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There are no external users left, make the array static.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613-cros_ec-led-v3-3-500b50f41e0f@weissschuh.net
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
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led_get_color_name() is a safer alternative to led_colors.
led-class-multicolor.c is the only external user of led_colors and its
removal allows unexporting the array.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613-cros_ec-led-v3-2-500b50f41e0f@weissschuh.net
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
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This is similar to the existing led_colors[] array but is safer to use and
usable by everyone.
Getting string representations of color ids is useful for drivers
which are handling color IDs anyways, for example for the multicolor API.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613-cros_ec-led-v3-1-500b50f41e0f@weissschuh.net
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
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percpu.h depends on smp.h, but doesn't include it directly because of
circular header dependency issues; percpu.h is needed in a bunch of low
level headers.
This fixes a randconfig build error on mips:
include/linux/alloc_tag.h: In function '__alloc_tag_ref_set':
include/asm-generic/percpu.h:31:40: error: implicit declaration of function 'raw_smp_processor_id' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: 24e44cc22aa3 ("mm: percpu: enable per-cpu allocation tagging")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202405210052.DIrMXJNz-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This reverts commit 617824a7f0f73e4de325cf8add58e55b28c12493.
This made a simple 'perf record -e cycles:pp make -j199' stop working on
the Ampere ARM64 system Linus uses to test ARM64 kernels, as discussed
at length in the threads in the Link tags below.
The fix provided by Ian wasn't acceptable and work to fix this will take
time we don't have at this point, so lets revert this and work on it on
the next devel cycle.
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Bhaskar Chowdhury <unixbhaskar@gmail.com>
Cc: Ethan Adams <j.ethan.adams@gmail.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Cc: Yang Jihong <yangjihong@bytedance.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wi5Ri=yR2jBVk-4HzTzpoAWOgstr1LEvg_-OXtJvXXJOA@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiWvtFyedDNpoV7a8Fq_FpbB+F5KmWK2xPY3QoYseOf_A@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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Occasionally, the generic/001 xfstest will fail indicating corruption in
one of the copy chains when run on cifs against a server that supports
FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE (eg. Samba with a share on btrfs). The
problem is that the remote_i_size value isn't updated by cifs_setsize()
when called by smb2_duplicate_extents(), but i_size *is*.
This may cause cifs_remap_file_range() to then skip the bit after calling
->duplicate_extents() that sets sizes.
Fix this by calling netfs_resize_file() in smb2_duplicate_extents() before
calling cifs_setsize() to set i_size.
This means we don't then need to call netfs_resize_file() upon return from
->duplicate_extents(), but we also fix the test to compare against the pre-dup
inode size.
[Note that this goes back before the addition of remote_i_size with the
netfs_inode struct. It should probably have been setting cifsi->server_eof
previously.]
Fixes: cfc63fc8126a ("smb3: fix cached file size problems in duplicate extents (reflink)")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
cc: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.com>
cc: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com>
cc: Rohith Surabattula <rohiths.msft@gmail.com>
cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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Fix smb3_insert_range() to move the zero_point over to the new EOF.
Without this, generic/147 fails as reads of data beyond the old EOF point
return zeroes.
Fixes: 3ee1a1fc3981 ("cifs: Cut over to using netfslib")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com>
cc: Rohith Surabattula <rohiths.msft@gmail.com>
cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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The commit 2c653d0ee2ae ("ksm: introduce ksm_max_page_sharing per page
deduplication limit") introduced a possible failure case in the
stable_tree_insert(), where we may free the new allocated stable_node_dup
if we fail to prepare the missing chain node.
Then that kfolio return and unlock with a freed stable_node set... And
any MM activities can come in to access kfolio->mapping, so UAF.
Fix it by moving folio_set_stable_node() to the end after stable_node
is inserted successfully.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240513-b4-ksm-stable-node-uaf-v1-1-f687de76f452@linux.dev
Fixes: 2c653d0ee2ae ("ksm: introduce ksm_max_page_sharing per page deduplication limit")
Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou@linux.dev>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Stefan Roesch <shr@devkernel.io>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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When I did memory failure tests recently, below panic occurs:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page))
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:1009!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:__del_page_from_free_list+0x151/0x180
RSP: 0018:ffffa49c90437998 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: 0000000000000035 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c8
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c0
RBP: ffffd901233b8000 R08: ffffffffab5511f8 R09: 0000000000008c69
R10: 0000000000003c15 R11: ffffffffab5511f8 R12: ffff8dd8fffc0c80
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8dd8fffc0c80 R15: 0000000000000009
FS: 00007ff916304740(0000) GS:ffff8dd8dfd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055eae50124c8 CR3: 00000008479e0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__rmqueue_pcplist+0x23b/0x520
get_page_from_freelist+0x26b/0xe40
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x113/0x1120
__folio_alloc_noprof+0x11/0xb0
alloc_buddy_hugetlb_folio.isra.0+0x5a/0x130
__alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio+0xe7/0x140
alloc_pool_huge_folio+0x68/0x100
set_max_huge_pages+0x13d/0x340
hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common+0xe8/0x110
proc_sys_call_handler+0x194/0x280
vfs_write+0x387/0x550
ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ff916114887
RSP: 002b:00007ffec8a2fd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055eae500e350 RCX: 00007ff916114887
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000055eae500e390 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000055eae50104c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055eae50104c0
R10: 0000000000000077 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00007ff916216b80 R15: 00007ff916216a00
</TASK>
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
And before the panic, there had an warning about bad page state:
BUG: Bad page state in process page-types pfn:8cee00
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
page_type: 0xffffff7f(buddy)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 ffffd901241c0008 ffffd901240f8008 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
CPU: 8 PID: 154211 Comm: page-types Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-00499-g5544ec3178e2-dirty #22
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x83/0xa0
bad_page+0x63/0xf0
free_unref_page+0x36e/0x5c0
unpoison_memory+0x50b/0x630
simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110
debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60
full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80
vfs_write+0xcd/0x550
ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f189a514887
RSP: 002b:00007ffdcd899718 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f189a514887
RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 00007ffdcd899730 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffdcd8997a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffdcd8994b2
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdcda199a8
R13: 0000000000404af1 R14: 000000000040ad78 R15: 00007f189a7a5040
</TASK>
The root cause should be the below race:
memory_failure
try_memory_failure_hugetlb
me_huge_page
__page_handle_poison
dissolve_free_hugetlb_folio
drain_all_pages -- Buddy page can be isolated e.g. for compaction.
take_page_off_buddy -- Failed as page is not in the buddy list.
-- Page can be putback into buddy after compaction.
page_ref_inc -- Leads to buddy page with refcnt = 1.
Then unpoison_memory() can unpoison the page and send the buddy page back
into buddy list again leading to the above bad page state warning. And
bad_page() will call page_mapcount_reset() to remove PageBuddy from buddy
page leading to later VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page)) when trying to
allocate this page.
Fix this issue by only treating __page_handle_poison() as successful when
it returns 1.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240523071217.1696196-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: ceaf8fbea79a ("mm, hwpoison: skip raw hwpoison page in freeing 1GB hugepage")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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After switching smaps_rollup to use VMA iterator, searching for next entry
is part of the condition expression of the do-while loop. So the current
VMA needs to be addressed before the continue statement.
Otherwise, with some VMAs skipped, userspace observed memory
consumption from /proc/pid/smaps_rollup will be smaller than the sum of
the corresponding fields from /proc/pid/smaps.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240523183531.2535436-1-yzhong@purestorage.com
Fixes: c4c84f06285e ("fs/proc/task_mmu: stop using linked list and highest_vm_end")
Signed-off-by: Yuanyuan Zhong <yzhong@purestorage.com>
Reviewed-by: Mohamed Khalfella <mkhalfella@purestorage.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Syzbot has reported a potential hang in nilfs_detach_log_writer() called
during nilfs2 unmount.
Analysis revealed that this is because nilfs_segctor_sync(), which
synchronizes with the log writer thread, can be called after
nilfs_segctor_destroy() terminates that thread, as shown in the call trace
below:
nilfs_detach_log_writer
nilfs_segctor_destroy
nilfs_segctor_kill_thread --> Shut down log writer thread
flush_work
nilfs_iput_work_func
nilfs_dispose_list
iput
nilfs_evict_inode
nilfs_transaction_commit
nilfs_construct_segment (if inode needs sync)
nilfs_segctor_sync --> Attempt to synchronize with
log writer thread
*** DEADLOCK ***
Fix this issue by changing nilfs_segctor_sync() so that the log writer
thread returns normally without synchronizing after it terminates, and by
forcing tasks that are already waiting to complete once after the thread
terminates.
The skipped inode metadata flushout will then be processed together in the
subsequent cleanup work in nilfs_segctor_destroy().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240520132621.4054-4-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+e3973c409251e136fdd0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e3973c409251e136fdd0
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Bai, Shuangpeng" <sjb7183@psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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A potential and reproducible race issue has been identified where
nilfs_segctor_sync() would block even after the log writer thread writes a
checkpoint, unless there is an interrupt or other trigger to resume log
writing.
This turned out to be because, depending on the execution timing of the
log writer thread running in parallel, the log writer thread may skip
responding to nilfs_segctor_sync(), which causes a call to schedule()
waiting for completion within nilfs_segctor_sync() to lose the opportunity
to wake up.
The reason why waking up the task waiting in nilfs_segctor_sync() may be
skipped is that updating the request generation issued using a shared
sequence counter and adding an wait queue entry to the request wait queue
to the log writer, are not done atomically. There is a possibility that
log writing and request completion notification by nilfs_segctor_wakeup()
may occur between the two operations, and in that case, the wait queue
entry is not yet visible to nilfs_segctor_wakeup() and the wake-up of
nilfs_segctor_sync() will be carried over until the next request occurs.
Fix this issue by performing these two operations simultaneously within
the lock section of sc_state_lock. Also, following the memory barrier
guidelines for event waiting loops, move the call to set_current_state()
in the same location into the event waiting loop to ensure that a memory
barrier is inserted just before the event condition determination.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240520132621.4054-3-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Fixes: 9ff05123e3bf ("nilfs2: segment constructor")
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Bai, Shuangpeng" <sjb7183@psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "nilfs2: fix log writer related issues".
This bug fix series covers three nilfs2 log writer-related issues,
including a timer use-after-free issue and potential deadlock issue on
unmount, and a potential freeze issue in event synchronization found
during their analysis. Details are described in each commit log.
This patch (of 3):
A use-after-free issue has been reported regarding the timer sc_timer on
the nilfs_sc_info structure.
The problem is that even though it is used to wake up a sleeping log
writer thread, sc_timer is not shut down until the nilfs_sc_info structure
is about to be freed, and is used regardless of the thread's lifetime.
Fix this issue by limiting the use of sc_timer only while the log writer
thread is alive.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240520132621.4054-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240520132621.4054-2-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Fixes: fdce895ea5dd ("nilfs2: change sc_timer from a pointer to an embedded one in struct nilfs_sc_info")
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Reported-by: "Bai, Shuangpeng" <sjb7183@psu.edu>
Closes: https://groups.google.com/g/syzkaller/c/MK_LYqtt8ko/m/8rgdWeseAwAJ
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Fix warnings like:
In file included from uffd-unit-tests.c:8:
uffd-unit-tests.c: In function `uffd_poison_handle_fault':
uffd-common.h:45:33: warning: format `%llu' expects argument of type
`long long unsigned int', but argument 3 has type `__u64' {aka `long
unsigned int'} [-Wformat=]
By switching to unsigned long long for u64 for ppc64 builds.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240521030219.57439-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Klara Modin reported warnings for a kernel configured with BPF_JIT but
without MODULES:
[ 44.131296] Trying to vfree() bad address (000000004a17c299)
[ 44.138024] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 193 at mm/vmalloc.c:3189 remove_vm_area (mm/vmalloc.c:3189 (discriminator 1))
[ 44.146675] CPU: 1 PID: 193 Comm: kworker/1:2 Tainted: G D W 6.9.0-01786-g2c9e5d4a0082 #25
[ 44.158229] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 3 Model B (DT)
[ 44.164433] Workqueue: events bpf_prog_free_deferred
[ 44.170492] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 44.178601] pc : remove_vm_area (mm/vmalloc.c:3189 (discriminator 1))
[ 44.183705] lr : remove_vm_area (mm/vmalloc.c:3189 (discriminator 1))
[ 44.188772] sp : ffff800082a13c70
[ 44.193112] x29: ffff800082a13c70 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 44.201384] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff00003a44efa0 x24: 00000000d4202000
[ 44.209658] x23: ffff800081223dd0 x22: ffff00003a198a40 x21: ffff8000814dd880
[ 44.217924] x20: 00000000d4202000 x19: ffff8000814dd880 x18: 0000000000000006
[ 44.226206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000020 x15: 0000000000000002
[ 44.234460] x14: ffff8000811a6370 x13: 0000000020000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 44.242710] x11: ffff8000811a6370 x10: 0000000000000144 x9 : ffff8000811fe370
[ 44.250959] x8 : 0000000000017fe8 x7 : 00000000fffff000 x6 : ffff8000811fe370
[ 44.259206] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 44.267457] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000002203240
[ 44.275703] Call trace:
[ 44.279158] remove_vm_area (mm/vmalloc.c:3189 (discriminator 1))
[ 44.283858] vfree (mm/vmalloc.c:3322)
[ 44.287835] execmem_free (mm/execmem.c:70)
[ 44.292347] bpf_jit_free_exec+0x10/0x1c
[ 44.297283] bpf_prog_pack_free (kernel/bpf/core.c:1006)
[ 44.302457] bpf_jit_binary_pack_free (kernel/bpf/core.c:1195)
[ 44.307951] bpf_jit_free (include/linux/filter.h:1083 arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:2474)
[ 44.312342] bpf_prog_free_deferred (kernel/bpf/core.c:2785)
[ 44.317785] process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3273)
[ 44.322684] worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3342 (discriminator 2) kernel/workqueue.c:3429 (discriminator 2))
[ 44.327292] kthread (kernel/kthread.c:388)
[ 44.331342] ret_from_fork (arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:861)
The problem is because bpf_arch_text_copy() silently fails to write to the
read-only area as a result of patch_map() faulting and the resulting
-EFAULT being chucked away.
Update patch_map() to use CONFIG_EXECMEM instead of
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX to check for vmalloc addresses.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240521213813.703309-1-rppt@kernel.org
Fixes: 2c9e5d4a0082 ("bpf: remove CONFIG_BPF_JIT dependency on CONFIG_MODULES of")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/7983fbbf-0127-457c-9394-8d6e4299c685@gmail.com
Tested-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Cc: Björn Töpel <bjorn@kernel.org>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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of OOM-killer invocation
Reset nr_hugepages to zero before the start of the test.
If a non-zero number of hugepages is already set before the start of the
test, the following problems arise:
- The probability of the test getting OOM-killed increases. Proof:
The test wants to run on 80% of available memory to prevent OOM-killing
(see original code comments). Let the value of mem_free at the start
of the test, when nr_hugepages = 0, be x. In the other case, when
nr_hugepages > 0, let the memory consumed by hugepages be y. In the
former case, the test operates on 0.8 * x of memory. In the latter,
the test operates on 0.8 * (x - y) of memory, with y already filled,
hence, memory consumed is y + 0.8 * (x - y) = 0.8 * x + 0.2 * y > 0.8 *
x. Q.E.D
- The probability of a bogus test success increases. Proof: Let the
memory consumed by hugepages be greater than 25% of x, with x and y
defined as above. The definition of compaction_index is c_index = (x -
y)/z where z is the memory consumed by hugepages after trying to
increase them again. In check_compaction(), we set the number of
hugepages to zero, and then increase them back; the probability that
they will be set back to consume at least y amount of memory again is
very high (since there is not much delay between the two attempts of
changing nr_hugepages). Hence, z >= y > (x/4) (by the 25% assumption).
Therefore, c_index = (x - y)/z <= (x - y)/y = x/y - 1 < 4 - 1 = 3
hence, c_index can always be forced to be less than 3, thereby the test
succeeding always. Q.E.D
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240521074358.675031-4-dev.jain@arm.com
Fixes: bd67d5c15cc1 ("Test compaction of mlocked memory")
Signed-off-by: Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sri Jayaramappa <sjayaram@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Currently, the test tries to set nr_hugepages to zero, but that is not
actually done because the file offset is not reset after read(). Fix that
using lseek().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240521074358.675031-3-dev.jain@arm.com
Fixes: bd67d5c15cc1 ("Test compaction of mlocked memory")
Signed-off-by: Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sri Jayaramappa <sjayaram@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Patch series "Fixes for compaction_test", v2.
The compaction_test memory selftest introduces fragmentation in memory
and then tries to allocate as many hugepages as possible. This series
addresses some problems.
On Aarch64, if nr_hugepages == 0, then the test trivially succeeds since
compaction_index becomes 0, which is less than 3, due to no division by
zero exception being raised. We fix that by checking for division by
zero.
Secondly, correctly set the number of hugepages to zero before trying
to set a large number of them.
Now, consider a situation in which, at the start of the test, a non-zero
number of hugepages have been already set (while running the entire
selftests/mm suite, or manually by the admin). The test operates on 80%
of memory to avoid OOM-killer invocation, and because some memory is
already blocked by hugepages, it would increase the chance of OOM-killing.
Also, since mem_free used in check_compaction() is the value before we
set nr_hugepages to zero, the chance that the compaction_index will
be small is very high if the preset nr_hugepages was high, leading to a
bogus test success.
This patch (of 3):
Currently, if at runtime we are not able to allocate a huge page, the test
will trivially pass on Aarch64 due to no exception being raised on
division by zero while computing compaction_index. Fix that by checking
for nr_hugepages == 0. Anyways, in general, avoid a division by zero by
exiting the program beforehand. While at it, fix a typo, and handle the
case where the number of hugepages may overflow an integer.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240521074358.675031-1-dev.jain@arm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240521074358.675031-2-dev.jain@arm.com
Fixes: bd67d5c15cc1 ("Test compaction of mlocked memory")
Signed-off-by: Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sri Jayaramappa <sjayaram@akamai.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Update mailmap with my latest email ID, quic_c_skakit@quicinc.com
is no longer active.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240515-mailmap-update-v1-1-df4853f757a3@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Satya Priya Kakitapalli <quic_skakitap@quicinc.com>
Cc: Ajit Pandey <quic_ajipan@quicinc.com>
Cc: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org>
Cc: Imran Shaik <quic_imrashai@quicinc.com>
Cc: Jagadeesh Kona <quic_jkona@quicinc.com>
Cc: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio@linaro.org>
Cc: Taniya Das <quic_tdas@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
When I did memory failure tests recently, below panic occurs:
kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1135!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 9 PID: 137 Comm: kswapd1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-00491-gd5ce28f156fe-dirty #14
RIP: 0010:shrink_huge_zero_page_scan+0x168/0x1a0
RSP: 0018:ffff9933c6c57bd0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88f61fc5c9c8
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff88f61fc5c9c0
RBP: ffffcd7c446b0000 R08: ffffffff9a9405f0 R09: 0000000000005492
R10: 00000000000030ea R11: ffffffff9a9405f0 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88e703c4ac00
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88f61fc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055f4da6e9878 CR3: 0000000c71048000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
do_shrink_slab+0x14f/0x6a0
shrink_slab+0xca/0x8c0
shrink_node+0x2d0/0x7d0
balance_pgdat+0x33a/0x720
kswapd+0x1f3/0x410
kthread+0xd5/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:shrink_huge_zero_page_scan+0x168/0x1a0
RSP: 0018:ffff9933c6c57bd0 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88f61fc5c9c8
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff88f61fc5c9c0
RBP: ffffcd7c446b0000 R08: ffffffff9a9405f0 R09: 0000000000005492
R10: 00000000000030ea R11: ffffffff9a9405f0 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88e703c4ac00
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88f61fc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055f4da6e9878 CR3: 0000000c71048000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
The root cause is that HWPoison flag will be set for huge_zero_folio
without increasing the folio refcnt. But then unpoison_memory() will
decrease the folio refcnt unexpectedly as it appears like a successfully
hwpoisoned folio leading to VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_ref_count(page) == 0) when
releasing huge_zero_folio.
Skip unpoisoning huge_zero_folio in unpoison_memory() to fix this issue.
We're not prepared to unpoison huge_zero_folio yet.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240516122608.22610-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: 478d134e9506 ("mm/huge_memory: do not overkill when splitting huge_zero_page")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>
Cc: Xu Yu <xuyu@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
After commit 69d4c0d32186 ("entry, kasan, x86: Disallow overriding mem*()
functions") and the follow-up fixes, with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE enabled,
even though the compiler instruments meminstrinsics by generating calls to
__asan/__hwasan_ prefixed functions, FORTIFY_SOURCE still uses
uninstrumented memset/memmove/memcpy as the underlying functions.
As a result, KASAN cannot detect bad accesses in memset/memmove/memcpy.
This also makes KASAN tests corrupt kernel memory and cause crashes.
To fix this, use __asan_/__hwasan_memset/memmove/memcpy as the underlying
functions whenever appropriate. Do this only for the instrumented code
(as indicated by __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240517130118.759301-1-andrey.konovalov@linux.dev
Fixes: 69d4c0d32186 ("entry, kasan, x86: Disallow overriding mem*() functions")
Fixes: 51287dcb00cc ("kasan: emit different calls for instrumentable memintrinsics")
Fixes: 36be5cba99f6 ("kasan: treat meminstrinsic as builtins in uninstrumented files")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Reported-by: Nico Pache <npache@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240501144156.17e65021@outsider.home/
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Tested-by: Nico Pache <npache@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Nico Pache <npache@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Add version string and a header at the beginning of /proc/allocinfo to
allow later format changes. Example output:
> head /proc/allocinfo
allocinfo - version: 1.0
# <size> <calls> <tag info>
0 0 init/main.c:1314 func:do_initcalls
0 0 init/do_mounts.c:353 func:mount_nodev_root
0 0 init/do_mounts.c:187 func:mount_root_generic
0 0 init/do_mounts.c:158 func:do_mount_root
0 0 init/initramfs.c:493 func:unpack_to_rootfs
0 0 init/initramfs.c:492 func:unpack_to_rootfs
0 0 init/initramfs.c:491 func:unpack_to_rootfs
512 1 arch/x86/events/rapl.c:681 func:init_rapl_pmus
128 1 arch/x86/events/rapl.c:571 func:rapl_cpu_online
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove stray newline from struct allocinfo_private]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240514163128.3662251-1-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
commit a421ef303008 ("mm: allow !GFP_KERNEL allocations for kvmalloc")
includes support for __GFP_NOFAIL, but it presents a conflict with commit
dd544141b9eb ("vmalloc: back off when the current task is OOM-killed"). A
possible scenario is as follows:
process-a
__vmalloc_node_range(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL)
__vmalloc_area_node()
vm_area_alloc_pages()
--> oom-killer send SIGKILL to process-a
if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) break;
--> return NULL;
To fix this, do not check fatal_signal_pending() in vm_area_alloc_pages()
if __GFP_NOFAIL set.
This issue occurred during OPLUS KASAN TEST. Below is part of the log
-> oom-killer sends signal to process
[65731.222840] [ T1308] oom-kill:constraint=CONSTRAINT_NONE,nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0,global_oom,task_memcg=/apps/uid_10198,task=gs.intelligence,pid=32454,uid=10198
[65731.259685] [T32454] Call trace:
[65731.259698] [T32454] dump_backtrace+0xf4/0x118
[65731.259734] [T32454] show_stack+0x18/0x24
[65731.259756] [T32454] dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x7c
[65731.259781] [T32454] dump_stack+0x18/0x38
[65731.259800] [T32454] mrdump_common_die+0x250/0x39c [mrdump]
[65731.259936] [T32454] ipanic_die+0x20/0x34 [mrdump]
[65731.260019] [T32454] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xb4/0xfc
[65731.260047] [T32454] notify_die+0x114/0x198
[65731.260073] [T32454] die+0xf4/0x5b4
[65731.260098] [T32454] die_kernel_fault+0x80/0x98
[65731.260124] [T32454] __do_kernel_fault+0x160/0x2a8
[65731.260146] [T32454] do_bad_area+0x68/0x148
[65731.260174] [T32454] do_mem_abort+0x151c/0x1b34
[65731.260204] [T32454] el1_abort+0x3c/0x5c
[65731.260227] [T32454] el1h_64_sync_handler+0x54/0x90
[65731.260248] [T32454] el1h_64_sync+0x68/0x6c
[65731.260269] [T32454] z_erofs_decompress_queue+0x7f0/0x2258
--> be->decompressed_pages = kvcalloc(be->nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL);
kernel panic by NULL pointer dereference.
erofs assume kvmalloc with __GFP_NOFAIL never return NULL.
[65731.260293] [T32454] z_erofs_runqueue+0xf30/0x104c
[65731.260314] [T32454] z_erofs_readahead+0x4f0/0x968
[65731.260339] [T32454] read_pages+0x170/0xadc
[65731.260364] [T32454] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x874/0xf30
[65731.260388] [T32454] page_cache_ra_order+0x24c/0x714
[65731.260411] [T32454] filemap_fault+0xbf0/0x1a74
[65731.260437] [T32454] __do_fault+0xd0/0x33c
[65731.260462] [T32454] handle_mm_fault+0xf74/0x3fe0
[65731.260486] [T32454] do_mem_abort+0x54c/0x1b34
[65731.260509] [T32454] el0_da+0x44/0x94
[65731.260531] [T32454] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x98/0xb4
[65731.260553] [T32454] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240510100131.1865-1-hailong.liu@oppo.com
Fixes: 9376130c390a ("mm/vmalloc: add support for __GFP_NOFAIL")
Signed-off-by: Hailong.Liu <hailong.liu@oppo.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Suggested-by: Barry Song <21cnbao@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Oven <liyangouwen1@oppo.com>
Reviewed-by: Barry Song <baohua@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Gao Xiang <xiang@kernel.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
irq_find_at_or_after() dereferences the interrupt descriptor which is
returned by mt_find() while neither holding sparse_irq_lock nor RCU read
lock, which means the descriptor can be freed between mt_find() and the
dereference:
CPU0 CPU1
desc = mt_find()
delayed_free_desc(desc)
irq_desc_get_irq(desc)
The use-after-free is reported by KASAN:
Call trace:
irq_get_next_irq+0x58/0x84
show_stat+0x638/0x824
seq_read_iter+0x158/0x4ec
proc_reg_read_iter+0x94/0x12c
vfs_read+0x1e0/0x2c8
Freed by task 4471:
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x174/0x1e0
__kmem_cache_free+0xa4/0x1dc
kfree+0x64/0x128
irq_kobj_release+0x28/0x3c
kobject_put+0xcc/0x1e0
delayed_free_desc+0x14/0x2c
rcu_do_batch+0x214/0x720
Guard the access with a RCU read lock section.
Fixes: 721255b9826b ("genirq: Use a maple tree for interrupt descriptor management")
Signed-off-by: dicken.ding <dicken.ding@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240524091739.31611-1-dicken.ding@mediatek.com
|
|
If we somehow attempt to read beyond the directory size, an error
is supposed to be returned.
However, in some cases, read requests do not stop and instead enter
into a loop.
To avoid this, we set the position in the directory to the end.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
|
In most cases when adding a cluster to the directory index,
they are placed at the end, and in the bitmap, this cluster corresponds
to the last bit. The new directory size is calculated as follows:
data_size = (u64)(bit + 1) << indx->index_bits;
In the case of reusing a non-final cluster from the index,
data_size is calculated incorrectly, resulting in the directory size
differing from the actual size.
A check for cluster reuse has been added, and the size update is skipped.
Fixes: 82cae269cfa95 ("fs/ntfs3: Add initialization of super block")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
|
|
Sealing read-only of elf mapping so it can't be changed by mprotect.
[jeffxu@chromium.org: style change]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240416220944.2481203-2-jeffxu@chromium.org
[amer.shanawany@gmail.com: fix linker error for inline function]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240420202346.546444-1-amer.shanawany@gmail.com
[jeffxu@chromium.org: fix compile warning]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240420003515.345982-2-jeffxu@chromium.org
[jeffxu@chromium.org: fix arm build]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240502225331.3806279-2-jeffxu@chromium.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-6-jeffxu@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com>
Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Add documentation for mseal().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-5-jeffxu@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com>
Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
selftest for memory sealing change in mmap() and mseal().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-4-jeffxu@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com>
Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature:
int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
addr/len: memory range.
flags: reserved.
mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range.
1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can
be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.
2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
via mremap().
3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific
risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is
unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA.
5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().
6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous
memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those
behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a
memset(0) for anonymous memory.
Following input during RFC are incooperated into this patch:
Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the
destructive madvise operations.
Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope.
Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization.
Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from
implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD.
Finally, the idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger's
work in Chrome V8 CFI.
[jeffxu@chromium.org: add branch prediction hint, per Pedro]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240423192825.1273679-2-jeffxu@chromium.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-3-jeffxu@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com>
Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10.
This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel.
In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range
against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits.
Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and
no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel
version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature improves
the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot
simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The memory
must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur.
Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data
structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects the
VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type.
Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a
corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example,
such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees
since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable
or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be
applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and
applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A
similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the
VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall
[4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and
this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case.
Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal().
The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature:
int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
addr/len: memory range.
flags: reserved.
mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range.
1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can
be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.
2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
via mremap().
3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific
risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is
unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA.
5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().
6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous
memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those
behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a
memset(0) for anonymous memory.
The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in
V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this
API.
Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing,
which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in the
case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute
(RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from
becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime
of the process.
Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed
by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively
but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM
permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those mappings are not
tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is
sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory.
For example, with madvise(DONTNEED).
However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security
risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the
second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros
and change the control flow. Checking write-permission before the discard
operation allows us to control when the operation is valid. In this case,
the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write
permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow
integrity.
Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome
browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions
that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a
complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases.
The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and
sealing ELF executables. To this end, Stephen is working on a change to
glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all
non-writable segments at startup. Once this work is completed, all
applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new
protections.
In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable
contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental in
shaping this patch:
Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the
destructive madvise operations.
Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization.
Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope.
Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from
implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD.
MM perf benchmarks
==================
This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to
check the VMAs’ sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made,
when any segment within the given memory range is sealed.
To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed.
[8]
The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call,
by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using
PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have
similar results.
The tests have roughly below sequence:
for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++)
create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA)
start the sampling
for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++)
mprotect one mapping
stop and save the sample
delete 1000 mappings
calculates all samples.
Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz,
4G memory, Chromebook.
Based on the latest upstream code:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t t_mseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 909 944 35 35 104%
munmap__ 2 1398 1502 104 52 107%
munmap__ 4 2444 2594 149 37 106%
munmap__ 8 4029 4323 293 37 107%
munmap__ 16 6647 6935 288 18 104%
munmap__ 32 11811 12398 587 18 105%
mprotect 1 439 465 26 26 106%
mprotect 2 1659 1745 86 43 105%
mprotect 4 3747 3889 142 36 104%
mprotect 8 6755 6969 215 27 103%
mprotect 16 13748 14144 396 25 103%
mprotect 32 27827 28969 1142 36 104%
madvise_ 1 240 262 22 22 109%
madvise_ 2 366 442 76 38 121%
madvise_ 4 623 751 128 32 121%
madvise_ 8 1110 1324 215 27 119%
madvise_ 16 2127 2451 324 20 115%
madvise_ 32 4109 4642 534 17 113%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 1790 1890 100 100 106%
munmap__ 2 2819 3033 214 107 108%
munmap__ 4 4959 5271 312 78 106%
munmap__ 8 8262 8745 483 60 106%
munmap__ 16 13099 14116 1017 64 108%
munmap__ 32 23221 24785 1565 49 107%
mprotect 1 906 967 62 62 107%
mprotect 2 3019 3203 184 92 106%
mprotect 4 6149 6569 420 105 107%
mprotect 8 9978 10524 545 68 105%
mprotect 16 20448 21427 979 61 105%
mprotect 32 40972 42935 1963 61 105%
madvise_ 1 434 497 63 63 115%
madvise_ 2 752 899 147 74 120%
madvise_ 4 1313 1513 200 50 115%
madvise_ 8 2271 2627 356 44 116%
madvise_ 16 4312 4883 571 36 113%
madvise_ 32 8376 9319 943 29 111%
Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds
20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA.
In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t tmseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 390 33 33 109%
munmap__ 2 442 463 21 11 105%
munmap__ 4 614 634 20 5 103%
munmap__ 8 1017 1137 120 15 112%
munmap__ 16 1889 2153 263 16 114%
munmap__ 32 4109 4088 -21 -1 99%
mprotect 1 235 227 -7 -7 97%
mprotect 2 495 464 -30 -15 94%
mprotect 4 741 764 24 6 103%
mprotect 8 1434 1437 2 0 100%
mprotect 16 2958 2991 33 2 101%
mprotect 32 6431 6608 177 6 103%
madvise_ 1 191 208 16 16 109%
madvise_ 2 300 324 24 12 108%
madvise_ 4 450 473 23 6 105%
madvise_ 8 753 806 53 7 107%
madvise_ 16 1467 1592 125 8 108%
madvise_ 32 2795 3405 610 19 122%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ nbr_vma cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 715 31 31 105%
munmap__ 2 861 898 38 19 104%
munmap__ 4 1183 1235 51 13 104%
munmap__ 8 1999 2045 46 6 102%
munmap__ 16 3839 3816 -23 -1 99%
munmap__ 32 7672 7887 216 7 103%
mprotect 1 397 443 46 46 112%
mprotect 2 738 788 50 25 107%
mprotect 4 1221 1256 35 9 103%
mprotect 8 2356 2429 72 9 103%
mprotect 16 4961 4935 -26 -2 99%
mprotect 32 9882 10172 291 9 103%
madvise_ 1 351 380 29 29 108%
madvise_ 2 565 615 49 25 109%
madvise_ 4 872 933 61 15 107%
madvise_ 8 1508 1640 132 16 109%
madvise_ 16 3078 3323 245 15 108%
madvise_ 32 5893 6704 811 25 114%
For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30
CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases.
It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t_5_10 t_6_8 delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 909 552 552 254%
munmap__ 2 442 1398 956 478 316%
munmap__ 4 614 2444 1830 458 398%
munmap__ 8 1017 4029 3012 377 396%
munmap__ 16 1889 6647 4758 297 352%
munmap__ 32 4109 11811 7702 241 287%
mprotect 1 235 439 204 204 187%
mprotect 2 495 1659 1164 582 335%
mprotect 4 741 3747 3006 752 506%
mprotect 8 1434 6755 5320 665 471%
mprotect 16 2958 13748 10790 674 465%
mprotect 32 6431 27827 21397 669 433%
madvise_ 1 191 240 49 49 125%
madvise_ 2 300 366 67 33 122%
madvise_ 4 450 623 173 43 138%
madvise_ 8 753 1110 357 45 147%
madvise_ 16 1467 2127 660 41 145%
madvise_ 32 2795 4109 1314 41 147%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu_5_10 c_6_8 delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 1790 1106 1106 262%
munmap__ 2 861 2819 1958 979 327%
munmap__ 4 1183 4959 3776 944 419%
munmap__ 8 1999 8262 6263 783 413%
munmap__ 16 3839 13099 9260 579 341%
munmap__ 32 7672 23221 15549 486 303%
mprotect 1 397 906 509 509 228%
mprotect 2 738 3019 2281 1140 409%
mprotect 4 1221 6149 4929 1232 504%
mprotect 8 2356 9978 7622 953 423%
mprotect 16 4961 20448 15487 968 412%
mprotect 32 9882 40972 31091 972 415%
madvise_ 1 351 434 82 82 123%
madvise_ 2 565 752 186 93 133%
madvise_ 4 872 1313 442 110 151%
madvise_ 8 1508 2271 763 95 151%
madvise_ 16 3078 4312 1234 77 140%
madvise_ 32 5893 8376 2483 78 142%
From 5.10 to 6.8
munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma.
mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma.
madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma.
In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the
increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten times
greater for munmap and mprotect.
When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer who worked
on performance, it was brought to my attention that such performance
benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may
not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database
service. Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data
from another HW or distribution might be different. It might be best to
take this data with a grain of salt.
This patch (of 5):
Wire up mseal syscall for all architectures.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@chromium.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-2-jeffxu@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> [Bug #2]
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com>
Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The absence of IRQD_MOVE_PCNTXT prevents immediate effectiveness of
interrupt affinity reconfiguration via procfs. Instead, the change is
deferred until the next instance of the interrupt being triggered on the
original CPU.
When the interrupt next triggers on the original CPU, the new affinity is
enforced within __irq_move_irq(). A vector is allocated from the new CPU,
but the old vector on the original CPU remains and is not immediately
reclaimed. Instead, apicd->move_in_progress is flagged, and the reclaiming
process is delayed until the next trigger of the interrupt on the new CPU.
Upon the subsequent triggering of the interrupt on the new CPU,
irq_complete_move() adds a task to the old CPU's vector_cleanup list if it
remains online. Subsequently, the timer on the old CPU iterates over its
vector_cleanup list, reclaiming old vectors.
However, a rare scenario arises if the old CPU is outgoing before the
interrupt triggers again on the new CPU.
In that case irq_force_complete_move() is not invoked on the outgoing CPU
to reclaim the old apicd->prev_vector because the interrupt isn't currently
affine to the outgoing CPU, and irq_needs_fixup() returns false. Even
though __vector_schedule_cleanup() is later called on the new CPU, it
doesn't reclaim apicd->prev_vector; instead, it simply resets both
apicd->move_in_progress and apicd->prev_vector to 0.
As a result, the vector remains unreclaimed in vector_matrix, leading to a
CPU vector leak.
To address this issue, move the invocation of irq_force_complete_move()
before the irq_needs_fixup() call to reclaim apicd->prev_vector, if the
interrupt is currently or used to be affine to the outgoing CPU.
Additionally, reclaim the vector in __vector_schedule_cleanup() as well,
following a warning message, although theoretically it should never see
apicd->move_in_progress with apicd->prev_cpu pointing to an offline CPU.
Fixes: f0383c24b485 ("genirq/cpuhotplug: Add support for cleaning up move in progress")
Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522220218.162423-1-dongli.zhang@oracle.com
|
|
There was a semantic conflict between 21a8f8a0eb35 ("irqchip: Add RISC-V
incoming MSI controller early driver") and dc892fb44322 ("riscv: Use
IPIs for remote cache/TLB flushes by default") due to an API change.
This manifests as a build failure post-merge.
Fixes: 0bfbc914d943 ("Merge tag 'riscv-for-linus-6.10-mw1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux")
Reported-by: Tomasz Jeznach <tjeznach@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522184953.28531-3-palmer@rivosinc.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/mhng-10b71228-cf3e-42ca-9abf-5464b15093f1@palmer-ri-x1c9/
|
|
Commit c97bf629963e ("riscv: Fix text patching when IPI are used")
converted ftrace_make_nop() to use patch_insn_write() which does not
emit any icache flush relying entirely on __ftrace_modify_code() to do
that.
But we missed that ftrace_make_nop() was called very early directly when
converting mcount calls into nops (actually on riscv it converts 2B nops
emitted by the compiler into 4B nops).
This caused crashes on multiple HW as reported by Conor and Björn since
the booting core could have half-patched instructions in its icache
which would trigger an illegal instruction trap: fix this by emitting a
local flush icache when early patching nops.
Fixes: c97bf629963e ("riscv: Fix text patching when IPI are used")
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reported-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Tested-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Tested-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240523115134.70380-1-alexghiti@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
|
|
Fix the following -Wformat-security compile warnings adding missing
format arguments:
latency-collector.c: In function ‘show_available’:
latency-collector.c:938:17: warning: format not a string literal and
no format arguments [-Wformat-security]
938 | warnx(no_tracer_msg);
| ^~~~~
latency-collector.c:943:17: warning: format not a string literal and
no format arguments [-Wformat-security]
943 | warnx(no_latency_tr_msg);
| ^~~~~
latency-collector.c: In function ‘find_default_tracer’:
latency-collector.c:986:25: warning: format not a string literal and
no format arguments [-Wformat-security]
986 | errx(EXIT_FAILURE, no_tracer_msg);
|
^~~~
latency-collector.c: In function ‘scan_arguments’:
latency-collector.c:1881:33: warning: format not a string literal and
no format arguments [-Wformat-security]
1881 | errx(EXIT_FAILURE, no_tracer_msg);
| ^~~~
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240404011009.32945-1-skhan@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e23db805da2df ("tracing/tools: Add the latency-collector to tools directory")
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
|
An issue was found on the RTL8125b when transmitting small fragmented
packets, whereby invalid entries were inserted into the transmit ring
buffer, subsequently leading to calls to dma_unmap_single() with a null
address.
This was caused by rtl8169_start_xmit() not noticing changes to nr_frags
which may occur when small packets are padded (to work around hardware
quirks) in rtl8169_tso_csum_v2().
To fix this, postpone inspecting nr_frags until after any padding has been
applied.
Fixes: 9020845fb5d6 ("r8169: improve rtl8169_start_xmit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ken Milmore <ken.milmore@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/27ead18b-c23d-4f49-a020-1fc482c5ac95@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
The top "events" directory has a static inode (it's created when it is and
removed when the directory is removed). There's no need to use the events
ei->attr to determine its permissions. But it is used for saving the
permissions of the "events" directory for when it is created, as that is
needed for the default permissions for the files and directories
underneath it.
For example:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# mkdir instances/foo
# chown 1001 instances/foo/events
The files under instances/foo/events should still have the same owner as
instances/foo (which the instances/foo/events ei->attr will hold), but the
events directory now has owner 1001.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240522165032.104981011@goodmis.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
|
The permissions being set during the creation of the inodes was updating
eventfs_inode attributes as well. Those attributes should only be touched
by the setattr or remount operations, not during the creation of inodes.
The eventfs_inode attributes should only be used to set the inodes and
should not be modified during the inode creation.
Simplify the code and fix the situation by:
1) Removing the eventfs_find_events() and doing a simple lookup for
the events descriptor in eventfs_get_inode()
2) Remove update_events_attr() as the attributes should only be used
to update the inode and should not be modified here.
3) Add update_inode_attr() that uses the attributes to determine what
the inode permissions should be.
4) As the parent_inode of the eventfs_root_inode structure is no longer
needed, remove it.
Now on creation, the inode gets the proper permissions without causing
side effects to the ei->attr field.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240522165031.944088388@goodmis.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
|
Now that inodes have their permissions updated on remount, the only other
places to update the inode permissions are when they are created and in
the setattr callback. The getattr and permission callbacks are not needed
as the inodes should already be set at their proper settings.
Remove the callbacks, as it not only simplifies the code, but also allows
more flexibility to fix the inconsistencies with various corner cases
(like changing the permission of an instance directory).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240522165031.782066021@goodmis.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
|
To simplify the code, create a eventfs_get_inode() that is used when an
eventfs file or directory is created. Have the internal tracefs_inode
updated the appropriate flags in this function and update the inode's
mode as well.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240522165031.624864160@goodmis.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
|
When the inode is being dropped from the dentry, the TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE
flag needs to be cleared to prevent a remount from calling
eventfs_remount() on the tracefs_inode private data. There's a race
between the inode is dropped (and the dentry freed) to where the inode is
actually freed. If a remount happens between the two, the eventfs_inode
could be accessed after it is freed (only the dentry keeps a ref count on
it).
Currently the TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE flag is cleared from the dentry iput()
function. But this is incorrect, as it is possible that the inode has
another reference to it. The flag should only be cleared when the inode is
really being dropped and has no more references. That happens in the
drop_inode callback of the inode, as that gets called when the last
reference of the inode is released.
Remove the tracefs_d_iput() function and move its logic to the more
appropriate tracefs_drop_inode() callback function.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240523051539.908205106@goodmis.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Fixes: baa23a8d4360d ("tracefs: Reset permissions on remount if permissions are options")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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The change to update the permissions of the eventfs_inode had the
misconception that using the tracefs_inode would find all the
eventfs_inodes that have been updated and reset them on remount.
The problem with this approach is that the eventfs_inodes are freed when
they are no longer used (basically the reason the eventfs system exists).
When they are freed, the updated eventfs_inodes are not reset on a remount
because their tracefs_inodes have been freed.
Instead, since the events directory eventfs_inode always has a
tracefs_inode pointing to it (it is not freed when finished), and the
events directory has a link to all its children, have the
eventfs_remount() function only operate on the events eventfs_inode and
have it descend into its children updating their uid and gids.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAK7LNARXgaWw3kH9JgrnH4vK6fr8LDkNKf3wq8NhMWJrVwJyVQ@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240523051539.754424703@goodmis.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Fixes: baa23a8d4360d ("tracefs: Reset permissions on remount if permissions are options")
Reported-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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When a remount happens, if a gid or uid is specified update the inodes to
have the same gid and uid. This will allow the simplification of the
permissions logic for the dynamically created files and directories.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240523051539.592429986@goodmis.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Fixes: baa23a8d4360d ("tracefs: Reset permissions on remount if permissions are options")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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The directories require unique inode numbers but all the eventfs files
have the same inode number. Prevent the directories from having the same
inode numbers as the files as that can confuse some tooling.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240523051539.428826685@goodmis.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Fixes: 834bf76add3e6 ("eventfs: Save directory inodes in the eventfs_inode structure")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Writing 'power' and 'submit_queues' concurrently will trigger kernel
panic:
Test script:
modprobe null_blk nr_devices=0
mkdir -p /sys/kernel/config/nullb/nullb0
while true; do echo 1 > submit_queues; echo 4 > submit_queues; done &
while true; do echo 1 > power; echo 0 > power; done
Test result:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000148
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x41d/0x28f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
lock_acquire+0x121/0x450
down_write+0x5f/0x1d0
simple_recursive_removal+0x12f/0x5c0
blk_mq_debugfs_unregister_hctxs+0x7c/0x100
blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x4a3/0x720
nullb_update_nr_hw_queues+0x71/0xf0 [null_blk]
nullb_device_submit_queues_store+0x79/0xf0 [null_blk]
configfs_write_iter+0x119/0x1e0
vfs_write+0x326/0x730
ksys_write+0x74/0x150
This is because del_gendisk() can concurrent with
blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues():
nullb_device_power_store nullb_apply_submit_queues
null_del_dev
del_gendisk
nullb_update_nr_hw_queues
if (!dev->nullb)
// still set while gendisk is deleted
return 0
blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues
dev->nullb = NULL
Fix this problem by resuing the global mutex to protect
nullb_device_power_store() and nullb_update_nr_hw_queues() from configfs.
Fixes: 45919fbfe1c4 ("null_blk: Enable modifying 'submit_queues' after an instance has been configured")
Reported-and-tested-by: Yi Zhang <yi.zhang@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHj4cs9LgsHLnjg8z06LQ3Pr5cax-+Ps+xT7AP7TPnEjStuwZA@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240523153934.1937851-1-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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There was a semantic conflict between 21a8f8a0eb35 ("irqchip: Add RISC-V
incoming MSI controller early driver") and dc892fb44322 ("riscv: Use
IPIs for remote cache/TLB flushes by default") due to an API change.
This manifests as a build failure post-merge.
Reported-by: Tomasz Jeznach <tjeznach@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/mhng-10b71228-cf3e-42ca-9abf-5464b15093f1@palmer-ri-x1c9/
Fixes: 0bfbc914d943 ("Merge tag 'riscv-for-linus-6.10-mw1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux")
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522184953.28531-3-palmer@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
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Unlike ice, idpf does not check, if user has requested at least 1 combined
channel. Instead, it relies on a check in the core code. Unfortunately, the
check does not trigger for us because of the hacky .set_channels()
interpretation logic that is not consistent with the core code.
This naturally leads to user being able to trigger a crash with an invalid
input. This is how:
1. ethtool -l <IFNAME> -> combined: 40
2. ethtool -L <IFNAME> rx 0 tx 0
combined number is not specified, so command becomes {rx_count = 0,
tx_count = 0, combined_count = 40}.
3. ethnl_set_channels checks, if there is at least 1 RX and 1 TX channel,
comparing (combined_count + rx_count) and (combined_count + tx_count)
to zero. Obviously, (40 + 0) is greater than zero, so the core code
deems the input OK.
4. idpf interprets `rx 0 tx 0` as 0 channels and tries to proceed with such
configuration.
The issue has to be solved fundamentally, as current logic is also known to
cause AF_XDP problems in ice [0].
Interpret the command in a way that is more consistent with ethtool
manual [1] (--show-channels and --set-channels) and new ice logic.
Considering that in the idpf driver only the difference between RX and TX
queues forms dedicated channels, change the correct way to set number of
channels to:
ethtool -L <IFNAME> combined 10 /* For symmetric queues */
ethtool -L <IFNAME> combined 8 tx 2 rx 0 /* For asymmetric queues */
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240418095857.2827-1-larysa.zaremba@intel.com/
[1] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ethtool.8.html
Fixes: 02cbfba1add5 ("idpf: add ethtool callbacks")
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Igor Bagnucki <igor.bagnucki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com>
Tested-by: Krishneil Singh <krishneil.k.singh@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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A bug occurs because a safety check guarding AF_XDP-related queues in
ethnl_set_channels(), does not trigger. This happens, because kernel and
ice driver interpret the ethtool command differently.
How the bug occurs:
1. ethtool -l <IFNAME> -> combined: 40
2. Attach AF_XDP to queue 30
3. ethtool -L <IFNAME> rx 15 tx 15
combined number is not specified, so command becomes {rx_count = 15,
tx_count = 15, combined_count = 40}.
4. ethnl_set_channels checks, if there are any AF_XDP of queues from the
new (combined_count + rx_count) to the old one, so from 55 to 40, check
does not trigger.
5. ice interprets `rx 15 tx 15` as 15 combined channels and deletes the
queue that AF_XDP is attached to.
Interpret the command in a way that is more consistent with ethtool
manual [0] (--show-channels and --set-channels).
Considering that in the ice driver only the difference between RX and TX
queues forms dedicated channels, change the correct way to set number of
channels to:
ethtool -L <IFNAME> combined 10 /* For symmetric queues */
ethtool -L <IFNAME> combined 8 tx 2 rx 0 /* For asymmetric queues */
[0] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ethtool.8.html
Fixes: 87324e747fde ("ice: Implement ethtool ops for channels")
Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com>
Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <chandanx.rout@intel.com>
Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy <himasekharx.reddy.pucha@intel.com>
Acked-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Currently, the late XenStore init protocol is only triggered properly
for the case that HVM_PARAM_STORE_PFN is ~0ULL (invalid). For the
case that XenStore interface is allocated but not ready (the connection
status is not XENSTORE_CONNECTED), Linux should also wait until the
XenStore is set up properly.
Introduce a macro to describe the XenStore interface is ready, use
it in xenbus_probe_initcall() to select the code path of doing the
late XenStore init protocol or not. Since now we have more than one
condition for XenStore late init, rework the check in xenbus_probe()
for the free_irq().
Take the opportunity to enhance the check of the allocated XenStore
interface can be properly mapped, and return error early if the
memremap() fails.
Fixes: 5b3353949e89 ("xen: add support for initializing xenstore later as HVM domain")
Signed-off-by: Henry Wang <xin.wang2@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240517011516.1451087-1-xin.wang2@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
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