| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|---|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The 'MSG_MORE' state of the previous sendmsg() is fetched without the
socket lock held, so two sendmsg calls can race. This can be seen with a
large sendfile() as that now does a series of sendmsg() calls, and if a
write() comes in on the same socket at an inopportune time, it can flip the
state.
Fix this by moving the fetch of ctx->more inside the socket lock.
Fixes: c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
Reported-by: syzbot+689ec3afb1ef07b766b2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000554b8205ffdea64e@google.com/
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: syzbot+689ec3afb1ef07b766b2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
If an AF_ALG socket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length
message with MSG_MORE set and then recvmsg() is called without first
sending another message without MSG_MORE set to end the operation, an oops
will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in
advance because hash_sendmsg() now defers that as long as possible in the
hope that it can use crypto_ahash_digest() - and then because the message
is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped.
Fix this by handling zero-length sends at the top of the hash_sendmsg()
function. If we're not continuing the previous sendmsg(), then just ignore
the send (hash_recvmsg() will invent something when called); if we are
continuing, then we finalise the request at this point if MSG_MORE is not
set to get any error here, otherwise the send is of no effect and can be
ignored.
Whilst we're at it, remove the code to create a kvmalloc'd scatterlist if
we get more than ALG_MAX_PAGES - this shouldn't happen.
Fixes: c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
Reported-by: syzbot+13a08c0bf4d212766c3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b928f705fdeb873a@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+14234ccf6d0ef629ec1a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000c047db05fdeb8790@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+4e2e47f32607d0f72d43@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000bcca3205fdeb87fb@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+472626bb5e7c59fb768f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b55d8805fdeb8385@google.com/
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+6efc50cc1f8d718d6cb7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/427646.1686913832@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Remove hash_sendpage*() as nothing should now call it since the rewrite of
splice_to_socket()[1].
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next.git/commit/?id=2dc334f1a63a8839b88483a3e73c0f27c9c1791c [1]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Make AF_ALG sendmsg() support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES in the hashing code. This
causes pages to be spliced from the source iterator if possible.
This allows ->sendpage() to be replaced by something that can handle
multiple multipage folios in a single transaction.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Use extract_iter_to_sg() to decant the destination iterator into a
scatterlist in af_alg_get_rsgl(). af_alg_make_sg() can then be removed.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Allocating the hash state on the stack limits its size. Change
this to use kmalloc so the limit can be removed for new drivers.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
... and adjust the callers
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Just check for a NULL method instead of wiring up
sock_no_{get,set}sockopt.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The locking in af_alg_release_parent is broken as the BH socket
lock can only be taken if there is a code-path to handle the case
where the lock is owned by process-context. Instead of adding
such handling, we can fix this by changing the ref counts to
atomic_t.
This patch also modifies the main refcnt to include both normal
and nokey sockets. This way we don't have to fudge the nokey
ref count when a socket changes from nokey to normal.
Credits go to Mauricio Faria de Oliveira who diagnosed this bug
and sent a patch for it:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20200605161657.535043-1-mfo@canonical.com/
Reported-by: Brian Moyles <bmoyles@netflix.com>
Reported-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mfo@canonical.com>
Fixes: 37f96694cf73 ("crypto: af_alg - Use bh_lock_sock in...")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
When working with bool values the true and false definitions should be used
instead of 1 and 0.
Hopefully I fixed my mailer and apologize for that.
Signed-off-by: Lothar Rubusch <l.rubusch@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
removes the VLAs in SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK (via crypto_shash_descsize())
by using the maximum allowable size (which is now more clearly captured
in a macro), along with a few other cases. Similar limits are turned into
macros as well.
A review of existing sizes shows that SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE (64) is the
largest digest size and that sizeof(struct sha3_state) (360) is the
largest descriptor size. The corresponding maximums are reduced.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Now that sock_poll handles a NULL ->poll or ->poll_mask there is no need
for a stub.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Currently, almost none of the keyed hash algorithms check whether a key
has been set before proceeding. Some algorithms are okay with this and
will effectively just use a key of all 0's or some other bogus default.
However, others will severely break, as demonstrated using
"hmac(sha3-512-generic)", the unkeyed use of which causes a kernel crash
via a (potentially exploitable) stack buffer overflow.
A while ago, this problem was solved for AF_ALG by pairing each hash
transform with a 'has_key' bool. However, there are still other places
in the kernel where userspace can specify an arbitrary hash algorithm by
name, and the kernel uses it as unkeyed hash without checking whether it
is really unkeyed. Examples of this include:
- KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, via the KDF extension
- dm-verity
- dm-crypt, via the ESSIV support
- dm-integrity, via the "internal hash" mode with no key given
- drbd (Distributed Replicated Block Device)
This bug is especially bad for KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE as that requires no
privileges to call.
Fix the bug for all users by adding a flag CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY to the
->crt_flags of each hash transform that indicates whether the transform
still needs to be keyed or not. Then, make the hash init, import, and
digest functions return -ENOKEY if the key is still needed.
The new flag also replaces the 'has_key' bool which algif_hash was
previously using, thereby simplifying the algif_hash implementation.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
algif starts several async crypto ops and waits for their completion.
Move it over to generic code doing the same.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Lockdep issues a circular dependency warning when AFS issues an operation
through AF_RXRPC from a context in which the VFS/VM holds the mmap_sem.
The theory lockdep comes up with is as follows:
(1) If the pagefault handler decides it needs to read pages from AFS, it
calls AFS with mmap_sem held and AFS begins an AF_RXRPC call, but
creating a call requires the socket lock:
mmap_sem must be taken before sk_lock-AF_RXRPC
(2) afs_open_socket() opens an AF_RXRPC socket and binds it. rxrpc_bind()
binds the underlying UDP socket whilst holding its socket lock.
inet_bind() takes its own socket lock:
sk_lock-AF_RXRPC must be taken before sk_lock-AF_INET
(3) Reading from a TCP socket into a userspace buffer might cause a fault
and thus cause the kernel to take the mmap_sem, but the TCP socket is
locked whilst doing this:
sk_lock-AF_INET must be taken before mmap_sem
However, lockdep's theory is wrong in this instance because it deals only
with lock classes and not individual locks. The AF_INET lock in (2) isn't
really equivalent to the AF_INET lock in (3) as the former deals with a
socket entirely internal to the kernel that never sees userspace. This is
a limitation in the design of lockdep.
Fix the general case by:
(1) Double up all the locking keys used in sockets so that one set are
used if the socket is created by userspace and the other set is used
if the socket is created by the kernel.
(2) Store the kern parameter passed to sk_alloc() in a variable in the
sock struct (sk_kern_sock). This informs sock_lock_init(),
sock_init_data() and sk_clone_lock() as to the lock keys to be used.
Note that the child created by sk_clone_lock() inherits the parent's
kern setting.
(3) Add a 'kern' parameter to ->accept() that is analogous to the one
passed in to ->create() that distinguishes whether kernel_accept() or
sys_accept4() was the caller and can be passed to sk_alloc().
Note that a lot of accept functions merely dequeue an already
allocated socket. I haven't touched these as the new socket already
exists before we get the parameter.
Note also that there are a couple of places where I've made the accepted
socket unconditionally kernel-based:
irda_accept()
rds_rcp_accept_one()
tcp_accept_from_sock()
because they follow a sock_create_kern() and accept off of that.
Whilst creating this, I noticed that lustre and ocfs don't create sockets
through sock_create_kern() and thus they aren't marked as for-kernel,
though they appear to be internal. I wonder if these should do that so
that they use the new set of lock keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
With this reproducer:
struct sockaddr_alg alg = {
.salg_family = 0x26,
.salg_type = "hash",
.salg_feat = 0xf,
.salg_mask = 0x5,
.salg_name = "digest_null",
};
int sock, sock2;
sock = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&alg, sizeof(alg));
sock2 = accept(sock, NULL, NULL);
setsockopt(sock, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, "\x9b\xca", 2);
accept(sock2, NULL, NULL);
==== 8< ======== 8< ======== 8< ======== 8< ====
one can immediatelly see an UBSAN warning:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in crypto/algif_hash.c:187:7
variable length array bound value 0 <= 0
CPU: 0 PID: 15949 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G E 4.4.30-0-default #1
...
Call Trace:
...
[<ffffffff81d598fd>] ? __ubsan_handle_vla_bound_not_positive+0x13d/0x188
[<ffffffff81d597c0>] ? __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x1bc/0x1bc
[<ffffffffa0e2204d>] ? hash_accept+0x5bd/0x7d0 [algif_hash]
[<ffffffffa0e2293f>] ? hash_accept_nokey+0x3f/0x51 [algif_hash]
[<ffffffffa0e206b0>] ? hash_accept_parent_nokey+0x4a0/0x4a0 [algif_hash]
[<ffffffff8235c42b>] ? SyS_accept+0x2b/0x40
It is a correct warning, as hash state is propagated to accept as zero,
but creating a zero-length variable array is not allowed in C.
Fix this as proposed by Herbert -- do "?: 1" on that site. No sizeof or
similar happens in the code there, so we just allocate one byte even
though we do not use the array.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> (maintainer:CRYPTO API)
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Recently an init call was added to hash_recvmsg so as to reset
the hash state in case a sendmsg call was never made.
Unfortunately this ended up clobbering the result if the previous
sendmsg was done with a MSG_MORE flag. This patch fixes it by
excluding that case when we make the init call.
Fixes: a8348bca2944 ("algif_hash - Fix NULL hash crash with shash")
Reported-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Recently algif_hash has been changed to allow null hashes. This
triggers a bug when used with an shash algorithm whereby it will
cause a crash during the digest operation.
This patch fixes it by avoiding the digest operation and instead
doing an init followed by a final which avoids the buggy code in
shash.
This patch also ensures that the result buffer is freed after an
error so that it is not returned as a genuine hash result on the
next recv call.
The shash/ahash wrapper code will be fixed later to handle this
case correctly.
Fixes: 493b2ed3f760 ("crypto: algif_hash - Handle NULL hashes correctly")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Right now attempting to read an empty hash simply returns zeroed
bytes, this patch corrects this by calling the digest function
using an empty input.
Reported-by: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
hash_sendmsg/sendpage() need to wait for the completion
of crypto_ahash_init() otherwise it can cause panic.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rui Wang <rui.y.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
We need to lock the child socket in hash_check_key as otherwise
two simultaneous calls can cause the parent socket to be freed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This patch removes the custom release parent function as the
generic af_alg_release_parent now works for nokey sockets too.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Hash implementations that require a key may crash if you use
them without setting a key. This patch adds the necessary checks
so that if you do attempt to use them without a key that we return
-ENOKEY instead of proceeding.
This patch also adds a compatibility path to support old applications
that do acept(2) before setkey.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The hash_accept call fails to work on sockets that have not received
any data. For some algorithm implementations it may cause crashes.
This patch fixes this by ensuring that we only export and import on
sockets that have received data.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Harsh Jain <harshjain.prof@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
convert open-coded instances
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
After TIPC doesn't depend on iocb argument in its internal
implementations of sendmsg() and recvmsg() hooks defined in proto
structure, no any user is using iocb argument in them at all now.
Then we can drop the redundant iocb argument completely from kinds of
implementations of both sendmsg() and recvmsg() in the entire
networking stack.
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
With that, all ->sendmsg() instances are converted to iov_iter primitives
and are agnostic wrt the kind of iov_iter they are working with.
So's the last remaining ->recvmsg() instance that wasn't kind-agnostic yet.
All ->sendmsg() and ->recvmsg() advance ->msg_iter by the amount actually
copied and none of them modifies the underlying iovec, etc.
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| |\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
- The crypto API is now documented :)
- Disallow arbitrary module loading through crypto API.
- Allow get request with empty driver name through crypto_user.
- Allow speed testing of arbitrary hash functions.
- Add caam support for ctr(aes), gcm(aes) and their derivatives.
- nx now supports concurrent hashing properly.
- Add sahara support for SHA1/256.
- Add ARM64 version of CRC32.
- Misc fixes.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (77 commits)
crypto: tcrypt - Allow speed testing of arbitrary hash functions
crypto: af_alg - add user space interface for AEAD
crypto: qat - fix problem with coalescing enable logic
crypto: sahara - add support for SHA1/256
crypto: sahara - replace tasklets with kthread
crypto: sahara - add support for i.MX53
crypto: sahara - fix spinlock initialization
crypto: arm - replace memset by memzero_explicit
crypto: powerpc - replace memset by memzero_explicit
crypto: sha - replace memset by memzero_explicit
crypto: sparc - replace memset by memzero_explicit
crypto: algif_skcipher - initialize upon init request
crypto: algif_skcipher - removed unneeded code
crypto: algif_skcipher - Fixed blocking recvmsg
crypto: drbg - use memzero_explicit() for clearing sensitive data
crypto: drbg - use MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO
crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
crypto: user - add MODULE_ALIAS
crypto: sha-mb - remove a bogus NULL check
crytpo: qat - Fix 64 bytes requests
...
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Commit e1bd95bf7c25 ("crypto: algif - zeroize IV buffer") and
2a6af25befd0 ("crypto: algif - zeroize message digest buffer")
added memzero_explicit() calls on buffers that are later on
passed back to sock_kfree_s().
This is a discussed follow-up that, instead, extends the sock
API and adds sock_kzfree_s(), which internally uses kzfree()
instead of kfree() for passing the buffers back to slab.
Having sock_kzfree_s() allows to keep the changes more minimal
by just having a drop-in replacement instead of adding
memzero_explicit() calls everywhere before sock_kfree_s().
In kzfree(), the compiler is not allowed to optimize the memset()
away and thus there's no need for memzero_explicit(). Both,
sock_kfree_s() and sock_kzfree_s() are wrappers for
__sock_kfree_s() and call into kfree() resp. kzfree(); here,
__sock_kfree_s() needs to be explicitly inlined as we want the
compiler to optimize the call and condition away and thus it
produces e.g. on x86_64 the _same_ assembler output for
sock_kfree_s() before and after, and thus also allows for
avoiding code duplication.
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Zeroize the buffer holding the message digest calculated for the
consumer before the buffer is released by the hash AF_ALG interface
handler.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Note that the code _using_ ->msg_iter at that point will be very
unhappy with anything other than unshifted iovec-backed iov_iter.
We still need to convert users to proper primitives.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| |/
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Commit 35f9c09fe (tcp: tcp_sendpages() should call tcp_push() once)
added an internal flag MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST, similar to
MSG_MORE.
algif_hash, algif_skcipher, and udp used MSG_MORE from tcp_sendpages()
and need to see the new flag as identical to MSG_MORE.
This fixes sendfile() on AF_ALG.
v3: also fix udp
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.4.x + 3.2.x
Reported-and-tested-by: Shawn Landden <shawnlandden@gmail.com>
Original-patch: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Landden <shawn@churchofgit.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The current code does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local sockaddr_storage variable to userland
-- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.38
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
When the first call to af_alg_make_sg fails, we may return garbage
instead of the real error. This patch fixes it by setting the error
if "copied" is zero.
Based on a patch by Jesper Juhl.
Reported-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
|
|
This patch adds the af_alg plugin for hash, corresponding to
the ahash kernel operation type.
Keys can optionally be set through the setsockopt interface.
Each sendmsg call will finalise the hash unless sent with a MSG_MORE
flag.
Partial hash states can be cloned using accept(2).
The interface is completely synchronous, all operations will
complete prior to the system call returning.
Both sendmsg(2) and splice(2) support reading the user-space
data directly without copying (except that the Crypto API itself
may copy the data if alignment is off).
For now only the splice(2) interface supports performing digest
instead of init/update/final. In future the sendmsg(2) interface
will also be modified to use digest/finup where possible so that
hardware that cannot return a partial hash state can still benefit
from this interface.
Thakns to Miloslav Trmac for reviewing this and contributing
fixes and improvements.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
|
