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* net: rename SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE and SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATAEric Dumazet2015-12-012-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch is a cleanup to make following patch easier to review. Goal is to move SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE and SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA from (struct socket)->flags to a (struct socket_wq)->flags to benefit from RCU protection in sock_wake_async() To ease backports, we rename both constants. Two new helpers, sk_set_bit(int nr, struct sock *sk) and sk_clear_bit(int net, struct sock *sk) are added so that following patch can change their implementation. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* X.509: Fix the time validation [ver #2]David Howells2015-11-121-5/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes CVE-2015-5327. It affects kernels from 4.3-rc1 onwards. Fix the X.509 time validation to use month number-1 when looking up the number of days in that month. Also put the month number validation before doing the lookup so as not to risk overrunning the array. This can be tested by doing the following: cat <<EOF | openssl x509 -outform DER | keyctl padd asymmetric "" @s -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDbjCCAlagAwIBAgIJAN/lUld+VR4hMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMCkxETAPBgNV BAoMCGxvY2FsLWNhMRQwEgYDVQQDDAtzaWduaW5nIGtleTAeFw0xNTA5MDEyMTMw MThaFw0xNjA4MzEyMTMwMThaMCkxETAPBgNVBAoMCGxvY2FsLWNhMRQwEgYDVQQD DAtzaWduaW5nIGtleTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBANrn crcMfMeG67nagX4+m02Xk9rkmsMKI5XTUxbikROe7GSUVJ27sPVPZp4mgzoWlvhh jfK8CC/qhEhwep8Pgg4EJZyWOjhZb7R97ckGvLIoUC6IO3FC2ZnR7WtmWDgo2Jcj VlXwJdHhKU1VZwulh81O61N8IBKqz2r/kDhIWiicUCUkI/Do/RMRfKAoDBcSh86m gOeIAGfq62vbiZhVsX5dOE8Oo2TK5weAvwUIOR7OuGBl5AqwFlPnXQolewiHzKry THg9e44HfzG4Mi6wUvcJxVaQT1h5SrKD779Z5+8+wf1JLaooetcEUArvWyuxCU59 qxA4lsTjBwl4cmEki+cCAwEAAaOBmDCBlTAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MAsGA1UdDwQE AwIHgDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUyND/eKUis7ep/hXMJ8iZMdUhI+IwWQYDVR0jBFIwUIAU yND/eKUis7ep/hXMJ8iZMdUhI+KhLaQrMCkxETAPBgNVBAoMCGxvY2FsLWNhMRQw EgYDVQQDDAtzaWduaW5nIGtleYIJAN/lUld+VR4hMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IB AQAMqm1N1yD5pimUELLhT5eO2lRdGUfTozljRxc7e2QT3RLk2TtGhg65JFFN6eml XS58AEPVcAsSLDlR6WpOpOLB2giM0+fV/eYFHHmh22yqTJl4YgkdUwyzPdCHNOZL hmSKeY9xliHb6PNrNWWtZwhYYvRaO2DX4GXOMR0Oa2O4vaYu6/qGlZOZv3U6qZLY wwHEJSrqeBDyMuwN+eANHpoSpiBzD77S4e+7hUDJnql4j6xzJ65+nWJ89fCrQypR 4sN5R3aGeIh3QAQUIKpHilwek0CtEaYERgc5m+jGyKSc1rezJW62hWRTaitOc+d5 G5hh+9YpnYcxQHEKnZ7rFNKJ -----END CERTIFICATE----- EOF If it works, it emit a key ID; if it fails, it should give a bad message error. Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-11-111-2/+10
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto fix from Herbert Xu: "This fixes a bug in the algif_hash interface that may lead to crashes when used with certain algorithms such as HMAC" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: crypto: algif_hash - Only export and import on sockets with data
| * crypto: algif_hash - Only export and import on sockets with dataHerbert Xu2015-11-021-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The hash_accept call fails to work on sockets that have not received any data. For some algorithm implementations it may cause crashes. This patch fixes this by ensuring that we only export and import on sockets that have received data. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Harsh Jain <harshjain.prof@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Tested-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
* | Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-11-066-30/+35
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem update from James Morris: "This is mostly maintenance updates across the subsystem, with a notable update for TPM 2.0, and addition of Jarkko Sakkinen as a maintainer of that" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (40 commits) apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependency selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_struct selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be static selinux: use sprintf return value selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools() selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core() selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity() selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate call selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data KEYS: Provide a script to extract a module signature KEYS: Provide a script to extract the sys cert list from a vmlinux file keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members used certs: add .gitignore to stop git nagging about x509_certificate_list KEYS: use kvfree() in add_key Smack: limited capability for changing process label TPM: remove unnecessary little endian conversion vTPM: support little endian guests char: Drop owner assignment from i2c_driver ...
| * | KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload dataDavid Howells2015-10-216-30/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk as it seems pointless to keep them separate. Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded user-defined keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
* | | Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-11-0417-116/+677
|\ \ \ | | |/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu: "API: - Add support for cipher output IVs in testmgr - Add missing crypto_ahash_blocksize helper - Mark authenc and des ciphers as not allowed under FIPS. Algorithms: - Add CRC support to 842 compression - Add keywrap algorithm - A number of changes to the akcipher interface: + Separate functions for setting public/private keys. + Use SG lists. Drivers: - Add Intel SHA Extension optimised SHA1 and SHA256 - Use dma_map_sg instead of custom functions in crypto drivers - Add support for STM32 RNG - Add support for ST RNG - Add Device Tree support to exynos RNG driver - Add support for mxs-dcp crypto device on MX6SL - Add xts(aes) support to caam - Add ctr(aes) and xts(aes) support to qat - A large set of fixes from Russell King for the marvell/cesa driver" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (115 commits) crypto: asymmetric_keys - Fix unaligned access in x509_get_sig_params() crypto: akcipher - Don't #include crypto/public_key.h as the contents aren't used hwrng: exynos - Add Device Tree support hwrng: exynos - Fix missing configuration after suspend to RAM hwrng: exynos - Add timeout for waiting on init done dt-bindings: rng: Describe Exynos4 PRNG bindings crypto: marvell/cesa - use __le32 for hardware descriptors crypto: marvell/cesa - fix missing cpu_to_le32() in mv_cesa_dma_add_op() crypto: marvell/cesa - use memcpy_fromio()/memcpy_toio() crypto: marvell/cesa - use gfp_t for gfp flags crypto: marvell/cesa - use dma_addr_t for cur_dma crypto: marvell/cesa - use readl_relaxed()/writel_relaxed() crypto: caam - fix indentation of close braces crypto: caam - only export the state we really need to export crypto: caam - fix non-block aligned hash calculation crypto: caam - avoid needlessly saving and restoring caam_hash_ctx crypto: caam - print errno code when hash registration fails crypto: marvell/cesa - fix memory leak crypto: marvell/cesa - fix first-fragment handling in mv_cesa_ahash_dma_last_req() crypto: marvell/cesa - rearrange handling for sw padded hashes ...
| * | crypto: asymmetric_keys - Fix unaligned access in x509_get_sig_params()Sowmini Varadhan2015-10-201-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | x509_get_sig_params() has the same code pattern as the one in pkcs7_verify() that is fixed by commit 62f57d05e287 ("crypto: pkcs7 - Fix unaligned access in pkcs7_verify()") so apply a similar fix here: make sure that desc is pointing at an algined value past the digest_size, and take alignment values into consideration when doing kzalloc() Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: akcipher - Don't #include crypto/public_key.h as the contents aren't ↵David Howells2015-10-201-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | used Don't #include crypto/public_key.h in akcipher as the contents of the header aren't used and changes in a future patch cause it to fail to compile if CONFIG_KEYS=n. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: keywrap - add testmgr supportStephan Mueller2015-10-152-0/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The testmanager code for symmetric ciphers is extended to allow verification of the IV after a cipher operation. In addition, test vectors for kw(aes) for encryption and decryption are added. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: keywrap - enable compilationStephan Mueller2015-10-152-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Hook keywrap source code into Kconfig and Makefile Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: keywrap - add key wrapping block chaining modeStephan Mueller2015-10-151-0/+419
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch implements the AES key wrapping as specified in NIST SP800-38F and RFC3394. The implementation covers key wrapping without padding. IV handling: The caller does not provide an IV for encryption, but must obtain the IV after encryption which would serve as the first semblock in the ciphertext structure defined by SP800-38F. Conversely, for decryption, the caller must provide the first semiblock of the data as the IV and the following blocks as ciphertext. The key wrapping is an authenticated decryption operation. The caller will receive EBADMSG during decryption if the authentication failed. Albeit the standards define the key wrapping for AES only, the template can be used with any other block cipher that has a block size of 16 bytes. During initialization of the template, that condition is checked. Any cipher not having a block size of 16 bytes will cause the initialization to fail. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: testmgr - test IV value after a cipher operationBoris BREZILLON2015-10-152-1/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The crypto drivers are supposed to update the IV passed to the crypto request before calling the completion callback. Test for the IV value before considering the test as successful. Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: pkcs7 - Fix unaligned access in pkcs7_verify()Sowmini Varadhan2015-10-141-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On sparc, we see unaligned access messages on each modprobe[-r]: Kernel unaligned access at TPC[6ad9b4] pkcs7_verify [..] Kernel unaligned access at TPC[6a5484] crypto_shash_finup [..] Kernel unaligned access at TPC[6a5390] crypto_shash_update [..] Kernel unaligned access at TPC[10150308] sha1_sparc64_update [..] Kernel unaligned access at TPC[101501ac] __sha1_sparc64_update [..] These ware triggered by mod_verify_sig() invocations of pkcs_verify(), and are are being caused by an unaligned desc at (sha1, digest_size is 0x14) desc = digest + digest_size; To fix this, pkcs7_verify needs to make sure that desc is pointing at an aligned value past the digest_size, and kzalloc appropriately, taking alignment values into consideration. Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: jitterentropy - remove unnecessary information from a commentAlexander Kuleshov2015-10-141-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The clocksource does not provide clocksource_register() function since f893598 commit (clocksource: Mostly kill clocksource_register()), so let's remove unnecessary information about this function from a comment. Signed-off-by: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: akcipher - Changes to asymmetric key APITadeusz Struk2015-10-148-77/+152
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Setkey function has been split into set_priv_key and set_pub_key. Akcipher requests takes sgl for src and dst instead of void *. Users of the API i.e. two existing RSA implementation and test mgr code have been updated accordingly. Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: skcipher - blkcipher and ablkcipher should it be staticGeliang Tang2015-10-011-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fixes the following sparse warnings: crypto/skcipher.c:94:5: warning: symbol 'crypto_init_skcipher_ops_blkcipher' was not declared. Should it be static? crypto/skcipher.c:185:5: warning: symbol 'crypto_init_skcipher_ops_ablkcipher' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: testmgr - Disable fips-allowed for authenc() and des() ciphersJohn Haxby2015-10-011-16/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | No authenc() ciphers are FIPS approved, nor is ecb(des). After the end of 2015, ansi_cprng will also be non-approved. Signed-off-by: John Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com> Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: x86/sha - Add build support for Intel SHA Extensions optimized SHA1 ↵tim2015-09-211-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | and SHA256 This patch provides the configuration and build support to include and build the optimized SHA1 and SHA256 update transforms for the kernel's crypto library. Originally-by: Chandramouli Narayanan <mouli_7982@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: asymmetric_keys - remove always false comparisonsudip2015-09-211-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | hour, min and sec are unsigned int and they can never be less than zero. Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudip@vectorindia.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * | crypto: tcrypt - avoid mapping from module image addressesHoria Geant?2015-09-211-4/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The output buffer in test_ahash_speed will point to an address located within the tcrypt module image. This causes problems when trying to DMA map the buffer. For e.g. on ARM-based LS1021A, a page fault occurs within the DMA API when trying to access the struct page returned by virt_to_page(output): insmod tcrypt.ko mode=403 testing speed of async sha1 (sha1-caam) test 0 ( 16 byte blocks, 16 bytes per update, 1 updates): Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address f07e9080 pgd = e58d0e00 [f07e9080] *pgd=80000080007003, *pmd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 206 [#1] SMP THUMB2 Modules linked in: tcrypt(+) CPU: 1 PID: 1119 Comm: insmod Not tainted 4.2.0-rc1-256134-gbf433416e675 #1 Hardware name: Freescale LS1021A task: ea063900 ti: e5a34000 task.ti: e5a34000 PC is at dma_cache_maint_page+0x38/0xd0 LR is at __dma_page_cpu_to_dev+0x15/0x64 pc : [<800155a0>] lr : [<8001564d>] psr: 000f0033 sp : e5a35ca0 ip : 8063df00 fp : f07e9080 r10: 00000cd0 r9 : 8063df00 r8 : 805a2f04 r7 : 0017f804 r6 : 00000002 r5 : ee7f9000 r4 : 00000014 r3 : 80612d40 r2 : 01ff0080 r1 : 00000380 r0 : ee7f9000 Flags: nzcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA Thumb Segment user Control: 70c5387d Table: e58d0e00 DAC: 9b7ede70 Process insmod (pid: 1119, stack limit = 0xe5a34210) Stack: (0xe5a35ca0 to 0xe5a36000) [...] [<800155a0>] (dma_cache_maint_page) from [<8001564d>] (__dma_page_cpu_to_dev+0x15/0x64) [<8001564d>] (__dma_page_cpu_to_dev) from [<800156eb>] (arm_dma_map_page+0x1f/0x44) [<800156eb>] (arm_dma_map_page) from [<802935e3>] (ahash_digest+0x35f/0x510) [<802935e3>] (ahash_digest) from [<7f800d03>] (test_ahash_speed.constprop.6+0x24a/0x4e4 [tcrypt]) [<7f800d03>] (test_ahash_speed.constprop.6 [tcrypt]) from [<7f802fd5>] (do_test+0x1898/0x2058 [tcrypt]) [<7f802fd5>] (do_test [tcrypt]) from [<7f80802f>] (tcrypt_mod_init+0x2e/0x63 [tcrypt]) [<7f80802f>] (tcrypt_mod_init [tcrypt]) from [<80009517>] (do_one_initcall+0xb3/0x134) [<80009517>] (do_one_initcall) from [<80351ec7>] (do_init_module+0x3b/0x13c) [<80351ec7>] (do_init_module) from [<8005cc3f>] (load_module+0x97b/0x9dc) [<8005cc3f>] (load_module) from [<8005cd8d>] (SyS_finit_module+0x35/0x3e) [<8005cd8d>] (SyS_finit_module) from [<8000d101>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x1/0x4c) Code: 1aba 0152 eb00 0b02 (5882) 0f92 addr2line -f -i -e vmlinux 800155a0 page_zonenum include/linux/mm.h:728 page_zone include/linux/mm.h:881 dma_cache_maint_page arch/arm/mm/dma-mapping.c:822 Signed-off-by: Horia Geant? <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | | Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-10-274-6/+6
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto fix from Herbert Xu: "This fixes a problem in the Crypto API that may cause spurious errors when signals are received by the process that made the orignal system call into the kernel" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: crypto: api - Only abort operations on fatal signal
| * | | crypto: api - Only abort operations on fatal signalHerbert Xu2015-10-204-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently a number of Crypto API operations may fail when a signal occurs. This causes nasty problems as the caller of those operations are often not in a good position to restart the operation. In fact there is currently no need for those operations to be interrupted by user signals at all. All we need is for them to be killable. This patch replaces the relevant calls of signal_pending with fatal_signal_pending, and wait_for_completion_interruptible with wait_for_completion_killable, respectively. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | | | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6Linus Torvalds2015-10-131-1/+2
|\| | | | |_|/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu: "This fixes the following issues: - Fix AVX detection to prevent use of non-existent AESNI. - Some SPARC ciphers did not set their IV size which may lead to memory corruption" * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: crypto: ahash - ensure statesize is non-zero crypto: camellia_aesni_avx - Fix CPU feature checks crypto: sparc - initialize blkcipher.ivsize
| * | crypto: ahash - ensure statesize is non-zeroRussell King2015-10-131-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Unlike shash algorithms, ahash drivers must implement export and import as their descriptors may contain hardware state and cannot be exported as is. Unfortunately some ahash drivers did not provide them and end up causing crashes with algif_hash. This patch adds a check to prevent these drivers from registering ahash algorithms until they are fixed. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | | X.509: Don't strip leading 00's from key ID when constructing key descriptionDavid Howells2015-09-251-4/+0
| |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't strip leading zeros from the crypto key ID when using it to construct the struct key description as the signature in kernels up to and including 4.2 matched this aspect of the key. This means that 1 in 256 keys won't actually match if their key ID begins with 00. The key ID is stored in the module signature as binary and so must be converted to text in order to invoke request_key() - but it isn't stripped at this point. Something like this is likely to be observed in dmesg when the key is loaded: [ 1.572423] Loaded X.509 cert 'Build time autogenerated kernel key: 62a7c3d2da278be024da4af8652c071f3fea33' followed by this when we try and use it: [ 1.646153] Request for unknown module key 'Build time autogenerated kernel key: 0062a7c3d2da278be024da4af8652c071f3fea33' err -11 The 'Loaded' line should show an extra '00' on the front of the hex string. This problem should not affect 4.3-rc1 and onwards because there the key should be matched on one of its auxiliary identities rather than the key struct's description string. Reported-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Reported-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6Linus Torvalds2015-09-161-2/+3
|\| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu: "This fixes the following issues: - The selftest overreads the IV test vector. - Fix potential infinite loop in sunxi-ss driver. - Fix powerpc build failure when VMX is set without VSX" * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: crypto: testmgr - don't copy from source IV too much crypto: sunxi-ss - Fix a possible driver hang with ciphers crypto: vmx - VMX crypto should depend on CONFIG_VSX
| * crypto: testmgr - don't copy from source IV too muchAndrey Ryabinin2015-09-111-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While the destination buffer 'iv' is MAX_IVLEN size, the source 'template[i].iv' could be smaller, thus memcpy may read read invalid memory. Use crypto_skcipher_ivsize() to get real ivsize and pass it to memcpy. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-09-0816-163/+738
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - PKCS#7 support added to support signed kexec, also utilized for module signing. See comments in 3f1e1bea. ** NOTE: this requires linking against the OpenSSL library, which must be installed, e.g. the openssl-devel on Fedora ** - Smack - add IPv6 host labeling; ignore labels on kernel threads - support smack labeling mounts which use binary mount data - SELinux: - add ioctl whitelisting (see http://kernsec.org/files/lss2015/vanderstoep.pdf) - fix mprotect PROT_EXEC regression caused by mm change - Seccomp: - add ptrace options for suspend/resume" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (57 commits) PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them Documentation/Changes: Now need OpenSSL devel packages for module signing scripts: add extract-cert and sign-file to .gitignore modsign: Handle signing key in source tree modsign: Use if_changed rule for extracting cert from module signing key Move certificate handling to its own directory sign-file: Fix warning about BIO_reset() return value PKCS#7: Add MODULE_LICENSE() to test module Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfigured sign-file: Document dependency on OpenSSL devel libraries PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7 PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7 PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652] X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer PKCS#7: Check content type and versions MAINTAINERS: The keyrings mailing list has moved ...
| * | PKCS#7: Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use themDavid Howells2015-09-012-0/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add OIDs for sha224, sha284 and sha512 hash algos and use them to select the hashing algorithm. Without this, something like the following error might get written to dmesg: [ 31.829322] PKCS7: Unknown OID: [32] 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3 [ 31.829328] PKCS7: Unknown OID: [180] 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3 [ 31.829330] Unsupported digest algo: 55 Where the 55 on the third line is OID__NR indicating an unknown OID. Reported-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-By: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * | Move certificate handling to its own directoryDavid Howells2015-08-141-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move certificate handling out of the kernel/ directory and into a certs/ directory to get all the weird stuff in one place and move the generated signing keys into this directory. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
| * | PKCS#7: Add MODULE_LICENSE() to test moduleDavid Howells2015-08-131-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a MODULE_LICENSE() line to the PKCS#7 test key module to fix this warning: WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_LICENSE() in crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_test_key.o Whilst we're at it, also add a module description. Reported-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * | PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content typeDavid Howells2015-08-127-17/+239
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that signature. If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then contributes to the signature. Further, we already require the master message content type to be pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1]. We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them entirely as appropriate. To this end: (1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one that does not. (2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them. Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are rejected: (a) contentType. This is checked to be an OID that matches the content type in the SignedData object. (b) messageDigest. This must match the crypto digest of the data. (c) signingTime. If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within the validity window of the matching X.509 cert. (d) S/MIME capabilities. We don't check the contents. (e) Authenticode SP Opus Info. We don't check the contents. (f) Authenticode Statement Type. We don't check the contents. The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing. If the message is an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present. The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed to support kernels already signed by the pesign program. This only affects kexec. sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP). The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or if it contains more than one element in its set of values. (3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of the following restrictions and pass in the appropriate option from the callers: (*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and forbids authattrs. sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR. We could be more flexible and permit authattrs optionally, but only permit minimal content. (*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and requires authattrs. In future, this will require an attribute holding the target firmware name in addition to the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data but allows either no authattrs or only permits the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type and requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr in addition to the minimal set. It also permits an SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and an S/MIME capabilities authattr because the pesign program doesn't remove these). (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE These are invalid in this context but are included for later use when limiting the use of X.509 certs. (4) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between the above options for testing purposes. For example: echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s </tmp/stuff.pkcs7 will attempt to check the signature on stuff.pkcs7 as if it contains a firmware blob (1 being VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE). Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
| * | KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7David Howells2015-08-121-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7 into the pkey_id_type_name array. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * | PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoderDavid Howells2015-08-123-31/+72
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder fill in a time64_t rather than a struct tm to make comparison easier (unfortunately, this makes readable display less easy) and export it so that it can be used by the PKCS#7 code too. Further, tighten up its parsing to reject invalid dates (eg. weird characters, non-existent hour numbers) and unsupported dates (eg. timezones other than 'Z' or dates earlier than 1970). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
| * | PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652]David Howells2015-08-123-9/+68
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since CMS is an evolution of PKCS#7, with much of the ASN.1 being compatible, add support for CMS signed-data messages also [RFC5652 sec 5]. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-By: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
| * | X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or IssuerDavid Howells2015-08-121-6/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The key identifiers fabricated from an X.509 certificate are currently: (A) Concatenation of serial number and issuer (B) Concatenation of subject and subjectKeyID (SKID) When verifying one X.509 certificate with another, the AKID in the target can be used to match the authoritative certificate. The AKID can specify the match in one or both of two ways: (1) Compare authorityCertSerialNumber and authorityCertIssuer from the AKID to identifier (A) above. (2) Compare keyIdentifier from the AKID plus the issuer from the target certificate to identifier (B) above. When verifying a PKCS#7 message, the only available comparison is between the IssuerAndSerialNumber field and identifier (A) above. However, a subsequent patch adds CMS support. Whilst CMS still supports a match on IssuerAndSerialNumber as for PKCS#7, it also supports an alternative - which is the SubjectKeyIdentifier field. This is used to match to an X.509 certificate on the SKID alone. No subject information is available to be used. To this end change the fabrication of (B) above to be from the X.509 SKID alone. The AKID in keyIdentifier form then only matches on that and does not include the issuer. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-By: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
| * | PKCS#7: Check content type and versionsDavid Howells2015-08-122-4/+77
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We only support PKCS#7 signed-data [RFC2315 sec 9] content at the top level, so reject anything else. Further, check that the version numbers in SignedData and SignerInfo are 1 in both cases. Note that we don't restrict the inner content type. In the PKCS#7 code we don't parse the data attached there, but merely verify the signature over it. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-By: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
| * | PKCS#7: Allow detached data to be supplied for signature checking purposesDavid Howells2015-08-071-0/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It is possible for a PKCS#7 message to have detached data. However, to verify the signatures on a PKCS#7 message, we have to be able to digest the data. Provide a function to supply that data. An error is given if the PKCS#7 message included embedded data. This is used in a subsequent patch to supply the data to module signing where the signature is in the form of a PKCS#7 message with detached data, whereby the detached data is the module content that is signed. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
| * | X.509: Support X.509 lookup by Issuer+Serial form AuthorityKeyIdentifierDavid Howells2015-08-073-40/+101
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If an X.509 certificate has an AuthorityKeyIdentifier extension that provides an issuer and serialNumber, then make it so that these are used in preference to the keyIdentifier field also held therein for searching for the signing certificate. If both the issuer+serialNumber and the keyIdentifier are supplied, then the certificate is looked up by the former but the latter is checked as well. If the latter doesn't match the subjectKeyIdentifier of the parent certificate, EKEYREJECTED is returned. This makes it possible to chain X.509 certificates based on the issuer and serialNumber fields rather than on subjectKeyIdentifier. This is necessary as we are having to deal with keys that are represented by X.509 certificates that lack a subjectKeyIdentifier. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
| * | X.509: Extract both parts of the AuthorityKeyIdentifierDavid Howells2015-08-077-69/+145
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Extract both parts of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier, not just the keyIdentifier, as the second part can be used to match X.509 certificates by issuer and serialNumber. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
* | | Merge branch 'for-4.3/sg' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-blockLinus Torvalds2015-09-022-3/+3
|\ \ \ | |_|/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull SG updates from Jens Axboe: "This contains a set of scatter-gather related changes/fixes for 4.3: - Add support for limited chaining of sg tables even for architectures that do not set ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN. From Christoph. - Add sg chain support to target_rd. From Christoph. - Fixup open coded sg->page_link in crypto/omap-sham. From Christoph. - Fixup open coded crypto ->page_link manipulation. From Dan. - Also from Dan, automated fixup of manual sg_unmark_end() manipulations. - Also from Dan, automated fixup of open coded sg_phys() implementations. - From Robert Jarzmik, addition of an sg table splitting helper that drivers can use" * 'for-4.3/sg' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: lib: scatterlist: add sg splitting function scatterlist: use sg_phys() crypto/omap-sham: remove an open coded access to ->page_link scatterlist: remove open coded sg_unmark_end instances crypto: replace scatterwalk_sg_chain with sg_chain target/rd: always chain S/G list scatterlist: allow limited chaining without ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
| * | crypto: replace scatterwalk_sg_chain with sg_chainDan Williams2015-08-173-7/+7
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> [hch: split from a larger patch by Dan] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
* | crypto: algif_aead - fix for multiple operations on AF_ALG socketsLars Persson2015-08-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The tsgl scatterlist must be re-initialized after each operation. Otherwise the sticky bits in the page_link will corrupt the list with pre-mature termination or false chaining. Signed-off-by: Lars Persson <larper@axis.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: testmgr - Use new skcipher interfaceHerbert Xu2015-08-211-29/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch replaces uses of blkcipher and ablkcipher with the new skcipher interface. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: skcipher - Add top-level skcipher interfaceHerbert Xu2015-08-212-0/+246
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch introduces the crypto skcipher interface which aims to replace both blkcipher and ablkcipher. It's very similar to the existing ablkcipher interface. The main difference is the removal of the givcrypt interface. In order to make the transition easier for blkcipher users, there is a helper SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK which can be used to place a request on the stack for synchronous transforms. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: cmac - allow usage in FIPS modeStephan Mueller2015-08-191-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CMAC is an approved cipher in FIPS 140-2. The patch allows the use of CMAC with TDES and AES in FIPS mode. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: null - Add missing Kconfig tristate for NULL2Herbert Xu2015-08-171-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds a missing tristate statement to Kconfig for the new CRYPTO_NULL2 option. Fixes: 149a39717dcc ("crypto: aead - Add type-safe geniv init/exit helpers") Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: null - Use NULL2 in MakefileHerbert Xu2015-08-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The Kconfig option NULL2 has been added as CRYPTO_MANAGER now depends indirectly on NULL2. However, the Makefile was not updated to use the new option, resulting in potential build failures when only NULL2 is enabled. Fixes: 149a39717dcc ("crypto: aead - Add type-safe geniv init/exit helpers") Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | crypto: aead - Remove CRYPTO_ALG_AEAD_NEW flagHerbert Xu2015-08-1710-45/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch removes the CRYPTO_ALG_AEAD_NEW flag now that everyone has been converted. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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