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* KEYS: Fix for erroneous trust of incorrectly signed X.509 certsMat Martineau2016-07-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Arbitrary X.509 certificates without authority key identifiers (AKIs) can be added to "trusted" keyrings, including IMA or EVM certs loaded from the filesystem. Signature verification is currently bypassed for certs without AKIs. Trusted keys were recently refactored, and this bug is not present in 4.6. restrict_link_by_signature should return -ENOKEY (no matching parent certificate found) if the certificate being evaluated has no AKIs, instead of bypassing signature checks and returning 0 (new certificate accepted). Reported-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* pefile: Fix the failure of calculation for digestLans Zhang2016-07-181-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit e68503bd68 forgot to set digest_len and thus cause the following error reported by kexec when launching a crash kernel: kexec_file_load failed: Bad message Fixes: e68503bd68 (KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content) Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com> Tested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* PKCS#7: Fix panic when referring to the empty AKID when DEBUG definedLans Zhang2016-07-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fix resolves the following kernel panic if an empty or missing AuthorityKeyIdentifier is encountered and DEBUG is defined in pkcs7_verify.c. [ 459.041989] PKEY: <==public_key_verify_signature() = 0 [ 459.041993] PKCS7: Verified signature 1 [ 459.041995] PKCS7: ==> pkcs7_verify_sig_chain() [ 459.041999] PKCS7: verify Sample DB Certificate for SCP: 01 [ 459.042002] PKCS7: - issuer Sample KEK Certificate for SCP [ 459.042014] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 459.042135] IP: [<ffffffff813e7b4c>] pkcs7_verify+0x72c/0x7f0 [ 459.042217] PGD 739e6067 PUD 77719067 PMD 0 [ 459.042286] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 459.042328] Modules linked in: [ 459.042368] CPU: 0 PID: 474 Comm: kexec Not tainted 4.7.0-rc7-WR8.0.0.0_standard+ #18 [ 459.042462] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 10/09/2014 [ 459.042586] task: ffff880073a50000 ti: ffff8800738e8000 task.ti: ffff8800738e8000 [ 459.042675] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff813e7b4c>] [<ffffffff813e7b4c>] pkcs7_verify+0x72c/0x7f0 [ 459.042784] RSP: 0018:ffff8800738ebd58 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 459.042845] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880076b7da80 RCX: 0000000000000006 [ 459.042929] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff81c85001 RDI: ffffffff81ca00a9 [ 459.043014] RBP: ffff8800738ebd98 R08: 0000000000000400 R09: ffff8800788a304c [ 459.043098] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000060ca R12: ffff8800769a2bc0 [ 459.043182] R13: ffff880077358300 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8800769a2dc0 [ 459.043268] FS: 00007f24cc741700(0000) GS:ffff880074e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 459.043365] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 459.043431] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000073a36000 CR4: 00000000001006f0 [ 459.043514] Stack: [ 459.043530] 0000000000000000 ffffffbf00000020 31ffffff813e68b0 0000000000000002 [ 459.043644] ffff8800769a2bc0 0000000000000000 00000000007197b8 0000000000000002 [ 459.043756] ffff8800738ebdd8 ffffffff81153fb1 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 459.043869] Call Trace: [ 459.043898] [<ffffffff81153fb1>] verify_pkcs7_signature+0x61/0x140 [ 459.043974] [<ffffffff813e7f0b>] verify_pefile_signature+0x2cb/0x830 [ 459.044052] [<ffffffff813e8470>] ? verify_pefile_signature+0x830/0x830 [ 459.044134] [<ffffffff81048e25>] bzImage64_verify_sig+0x15/0x20 [ 459.046332] [<ffffffff81046e09>] arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig+0x29/0x40 [ 459.048552] [<ffffffff810f10e4>] SyS_kexec_file_load+0x1f4/0x6c0 [ 459.050768] [<ffffffff81050e36>] ? __do_page_fault+0x1b6/0x550 [ 459.052996] [<ffffffff8199241f>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x17/0x93 [ 459.055242] Code: e8 0a d6 ff ff 85 c0 0f 88 7a fb ff ff 4d 39 fd 4d 89 7d 08 74 45 4d 89 fd e9 14 fe ff ff 4d 8b 76 08 31 c0 48 c7 c7 a9 00 ca 81 <41> 0f b7 36 49 8d 56 02 e8 d0 91 d6 ff 4d 8b 3c 24 4d 85 ff 0f [ 459.060535] RIP [<ffffffff813e7b4c>] pkcs7_verify+0x72c/0x7f0 [ 459.063040] RSP <ffff8800738ebd58> [ 459.065456] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 459.075998] ---[ end trace c15f0e897cda28dc ]--- Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-05-311-0/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu: "This fixes the following issues: - missing selection in public_key that may result in a build failure - Potential crash in error path in omap-sham - ccp AES XTS bug that affects requests larger than 4096" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: crypto: ccp - Fix AES XTS error for request sizes above 4096 crypto: public_key: select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER crypto: omap-sham - potential Oops on error in probe
| * crypto: public_key: select CRYPTO_AKCIPHERArnd Bergmann2016-05-191-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In some rare randconfig builds, we can end up with ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE enabled but CRYPTO_AKCIPHER disabled, which fails to link because of the reference to crypto_alloc_akcipher: crypto/built-in.o: In function `public_key_verify_signature': :(.text+0x110e4): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_akcipher' This adds a Kconfig 'select' statement to ensure the dependency is always there. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * PKCS#7: fix missing break on OID_sha224 caseColin Ian King2016-04-051-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The OID_sha224 case is missing a break and it falls through to the -ENOPKG error default. Since HASH_ALGO_SHA224 seems to be supported, this looks like an unintentional missing break. Fixes: 07f081fb5057 ("PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.2+ Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | KEYS: The PKCS#7 test key type should use the secondary keyringDavid Howells2016-05-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The PKCS#7 test key type should use the secondary keyring instead of the built-in keyring if available as the source of trustworthy keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()David Howells2016-04-113-56/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to __key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not. What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring. Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the trustworthiness of a new key. With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through one of the contained keys. Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could be secondarily linked. To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data. If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted() resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code still works correctly with this as it was previously using KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there is no system keyring against which trust can be determined. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | KEYS: Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key typeDavid Howells2016-04-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type as there's not a lot of point having it if you can't then load asymmetric keys onto it. This requires the ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to be made a bool, not a tristate, as the Kconfig language doesn't then correctly force ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to 'y' rather than 'm' if SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING is 'y'. Making SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING *select* ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE instead doesn't work as the Kconfig interpreter then wrongly complains about dependency loops. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its own fileDavid Howells2016-04-114-80/+116
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the X.509 trust validation code out to its own file so that it can be generalised. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | X.509: Use verify_signature() if we have a struct key * to useDavid Howells2016-04-111-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We should call verify_signature() rather than directly calling public_key_verify_signature() if we have a struct key to use as we shouldn't be poking around in the private data of the key struct as that's subtype dependent. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key()David Howells2016-04-114-35/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key(). It doesn't really have any dependencies on X.509 features as it uses generalised IDs and the public_key structs that contain data extracted from X.509. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | KEYS: Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.cDavid Howells2016-04-112-89/+89
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c so that it can be generalised. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyringDavid Howells2016-04-065-19/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the determination of the trustworthiness of a key dependent on whether a key that can verify it is present in the supplied ring of trusted keys rather than whether or not the verifying key has KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set. verify_pkcs7_signature() will return -ENOKEY if the PKCS#7 message trust chain cannot be verified. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal contentDavid Howells2016-04-066-104/+59
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content through a callback. This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key. If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the function. If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL. The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | X.509: Fix self-signed determinationDavid Howells2016-04-061-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There's a bug in the code determining whether a certificate is self-signed or not: if they have neither AKID nor SKID then we just assume that the cert is self-signed, which may not be true. Fix this by checking that the raw subject name matches the raw issuer name and that the public key algorithm for the key and signature are both the same in addition to requiring that the AKID bits match. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlierDavid Howells2016-04-064-71/+110
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Extract the signature digest for an X.509 certificate earlier, at the end of x509_cert_parse() rather than leaving it to the callers thereof since it has to be called anyway. Further, immediately after that, check the signature on self-signed certificates, also rather in the callers of x509_cert_parse(). We note in the x509_certificate struct the following bits of information: (1) Whether the signature is self-signed (even if we can't check the signature due to missing crypto). (2) Whether the key held in the certificate needs unsupported crypto to be used. We may get a PKCS#7 message with X.509 certs that we can't make use of - we just ignore them and give ENOPKG at the end it we couldn't verify anything if at least one of these unusable certs are in the chain of trust. (3) Whether the signature held in the certificate needs unsupported crypto to be checked. We can still use the key held in this certificate, even if we can't check the signature on it - if it is held in the system trusted keyring, for instance. We just can't add it to a ring of trusted keys or follow it further up the chain of trust. Making these checks earlier allows x509_check_signature() to be removed and replaced with direct calls to public_key_verify_signature(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | PKCS#7: Make the signature a pointer rather than embedding itDavid Howells2016-04-064-48/+55
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Point to the public_key_signature struct from the pkcs7_signed_info struct rather than embedding it. This makes the code consistent with the X.509 signature handling and makes it possible to have a common cleanup function. We also save a copy of the digest in the signature without sharing the memory with the crypto layer metadata. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | X.509: Retain the key verification dataDavid Howells2016-04-065-66/+67
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Retain the key verification data (ie. the struct public_key_signature) including the digest and the key identifiers. Note that this means that we need to take a separate copy of the digest in x509_get_sig_params() rather than lumping it in with the crypto layer data. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | KEYS: Add identifier pointers to public_key_signature structDavid Howells2016-04-061-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add key identifier pointers to public_key_signature struct so that they can be used to retain the identifier of the key to be used to verify the signature in both PKCS#7 and X.509. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | KEYS: Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric keyDavid Howells2016-04-064-9/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key in the 4th element of the key payload and provide a way for it to be destroyed. For the public key subtype, this will be a public_key_signature struct. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | X.509: Whitespace cleanupDavid Howells2016-04-061-2/+2
|/ | | | | | Clean up some whitespace. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-03-301-0/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto fix from Herbert Xu: "This fixes a bug in pkcs7_validate_trust and its users where the output value may in fact be taken from uninitialised memory" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: PKCS#7: pkcs7_validate_trust(): initialize the _trusted output argument
| * PKCS#7: pkcs7_validate_trust(): initialize the _trusted output argumentNicolai Stange2016-03-231-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Despite what the DocBook comment to pkcs7_validate_trust() says, the *_trusted argument is never set to false. pkcs7_validate_trust() only positively sets *_trusted upon encountering a trusted PKCS#7 SignedInfo block. This is quite unfortunate since its callers, system_verify_data() for example, depend on pkcs7_validate_trust() clearing *_trusted on non-trust. Indeed, UBSAN splats when attempting to load the uninitialized local variable 'trusted' from system_verify_data() in pkcs7_validate_trust(): UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c:194:14 load of value 82 is not a valid value for type '_Bool' [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff818c4d35>] dump_stack+0xbc/0x117 [<ffffffff818c4c79>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x169/0x169 [<ffffffff8194113b>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x4e [<ffffffff819419fa>] __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0x111/0x158 [<ffffffff819418e9>] ? val_to_string.constprop.12+0xcf/0xcf [<ffffffff818334a4>] ? x509_request_asymmetric_key+0x114/0x370 [<ffffffff814b83f0>] ? kfree+0x220/0x370 [<ffffffff818312c2>] ? public_key_verify_signature_2+0x32/0x50 [<ffffffff81835e04>] pkcs7_validate_trust+0x524/0x5f0 [<ffffffff813c391a>] system_verify_data+0xca/0x170 [<ffffffff813c3850>] ? top_trace_array+0x9b/0x9b [<ffffffff81510b29>] ? __vfs_read+0x279/0x3d0 [<ffffffff8129372f>] mod_verify_sig+0x1ff/0x290 [...] The implication is that pkcs7_validate_trust() effectively grants trust when it really shouldn't have. Fix this by explicitly setting *_trusted to false at the very beginning of pkcs7_validate_trust(). Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: keys - Revert "convert public key to akcipher api"Herbert Xu2016-02-0911-124/+272
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This needs to go through the security tree so I'm reverting the patches for now. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: asymmetric_keys - convert public key and digsig asym to the akcipher apiTadeusz Struk2016-02-0611-272/+124
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch converts the module verification code to the new akcipher API. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enumDavid Howells2016-03-038-67/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the identifier public key and digest algorithm fields text instead of enum. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | akcipher: Move the RSA DER encoding check to the crypto layerDavid Howells2016-03-034-243/+93
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the RSA EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding from the asymmetric-key public_key subtype to the rsa crypto module's pkcs1pad template. This means that the public_key subtype no longer has any dependencies on public key type. To make this work, the following changes have been made: (1) The rsa pkcs1pad template is now used for RSA keys. This strips off the padding and returns just the message hash. (2) In a previous patch, the pkcs1pad template gained an optional second parameter that, if given, specifies the hash used. We now give this, and pkcs1pad checks the encoded message E(M) for the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding and verifies that the correct digest OID is present. (3) The crypto driver in crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c is now reduced to something that doesn't care about what the encryption actually does and and has been merged into public_key.c. (4) CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA is gone. Module signing must set CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA=y instead. Thoughts: (*) Should the encoding style (eg. raw, EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5) also be passed to the padding template? Should there be multiple padding templates registered that share most of the code? Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | X.509: Handle midnight alternative notation in GeneralizedTimeDavid Howells2016-02-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The ASN.1 GeneralizedTime object carries an ISO 8601 format date and time. The time is permitted to show midnight as 00:00 or 24:00 (the latter being equivalent of 00:00 of the following day). The permitted value is checked in x509_decode_time() but the actual handling is left to mktime64(). Without this patch, certain X.509 certificates will be rejected and could lead to an unbootable kernel. Note that with this patch we also permit any 24:mm:ss time and extend this to UTCTime, which whilst not strictly correct don't permit much leeway in fiddling date strings. Reported-by: Rudolf Polzer <rpolzer@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> cc: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
* | X.509: Support leap secondsDavid Howells2016-02-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The format of ASN.1 GeneralizedTime seems to be specified by ISO 8601 [X.680 46.3] and this apparently supports leap seconds (ie. the seconds field is 60). It's not entirely clear that ASN.1 expects it, but we can relax the seconds check slightly for GeneralizedTime. This results in us passing a time with sec as 60 to mktime64(), which handles it as being a duplicate of the 0th second of the next minute. We can't really do otherwise without giving the kernel much greater knowledge of where all the leap seconds are. Unfortunately, this would require change the mapping of the kernel's current-time-in-seconds. UTCTime, however, only supports a seconds value in the range 00-59, but for the sake of simplicity allow this with UTCTime also. Without this patch, certain X.509 certificates will be rejected, potentially making a kernel unbootable. Reported-by: Rudolf Polzer <rpolzer@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> cc: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
* | X.509: Fix leap year handling againDavid Howells2016-02-291-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There are still a couple of minor issues in the X.509 leap year handling: (1) To avoid doing a modulus-by-400 in addition to a modulus-by-100 when determining whether the year is a leap year or not, I divided the year by 100 after doing the modulus-by-100, thereby letting the compiler do one instruction for both, and then did a modulus-by-4. Unfortunately, I then passed the now-modified year value to mktime64() to construct a time value. Since this isn't a fast path and since mktime64() does a bunch of divisions, just condense down to "% 400". It's also easier to read. (2) The default month length for any February where the year doesn't divide by four exactly is obtained from the month_length[] array where the value is 29, not 28. This is fixed by altering the table. Reported-by: Rudolf Polzer <rpolzer@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
* | PKCS#7: fix unitialized boolean 'want'Colin Ian King2016-02-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The boolean want is not initialized and hence garbage. The default should be false (later it is only set to true on tne sinfo->authattrs check). Found with static analysis using CoverityScan Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | crypto: KEYS: convert public key and digsig asym to the akcipher apiTadeusz Struk2016-02-1011-271/+124
|/ | | | | | | | This patch converts the module verification code to the new akcipher API. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* PKCS#7: Don't require SpcSpOpusInfo in Authenticode pkcs7 signaturesPeter Jones2016-01-251-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Dave Young reported: > Hi, > > I saw the warning "Missing required AuthAttr" when testing kexec, > known issue? Idea about how to fix it? > > The kernel is latest linus tree plus sevral patches from Toshi to > cleanup io resource structure. > > in function pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs(): > if (!test_bit(sinfo_has_content_type, &sinfo->aa_set) || > !test_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set) || > (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData && > !test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set))) { > pr_warn("Missing required AuthAttr\n"); > return -EBADMSG; > } > > The third condition below is true: > (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData && > !test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set)) > > I signed the kernel with redhat test key like below: > pesign -c 'Red Hat Test Certificate' -i arch/x86/boot/bzImage -o /boot/vmlinuz-4.4.0-rc8+ -s --force And right he is! The Authenticode specification is a paragon amongst technical documents, and has this pearl of wisdom to offer: --------------------------------- Authenticode-Specific SignerInfo UnauthenticatedAttributes Structures The following Authenticode-specific data structures are present in SignerInfo authenticated attributes. SpcSpOpusInfo SpcSpOpusInfo is identified by SPC_SP_OPUS_INFO_OBJID (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.12) and is defined as follows: SpcSpOpusInfo ::= SEQUENCE { programName [0] EXPLICIT SpcString OPTIONAL, moreInfo [1] EXPLICIT SpcLink OPTIONAL, } --#public-- SpcSpOpusInfo has two fields: programName This field contains the program description: If publisher chooses not to specify a description, the SpcString structure contains a zero-length program name. If the publisher chooses to specify a description, the SpcString structure contains a Unicode string. moreInfo This field is set to an SPCLink structure that contains a URL for a Web site with more information about the signer. The URL is an ASCII string. --------------------------------- Which is to say that this is an optional *unauthenticated* field which may be present in the Authenticated Attribute list. This is not how pkcs7 is supposed to work, so when David implemented this, he didn't appreciate the subtlety the original spec author was working with, and missed the part of the sublime prose that says this Authenticated Attribute is an Unauthenticated Attribute. As a result, the code in question simply takes as given that the Authenticated Attributes should be authenticated. But this one should not, individually. Because it says it's not authenticated. It still has to hash right so the TBS digest is correct. So it is both authenticated and unauthenticated, all at once. Truly, a wonder of technical accomplishment. Additionally, pesign's implementation has always attempted to be compatible with the signatures emitted from contemporary versions of Microsoft's signtool.exe. During the initial implementation, Microsoft signatures always produced the same values for SpcSpOpusInfo - {U"Microsoft Windows", "http://www.microsoft.com"} - without regard to who the signer was. Sometime between Windows 8 and Windows 8.1 they stopped including the field in their signatures altogether, and as such pesign stopped producing them in commits c0c4da6 and d79cb0c, sometime around June of 2012. The theory here is that anything that breaks with pesign signatures would also be breaking with signtool.exe sigs as well, and that'll be a more noticed problem for firmwares parsing it, so it'll get fixed. The fact that we've done exactly this bug in Linux code is first class, grade A irony. So anyway, we should not be checking this field for presence or any particular value: if the field exists, it should be at the right place, but aside from that, as long as the hash matches the field is good. Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Tested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-01-181-0/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: - EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel (EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring. - Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks. - Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2. - Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA. * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits) selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix KEYS: refcount bug fix ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking IMA: policy can be updated zero times selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm() selinux: export validatetrans decisions gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code ...
| * IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyringsPetko Manolov2015-12-151-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings, effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system keyring. On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty at kernel boot. IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller. Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* | crypto: asymmetric_keys - signature.c does not need <module.h>Paul Gortmaker2015-12-111-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | This file does not contain any modular related function calls. So get rid of module.h since it drags in a lot of other headers and adds to the preprocessing load. It does export some symbols though, so we'll need to ensure it has export.h present instead. Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* X.509: Fix the time validation [ver #2]David Howells2015-11-121-5/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes CVE-2015-5327. It affects kernels from 4.3-rc1 onwards. Fix the X.509 time validation to use month number-1 when looking up the number of days in that month. Also put the month number validation before doing the lookup so as not to risk overrunning the array. This can be tested by doing the following: cat <<EOF | openssl x509 -outform DER | keyctl padd asymmetric "" @s -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDbjCCAlagAwIBAgIJAN/lUld+VR4hMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMCkxETAPBgNV BAoMCGxvY2FsLWNhMRQwEgYDVQQDDAtzaWduaW5nIGtleTAeFw0xNTA5MDEyMTMw MThaFw0xNjA4MzEyMTMwMThaMCkxETAPBgNVBAoMCGxvY2FsLWNhMRQwEgYDVQQD DAtzaWduaW5nIGtleTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANrn crcMfMeG67nagX4+m02Xk9rkmsMKI5XTUxbikROe7GSUVJ27sPVPZp4mgzoWlvhh jfK8CC/qhEhwep8Pgg4EJZyWOjhZb7R97ckGvLIoUC6IO3FC2ZnR7WtmWDgo2Jcj VlXwJdHhKU1VZwulh81O61N8IBKqz2r/kDhIWiicUCUkI/Do/RMRfKAoDBcSh86m gOeIAGfq62vbiZhVsX5dOE8Oo2TK5weAvwUIOR7OuGBl5AqwFlPnXQolewiHzKry THg9e44HfzG4Mi6wUvcJxVaQT1h5SrKD779Z5+8+wf1JLaooetcEUArvWyuxCU59 qxA4lsTjBwl4cmEki+cCAwEAAaOBmDCBlTAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MAsGA1UdDwQE AwIHgDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUyND/eKUis7ep/hXMJ8iZMdUhI+IwWQYDVR0jBFIwUIAU yND/eKUis7ep/hXMJ8iZMdUhI+KhLaQrMCkxETAPBgNVBAoMCGxvY2FsLWNhMRQw EgYDVQQDDAtzaWduaW5nIGtleYIJAN/lUld+VR4hMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IB AQAMqm1N1yD5pimUELLhT5eO2lRdGUfTozljRxc7e2QT3RLk2TtGhg65JFFN6eml XS58AEPVcAsSLDlR6WpOpOLB2giM0+fV/eYFHHmh22yqTJl4YgkdUwyzPdCHNOZL hmSKeY9xliHb6PNrNWWtZwhYYvRaO2DX4GXOMR0Oa2O4vaYu6/qGlZOZv3U6qZLY wwHEJSrqeBDyMuwN+eANHpoSpiBzD77S4e+7hUDJnql4j6xzJ65+nWJ89fCrQypR 4sN5R3aGeIh3QAQUIKpHilwek0CtEaYERgc5m+jGyKSc1rezJW62hWRTaitOc+d5 G5hh+9YpnYcxQHEKnZ7rFNKJ -----END CERTIFICATE----- EOF If it works, it emit a key ID; if it fails, it should give a bad message error. Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-11-066-30/+35
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem update from James Morris: "This is mostly maintenance updates across the subsystem, with a notable update for TPM 2.0, and addition of Jarkko Sakkinen as a maintainer of that" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (40 commits) apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependency selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_struct selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be static selinux: use sprintf return value selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools() selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core() selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity() selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate call selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data KEYS: Provide a script to extract a module signature KEYS: Provide a script to extract the sys cert list from a vmlinux file keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members used certs: add .gitignore to stop git nagging about x509_certificate_list KEYS: use kvfree() in add_key Smack: limited capability for changing process label TPM: remove unnecessary little endian conversion vTPM: support little endian guests char: Drop owner assignment from i2c_driver ...
| * KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload dataDavid Howells2015-10-216-30/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk as it seems pointless to keep them separate. Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded user-defined keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
* | Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-11-043-7/+9
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu: "API: - Add support for cipher output IVs in testmgr - Add missing crypto_ahash_blocksize helper - Mark authenc and des ciphers as not allowed under FIPS. Algorithms: - Add CRC support to 842 compression - Add keywrap algorithm - A number of changes to the akcipher interface: + Separate functions for setting public/private keys. + Use SG lists. Drivers: - Add Intel SHA Extension optimised SHA1 and SHA256 - Use dma_map_sg instead of custom functions in crypto drivers - Add support for STM32 RNG - Add support for ST RNG - Add Device Tree support to exynos RNG driver - Add support for mxs-dcp crypto device on MX6SL - Add xts(aes) support to caam - Add ctr(aes) and xts(aes) support to qat - A large set of fixes from Russell King for the marvell/cesa driver" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (115 commits) crypto: asymmetric_keys - Fix unaligned access in x509_get_sig_params() crypto: akcipher - Don't #include crypto/public_key.h as the contents aren't used hwrng: exynos - Add Device Tree support hwrng: exynos - Fix missing configuration after suspend to RAM hwrng: exynos - Add timeout for waiting on init done dt-bindings: rng: Describe Exynos4 PRNG bindings crypto: marvell/cesa - use __le32 for hardware descriptors crypto: marvell/cesa - fix missing cpu_to_le32() in mv_cesa_dma_add_op() crypto: marvell/cesa - use memcpy_fromio()/memcpy_toio() crypto: marvell/cesa - use gfp_t for gfp flags crypto: marvell/cesa - use dma_addr_t for cur_dma crypto: marvell/cesa - use readl_relaxed()/writel_relaxed() crypto: caam - fix indentation of close braces crypto: caam - only export the state we really need to export crypto: caam - fix non-block aligned hash calculation crypto: caam - avoid needlessly saving and restoring caam_hash_ctx crypto: caam - print errno code when hash registration fails crypto: marvell/cesa - fix memory leak crypto: marvell/cesa - fix first-fragment handling in mv_cesa_ahash_dma_last_req() crypto: marvell/cesa - rearrange handling for sw padded hashes ...
| * crypto: asymmetric_keys - Fix unaligned access in x509_get_sig_params()Sowmini Varadhan2015-10-201-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | x509_get_sig_params() has the same code pattern as the one in pkcs7_verify() that is fixed by commit 62f57d05e287 ("crypto: pkcs7 - Fix unaligned access in pkcs7_verify()") so apply a similar fix here: make sure that desc is pointing at an algined value past the digest_size, and take alignment values into consideration when doing kzalloc() Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: pkcs7 - Fix unaligned access in pkcs7_verify()Sowmini Varadhan2015-10-141-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On sparc, we see unaligned access messages on each modprobe[-r]: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[6ad9b4] pkcs7_verify [..] Kernel unaligned access at TPC[6a5484] crypto_shash_finup [..] Kernel unaligned access at TPC[6a5390] crypto_shash_update [..] Kernel unaligned access at TPC[10150308] sha1_sparc64_update [..] Kernel unaligned access at TPC[101501ac] __sha1_sparc64_update [..] These ware triggered by mod_verify_sig() invocations of pkcs_verify(), and are are being caused by an unaligned desc at (sha1, digest_size is 0x14) desc = digest + digest_size; To fix this, pkcs7_verify needs to make sure that desc is pointing at an aligned value past the digest_size, and kzalloc appropriately, taking alignment values into consideration. Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: asymmetric_keys - remove always false comparisonsudip2015-09-211-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | hour, min and sec are unsigned int and they can never be less than zero. Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudip@vectorindia.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | X.509: Don't strip leading 00's from key ID when constructing key descriptionDavid Howells2015-09-251-4/+0
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't strip leading zeros from the crypto key ID when using it to construct the struct key description as the signature in kernels up to and including 4.2 matched this aspect of the key. This means that 1 in 256 keys won't actually match if their key ID begins with 00. The key ID is stored in the module signature as binary and so must be converted to text in order to invoke request_key() - but it isn't stripped at this point. Something like this is likely to be observed in dmesg when the key is loaded: [ 1.572423] Loaded X.509 cert 'Build time autogenerated kernel key: 62a7c3d2da278be024da4af8652c071f3fea33' followed by this when we try and use it: [ 1.646153] Request for unknown module key 'Build time autogenerated kernel key: 0062a7c3d2da278be024da4af8652c071f3fea33' err -11 The 'Loaded' line should show an extra '00' on the front of the hex string. This problem should not affect 4.3-rc1 and onwards because there the key should be matched on one of its auxiliary identities rather than the key struct's description string. Reported-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Reported-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use themDavid Howells2015-09-012-0/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them to select the hashing algorithm. Without this, something like the following error might get written to dmesg: [ 31.829322] PKCS7: Unknown OID: [32] 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3 [ 31.829328] PKCS7: Unknown OID: [180] 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3 [ 31.829330] Unsupported digest algo: 55 Where the 55 on the third line is OID__NR indicating an unknown OID. Reported-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-By: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* PKCS#7: Add MODULE_LICENSE() to test moduleDavid Howells2015-08-131-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a MODULE_LICENSE() line to the PKCS#7 test key module to fix this warning: WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_LICENSE() in crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_test_key.o Whilst we're at it, also add a module description. Reported-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content typeDavid Howells2015-08-127-17/+239
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that signature. If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then contributes to the signature. Further, we already require the master message content type to be pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1]. We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them entirely as appropriate. To this end: (1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one that does not. (2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them. Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are rejected: (a) contentType. This is checked to be an OID that matches the content type in the SignedData object. (b) messageDigest. This must match the crypto digest of the data. (c) signingTime. If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within the validity window of the matching X.509 cert. (d) S/MIME capabilities. We don't check the contents. (e) Authenticode SP Opus Info. We don't check the contents. (f) Authenticode Statement Type. We don't check the contents. The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing. If the message is an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present. The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed to support kernels already signed by the pesign program. This only affects kexec. sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP). The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or if it contains more than one element in its set of values. (3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of the following restrictions and pass in the appropriate option from the callers: (*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and forbids authattrs. sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR. We could be more flexible and permit authattrs optionally, but only permit minimal content. (*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and requires authattrs. In future, this will require an attribute holding the target firmware name in addition to the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data but allows either no authattrs or only permits the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type and requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr in addition to the minimal set. It also permits an SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and an S/MIME capabilities authattr because the pesign program doesn't remove these). (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE These are invalid in this context but are included for later use when limiting the use of X.509 certs. (4) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between the above options for testing purposes. For example: echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s </tmp/stuff.pkcs7 will attempt to check the signature on stuff.pkcs7 as if it contains a firmware blob (1 being VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE). Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
* KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7David Howells2015-08-121-0/+1
| | | | | | Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7 into the pkey_id_type_name array. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoderDavid Howells2015-08-123-31/+72
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder fill in a time64_t rather than a struct tm to make comparison easier (unfortunately, this makes readable display less easy) and export it so that it can be used by the PKCS#7 code too. Further, tighten up its parsing to reject invalid dates (eg. weird characters, non-existent hour numbers) and unsupported dates (eg. timezones other than 'Z' or dates earlier than 1970). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-12-27 02:07:48 +0100