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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random
Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld:
"Originally I'd planned on sending each of the vDSO getrandom()
architecture ports to their respective arch trees. But as we started
to work on this, we found lots of interesting issues in the shared
code and infrastructure, the fixes for which the various archs needed
to base their work.
So in the end, this turned into a nice collaborative effort fixing up
issues and porting to 5 new architectures -- arm64, powerpc64,
powerpc32, s390x, and loongarch64 -- with everybody pitching in and
commenting on each other's code. It was a fun development cycle.
This contains:
- Numerous fixups to the vDSO selftest infrastructure, getting it
running successfully on more platforms, and fixing bugs in it.
- Additions to the vDSO getrandom & chacha selftests. Basically every
time manual review unearthed a bug in a revision of an arch patch,
or an ambiguity, the tests were augmented.
By the time the last arch was submitted for review, s390x, v1 of
the series was essentially fine right out of the gate.
- Fixes to the the generic C implementation of vDSO getrandom, to
build and run successfully on all archs, decoupling it from
assumptions we had (unintentionally) made on x86_64 that didn't
carry through to the other architectures.
- Port of vDSO getrandom to LoongArch64, from Xi Ruoyao and acked by
Huacai Chen.
- Port of vDSO getrandom to ARM64, from Adhemerval Zanella and acked
by Will Deacon.
- Port of vDSO getrandom to PowerPC, in both 32-bit and 64-bit
varieties, from Christophe Leroy and acked by Michael Ellerman.
- Port of vDSO getrandom to S390X from Heiko Carstens, the arch
maintainer.
While it'd be natural for there to be things to fix up over the course
of the development cycle, these patches got a decent amount of review
from a fairly diverse crew of folks on the mailing lists, and, for the
most part, they've been cooking in linux-next, which has been helpful
for ironing out build issues.
In terms of architectures, I think that mostly takes care of the
important 64-bit archs with hardware still being produced and running
production loads in settings where vDSO getrandom is likely to help.
Arguably there's still RISC-V left, and we'll see for 6.13 whether
they find it useful and submit a port"
* tag 'random-6.12-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random: (47 commits)
selftests: vDSO: check cpu caps before running chacha test
s390/vdso: Wire up getrandom() vdso implementation
s390/vdso: Move vdso symbol handling to separate header file
s390/vdso: Allow alternatives in vdso code
s390/module: Provide find_section() helper
s390/facility: Let test_facility() generate static branch if possible
s390/alternatives: Remove ALT_FACILITY_EARLY
s390/facility: Disable compile time optimization for decompressor code
selftests: vDSO: fix vdso_config for s390
selftests: vDSO: fix ELF hash table entry size for s390x
powerpc/vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation on VDSO64
powerpc/vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation on VDSO32
powerpc/vdso: Refactor CFLAGS for CVDSO build
powerpc/vdso32: Add crtsavres
mm: Define VM_DROPPABLE for powerpc/32
powerpc/vdso: Fix VDSO data access when running in a non-root time namespace
selftests: vDSO: don't include generated headers for chacha test
arm64: vDSO: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation
arm64: alternative: make alternative_has_cap_likely() VDSO compatible
selftests: vDSO: also test counter in vdso_test_chacha
...
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Hook up the generic vDSO implementation to the aarch64 vDSO data page.
The _vdso_rng_data required data is placed within the _vdso_data vvar
page, by using a offset larger than the vdso_data.
The vDSO function requires a ChaCha20 implementation that does not write
to the stack, and that can do an entire ChaCha20 permutation. The one
provided uses NEON on the permute operation, with a fallback to the
syscall for chips that do not support AdvSIMD.
This also passes the vdso_test_chacha test along with
vdso_test_getrandom. The vdso_test_getrandom bench-single result on
Neoverse-N1 shows:
vdso: 25000000 times in 0.783884250 seconds
libc: 25000000 times in 8.780275399 seconds
syscall: 25000000 times in 8.786581518 seconds
A small fixup to arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h was required to avoid
pulling kernel code into the vDSO, similar to what's already done in
arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h.
Signed-off-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Modify arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() and vm_get_page_prot() such that the pkey
value is set in the vm_flags and then into the pgprot value.
Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240822151113.1479789-15-joey.gouly@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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This defines and exports a platform specific custom vm_get_page_prot() via
subscribing ARCH_HAS_VM_GET_PAGE_PROT. It localizes arch_vm_get_page_prot()
and moves it near vm_get_page_prot().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220414062125.609297-4-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Make use of the newly introduced arch_validate_flags() hook to
sanity-check the PROT_MTE request passed to mmap() and mprotect(). If
the mapping does not support MTE, these syscalls will return -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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To enable tagging on a memory range, the user must explicitly opt in via
a new PROT_MTE flag passed to mmap() or mprotect(). Since this is a new
memory type in the AttrIndx field of a pte, simplify the or'ing of these
bits over the protection_map[] attributes by making MT_NORMAL index 0.
There are two conditions for arch_vm_get_page_prot() to return the
MT_NORMAL_TAGGED memory type: (1) the user requested it via PROT_MTE,
registered as VM_MTE in the vm_flags, and (2) the vma supports MTE,
decided during the mmap() call (only) and registered as VM_MTE_ALLOWED.
arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() is responsible for registering the user request
as VM_MTE. The newly introduced arch_calc_vm_flag_bits() sets
VM_MTE_ALLOWED if the mapping is MAP_ANONYMOUS. An MTE-capable
filesystem (RAM-based) may be able to set VM_MTE_ALLOWED during its
mmap() file ops call.
In addition, update VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS to allow mprotect(PROT_MTE) on
stack or brk area.
The Linux mmap() syscall currently ignores unknown PROT_* flags. In the
presence of MTE, an mmap(PROT_MTE) on a file which does not support MTE
will not report an error and the memory will not be mapped as Normal
Tagged. For consistency, mprotect(PROT_MTE) will not report an error
either if the memory range does not support MTE. Two subsequent patches
in the series will propose tightening of this behaviour.
Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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This patch adds the bare minimum required to expose the ARMv8.5
Branch Target Identification feature to userspace.
By itself, this does _not_ automatically enable BTI for any initial
executable pages mapped by execve(). This will come later, but for
now it should be possible to enable BTI manually on those pages by
using mprotect() from within the target process.
Other arches already using the generic mman.h are already using
0x10 for arch-specific prot flags, so we use that for PROT_BTI
here.
For consistency, signal handler entry points in BTI guarded pages
are required to be annotated as such, just like any other function.
This blocks a relatively minor attack vector, but comforming
userspace will have the annotations anyway, so we may as well
enforce them.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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