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Instead of passing opt_flags around so much, store it in the private
structure so it can be examined by internals without needing to add more
arguments to functions.
Co-developed-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-15-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Now that security_post_load_data() is wired up, use it instead
of the NULL file argument style of security_post_read_file(),
and update the security_kernel_load_data() call to indicate that a
security_kernel_post_load_data() call is expected.
Wire up the IMA check to match earlier logic. Perhaps a generalized
change to ima_post_load_data() might look something like this:
return process_buffer_measurement(buf, size,
kernel_load_data_id_str(load_id),
read_idmap[load_id] ?: FILE_CHECK,
0, NULL);
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-10-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have
visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or
read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the
buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such
hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data().
Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a
NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for
the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was
left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in
a subsequent patch.)
Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single
contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image
segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to
reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle
this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that
indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called
with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents
can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false
(which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true
they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook
once the buffer is loaded.
With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads
(e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen
in subsequent patches.
Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The "FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED" enum is a "where", not a "what". It
should not be distinguished separately from just "FIRMWARE", as this
confuses the LSMs about what is being loaded. Additionally, there was
no actual validation of the firmware contents happening.
Fixes: e4c2c0ff00ec ("firmware: Add new platform fallback mechanism and firmware_request_platform()")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-3-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The EFI platform firmware fallback would clobber any pre-allocated
buffers. Instead, correctly refuse to reallocate when too small (as
already done in the sysfs fallback), or perform allocation normally
when needed.
Fixes: e4c2c0ff00ec ("firmware: Add new platform fallback mechanism and firmware_request_platform()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200724213640.389191-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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"enum fw_opt" is not used as an enum.
Change fw_opt to u32 as FW_OPT_* values are OR'd together.
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200522231202.13681-1-scott.branden@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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In some cases the platform's main firmware (e.g. the UEFI fw) may contain
an embedded copy of device firmware which needs to be (re)loaded into the
peripheral. Normally such firmware would be part of linux-firmware, but in
some cases this is not feasible, for 2 reasons:
1) The firmware is customized for a specific use-case of the chipset / use
with a specific hardware model, so we cannot have a single firmware file
for the chipset. E.g. touchscreen controller firmwares are compiled
specifically for the hardware model they are used with, as they are
calibrated for a specific model digitizer.
2) Despite repeated attempts we have failed to get permission to
redistribute the firmware. This is especially a problem with customized
firmwares, these get created by the chip vendor for a specific ODM and the
copyright may partially belong with the ODM, so the chip vendor cannot
give a blanket permission to distribute these.
This commit adds a new platform fallback mechanism to the firmware loader
which will try to lookup a device fw copy embedded in the platform's main
firmware if direct filesystem lookup fails.
Drivers which need such embedded fw copies can enable this fallback
mechanism by using the new firmware_request_platform() function.
Note that for now this is only supported on EFI platforms and even on
these platforms firmware_fallback_platform() only works if
CONFIG_EFI_EMBEDDED_FIRMWARE is enabled (this gets selected by drivers
which need this), in all other cases firmware_fallback_platform() simply
always returns -ENOENT.
Reported-by: Dave Olsthoorn <dave@bewaar.me>
Suggested-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200115163554.101315-5-hdegoede@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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