. These may not exist eg. the following error was encountered when building Linux for OpenWrt under macOS: In file included from arch/mips/boot/compressed/calc_vmlinuz_load_addr.c:16: arch/mips/boot/compressed/../../../../include/linux/sizes.h:11:10: fatal error: 'linux/const.h' file not found ^~~~~~~~~~ Change makefile to force building on local linux headers instead of system headers. Also change eye-watering relative reference in include file spec. Thanks to Jo-Philip Wich & Petr Štetiar for assistance in tracking this down & fixing. Suggested-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io> Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz> Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ldir@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk> Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
| * | MIPS: ath79: fix ar933x uart parity modeStefan Hellermann2019-06-191-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While trying to get the uart with parity working I found setting even parity enabled odd parity insted. Fix the register settings to match the datasheet of AR9331. A similar patch was created by 8devices, but not sent upstream. https://github.com/8devices/openwrt-8devices/commit/77c5586ade3bb72cda010afad3f209ed0c98ea7c Signed-off-by: Stefan Hellermann <stefan@the2masters.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
| * | MIPS: Fix bounds check virt_addr_validHauke Mehrtens2019-06-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The bounds check used the uninitialized variable vaddr, it should use the given parameter kaddr instead. When using the uninitialized value the compiler assumed it to be 0 and optimized this function to just return 0 in all cases. This should make the function check the range of the given address and only do the page map check in case it is in the expected range of virtual addresses. Fixes: 074a1e1167af ("MIPS: Bounds check virt_addr_valid") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+ Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: ralf@linux-mips.org Cc: jhogan@kernel.org Cc: f4bug@amsat.org Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: ysu@wavecomp.com Cc: jcristau@debian.org
* | | Merge tag 'dmaengine-fix-5.2' of git://git.infradead.org/users/vkoul/slave-dmaLinus Torvalds2019-07-063-25/+35
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull dmaengine fixes from Vinod Koul: - bam_dma fix for completed descriptor count - fix for imx-sdma remove BD_INTR for channel0 and use-after-free on probe error path - endian bug fix in jz4780 IRQ handler * tag 'dmaengine-fix-5.2' of git://git.infradead.org/users/vkoul/slave-dma: dmaengine: qcom: bam_dma: Fix completed descriptors count dmaengine: imx-sdma: remove BD_INTR for channel0 dmaengine: imx-sdma: fix use-after-free on probe error path dmaengine: jz4780: Fix an endian bug in IRQ handler
| * | | dmaengine: qcom: bam_dma: Fix completed descriptors countSricharan R2019-07-051-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | One space is left unused in circular FIFO to differentiate 'full' and 'empty' cases. So take that in to account while counting for the descriptors completed. Fixes the issue reported here, https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/6/18/669 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sricharan R <sricharan@codeaurora.org> Tested-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
| * | | dmaengine: imx-sdma: remove BD_INTR for channel0Robin Gong2019-07-051-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It is possible for an irq triggered by channel0 to be received later after clks are disabled once firmware loaded during sdma probe. If that happens then clearing them by writing to SDMA_H_INTR won't work and the kernel will hang processing infinite interrupts. Actually, don't need interrupt triggered on channel0 since it's pollling SDMA_H_STATSTOP to know channel0 done rather than interrupt in current code, just clear BD_INTR to disable channel0 interrupt to avoid the above case. This issue was brought by commit 1d069bfa3c78 ("dmaengine: imx-sdma: ack channel 0 IRQ in the interrupt handler") which didn't take care the above case. Fixes: 1d069bfa3c78 ("dmaengine: imx-sdma: ack channel 0 IRQ in the interrupt handler") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #5.0+ Signed-off-by: Robin Gong <yibin.gong@nxp.com> Reported-by: Sven Van Asbroeck <thesven73@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sven Van Asbroeck <thesven73@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Olbrich <m.olbrich@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
| * | | dmaengine: imx-sdma: fix use-after-free on probe error pathSven Van Asbroeck2019-07-051-21/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If probe() fails anywhere beyond the point where sdma_get_firmware() is called, then a kernel oops may occur. Problematic sequence of events: 1. probe() calls sdma_get_firmware(), which schedules the firmware callback to run when firmware becomes available, using the sdma instance structure as the context 2. probe() encounters an error, which deallocates the sdma instance structure 3. firmware becomes available, firmware callback is called with deallocated sdma instance structure 4. use after free - kernel oops ! Solution: only attempt to load firmware when we're certain that probe() will succeed. This guarantees that the firmware callback's context will remain valid. Note that the remove() path is unaffected by this issue: the firmware loader will increment the driver module's use count, ensuring that the module cannot be unloaded while the firmware callback is pending or running. Signed-off-by: Sven Van Asbroeck <TheSven73@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Robin Gong <yibin.gong@nxp.com> [vkoul: fixed braces for if condition] Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
| * | | dmaengine: jz4780: Fix an endian bug in IRQ handlerDan Carpenter2019-07-051-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The "pending" variable was a u32 but we cast it to an unsigned long pointer when we do the for_each_set_bit() loop. The problem is that on big endian 64bit systems that results in an out of bounds read. Fixes: 4e4106f5e942 ("dmaengine: jz4780: Fix transfers being ACKed too soon") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
* | | | Merge tag 'scsi-fixes' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-07-062-9/+9
|\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi Pull SCSI fixes from James Bottomley: "Two iscsi fixes. One for an oops in the client which can be triggered by the server authentication protocol and the other in the target code which causes data corruption" * tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi: scsi: iscsi: set auth_protocol back to NULL if CHAP_A value is not supported scsi: target/iblock: Fix overrun in WRITE SAME emulation
| * | | | scsi: iscsi: set auth_protocol back to NULL if CHAP_A value is not supportedMaurizio Lombardi2019-07-021-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If the CHAP_A value is not supported, the chap_server_open() function should free the auth_protocol pointer and set it to NULL, or we will leave a dangling pointer around. [ 66.010905] Unsupported CHAP_A value [ 66.011660] Security negotiation failed. [ 66.012443] iSCSI Login negotiation failed. [ 68.413924] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 68.414962] CPU: 0 PID: 1562 Comm: targetcli Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.18.0-80.el8.x86_64 #1 [ 68.416589] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 [ 68.417677] RIP: 0010:__kmalloc_track_caller+0xc2/0x210 Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Chris Leech <cleech@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
| * | | | scsi: target/iblock: Fix overrun in WRITE SAME emulationRoman Bolshakov2019-07-021-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | WRITE SAME corrupts data on the block device behind iblock if the command is emulated. The emulation code issues (M - 1) * N times more bios than requested, where M is the number of 512 blocks per real block size and N is the NUMBER OF LOGICAL BLOCKS specified in WRITE SAME command. So, for a device with 4k blocks, 7 * N more LBAs gets written after the requested range. The issue happens because the number of 512 byte sectors to be written is decreased one by one while the real bios are typically from 1 to 8 512 byte sectors per bio. Fixes: c66ac9db8d4a ("[SCSI] target: Add LIO target core v4.0.0-rc6") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
* | | | | Merge branch 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfsLinus Torvalds2019-07-061-1/+0
|\ \ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull vfs fixlet from Al Viro: "Fix bogus default y in Kconfig (VALIDATE_FS_PARSER) That thing should not be turned on by default, especially since it's not quiet in case it finds no problems. Geert has sent the obvious fix quite a few times, but it fell through the cracks" * 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: fs: VALIDATE_FS_PARSER should default to n
| * | | | | fs: VALIDATE_FS_PARSER should default to nGeert Uytterhoeven2019-07-051-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CONFIG_VALIDATE_FS_PARSER is a debugging tool to check that the parser tables are vaguely sane. It was set to default to 'Y' for the moment to catch errors in upcoming fs conversion development. Make sure it is not enabled by default in the final release of v5.1. Fixes: 31d921c7fb969172 ("vfs: Add configuration parser helpers") Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | | | | | Revert "mm: page cache: store only head pages in i_pages"Linus Torvalds2019-07-068-82/+94
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 5fd4ca2d84b249f0858ce28cf637cf25b61a398f. Mikhail Gavrilov reports that it causes the VM_BUG_ON_PAGE() in __delete_from_swap_cache() to trigger: page:ffffd6d34dff0000 refcount:1 mapcount:1 mapping:ffff97812323a689 index:0xfecec363 anon flags: 0x17fffe00080034(uptodate|lru|active|swapbacked) raw: 0017fffe00080034 ffffd6d34c67c508 ffffd6d3504b8d48 ffff97812323a689 raw: 00000000fecec363 0000000000000000 0000000100000000 ffff978433ace000 page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(entry != page) page->mem_cgroup:ffff978433ace000 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/swap_state.c:170! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 221 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.2.0-0.rc2.git0.1.fc31.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/ROG STRIX X470-I GAMING, BIOS 2202 04/11/2019 RIP: 0010:__delete_from_swap_cache+0x20d/0x240 Code: 30 65 48 33 04 25 28 00 00 00 75 4a 48 83 c4 38 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 c7 c6 2f dc 0f 8a 48 89 c7 e8 93 1b fd ff <0f> 0b 48 c7 c6 a8 74 0f 8a e8 85 1b fd ff 0f 0b 48 c7 c6 a8 7d 0f RSP: 0018:ffffa982036e7980 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000021 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 0000000000000006 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000086 RDI: ffff97843d657900 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffa982036e7835 R09: 0000000000000535 R10: ffff97845e21a46c R11: ffffa982036e7835 R12: ffff978426387120 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffd6d34dff0040 R15: ffffd6d34dff0000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff97843d640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00002cba88ef5000 CR3: 000000078a97c000 CR4: 00000000003406e0 Call Trace: delete_from_swap_cache+0x46/0xa0 try_to_free_swap+0xbc/0x110 swap_writepage+0x13/0x70 pageout.isra.0+0x13c/0x350 shrink_page_list+0xc14/0xdf0 shrink_inactive_list+0x1e5/0x3c0 shrink_node_memcg+0x202/0x760 shrink_node+0xe0/0x470 balance_pgdat+0x2d1/0x510 kswapd+0x220/0x420 kthread+0xfb/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40 and it's not immediately obvious why it happens. It's too late in the rc cycle to do anything but revert for now. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CABXGCsN9mYmBD-4GaaeW_NrDu+FDXLzr_6x+XNxfmFV6QkYCDg@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-and-bisected-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Kirill Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | | | | Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds2019-07-065-15/+26
|\ \ \ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini: "x86 bugfix patches and one compilation fix for ARM" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: KVM: arm64/sve: Fix vq_present() macro to yield a bool KVM: LAPIC: Fix pending interrupt in IRR blocked by software disable LAPIC KVM: nVMX: Change KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS to signal vmcs12 is copied from eVMCS KVM: nVMX: Allow restore nested-state to enable eVMCS when vCPU in SMM KVM: x86: degrade WARN to pr_warn_ratelimited
| * | | | | | KVM: arm64/sve: Fix vq_present() macro to yield a boolZhang Lei2019-07-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The original implementation of vq_present() relied on aggressive inlining in order for the compiler to know that the code is correct, due to some const-casting issues. This was causing sparse and clang to complain, while GCC compiled cleanly. Commit 0c529ff789bc addressed this problem, but since vq_present() is no longer a function, there is now no implicit casting of the returned value to the return type (bool). In set_sve_vls(), this uncast bit value is compared against a bool, and so may spuriously compare as unequal when both are nonzero. As a result, KVM may reject valid SVE vector length configurations as invalid, and vice versa. Fix it by forcing the returned value to a bool. Signed-off-by: Zhang Lei <zhang.lei@jp.fujitsu.com> Fixes: 0c529ff789bc ("KVM: arm64: Implement vq_present() as a macro") Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> [commit message rewrite] Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * | | | | | KVM: LAPIC: Fix pending interrupt in IRR blocked by software disable LAPICWanpeng Li2019-07-021-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Thomas reported that: | Background: | | In preparation of supporting IPI shorthands I changed the CPU offline | code to software disable the local APIC instead of just masking it. | That's done by clearing the APIC_SPIV_APIC_ENABLED bit in the APIC_SPIV | register. | | Failure: | | When the CPU comes back online the startup code triggers occasionally | the warning in apic_pending_intr_clear(). That complains that the IRRs | are not empty. | | The offending vector is the local APIC timer vector who's IRR bit is set | and stays set. | | It took me quite some time to reproduce the issue locally, but now I can | see what happens. | | It requires apicv_enabled=0, i.e. full apic emulation. With apicv_enabled=1 | (and hardware support) it behaves correctly. | | Here is the series of events: | | Guest CPU | | goes down | | native_cpu_disable() | | apic_soft_disable(); | | play_dead() | | .... | | startup() | | if (apic_enabled()) | apic_pending_intr_clear() <- Not taken | | enable APIC | | apic_pending_intr_clear() <- Triggers warning because IRR is stale | | When this happens then the deadline timer or the regular APIC timer - | happens with both, has fired shortly before the APIC is disabled, but the | interrupt was not serviced because the guest CPU was in an interrupt | disabled region at that point. | | The state of the timer vector ISR/IRR bits: | | ISR IRR | before apic_soft_disable() 0 1 | after apic_soft_disable() 0 1 | | On startup 0 1 | | Now one would assume that the IRR is cleared after the INIT reset, but this | happens only on CPU0. | | Why? | | Because our CPU0 hotplug is just for testing to make sure nothing breaks | and goes through an NMI wakeup vehicle because INIT would send it through | the boots-trap code which is not really working if that CPU was not | physically unplugged. | | Now looking at a real world APIC the situation in that case is: | | ISR IRR | before apic_soft_disable() 0 1 | after apic_soft_disable() 0 1 | | On startup 0 0 | | Why? | | Once the dying CPU reenables interrupts the pending interrupt gets | delivered as a spurious interupt and then the state is clear. | | While that CPU0 hotplug test case is surely an esoteric issue, the APIC | emulation is still wrong, Even if the play_dead() code would not enable | interrupts then the pending IRR bit would turn into an ISR .. interrupt | when the APIC is reenabled on startup. From SDM 10.4.7.2 Local APIC State After It Has Been Software Disabled * Pending interrupts in the IRR and ISR registers are held and require masking or handling by the CPU. In Thomas's testing, hardware cpu will not respect soft disable LAPIC when IRR has already been set or APICv posted-interrupt is in flight, so we can skip soft disable APIC checking when clearing IRR and set ISR, continue to respect soft disable APIC when attempting to set IRR. Reported-by: Rong Chen <rong.a.chen@intel.com> Reported-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Rong Chen <rong.a.chen@intel.com> Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * | | | | | KVM: nVMX: Change KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS to signal vmcs12 is copied from eVMCSLiran Alon2019-07-022-9/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS is used to signal that eVMCS capability is enabled on vCPU. As indicated by vmx->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled. This is quite bizarre as userspace VMM should make sure to expose same vCPU with same CPUID values in both source and destination. In case vCPU is exposed with eVMCS support on CPUID, it is also expected to enable KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS capability. Therefore, KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS is redundant. KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS is currently used on restore path (vmx_set_nested_state()) only to enable eVMCS capability in KVM and to signal need_vmcs12_sync such that on next VMEntry to guest nested_sync_from_vmcs12() will be called to sync vmcs12 content into eVMCS in guest memory. However, because restore nested-state is rare enough, we could have just modified vmx_set_nested_state() to always signal need_vmcs12_sync. From all the above, it seems that we could have just removed the usage of KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS. However, in order to preserve backwards migration compatibility, we cannot do that. (vmx_get_nested_state() needs to signal flag when migrating from new kernel to old kernel). Returning KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS when just vCPU have eVMCS enabled have a bad side-effect of userspace VMM having to send nested-state from source to destination as part of migration stream. Even if guest have never used eVMCS as it doesn't even run a nested hypervisor workload. This requires destination userspace VMM and KVM to support setting nested-state. Which make it more difficult to migrate from new host to older host. To avoid this, change KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS to signal eVMCS is not only enabled but also active. i.e. Guest have made some eVMCS active via an enlightened VMEntry. i.e. vmcs12 is copied from eVMCS and therefore should be restored into eVMCS resident in memory (by copy_vmcs12_to_enlightened()). Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maran Wilson <maran.wilson@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * | | | | | KVM: nVMX: Allow restore nested-state to enable eVMCS when vCPU in SMMLiran Alon2019-07-021-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As comment in code specifies, SMM temporarily disables VMX so we cannot be in guest mode, nor can VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME be pending. However, code currently assumes that these are the only flags that can be set on kvm_state->flags. This is not true as KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS can also be set on this field to signal that eVMCS should be enabled. Therefore, fix code to check for guest-mode and pending VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME explicitly. Reviewed-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-12-26 11:23:36 +0100