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* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6Linus Torvalds2014-09-151-3/+0
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu: "This fixes the newly added drbg generator so that it actually works on 32-bit machines. Previously the code was only tested on 64-bit and on 32-bit it overflowed and simply doesn't work" * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: crypto: drbg - remove check for uninitialized DRBG handle crypto: drbg - backport "fix maximum value checks on 32 bit systems"
| * crypto: drbg - remove check for uninitialized DRBG handleStephan Mueller2014-09-051-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The drbg_healthcheck() contained a test to call the DRBG with an uninitialized DRBG cipher handle. As this is an inappropriate use of the kernel crypto API to try to generate random numbers before initialization, checks verifying for an initialized DRBG have been removed in previous patches. Now, the drbg_healthcheck test must also be removed. Changes V2: Added patch marker to email subject line. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | PEFILE: Relax the check on the length of the PKCS#7 certDavid Howells2014-09-031-16/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Relax the check on the length of the PKCS#7 cert as it appears that the PE file wrapper size gets rounded up to the nearest 8. The debugging output looks like this: PEFILE: ==> verify_pefile_signature() PEFILE: ==> pefile_parse_binary() PEFILE: checksum @ 110 PEFILE: header size = 200 PEFILE: cert = 968 @547be0 [68 09 00 00 00 02 02 00 30 82 09 56 ] PEFILE: sig wrapper = { 968, 200, 2 } PEFILE: Signature data not PKCS#7 The wrapper is the first 8 bytes of the hex dump inside []. This indicates a length of 0x968 bytes, including the wrapper header - so 0x960 bytes of payload. The ASN.1 wrapper begins [ ... 30 82 09 56 ]. That indicates an object of size 0x956 - a four byte discrepency, presumably just padding for alignment purposes. So we just check that the ASN.1 container is no bigger than the payload and reduce the recorded size appropriately. Whilst we're at it, allow shorter PKCS#7 objects that manage to squeeze within 127 or 255 bytes. It's just about conceivable if no X.509 certs are included in the PKCS#7 message. Reported-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | KEYS: Fix public_key asymmetric key subtype nameDavid Howells2014-09-031-0/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | The length of the name of an asymmetric key subtype must be stored in struct asymmetric_key_subtype::name_len so that it can be matched by a search for "<subkey_name>:<partial_fingerprint>". Fix the public_key subtype to have name_len set. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* initramfs: support initramfs that is bigger than 2GiBYinghai Lu2014-08-091-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now with 64bit bzImage and kexec tools, we support ramdisk that size is bigger than 2g, as we could put it above 4G. Found compressed initramfs image could not be decompressed properly. It turns out that image length is int during decompress detection, and it will become < 0 when length is more than 2G. Furthermore, during decompressing len as int is used for inbuf count, that has problem too. Change len to long, that should be ok as on 32 bit platform long is 32bits. Tested with following compressed initramfs image as root with kexec. gzip, bzip2, xz, lzma, lzop, lz4. run time for populate_rootfs(): size name Nehalem-EX Westmere-EX Ivybridge-EX 9034400256 root_img : 26s 24s 30s 3561095057 root_img.lz4 : 28s 27s 27s 3459554629 root_img.lzo : 29s 29s 28s 3219399480 root_img.gz : 64s 62s 49s 2251594592 root_img.xz : 262s 260s 183s 2226366598 root_img.lzma: 386s 376s 277s 2901482513 root_img.bz2 : 635s 599s Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Rashika Kheria <rashika.kheria@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com> Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Cc: "Daniel M. Weeks" <dan@danweeks.net> Cc: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@nvidia.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2014-08-0618-50/+2075
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "In this release: - PKCS#7 parser for the key management subsystem from David Howells - appoint Kees Cook as seccomp maintainer - bugfixes and general maintenance across the subsystem" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (94 commits) X.509: Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key() netlabel: shorter names for the NetLabel catmap funcs/structs netlabel: fix the catmap walking functions netlabel: fix the horribly broken catmap functions netlabel: fix a problem when setting bits below the previously lowest bit PKCS#7: X.509 certificate issuer and subject are mandatory fields in the ASN.1 tpm: simplify code by using %*phN specifier tpm: Provide a generic means to override the chip returned timeouts tpm: missing tpm_chip_put in tpm_get_random() tpm: Properly clean sysfs entries in error path tpm: Add missing tpm_do_selftest to ST33 I2C driver PKCS#7: Use x509_request_asymmetric_key() Revert "selinux: fix the default socket labeling in sock_graft()" X.509: x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need string length arguments PKCS#7: fix sparse non static symbol warning KEYS: revert encrypted key change ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware firmware_class: perform new LSM checks security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook PKCS#7: Missing inclusion of linux/err.h ...
| * X.509: Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key()David Howells2014-08-031-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key() so that PKCS#7 can use it if compiled as a module. Reported-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * PKCS#7: X.509 certificate issuer and subject are mandatory fields in the ASN.1David Howells2014-07-311-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X.509 certificate issuer and subject fields are mandatory fields in the ASN.1 and so their existence needn't be tested for. They are guaranteed to end up with an empty string if the name material has nothing we can use (see x509_fabricate_name()). Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
| * PKCS#7: Use x509_request_asymmetric_key()David Howells2014-07-292-72/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() and x509_request_asymmetric_key() do the same thing, the latter being a copy of the former created by the IMA folks, so drop the PKCS#7 version as the X.509 location is more general. Whilst we're at it, rename the arguments of x509_request_asymmetric_key() to better reflect what the values being passed in are intended to match on an X.509 cert. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * X.509: x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need string length argumentsDavid Howells2014-07-281-6/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need the lengths of the NUL-terminated strings passing in as it can work that out for itself. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * PKCS#7: fix sparse non static symbol warningWei Yongjun2014-07-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fixes the following sparse warnings: crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c:73:17: warning: symbol 'key_type_pkcs7' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * PKCS#7: Missing inclusion of linux/err.hDavid Howells2014-07-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c needs to #include linux/err.h rather than relying on getting it through other headers. Without this, the powerpc allyesconfig build fails. Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * Merge branch 'keys-fixes' into keys-nextDavid Howells2014-07-221-1/+0
| |\ | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * RSA: Don't select non-existent symbolJean Delvare2014-07-171-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | You can select MPILIB_EXTRA all you want, it doesn't exist ;-) Surprised kconfig doesn't complain about that... Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Acked-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | Merge remote-tracking branch 'integrity/next-with-keys' into keys-nextDavid Howells2014-07-223-20/+142
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * | KEYS: validate certificate trust only with builtin keysDmitry Kasatkin2014-07-171-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates signed by any key on the system trusted keyring, to be added to a trusted keyring, this patch further restricts the certificates to those signed only by builtin keys on the system keyring. This patch defines a new option 'builtin' for the kernel parameter 'keys_ownerid' to allow trust validation using builtin keys. Simplified Mimi's "KEYS: define an owner trusted keyring" patch Changelog v7: - rename builtin_keys to use_builtin_keys Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | KEYS: validate certificate trust only with selected keyDmitry Kasatkin2014-07-172-0/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates signed by any key on the system trusted keyring, to be added to a trusted keyring, this patch further restricts the certificates to those signed by a particular key on the system keyring. This patch defines a new kernel parameter 'ca_keys' to identify the specific key which must be used for trust validation of certificates. Simplified Mimi's "KEYS: define an owner trusted keyring" patch. Changelog: - support for builtin x509 public keys only - export "asymmetric_keyid_match" - remove ifndefs MODULE - rename kernel boot parameter from keys_ownerid to ca_keys Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | KEYS: make partial key id matching as a dedicated functionDmitry Kasatkin2014-07-172-19/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To avoid code duplication this patch refactors asymmetric_key_match(), making partial ID string match a separate function. This patch also implicitly fixes a bug in the code. asymmetric_key_match() allows to match the key by its subtype. But subtype matching could be undone if asymmetric_key_id(key) would return NULL. This patch first checks for matching spec and then for its value. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| | * | KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' keyMimi Zohar2014-07-171-1/+86
| | |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Only public keys, with certificates signed by an existing 'trusted' key on the system trusted keyring, should be added to a trusted keyring. This patch adds support for verifying a certificate's signature. This is derived from David Howells pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() patch. Changelog v6: - on error free key - Dmitry - validate trust only for not already trusted keys - Dmitry - formatting cleanup Changelog: - define get_system_trusted_keyring() to fix kbuild issues Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
| * | Merge tag 'keys-pefile-20140709' into keys-nextDavid Howells2014-07-226-1/+678
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Here's a set of changes that implement a PE file signature checker. This provides the following facility: (1) Extract the signature from the PE file. This is a PKCS#7 message containing, as its data, a hash of the signed parts of the file. (2) Digest the signed parts of the file. (3) Compare the digest with the one from the PKCS#7 message. (4) Validate the signatures on the PKCS#7 message and indicate whether it was matched by a trusted key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * | pefile: Validate PKCS#7 trust chainDavid Howells2014-07-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Validate the PKCS#7 trust chain against the contents of the system keyring. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
| | * | pefile: Digest the PE binary and compare to the PKCS#7 dataDavid Howells2014-07-091-0/+197
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Digest the signed parts of the PE binary, canonicalising the section table before we need it, and then compare the the resulting digest to the one in the PKCS#7 signed content. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | pefile: Handle pesign using the wrong OIDVivek Goyal2014-07-091-1/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The pesign utility had a bug where it was using OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose instead of OID_msPeImageDataObjId - so allow both OIDs. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
| | * | pefile: Parse the "Microsoft individual code signing" data blobDavid Howells2014-07-095-1/+168
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The PKCS#7 certificate should contain a "Microsoft individual code signing" data blob as its signed content. This blob contains a digest of the signed content of the PE binary and the OID of the digest algorithm used (typically SHA256). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | pefile: Parse the presumed PKCS#7 content of the certificate blobDavid Howells2014-07-091-1/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Parse the content of the certificate blob, presuming it to be PKCS#7 format. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | pefile: Strip the wrapper off of the cert data blockDavid Howells2014-07-091-0/+71
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The certificate data block in a PE binary has a wrapper around the PKCS#7 signature we actually want to get at. Strip this off and check that we've got something that appears to be a PKCS#7 signature. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | pefile: Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained thereinDavid Howells2014-07-094-0/+217
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained therein. Later patches will check the signature and add the key if the signature checks out. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | KEYS: X.509: Fix a spelling mistakeDavid Howells2014-07-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
| * | | Merge tag 'keys-pkcs7-20140708' into keys-nextDavid Howells2014-07-2211-2/+1302
| |\| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Here's a set of changes that implement a PKCS#7 message parser in the kernel. The PKCS#7 message parsing will then be used to limit kexec to authenticated kernels only if so configured. The changes provide the following facilities: (1) Parse an ASN.1 PKCS#7 message and pick out useful bits such as the data content and the X.509 certificates used to sign it and all the data signatures. (2) Verify all the data signatures against the set of X.509 certificates available in the message. (3) Follow the certificate chains and verify that: (a) for every self-signed X.509 certificate, check that it validly signed itself, and: (b) for every non-self-signed certificate, if we have a 'parent' certificate, the former is validly signed by the latter. (4) Look for intersections between the certificate chains and the trusted keyring, if any intersections are found, verify that the trusted certificates signed the intersection point in the chain. (5) For testing purposes, a key type can be made available that will take a PKCS#7 message, check that the message is trustworthy, and if so, add its data content into the key. Note that (5) has to be altered to take account of the preparsing patches already committed to this branch. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * | PKCS#7: Provide a key type for testing PKCS#7David Howells2014-07-083-0/+117
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide a key type for testing the PKCS#7 parser. It is given a non-detached PKCS#7 message as payload: keyctl padd pkcs7_test a @s <stuff.pkcs7 The PKCS#7 wrapper is validated against the trusted certificates available and then stripped off. If successful, the key can be read, which will give the data content of the PKCS#7 message. A suitable message can be created by running make on the attached Makefile. This will produce a file called stuff.pkcs7 for test loading. The key3.x509 file should be put into the kernel source tree before it is built and converted to DER form: openssl x509 -in .../pkcs7/key3.x509 -outform DER -out key3.x509 ############################################################################### # # Create a pkcs7 message and sign it twice # # openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key2.x509 # ############################################################################### stuff.pkcs7: stuff.txt key2.priv key2.x509 key4.priv key4.x509 certs $(RM) $@ openssl smime -sign \ -signer key2.x509 \ -inkey key2.priv \ -signer key4.x509 \ -inkey key4.priv \ -in stuff.txt \ -certfile certs \ -out $@ -binary -outform DER -nodetach openssl pkcs7 -inform DER -in stuff.pkcs7 -print_certs -noout openssl asn1parse -inform DER -in stuff.pkcs7 -i >out stuff.txt: echo "The quick red fox jumped over the lazy brown dog" >stuff.txt certs: key1.x509 key2.x509 key3.x509 key4.x509 cat key{1,3}.x509 >$@ ############################################################################### # # Generate a signed key # # openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key2.x509 # ############################################################################### key2.x509: key2.x509_unsigned key1.priv key1.x509 openssl x509 \ -req -in key2.x509_unsigned \ -out key2.x509 \ -extfile key2.genkey -extensions myexts \ -CA key1.x509 \ -CAkey key1.priv \ -CAcreateserial key2.priv key2.x509_unsigned: key2.genkey openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \ -batch -outform PEM \ -config key2.genkey \ -keyout key2.priv \ -out key2.x509_unsigned key2.genkey: @echo Generating X.509 key generation config @echo >$@ "[ req ]" @echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096" @echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name" @echo >>$@ "prompt = no" @echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only" @echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]" @echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea" @echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 2" @echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]" @echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE" @echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature" @echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" @echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid" ############################################################################### # # Generate a couple of signing keys # # openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key1.x509 # ############################################################################### key1.x509: key1.x509_unsigned key4.priv key4.x509 openssl x509 \ -req -in key1.x509_unsigned \ -out key1.x509 \ -extfile key1.genkey -extensions myexts \ -CA key4.x509 \ -CAkey key4.priv \ -CAcreateserial key1.priv key1.x509_unsigned: key1.genkey openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \ -batch -outform PEM \ -config key1.genkey \ -keyout key1.priv \ -out key1.x509_unsigned key1.genkey: @echo Generating X.509 key generation config @echo >$@ "[ req ]" @echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096" @echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name" @echo >>$@ "prompt = no" @echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only" @echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]" @echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea" @echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 1" @echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]" @echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE" @echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign" @echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" @echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid" ############################################################################### # # Generate a signed key # # openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key4.x509 # ############################################################################### key4.x509: key4.x509_unsigned key3.priv key3.x509 openssl x509 \ -req -in key4.x509_unsigned \ -out key4.x509 \ -extfile key4.genkey -extensions myexts \ -CA key3.x509 \ -CAkey key3.priv \ -CAcreateserial key4.priv key4.x509_unsigned: key4.genkey openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \ -batch -outform PEM \ -config key4.genkey \ -keyout key4.priv \ -out key4.x509_unsigned key4.genkey: @echo Generating X.509 key generation config @echo >$@ "[ req ]" @echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096" @echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name" @echo >>$@ "prompt = no" @echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only" @echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]" @echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea" @echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 4" @echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]" @echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE" @echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign" @echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" @echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid" ############################################################################### # # Generate a couple of signing keys # # openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key3.x509 # ############################################################################### key3.priv key3.x509: key3.genkey openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \ -batch -x509 -outform PEM \ -config key3.genkey \ -keyout key3.priv \ -out key3.x509 key3.genkey: @echo Generating X.509 key generation config @echo >$@ "[ req ]" @echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096" @echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name" @echo >>$@ "prompt = no" @echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only" @echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]" @echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea" @echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 3" @echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2" @echo >>$@ @echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]" @echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE" @echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign" @echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" @echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid" clean: $(RM) *~ $(RM) key1.* key2.* key3.* key4.* stuff.* out certs Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| | * | PKCS#7: Find intersection between PKCS#7 message and known, trusted keysDavid Howells2014-07-082-0/+220
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Find the intersection between the X.509 certificate chain contained in a PKCS#7 message and a set of keys that we already know and trust. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | PKCS#7: Verify internal certificate chainDavid Howells2014-07-081-1/+87
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Verify certificate chain in the X.509 certificates contained within the PKCS#7 message as far as possible. If any signature that we should be able to verify fails, we reject the whole lot. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | PKCS#7: Find the right key in the PKCS#7 key list and verify the signatureDavid Howells2014-07-081-0/+64
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Find the appropriate key in the PKCS#7 key list and verify the signature with it. There may be several keys in there forming a chain. Any link in that chain or the root of that chain may be in our keyrings. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | PKCS#7: Digest the data in a signed-data messageDavid Howells2014-07-082-1/+175
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Digest the data in a PKCS#7 signed-data message and attach to the public_key_signature struct contained in the pkcs7_message struct. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | PKCS#7: Implement a parser [RFC 2315]David Howells2014-07-085-0/+606
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement a parser for a PKCS#7 signed-data message as described in part of RFC 2315. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| | * | X.509: Export certificate parse and free functionsDavid Howells2014-07-021-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Export certificate parse and free functions for use by modules. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
| | * | X.509: Add bits needed for PKCS#7David Howells2014-07-013-2/+30
| | |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PKCS#7 validation requires access to the serial number and the raw names in an X.509 certificate. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
| * | KEYS: struct key_preparsed_payload should have two payload pointersDavid Howells2014-07-222-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | struct key_preparsed_payload should have two payload pointers to correspond with those in struct key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
| * | KEYS: Provide a generic instantiation functionDavid Howells2014-07-181-24/+1
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide a generic instantiation function for key types that use the preparse hook. This makes it easier to prereserve key quota before keyrings get locked to retain the new key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://ftp.arm.linux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-armLinus Torvalds2014-08-051-0/+26
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull ARM updates from Russell King: "Included in this update: - perf updates from Will Deacon: The main changes are callchain stability fixes from Jean Pihet and event mapping and PMU name rework from Mark Rutland The latter is preparatory work for enabling some code re-use with arm64 in the future. - updates for nommu from Uwe Kleine-König: Two different fixes for the same problem making some ARM nommu configurations not boot since 3.6-rc1. The problem is that user_addr_max returned the biggest available RAM address which makes some copy_from_user variants fail to read from XIP memory. - deprecate legacy OMAP DMA API, in preparation for it's removal. The popular drivers have been converted over, leaving a very small number of rarely used drivers, which hopefully can be converted during the next cycle with a bit more visibility (and hopefully people popping out of the woodwork to help test) - more tweaks for BE systems, particularly with the kernel image format. In connection with this, I've cleaned up the way we generate the linker script for the decompressor. - removal of hard-coded assumptions of the kernel stack size, making everywhere depend on the value of THREAD_SIZE_ORDER. - MCPM updates from Nicolas Pitre. - Make it easier for proper CPU part number checks (which should always include the vendor field). - Assembly code optimisation - use the "bx" instruction when returning from a function on ARMv6+ rather than "mov pc, reg". - Save the last kernel misaligned fault location and report it via the procfs alignment file. - Clean up the way we create the initial stack frame, which is a repeated pattern in several different locations. - Support for 8-byte get_user(), needed for some DRM implementations. - mcs locking from Will Deacon. - Save and restore a few more Cortex-A9 registers (for errata workarounds) - Fix various aspects of the SWP emulation, and the ELF hwcap for the SWP instruction. - Update LPAE logic for pte_write and pmd_write to make it more correct. - Support for Broadcom Brahma15 CPU cores. - ARM assembly crypto updates from Ard Biesheuvel" * 'for-linus' of git://ftp.arm.linux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm: (53 commits) ARM: add comments to the early page table remap code ARM: 8122/1: smp_scu: enable SCU standby support ARM: 8121/1: smp_scu: use macro for SCU enable bit ARM: 8120/1: crypto: sha512: add ARM NEON implementation ARM: 8119/1: crypto: sha1: add ARM NEON implementation ARM: 8118/1: crypto: sha1/make use of common SHA-1 structures ARM: 8113/1: remove remaining definitions of PLAT_PHYS_OFFSET from <mach/memory.h> ARM: 8111/1: Enable erratum 798181 for Broadcom Brahma-B15 ARM: 8110/1: do CPU-specific init for Broadcom Brahma15 cores ARM: 8109/1: mm: Modify pte_write and pmd_write logic for LPAE ARM: 8108/1: mm: Introduce {pte,pmd}_isset and {pte,pmd}_isclear ARM: hwcap: disable HWCAP_SWP if the CPU advertises it has exclusives ARM: SWP emulation: only initialise on ARMv7 CPUs ARM: SWP emulation: always enable when SMP is enabled ARM: 8103/1: save/restore Cortex-A9 CP15 registers on suspend/resume ARM: 8098/1: mcs lock: implement wfe-based polling for MCS locking ARM: 8091/2: add get_user() support for 8 byte types ARM: 8097/1: unistd.h: relocate comments back to place ARM: 8096/1: Describe required sort order for textofs-y (TEXT_OFFSET) ARM: 8090/1: add revision info for PL310 errata 588369 and 727915 ...
| * | ARM: 8120/1: crypto: sha512: add ARM NEON implementationJussi Kivilinna2014-08-021-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds ARM NEON assembly implementation of SHA-512 and SHA-384 algorithms. tcrypt benchmark results on Cortex-A8, sha512-generic vs sha512-neon-asm: block-size bytes/update old-vs-new 16 16 2.99x 64 16 2.67x 64 64 3.00x 256 16 2.64x 256 64 3.06x 256 256 3.33x 1024 16 2.53x 1024 256 3.39x 1024 1024 3.52x 2048 16 2.50x 2048 256 3.41x 2048 1024 3.54x 2048 2048 3.57x 4096 16 2.49x 4096 256 3.42x 4096 1024 3.56x 4096 4096 3.59x 8192 16 2.48x 8192 256 3.42x 8192 1024 3.56x 8192 4096 3.60x 8192 8192 3.60x Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
| * | ARM: 8119/1: crypto: sha1: add ARM NEON implementationJussi Kivilinna2014-08-021-0/+11
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds ARM NEON assembly implementation of SHA-1 algorithm. tcrypt benchmark results on Cortex-A8, sha1-arm-asm vs sha1-neon-asm: block-size bytes/update old-vs-new 16 16 1.04x 64 16 1.02x 64 64 1.05x 256 16 1.03x 256 64 1.04x 256 256 1.30x 1024 16 1.03x 1024 256 1.36x 1024 1024 1.52x 2048 16 1.03x 2048 256 1.39x 2048 1024 1.55x 2048 2048 1.59x 4096 16 1.03x 4096 256 1.40x 4096 1024 1.57x 4096 4096 1.62x 8192 16 1.03x 8192 256 1.40x 8192 1024 1.58x 8192 4096 1.63x 8192 8192 1.63x Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6Linus Torvalds2014-08-0413-235/+3546
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu: - CTR(AES) optimisation on x86_64 using "by8" AVX. - arm64 support to ccp - Intel QAT crypto driver - Qualcomm crypto engine driver - x86-64 assembly optimisation for 3DES - CTR(3DES) speed test - move FIPS panic from module.c so that it only triggers on crypto modules - SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator (drbg). - more test vectors for ghash. - tweak self tests to catch partial block bugs. - misc fixes. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (94 commits) crypto: drbg - fix failure of generating multiple of 2**16 bytes crypto: ccp - Do not sign extend input data to CCP crypto: testmgr - add missing spaces to drbg error strings crypto: atmel-tdes - Switch to managed version of kzalloc crypto: atmel-sha - Switch to managed version of kzalloc crypto: testmgr - use chunks smaller than algo block size in chunk tests crypto: qat - Fixed SKU1 dev issue crypto: qat - Use hweight for bit counting crypto: qat - Updated print outputs crypto: qat - change ae_num to ae_id crypto: qat - change slice->regions to slice->region crypto: qat - use min_t macro crypto: qat - remove unnecessary parentheses crypto: qat - remove unneeded header crypto: qat - checkpatch blank lines crypto: qat - remove unnecessary return codes crypto: Resolve shadow warnings crypto: ccp - Remove "select OF" from Kconfig crypto: caam - fix DECO RSR polling crypto: qce - Let 'DEV_QCE' depend on both HAS_DMA and HAS_IOMEM ...
| * | crypto: drbg - fix failure of generating multiple of 2**16 bytesStephan Mueller2014-08-011-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The function drbg_generate_long slices the request into 2**16 byte or smaller chunks. However, the loop, however invokes the random number generation function with zero bytes when the request size is a multiple of 2**16 bytes. The fix prevents zero bytes requests. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: testmgr - add missing spaces to drbg error stringsJarod Wilson2014-08-011-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There are a few missing spaces in the error text strings for drbg_cavs_test, trivial fix. CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: testmgr - use chunks smaller than algo block size in chunk testsArd Biesheuvel2014-08-011-132/+132
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch updates many of the chunked tcrypt test cases so that not all of the chunks are an exact multiple of the block size. This should help uncover cases where the residue passed to blkcipher_walk_done() is incorrect. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: Resolve shadow warningsMark Rustad2014-08-015-71/+72
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Change formal parameters to not clash with global names to eliminate many W=2 warnings. Signed-off-by: Mark Rustad <mark.d.rustad@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: testmgr - avoid DMA mapping from text, rodata, stackHoria Geanta2014-07-232-9/+50
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With DMA_API_DEBUG set, following warnings are emitted (tested on CAAM accelerator): DMA-API: device driver maps memory from kernel text or rodata DMA-API: device driver maps memory from stack and the culprits are: -key in __test_aead and __test_hash -result in __test_hash MAX_KEYLEN is changed to accommodate maximum key length from existing test vectors in crypto/testmgr.h (131 bytes) and rounded. Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Acked-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: drbg - drbg_exit() can be staticFengguang Wu2014-07-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CC: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: drbg - HMAC-SHA1 DRBG has crypto strength of 128 bitsStephan Mueller2014-07-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The patch corrects the security strength of the HMAC-SHA1 DRBG to 128 bits. This strength defines the size of the seed required for the DRBG. Thus, the patch lowers the seeding requirement from 256 bits to 128 bits for HMAC-SHA1. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-12-19 19:13:29 +0100