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| * | x86/bugs: Move the l1tf function and define pr_fmt properlyKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-06-211-26/+29
| * | x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tfAndi Kleen2018-06-201-0/+40
* | | x86/speculation: Support Enhanced IBRS on future CPUsSai Praneeth2018-08-031-2/+18
* | | x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSBJiri Kosina2018-07-311-31/+7
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* | x86/bugs: Fix the AMD SSBD usage of the SPEC_CTRL MSRTom Lendacky2018-07-031-3/+5
* | x86/pti: Don't report XenPV as vulnerableJiri Kosina2018-06-211-0/+4
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* x86/bugs: Switch the selection of mitigation from CPU vendor to CPU featuresKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-06-061-8/+3
* x86/bugs: Add AMD's SPEC_CTRL MSR usageKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-06-061-5/+7
* x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFGThomas Gleixner2018-05-171-0/+30
* x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logicThomas Gleixner2018-05-171-7/+19
* x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set()Thomas Gleixner2018-05-171-11/+2
* x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directlyThomas Gleixner2018-05-171-10/+1
* x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest,restore_host}Borislav Petkov2018-05-171-45/+15
* x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update()Thomas Gleixner2018-05-171-1/+1
* x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable supportTom Lendacky2018-05-171-1/+3
* x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRLThomas Gleixner2018-05-171-2/+18
* x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumerationThomas Gleixner2018-05-171-5/+5
* x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRSThomas Gleixner2018-05-171-7/+11
* x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing voidKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-05-121-2/+2
* x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() staticJiri Kosina2018-05-101-1/+1
* x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return typeJiri Kosina2018-05-101-1/+1
* x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBDKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-05-091-18/+18
* x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store BypassKees Cook2018-05-051-9/+23
* seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch codeThomas Gleixner2018-05-051-11/+18
* prctl: Add force disable speculationThomas Gleixner2018-05-051-10/+25
* x86/bugs: Make boot modes __ro_after_initKees Cook2018-05-051-2/+3
* nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current taskKees Cook2018-05-031-11/+16
* x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigationThomas Gleixner2018-05-031-10/+73
* x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store BypassThomas Gleixner2018-05-031-5/+21
* x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hellThomas Gleixner2018-05-031-1/+1
* x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if requestedKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-05-031-1/+26
* x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR valuesKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-05-031-2/+9
* x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDSKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-05-031-2/+28
* x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigationKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-05-031-0/+103
* x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypassKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-05-031-0/+5
* x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRSKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-05-031-0/+18
* x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bitsKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-05-031-0/+28
* x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting into a separate functionKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-05-031-14/+32
* x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmwareDavid Woodhouse2018-02-201-1/+11
* x86/spectre: Fix an error messageDan Carpenter2018-02-151-1/+1
* x86/speculation: Clean up various Spectre related detailsIngo Molnar2018-02-131-17/+11
* Revert "x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()"David Woodhouse2018-02-131-6/+0
* x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsingKarimAllah Ahmed2018-02-021-30/+56
* x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable"Colin Ian King2018-01-301-1/+1
* x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1Dan Williams2018-01-301-1/+1
* x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parserDou Liyang2018-01-301-3/+3
* x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()Borislav Petkov2018-01-271-0/+6
* x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flagsDavid Woodhouse2018-01-271-4/+3
* x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditionalThomas Gleixner2018-01-271-3/+11
* x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesgBorislav Petkov2018-01-261-1/+1
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