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A previous commit improved how !FMODE_NOWAIT is dealt with, but
inadvertently negated a check whilst doing so. This caused -EAGAIN to be
returned from reading files with O_NONBLOCK set. Fix up the check for
REQ_F_SUPPORT_NOWAIT.
Reported-by: Julian Orth <ju.orth@gmail.com>
Link: https://github.com/axboe/liburing/issues/1270
Fixes: f7c913438533 ("io_uring/rw: allow pollable non-blocking attempts for !FMODE_NOWAIT")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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The ret_stack_list is an array of ret_stack shadow stacks for the function
graph usage. When the first function graph is enabled, all tasks in the
system get a shadow stack. The ret_stack_list is a 32 element array of
pointers to these shadow stacks. It allocates the shadow stack in batches
(32 stacks at a time), assigns them to running tasks, and continues until
all tasks are covered.
When the function graph shadow stack changed from an array of
ftrace_ret_stack structures to an array of longs, the allocation of
ret_stack_list went from allocating an array of 32 elements to just a
block defined by SHADOW_STACK_SIZE. Luckily, that's defined as PAGE_SIZE
and is much more than enough to hold 32 pointers. But it is way overkill
for the amount needed to allocate.
Change the allocation of ret_stack_list back to a kcalloc() of
FTRACE_RETSTACK_ALLOC_SIZE pointers.
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241018215212.23f13f40@rorschach
Fixes: 42675b723b484 ("function_graph: Convert ret_stack to a series of longs")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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The function graph infrastructure allocates a shadow stack for every task
when enabled. This includes the idle tasks. The first time the function
graph is invoked, the shadow stacks are created and never freed until the
task exits. This includes the idle tasks.
Only the idle tasks that were for online CPUs had their shadow stacks
created when function graph tracing started. If function graph tracing is
enabled and a CPU comes online, the idle task representing that CPU will
not have its shadow stack created, and all function graph tracing for that
idle task will be silently dropped.
Instead, use the CPU hotplug mechanism to allocate the idle shadow stacks.
This will include idle tasks for CPUs that come online during tracing.
This issue can be reproduced by:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online
# echo 0 > set_ftrace_pid
# echo function_graph > current_tracer
# echo 1 > options/funcgraph-proc
# echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1
# grep '<idle>' per_cpu/cpu1/trace | head
Before, nothing would show up.
After:
1) <idle>-0 | 0.811 us | __enqueue_entity();
1) <idle>-0 | 5.626 us | } /* enqueue_entity */
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_server_update_idle_time() {
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_scaled_delta_exec() {
1) <idle>-0 | 0.450 us | arch_scale_cpu_capacity();
1) <idle>-0 | 1.242 us | }
1) <idle>-0 | 1.908 us | }
1) <idle>-0 | | dl_server_start() {
1) <idle>-0 | | enqueue_dl_entity() {
1) <idle>-0 | | task_contending() {
Note, if tracing stops and restarts, the old way would then initialize
the onlined CPUs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20241018214300.6df82178@rorschach
Fixes: 868baf07b1a25 ("ftrace: Fix memory leak with function graph and cpu hotplug")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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When initially adding the touchkey support, a mistake was made in the
property parsing code. The possible negative errno from
device_property_count_u32() was never checked, which was an oversight
left from converting to it from the of_property as part of the review
fixes.
Re-add the correct handling of the absent property, in which case zero
touchkeys should be assumed, which would disable the feature.
Reported-by: Jakob Hauser <jahau@rocketmail.com>
Tested-by: Jakob Hauser <jahau@rocketmail.com>
Fixes: 075d9b22c8fe ("Input: zinitix - add touchkey support")
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Nikita Travkin <nikita@trvn.ru>
Tested-by: Yassine Oudjana <y.oudjana@protonmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241004-zinitix-no-keycodes-v2-1-876dc9fea4b6@trvn.ru
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
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Add MSI Claw A1M controller to xpad_device match table when in xinput mode.
Add MSI VID as XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR.
Signed-off-by: John Edwards <uejji@uejji.net>
Reviewed-by: Derek J. Clark <derekjohn.clark@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christopher Snowhill <kode54@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241010232020.3292284-4-uejji@uejji.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
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Update Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM tree url and
maintainer's email to the newly issued kernel.org tree/email.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
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If enabled, we fallback to the platform keyring if the trusted keyring
doesn't have the key used to sign the ipe policy. But if pkcs7_verify()
rejects the key for other reasons, such as usage restrictions, we do not
fallback. Do so, following the same change in dm-verity.
Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
[FW: fixed some line length issues and a typo in the commit message]
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
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The lockdep asserts for the new follow_pfnmap() API "knows" that a
pfnmap always has a vma->vm_file, since that's the only way to create
such a mapping.
And that's actually true for all the normal cases. But not for the mmap
failure case, where the incomplete mapping is torn down and we have
cleared vma->vm_file because the failure occured before the file was
linked to the vma.
So this codepath does actually need to check for vm_file being NULL.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 6da8e9634bb7 ("mm: new follow_pfnmap API")
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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rts5228, rts5261, rts5264 are supported by the rtsx_pci driver, but
they are not mentioned in the Kconfig help when the code was added.
List those models in the Kconfig help accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Yo-Jung Lin (Leo) <0xff07@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241017144747.15966-1-0xff07@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Remove some entries due to various compliance requirements. They can come
back in the future if sufficient documentation is provided.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2024101835-tiptop-blip-09ed@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit 2fae6bb7be32 ("xen/privcmd: Add new syscall to get gsi from dev")
adds a weak reverse dependency to the config XEN_PRIVCMD definition, that
dependency causes xen-privcmd can't be loaded on domU, because dependent
xen-pciback isn't always be loaded successfully on domU.
To solve above problem, remove that dependency, and do not call
pcistub_get_gsi_from_sbdf() directly, instead add a hook in
drivers/xen/apci.c, xen-pciback register the real call function, then in
privcmd_ioctl_pcidev_get_gsi call that hook.
Fixes: 2fae6bb7be32 ("xen/privcmd: Add new syscall to get gsi from dev")
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiqian Chen <Jiqian.Chen@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Message-ID: <20241012084537.1543059-1-Jiqian.Chen@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
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The barrier_nospec() after the array bounds check is overkill and
painfully slow for arches which implement it.
Furthermore, most arches don't implement it, so they remain exposed to
Spectre v1 (which can affect pretty much any CPU with branch
prediction).
Instead, clamp the user pointer to a valid range so it's guaranteed to
be a valid array index even when the bounds check mispredicts.
Fixes: 8270cb10c068 ("cdrom: Fix spectre-v1 gadget")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1d86f4d9d8fba68e5ca64cdeac2451b95a8bf872.1729202937.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Add a maintainers entry now that the PREEMPT_RT bits are merged. Steven
volunteered and asked for the list.
There are no files associated with this entry since it is spread over the
kernel. It serves as entry for people knowing what they look for. There is
a keyword added so if PREEMPT_RT is mentioned somewhere, then the entry
will be picked up.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241015151132.Erx81G9f@linutronix.de
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>From memfd_secret(2) manpage:
The memory areas backing the file created with memfd_secret(2) are
visible only to the processes that have access to the file descriptor.
The memory region is removed from the kernel page tables and only the
page tables of the processes holding the file descriptor map the
corresponding physical memory. (Thus, the pages in the region can't be
accessed by the kernel itself, so that, for example, pointers to the
region can't be passed to system calls.)
We need to handle this special case gracefully in build ID fetching
code. Return -EFAULT whenever secretmem file is passed to build_id_parse()
family of APIs. Original report and repro can be found in [0].
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ZwyG8Uro%2FSyTXAni@ly-workstation/
Fixes: de3ec364c3c3 ("lib/buildid: add single folio-based file reader abstraction")
Reported-by: Yi Lai <yi1.lai@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241017175431.6183-A-hca@linux.ibm.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241017174713.2157873-1-andrii@kernel.org
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The current policy management makes it impossible to use IPE
in a general purpose distribution. In such cases the users are not
building the kernel, the distribution is, and access to the private
key included in the trusted keyring is, for obvious reason, not
available.
This means that users have no way to enable IPE, since there will
be no built-in generic policy, and no access to the key to sign
updates validated by the trusted keyring.
Just as we do for dm-verity, kernel modules and more, allow the
secondary and platform keyrings to also validate policies. This
allows users enrolling their own keys in UEFI db or MOK to also
sign policies, and enroll them. This makes it sensible to enable
IPE in general purpose distributions, as it becomes usable by
any user wishing to do so. Keys in these keyrings can already
load kernels and kernel modules, so there is no security
downgrade.
Add a kconfig each, like dm-verity does, but default to enabled if
the dependencies are available.
Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
[FW: fixed some style issues]
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
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Currently IPE accepts an update that has the same version as the policy
being updated, but it doesn't make it a no-op nor it checks that the
old and new policyes are the same. So it is possible to change the
content of a policy, without changing its version. This is very
confusing from userspace when managing policies.
Instead change the update logic to reject updates that have the same
version with ESTALE, as that is much clearer and intuitive behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
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version
When loading policies in userspace we want a recognizable error when an
update attempts to use an old policy, as that is an error that needs
to be treated differently from an invalid policy. Use -ESTALE as it is
clear enough for an update mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
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We no more need acquiring ctrl->lock before accessing the
NVMe controller state and instead we can now use the helper
nvme_ctrl_state. So replace the use of ctrl->lock from
nvme_keep_alive_finish function with nvme_ctrl_state call.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
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The nvme keep-alive operation, which executes at a periodic interval,
could potentially sneak in while shutting down a fabric controller.
This may lead to a race between the fabric controller admin queue
destroy code path (invoked while shutting down controller) and hw/hctx
queue dispatcher called from the nvme keep-alive async request queuing
operation. This race could lead to the kernel crash shown below:
Call Trace:
autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0xbc (unreliable)
__blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x114/0x24c
blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x44/0x84
blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x140/0x220
nvme_keep_alive_work+0xc8/0x19c [nvme_core]
process_one_work+0x200/0x4e0
worker_thread+0x340/0x504
kthread+0x138/0x140
start_kernel_thread+0x14/0x18
While shutting down fabric controller, if nvme keep-alive request sneaks
in then it would be flushed off. The nvme_keep_alive_end_io function is
then invoked to handle the end of the keep-alive operation which
decrements the admin->q_usage_counter and assuming this is the last/only
request in the admin queue then the admin->q_usage_counter becomes zero.
If that happens then blk-mq destroy queue operation (blk_mq_destroy_
queue()) which could be potentially running simultaneously on another
cpu (as this is the controller shutdown code path) would forward
progress and deletes the admin queue. So, now from this point onward
we are not supposed to access the admin queue resources. However the
issue here's that the nvme keep-alive thread running hw/hctx queue
dispatch operation hasn't yet finished its work and so it could still
potentially access the admin queue resource while the admin queue had
been already deleted and that causes the above crash.
This fix helps avoid the observed crash by implementing keep-alive as a
synchronous operation so that we decrement admin->q_usage_counter only
after keep-alive command finished its execution and returns the command
status back up to its caller (blk_execute_rq()). This would ensure that
fabric shutdown code path doesn't destroy the fabric admin queue until
keep-alive request finished execution and also keep-alive thread is not
running hw/hctx queue dispatch operation.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
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While shutting down loop controller, we first quiesce the admin/IO queue,
delete the admin/IO tag-set and then at last destroy the admin/IO queue.
However it's quite possible that during the window between quiescing and
destroying of the admin/IO queue, some admin/IO request might sneak in
and if that happens then we could potentially encounter a hung task
because shutdown operation can't forward progress until any pending I/O
is flushed off.
This commit helps ensure that before destroying the admin/IO queue, we
unquiesce the admin/IO queue so that any outstanding requests, which are
added after the admin/IO queue is quiesced, are now flushed to its
completion.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
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Add a small BPF verifier test case to ensure that alu32 additions to
registers are not subject to linked scalar delta tracking.
# ./vmtest.sh -- ./test_progs -t verifier_linked_scalars
[...]
./test_progs -t verifier_linked_scalars
[ 1.413138] tsc: Refined TSC clocksource calibration: 3407.993 MHz
[ 1.413524] clocksource: tsc: mask: 0xffffffffffffffff max_cycles: 0x311fcd52370, max_idle_ns: 440795242006 ns
[ 1.414223] clocksource: Switched to clocksource tsc
[ 1.419640] bpf_testmod: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel.
[ 1.420025] bpf_testmod: module verification failed: signature and/or required key missing - tainting kernel
#500/1 verifier_linked_scalars/scalars: find linked scalars:OK
#500 verifier_linked_scalars:OK
Summary: 1/1 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
[ 1.590858] ACPI: PM: Preparing to enter system sleep state S5
[ 1.591402] reboot: Power down
[...]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241016134913.32249-3-daniel@iogearbox.net
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print_reg_state() should not consider adding reg->off to reg->var_off.value
when dumping scalars. Scalars can be produced with reg->off != 0 through
BPF_ADD_CONST, and thus as-is this can skew the register log dump.
Fixes: 98d7ca374ba4 ("bpf: Track delta between "linked" registers.")
Reported-by: Nathaniel Theis <nathaniel.theis@nccgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241016134913.32249-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
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Nathaniel reported a bug in the linked scalar delta tracking, which can lead
to accepting a program with OOB access. The specific code is related to the
sync_linked_regs() function and the BPF_ADD_CONST flag, which signifies a
constant offset between two scalar registers tracked by the same register id.
The verifier attempts to track "similar" scalars in order to propagate bounds
information learned about one scalar to others. For instance, if r1 and r2
are known to contain the same value, then upon encountering 'if (r1 != 0x1234)
goto xyz', not only does it know that r1 is equal to 0x1234 on the path where
that conditional jump is not taken, it also knows that r2 is.
Additionally, with env->bpf_capable set, the verifier will track scalars
which should be a constant delta apart (if r1 is known to be one greater than
r2, then if r1 is known to be equal to 0x1234, r2 must be equal to 0x1233.)
The code path for the latter in adjust_reg_min_max_vals() is reached when
processing both 32 and 64-bit addition operations. While adjust_reg_min_max_vals()
knows whether dst_reg was produced by a 32 or a 64-bit addition (based on the
alu32 bool), the only information saved in dst_reg is the id of the source
register (reg->id, or'ed by BPF_ADD_CONST) and the value of the constant
offset (reg->off).
Later, the function sync_linked_regs() will attempt to use this information
to propagate bounds information from one register (known_reg) to others,
meaning, for all R in linked_regs, it copies known_reg range (and possibly
adjusting delta) into R for the case of R->id == known_reg->id.
For the delta adjustment, meaning, matching reg->id with BPF_ADD_CONST, the
verifier adjusts the register as reg = known_reg; reg += delta where delta
is computed as (s32)reg->off - (s32)known_reg->off and placed as a scalar
into a fake_reg to then simulate the addition of reg += fake_reg. This is
only correct, however, if the value in reg was created by a 64-bit addition.
When reg contains the result of a 32-bit addition operation, its upper 32
bits will always be zero. sync_linked_regs() on the other hand, may cause
the verifier to believe that the addition between fake_reg and reg overflows
into those upper bits. For example, if reg was generated by adding the
constant 1 to known_reg using a 32-bit alu operation, then reg->off is 1
and known_reg->off is 0. If known_reg is known to be the constant 0xFFFFFFFF,
sync_linked_regs() will tell the verifier that reg is equal to the constant
0x100000000. This is incorrect as the actual value of reg will be 0, as the
32-bit addition will wrap around.
Example:
0: (b7) r0 = 0; R0_w=0
1: (18) r1 = 0x80000001; R1_w=0x80000001
3: (37) r1 /= 1; R1_w=scalar()
4: (bf) r2 = r1; R1_w=scalar(id=1) R2_w=scalar(id=1)
5: (bf) r4 = r1; R1_w=scalar(id=1) R4_w=scalar(id=1)
6: (04) w2 += 2147483647; R2_w=scalar(id=1+2147483647,smin=0,smax=umax=0xffffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
7: (04) w4 += 0 ; R4_w=scalar(id=1+0,smin=0,smax=umax=0xffffffff,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff))
8: (15) if r2 == 0x0 goto pc+1
10: R0=0 R1=0xffffffff80000001 R2=0x7fffffff R4=0xffffffff80000001 R10=fp0
What can be seen here is that r1 is copied to r2 and r4, such that {r1,r2,r4}.id
are all the same which later lets sync_linked_regs() to be invoked. Then, in
a next step constants are added with alu32 to r2 and r4, setting their ->off,
as well as id |= BPF_ADD_CONST. Next, the conditional will bind r2 and
propagate ranges to its linked registers. The verifier now believes the upper
32 bits of r4 are r4=0xffffffff80000001, while actually r4=r1=0x80000001.
One approach for a simple fix suitable also for stable is to limit the constant
delta tracking to only 64-bit alu addition. If necessary at some later point,
BPF_ADD_CONST could be split into BPF_ADD_CONST64 and BPF_ADD_CONST32 to avoid
mixing the two under the tradeoff to further complicate sync_linked_regs().
However, none of the added tests from dedf56d775c0 ("selftests/bpf: Add tests
for add_const") make this necessary at this point, meaning, BPF CI also passes
with just limiting tracking to 64-bit alu addition.
Fixes: 98d7ca374ba4 ("bpf: Track delta between "linked" registers.")
Reported-by: Nathaniel Theis <nathaniel.theis@nccgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241016134913.32249-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
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Previously test_task_tid was setting `linfo.task.tid`
to `getpid()` which is the same as `gettid()` for the
parent process. Instead create a new child thread
and set `linfo.task.tid` to `gettid()` to make sure
the tid filtering logic is working as expected.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241016210048.1213935-2-linux@jordanrome.com
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In userspace, you can add a tid filter by setting
the "task.tid" field for "bpf_iter_link_info".
However, `get_pid_task` when called for the
`BPF_TASK_ITER_TID` type should have been using
`PIDTYPE_PID` (tid) instead of `PIDTYPE_TGID` (pid).
Fixes: f0d74c4da1f0 ("bpf: Parameterize task iterators.")
Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241016210048.1213935-1-linux@jordanrome.com
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nvme_dev_disable() modifies the dev->online_queues field, therefore
nvme_pci_update_nr_queues() should avoid racing against it, otherwise
we could end up passing invalid values to blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues().
WARNING: CPU: 39 PID: 61303 at drivers/pci/msi/api.c:347
pci_irq_get_affinity+0x187/0x210
Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_reset_work [nvme]
RIP: 0010:pci_irq_get_affinity+0x187/0x210
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? blk_mq_pci_map_queues+0x87/0x3c0
? pci_irq_get_affinity+0x187/0x210
blk_mq_pci_map_queues+0x87/0x3c0
nvme_pci_map_queues+0x189/0x460 [nvme]
blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x2a/0x40
nvme_reset_work+0x1be/0x2a0 [nvme]
Fix the bug by locking the shutdown_lock mutex before using
dev->online_queues. Give up if nvme_dev_disable() is running or if
it has been executed already.
Fixes: 949928c1c731 ("NVMe: Fix possible queue use after freed")
Tested-by: Yi Zhang <yi.zhang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
|
|
Not all virtual addresses have physical addresses, such as if they were
vmalloc'd. Just trace the virtual address instead of trying to trace a
physical address. This aligns with the API, and is good enough to
associate dma_alloc with dma_free.
Fixes: 038eb433dc14 ("dma-mapping: add tracing for dma-mapping API calls")
Reported-by: syzbot+b4bfacdec173efaa8567@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/670ebde5.050a0220.d9b66.0154.GAE@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
Add a regression test to assert that, when performing a spanning store
which consumes the entirety of the rightmost right leaf node does not
result in maple tree corruption when doing so.
This achieves this by building a test tree of 3 levels and establishing a
store which ultimately results in a spanned store of this nature.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/30cdc101a700d16e03ba2f9aa5d83f2efa894168.1728314403.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Bert Karwatzki <spasswolf@web.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Patch series "maple_tree: correct tree corruption on spanning store", v3.
There has been a nasty yet subtle maple tree corruption bug that appears
to have been in existence since the inception of the algorithm.
This bug seems far more likely to happen since commit f8d112a4e657
("mm/mmap: avoid zeroing vma tree in mmap_region()"), which is the point
at which reports started to be submitted concerning this bug.
We were made definitely aware of the bug thanks to the kind efforts of
Bert Karwatzki who helped enormously in my being able to track this down
and identify the cause of it.
The bug arises when an attempt is made to perform a spanning store across
two leaf nodes, where the right leaf node is the rightmost child of the
shared parent, AND the store completely consumes the right-mode node.
This results in mas_wr_spanning_store() mitakenly duplicating the new and
existing entries at the maximum pivot within the range, and thus maple
tree corruption.
The fix patch corrects this by detecting this scenario and disallowing the
mistaken duplicate copy.
The fix patch commit message goes into great detail as to how this occurs.
This series also includes a test which reliably reproduces the issue, and
asserts that the fix works correctly.
Bert has kindly tested the fix and confirmed it resolved his issues. Also
Mikhail Gavrilov kindly reported what appears to be precisely the same
bug, which this fix should also resolve.
This patch (of 2):
There has been a subtle bug present in the maple tree implementation from
its inception.
This arises from how stores are performed - when a store occurs, it will
overwrite overlapping ranges and adjust the tree as necessary to
accommodate this.
A range may always ultimately span two leaf nodes. In this instance we
walk the two leaf nodes, determine which elements are not overwritten to
the left and to the right of the start and end of the ranges respectively
and then rebalance the tree to contain these entries and the newly
inserted one.
This kind of store is dubbed a 'spanning store' and is implemented by
mas_wr_spanning_store().
In order to reach this stage, mas_store_gfp() invokes
mas_wr_preallocate(), mas_wr_store_type() and mas_wr_walk() in turn to
walk the tree and update the object (mas) to traverse to the location
where the write should be performed, determining its store type.
When a spanning store is required, this function returns false stopping at
the parent node which contains the target range, and mas_wr_store_type()
marks the mas->store_type as wr_spanning_store to denote this fact.
When we go to perform the store in mas_wr_spanning_store(), we first
determine the elements AFTER the END of the range we wish to store (that
is, to the right of the entry to be inserted) - we do this by walking to
the NEXT pivot in the tree (i.e. r_mas.last + 1), starting at the node we
have just determined contains the range over which we intend to write.
We then turn our attention to the entries to the left of the entry we are
inserting, whose state is represented by l_mas, and copy these into a 'big
node', which is a special node which contains enough slots to contain two
leaf node's worth of data.
We then copy the entry we wish to store immediately after this - the copy
and the insertion of the new entry is performed by mas_store_b_node().
After this we copy the elements to the right of the end of the range which
we are inserting, if we have not exceeded the length of the node (i.e.
r_mas.offset <= r_mas.end).
Herein lies the bug - under very specific circumstances, this logic can
break and corrupt the maple tree.
Consider the following tree:
Height
0 Root Node
/ \
pivot = 0xffff / \ pivot = ULONG_MAX
/ \
1 A [-----] ...
/ \
pivot = 0x4fff / \ pivot = 0xffff
/ \
2 (LEAVES) B [-----] [-----] C
^--- Last pivot 0xffff.
Now imagine we wish to store an entry in the range [0x4000, 0xffff] (note
that all ranges expressed in maple tree code are inclusive):
1. mas_store_gfp() descends the tree, finds node A at <=0xffff, then
determines that this is a spanning store across nodes B and C. The mas
state is set such that the current node from which we traverse further
is node A.
2. In mas_wr_spanning_store() we try to find elements to the right of pivot
0xffff by searching for an index of 0x10000:
- mas_wr_walk_index() invokes mas_wr_walk_descend() and
mas_wr_node_walk() in turn.
- mas_wr_node_walk() loops over entries in node A until EITHER it
finds an entry whose pivot equals or exceeds 0x10000 OR it
reaches the final entry.
- Since no entry has a pivot equal to or exceeding 0x10000, pivot
0xffff is selected, leading to node C.
- mas_wr_walk_traverse() resets the mas state to traverse node C. We
loop around and invoke mas_wr_walk_descend() and mas_wr_node_walk()
in turn once again.
- Again, we reach the last entry in node C, which has a pivot of
0xffff.
3. We then copy the elements to the left of 0x4000 in node B to the big
node via mas_store_b_node(), and insert the new [0x4000, 0xffff] entry
too.
4. We determine whether we have any entries to copy from the right of the
end of the range via - and with r_mas set up at the entry at pivot
0xffff, r_mas.offset <= r_mas.end, and then we DUPLICATE the entry at
pivot 0xffff.
5. BUG! The maple tree is corrupted with a duplicate entry.
This requires a very specific set of circumstances - we must be spanning
the last element in a leaf node, which is the last element in the parent
node.
spanning store across two leaf nodes with a range that ends at that shared
pivot.
A potential solution to this problem would simply be to reset the walk
each time we traverse r_mas, however given the rarity of this situation it
seems that would be rather inefficient.
Instead, this patch detects if the right hand node is populated, i.e. has
anything we need to copy.
We do so by only copying elements from the right of the entry being
inserted when the maximum value present exceeds the last, rather than
basing this on offset position.
The patch also updates some comments and eliminates the unused bool return
value in mas_wr_walk_index().
The work performed in commit f8d112a4e657 ("mm/mmap: avoid zeroing vma
tree in mmap_region()") seems to have made the probability of this event
much more likely, which is the point at which reports started to be
submitted concerning this bug.
The motivation for this change arose from Bert Karwatzki's report of
encountering mm instability after the release of kernel v6.12-rc1 which,
after the use of CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_MAPLE_TREE and similar configuration
options, was identified as maple tree corruption.
After Bert very generously provided his time and ability to reproduce this
event consistently, I was able to finally identify that the issue
discussed in this commit message was occurring for him.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1728314402.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/48b349a2a0f7c76e18772712d0997a5e12ab0a3b.1728314403.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Fixes: 54a611b60590 ("Maple Tree: add new data structure")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Bert Karwatzki <spasswolf@web.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241001023402.3374-1-spasswolf@web.de/
Tested-by: Bert Karwatzki <spasswolf@web.de>
Reported-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABXGCsOPwuoNOqSMmAvWO2Fz4TEmPnjFj-b7iF+XFRu1h7-+Dg@mail.gmail.com/
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Tested-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Sidhartha Kumar <sidhartha.kumar@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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According to the prototype formal BPF memory consistency model
discussed e.g. in [1] and following the ordering properties of
the C/in-kernel macro atomic_cmpxchg(), a BPF atomic operation
with the BPF_CMPXCHG modifier is fully ordered. However, the
current RISC-V JIT lowerings fail to meet such memory ordering
property. This is illustrated by the following litmus test:
BPF BPF__MP+success_cmpxchg+fence
{
0:r1=x; 0:r3=y; 0:r5=1;
1:r2=y; 1:r4=f; 1:r7=x;
}
P0 | P1 ;
*(u64 *)(r1 + 0) = 1 | r1 = *(u64 *)(r2 + 0) ;
r2 = cmpxchg_64 (r3 + 0, r4, r5) | r3 = atomic_fetch_add((u64 *)(r4 + 0), r5) ;
| r6 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0) ;
exists (1:r1=1 /\ 1:r6=0)
whose "exists" clause is not satisfiable according to the BPF
memory model. Using the current RISC-V JIT lowerings, the test
can be mapped to the following RISC-V litmus test:
RISCV RISCV__MP+success_cmpxchg+fence
{
0:x1=x; 0:x3=y; 0:x5=1;
1:x2=y; 1:x4=f; 1:x7=x;
}
P0 | P1 ;
sd x5, 0(x1) | ld x1, 0(x2) ;
L00: | amoadd.d.aqrl x3, x5, 0(x4) ;
lr.d x2, 0(x3) | ld x6, 0(x7) ;
bne x2, x4, L01 | ;
sc.d x6, x5, 0(x3) | ;
bne x6, x4, L00 | ;
fence rw, rw | ;
L01: | ;
exists (1:x1=1 /\ 1:x6=0)
where the two stores in P0 can be reordered. Update the RISC-V
JIT lowerings/implementation of BPF_CMPXCHG to emit an SC with
RELEASE ("rl") annotation in order to meet the expected memory
ordering guarantees. The resulting RISC-V JIT lowerings of
BPF_CMPXCHG match the RISC-V lowerings of the C atomic_cmpxchg().
Other lowerings were fixed via 20a759df3bba ("riscv, bpf: make
some atomic operations fully ordered").
Fixes: dd642ccb45ec ("riscv, bpf: Implement more atomic operations for RV64")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@kernel.org>
Link: https://lpc.events/event/18/contributions/1949/attachments/1665/3441/bpfmemmodel.2024.09.19p.pdf [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241017143628.2673894-1-parri.andrea@gmail.com
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When the sqpoll is exiting and cancels pending work items, it may need
to run task_work. If this happens from within io_uring_cancel_generic(),
then it may be under waiting for the io_uring_task waitqueue. This
results in the below splat from the scheduler, as the ring mutex may be
attempted grabbed while in a TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE state.
Ensure that the task state is set appropriately for that, just like what
is done for the other cases in io_run_task_work().
do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<0000000029387fd2>] prepare_to_wait+0x88/0x2fc
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 59939 at kernel/sched/core.c:8561 __might_sleep+0xf4/0x140
Modules linked in:
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 59939 Comm: iou-sqp-59938 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-00113-g8d020023b155 #7456
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __might_sleep+0xf4/0x140
lr : __might_sleep+0xf4/0x140
sp : ffff80008c5e7830
x29: ffff80008c5e7830 x28: ffff0000d93088c0 x27: ffff60001c2d7230
x26: dfff800000000000 x25: ffff0000e16b9180 x24: ffff80008c5e7a50
x23: 1ffff000118bcf4a x22: ffff0000e16b9180 x21: ffff0000e16b9180
x20: 000000000000011b x19: ffff80008310fac0 x18: 1ffff000118bcd90
x17: 30303c5b20746120 x16: 74657320313d6574 x15: 0720072007200720
x14: 0720072007200720 x13: 0720072007200720 x12: ffff600036c64f0b
x11: 1fffe00036c64f0a x10: ffff600036c64f0a x9 : dfff800000000000
x8 : 00009fffc939b0f6 x7 : ffff0001b6327853 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffff0001b6327850 x4 : ffff600036c64f0b x3 : ffff8000803c35bc
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000e16b9180
Call trace:
__might_sleep+0xf4/0x140
mutex_lock+0x84/0x124
io_handle_tw_list+0xf4/0x260
tctx_task_work_run+0x94/0x340
io_run_task_work+0x1ec/0x3c0
io_uring_cancel_generic+0x364/0x524
io_sq_thread+0x820/0x124c
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: af5d68f8892f ("io_uring/sqpoll: manage task_work privately")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Add the following Telit FN920C04 compositions:
0x10a2: MBIM + tty (AT/NMEA) + tty (AT) + tty (diag)
T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=03 Port=06 Cnt=01 Dev#= 17 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=1bc7 ProdID=10a2 Rev=05.15
S: Manufacturer=Telit Cinterion
S: Product=FN920
S: SerialNumber=92c4c4d8
C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim
E: Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=32ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim
E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option
E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=84(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms
I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=86(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms
I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option
E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=87(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
0x10a7: MBIM + tty (AT) + tty (AT) + tty (diag)
T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=03 Port=06 Cnt=01 Dev#= 18 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=1bc7 ProdID=10a7 Rev=05.15
S: Manufacturer=Telit Cinterion
S: Product=FN920
S: SerialNumber=92c4c4d8
C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim
E: Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=32ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim
E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option
E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=84(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms
I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=86(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms
I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option
E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=87(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
0x10aa: MBIM + tty (AT) + tty (diag) + DPL (data packet logging) + adb
T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=03 Port=06 Cnt=01 Dev#= 15 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=1bc7 ProdID=10aa Rev=05.15
S: Manufacturer=Telit Cinterion
S: Product=FN920
S: SerialNumber=92c4c4d8
C: #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA
I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim
E: Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=32ms
I: If#= 1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim
E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option
E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=84(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms
I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=80 Driver=(none)
E: Ad=86(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I: If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=(none)
E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=87(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
|
|
Add Quectel EM916Q-GL with product ID 0x6007
T: Bus=01 Lev=02 Prnt=02 Port=01 Cnt=01 Dev#= 3 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1
P: Vendor=2c7c ProdID=6007 Rev= 2.00
S: Manufacturer=Quectel
S: Product=EG916Q-GL
C:* #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=200mA
A: FirstIf#= 4 IfCount= 2 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=06 Prot=00
I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
E: Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 16 Ivl=32ms
E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
E: Ad=84(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 16 Ivl=32ms
E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option
E: Ad=86(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 16 Ivl=32ms
E: Ad=87(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
I:* If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(comm.) Sub=06 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether
E: Ad=88(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 32 Ivl=32ms
I: If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 0 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether
I:* If#= 5 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether
E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
E: Ad=89(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms
MI_00 Quectel USB Diag Port
MI_01 Quectel USB NMEA Port
MI_02 Quectel USB AT Port
MI_03 Quectel USB Modem Port
MI_04 Quectel USB Net Port
Signed-off-by: Benjamin B. Frost <benjamin@geanix.com>
Reviewed-by: Lars Melin <larsm17@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
|
|
vsock_bpf_prot is set up at runtime. Remove the superfluous init.
No functional change intended.
Fixes: 634f1a7110b4 ("vsock: support sockmap")
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241013-vsock-fixes-for-redir-v2-4-d6577bbfe742@rbox.co
|
|
Dequeuing via vsock_transport::read_skb() left msg_count outdated, which
then confused SOCK_SEQPACKET recv(). Decrease the counter.
Fixes: 634f1a7110b4 ("vsock: support sockmap")
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241013-vsock-fixes-for-redir-v2-3-d6577bbfe742@rbox.co
|
|
Make sure virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() and virtio_transport_dec_rx_pkt()
calls are balanced (i.e. virtio_vsock_sock::rx_bytes doesn't lie) after
vsock_transport::read_skb().
While here, also inform the peer that we've freed up space and it has more
credit.
Failing to update rx_bytes after packet is dequeued leads to a warning on
SOCK_STREAM recv():
[ 233.396654] rx_queue is empty, but rx_bytes is non-zero
[ 233.396702] WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 40601 at net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:589
Fixes: 634f1a7110b4 ("vsock: support sockmap")
Suggested-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241013-vsock-fixes-for-redir-v2-2-d6577bbfe742@rbox.co
|
|
Don't mislead the callers of bpf_{sk,msg}_redirect_{map,hash}(): make sure
to immediately and visibly fail the forwarding of unsupported af_vsock
packets.
Fixes: 634f1a7110b4 ("vsock: support sockmap")
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241013-vsock-fixes-for-redir-v2-1-d6577bbfe742@rbox.co
|
|
When profile rollback fails in mlx5e_netdev_change_profile, the netdev
profile var is left set to NULL. Avoid a crash when unloading the driver
by not calling profile->cleanup in such a case.
This was encountered while testing, with the original trigger that
the wq rescuer thread creation got interrupted (presumably due to
Ctrl+C-ing modprobe), which gets converted to ENOMEM (-12) by
mlx5e_priv_init, the profile rollback also fails for the same reason
(signal still active) so the profile is left as NULL, leading to a crash
later in _mlx5e_remove.
[ 732.473932] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1: E-Switch: Unload vfs: mode(OFFLOADS), nvfs(2), necvfs(0), active vports(2)
[ 734.525513] workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
[ 734.557372] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6235:(pid 6086): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
[ 734.559187] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1 eth3: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
[ 734.560153] workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
[ 734.589378] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6235:(pid 6086): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
[ 734.591136] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1 eth3: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12
[ 745.537492] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
[ 745.538222] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
<snipped>
[ 745.551290] Call Trace:
[ 745.551590] <TASK>
[ 745.551866] ? __die+0x20/0x60
[ 745.552218] ? page_fault_oops+0x150/0x400
[ 745.555307] ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0x240
[ 745.555729] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 745.556166] ? mlx5e_remove+0x6b/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
[ 745.556698] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x18/0x30
[ 745.557134] device_release_driver_internal+0x1df/0x240
[ 745.557654] bus_remove_device+0xd7/0x140
[ 745.558075] device_del+0x15b/0x3c0
[ 745.558456] mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked.part.0+0xb1/0x2f0 [mlx5_core]
[ 745.559112] mlx5_unregister_device+0x34/0x50 [mlx5_core]
[ 745.559686] mlx5_uninit_one+0x46/0xf0 [mlx5_core]
[ 745.560203] remove_one+0x4e/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
[ 745.560694] pci_device_remove+0x39/0xa0
[ 745.561112] device_release_driver_internal+0x1df/0x240
[ 745.561631] driver_detach+0x47/0x90
[ 745.562022] bus_remove_driver+0x84/0x100
[ 745.562444] pci_unregister_driver+0x3b/0x90
[ 745.562890] mlx5_cleanup+0xc/0x1b [mlx5_core]
[ 745.563415] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x14d/0x2f0
[ 745.563886] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1b0/0x460
[ 745.564313] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xe2/0x190
[ 745.564825] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
[ 745.565223] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[ 745.565725] RIP: 0033:0x7f1579b1288b
Fixes: 3ef14e463f6e ("net/mlx5e: Separate between netdev objects and mlx5e profiles initialization")
Signed-off-by: Cosmin Ratiu <cratiu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Dragos Tatulea <dtatulea@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
It otherwise remains registered and a subsequent attempt at eswitch
enabling might trigger warnings of the sort:
[ 682.589148] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 682.590204] notifier callback eswitch_vport_event [mlx5_core] already registered
[ 682.590256] WARNING: CPU: 13 PID: 2660 at kernel/notifier.c:31 notifier_chain_register+0x3e/0x90
[...snipped]
[ 682.610052] Call Trace:
[ 682.610369] <TASK>
[ 682.610663] ? __warn+0x7c/0x110
[ 682.611050] ? notifier_chain_register+0x3e/0x90
[ 682.611556] ? report_bug+0x148/0x170
[ 682.611977] ? handle_bug+0x36/0x70
[ 682.612384] ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60
[ 682.612817] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 682.613284] ? notifier_chain_register+0x3e/0x90
[ 682.613789] atomic_notifier_chain_register+0x25/0x40
[ 682.614322] mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x1d4/0x3b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 682.614965] mlx5_eswitch_enable+0xc9/0x100 [mlx5_core]
[ 682.615551] mlx5_device_enable_sriov+0x25/0x340 [mlx5_core]
[ 682.616170] mlx5_core_sriov_configure+0x50/0x170 [mlx5_core]
[ 682.616789] sriov_numvfs_store+0xb0/0x1b0
[ 682.617248] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x117/0x1a0
[ 682.617734] vfs_write+0x231/0x3f0
[ 682.618138] ksys_write+0x63/0xe0
[ 682.618536] do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x100
[ 682.618958] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
Fixes: 7624e58a8b3a ("net/mlx5: E-switch, register event handler before arming the event")
Signed-off-by: Cosmin Ratiu <cratiu@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
Command bitmask have a dedicated bit for MANAGE_PAGES command, this bit
isn't Initialize during command bitmask Initialization, only during
MANAGE_PAGES.
In addition, mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions() is trying to trigger
completion for MANAGE_PAGES command as well.
Hence, in case health error occurred before any MANAGE_PAGES command
have been invoke (for example, during mlx5_enable_hca()),
mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions() will try to trigger completion for
MANAGE_PAGES command, which will result in null-ptr-deref error.[1]
Fix it by Initialize command bitmask correctly.
While at it, re-write the code for better understanding.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions+0x1db/0x600 [mlx5_core]
Write of size 4 at addr 0000000000000214 by task kworker/u96:2/12078
CPU: 10 PID: 12078 Comm: kworker/u96:2 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2_for_upstream_debug_2024_04_07_19_01 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: mlx5_health0000:08:00.0 mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0
kasan_report+0xb9/0xf0
kasan_check_range+0xec/0x190
mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions+0x1db/0x600 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_cmd_flush+0x94/0x240 [mlx5_core]
enter_error_state+0x6c/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work+0xf3/0x480 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x787/0x1490
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400
? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0xda0/0xda0
? assign_work+0x168/0x240
worker_thread+0x586/0xd30
? rescuer_thread+0xae0/0xae0
kthread+0x2df/0x3b0
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
Fixes: 9b98d395b85d ("net/mlx5: Start health poll at earlier stage of driver load")
Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <shayd@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
Currently, mlx5 driver does not enforce vector index to be lower than
the maximum number of supported completion vectors when requesting a
new completion EQ. Thus, mlx5_comp_eqn_get() fails when trying to
acquire an IRQ with an improper vector index.
To prevent the case above, enforce that vector index value is
valid and lower than maximum in mlx5_comp_eqn_get() before handling the
request.
Fixes: f14c1a14e632 ("net/mlx5: Allocate completion EQs dynamically")
Signed-off-by: Maher Sanalla <msanalla@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
The HWS BWC API uses one lock per queue and usually acquires one of
them, except when doing changes which require locking all queues in
order. Naturally, lockdep isn't too happy about acquiring the same lock
class multiple times, so inform it that each queue lock is a different
class to avoid false positives.
Fixes: 2ca62599aa0b ("net/mlx5: HWS, added send engine and context handling")
Signed-off-by: Cosmin Ratiu <cratiu@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Yevgeny Kliteynik <kliteyn@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
hws_send_queues_bwc_locks_destroy destroyed more queue locks than
allocated, leading to memory corruption (occasionally) and warnings such
as DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(mutex_is_locked(lock)) in __mutex_destroy because
sometimes, the 'mutex' being destroyed was random memory.
The severity of this problem is proportional to the number of queues
configured because the code overreaches beyond the end of the
bwc_send_queue_locks array by 2x its length.
Fix that by using the correct number of bwc queues.
Fixes: 2ca62599aa0b ("net/mlx5: HWS, added send engine and context handling")
Signed-off-by: Cosmin Ratiu <cratiu@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Yevgeny Kliteynik <kliteyn@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
Fix error flow bug that could lead to double free of a buffer
during a failure to calculate a suitable definer layout.
Fixes: 74a778b4a63f ("net/mlx5: HWS, added definers handling")
Signed-off-by: Yevgeny Kliteynik <kliteyn@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Itamar Gozlan <igozlan@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
Removed wrong access to the num_of_rules field of the matcher.
This is a usual u32 variable, but the access was as if it was atomic.
This fixes the following CI warnings:
mlx5hws_bwc.c:708:17: warning: large atomic operation may incur significant performance penalty;
the access size (4 bytes) exceeds the max lock-free size (0 bytes) [-Watomic-alignment]
Fixes: 510f9f61a112 ("net/mlx5: HWS, added API and enabled HWS support")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202409291101.6NdtMFVC-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Yevgeny Kliteynik <kliteyn@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Itamar Gozlan <igozlan@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
|
|
Syzkaller reported this splat:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mptcp_pm_nl_rm_addr_or_subflow+0xb44/0xcc0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:881
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880569ac858 by task syz.1.2799/14662
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 14662 Comm: syz.1.2799 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-syzkaller-00307-g36c254515dc6 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0xc3/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601
mptcp_pm_nl_rm_addr_or_subflow+0xb44/0xcc0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:881
mptcp_pm_nl_rm_subflow_received net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:914 [inline]
mptcp_nl_remove_id_zero_address+0x305/0x4a0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1572
mptcp_pm_nl_del_addr_doit+0x5c9/0x770 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1603
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x202/0x2f0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x565/0x800 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210
netlink_rcv_skb+0x165/0x410 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2551
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1331 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x53c/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1357
netlink_sendmsg+0x8b8/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:729 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:744 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x9ae/0xb40 net/socket.c:2607
___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2661
__sys_sendmsg+0x117/0x1f0 net/socket.c:2690
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0x73/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:386
do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:411
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e
RIP: 0023:0xf7fe4579
Code: b8 01 10 06 03 74 b4 01 10 07 03 74 b0 01 10 08 03 74 d8 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00000000f574556c EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000172
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000b RCX: 0000000020000140
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Allocated by task 5387:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:878 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1014 [inline]
subflow_create_ctx+0x87/0x2a0 net/mptcp/subflow.c:1803
subflow_ulp_init+0xc3/0x4d0 net/mptcp/subflow.c:1956
__tcp_set_ulp net/ipv4/tcp_ulp.c:146 [inline]
tcp_set_ulp+0x326/0x7f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ulp.c:167
mptcp_subflow_create_socket+0x4ae/0x10a0 net/mptcp/subflow.c:1764
__mptcp_subflow_connect+0x3cc/0x1490 net/mptcp/subflow.c:1592
mptcp_pm_create_subflow_or_signal_addr+0xbda/0x23a0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:642
mptcp_pm_nl_fully_established net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:650 [inline]
mptcp_pm_nl_work+0x3a1/0x4f0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:943
mptcp_worker+0x15a/0x1240 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2777
process_one_work+0x958/0x1b30 kernel/workqueue.c:3229
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3310 [inline]
worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf00 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
Freed by task 113:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:579
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x51/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:230 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2342 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4579 [inline]
kfree+0x14f/0x4b0 mm/slub.c:4727
kvfree+0x47/0x50 mm/util.c:701
kvfree_rcu_list+0xf5/0x2c0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3423
kvfree_rcu_drain_ready kernel/rcu/tree.c:3563 [inline]
kfree_rcu_monitor+0x503/0x8b0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3632
kfree_rcu_shrink_scan+0x245/0x3a0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3966
do_shrink_slab+0x44f/0x11c0 mm/shrinker.c:435
shrink_slab+0x32b/0x12a0 mm/shrinker.c:662
shrink_one+0x47e/0x7b0 mm/vmscan.c:4818
shrink_many mm/vmscan.c:4879 [inline]
lru_gen_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:4957 [inline]
shrink_node+0x2452/0x39d0 mm/vmscan.c:5937
kswapd_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:6765 [inline]
balance_pgdat+0xc19/0x18f0 mm/vmscan.c:6957
kswapd+0x5ea/0xbf0 mm/vmscan.c:7226
kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xba/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:541
kvfree_call_rcu+0x74/0xbe0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3810
subflow_ulp_release+0x2ae/0x350 net/mptcp/subflow.c:2009
tcp_cleanup_ulp+0x7c/0x130 net/ipv4/tcp_ulp.c:124
tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x1c5/0x6a0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2541
inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x1a3/0x440 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1293
tcp_done+0x252/0x350 net/ipv4/tcp.c:4870
tcp_rcv_state_process+0x379b/0x4f30 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6933
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x1ad/0xa90 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1938
sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1115 [inline]
__release_sock+0x31b/0x400 net/core/sock.c:3072
__tcp_close+0x4f3/0xff0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3142
__mptcp_close_ssk+0x331/0x14d0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2489
mptcp_close_ssk net/mptcp/protocol.c:2543 [inline]
mptcp_close_ssk+0x150/0x220 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2526
mptcp_pm_nl_rm_addr_or_subflow+0x2be/0xcc0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:878
mptcp_pm_nl_rm_subflow_received net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:914 [inline]
mptcp_nl_remove_id_zero_address+0x305/0x4a0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1572
mptcp_pm_nl_del_addr_doit+0x5c9/0x770 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1603
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x202/0x2f0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x565/0x800 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210
netlink_rcv_skb+0x165/0x410 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2551
genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1331 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x53c/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1357
netlink_sendmsg+0x8b8/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:729 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:744 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x9ae/0xb40 net/socket.c:2607
___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2661
__sys_sendmsg+0x117/0x1f0 net/socket.c:2690
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0x73/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:386
do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:411
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880569ac800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 88 bytes inside of
freed 512-byte region [ffff8880569ac800, ffff8880569aca00)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x569ac
head: order:2 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0x4fff00000000040(head|node=1|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 04fff00000000040 ffff88801ac42c80 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 04fff00000000040 ffff88801ac42c80 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
head: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 04fff00000000002 ffffea00015a6b01 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 10238, tgid 10238 (kworker/u32:6), ts 597403252405, free_ts 597177952947
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x2d1/0x350 mm/page_alloc.c:1537
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1545 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x101e/0x3070 mm/page_alloc.c:3457
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x223/0x25a0 mm/page_alloc.c:4733
alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x2c9/0x610 mm/mempolicy.c:2265
alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:2412 [inline]
allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2578 [inline]
new_slab+0x2ba/0x3f0 mm/slub.c:2631
___slab_alloc+0xd1d/0x16f0 mm/slub.c:3818
__slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x56/0xb0 mm/slub.c:3908
__slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3961 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4122 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x2c5/0x310 mm/slub.c:4290
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:878 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1014 [inline]
mld_add_delrec net/ipv6/mcast.c:743 [inline]
igmp6_leave_group net/ipv6/mcast.c:2625 [inline]
igmp6_group_dropped+0x4ab/0xe40 net/ipv6/mcast.c:723
__ipv6_dev_mc_dec+0x281/0x360 net/ipv6/mcast.c:979
addrconf_leave_solict net/ipv6/addrconf.c:2253 [inline]
__ipv6_ifa_notify+0x3f6/0xc30 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:6283
addrconf_ifdown.isra.0+0xef9/0x1a20 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3982
addrconf_notify+0x220/0x19c0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3781
notifier_call_chain+0xb9/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:93
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xbe/0x140 net/core/dev.c:1996
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2034 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2048 [inline]
dev_close_many+0x333/0x6a0 net/core/dev.c:1589
page last free pid 13136 tgid 13136 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1108 [inline]
free_unref_page+0x5f4/0xdc0 mm/page_alloc.c:2638
stack_depot_save_flags+0x2da/0x900 lib/stackdepot.c:666
kasan_save_stack+0x42/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:48
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:319 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x89/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:345
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:247 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4085 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4134 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x121/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:4141
skb_clone+0x190/0x3f0 net/core/skbuff.c:2084
do_one_broadcast net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1462 [inline]
netlink_broadcast_filtered+0xb11/0xef0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1540
netlink_broadcast+0x39/0x50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1564
uevent_net_broadcast_untagged lib/kobject_uevent.c:331 [inline]
kobject_uevent_net_broadcast lib/kobject_uevent.c:410 [inline]
kobject_uevent_env+0xacd/0x1670 lib/kobject_uevent.c:608
device_del+0x623/0x9f0 drivers/base/core.c:3882
snd_card_disconnect.part.0+0x58a/0x7c0 sound/core/init.c:546
snd_card_disconnect+0x1f/0x30 sound/core/init.c:495
snd_usx2y_disconnect+0xe9/0x1f0 sound/usb/usx2y/usbusx2y.c:417
usb_unbind_interface+0x1e8/0x970 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:461
device_remove drivers/base/dd.c:569 [inline]
device_remove+0x122/0x170 drivers/base/dd.c:561
That's because 'subflow' is used just after 'mptcp_close_ssk(subflow)',
which will initiate the release of its memory. Even if it is very likely
the release and the re-utilisation will be done later on, it is of
course better to avoid any issues and read the content of 'subflow'
before closing it.
Fixes: 1c1f72137598 ("mptcp: pm: only decrement add_addr_accepted for MPJ req")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+3c8b7a8e7df6a2a226ca@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/670d7337.050a0220.4cbc0.004f.GAE@google.com
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241015-net-mptcp-uaf-pm-rm-v1-1-c4ee5d987a64@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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The loop responsible for allocating up to MTK_FQ_DMA_LENGTH buffers must
only touch as many descriptors, otherwise it ends up corrupting unrelated
memory. Fix the loop iteration count accordingly.
Fixes: c57e55819443 ("net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: handle dma buffer size soc specific")
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241015081755.31060-1-nbd@nbd.name
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Andrew and Nikolay reported connectivity issues with Cilium's service
load-balancing in case of vmxnet3.
If a BPF program for native XDP adds an encapsulation header such as
IPIP and transmits the packet out the same interface, then in case
of vmxnet3 a corrupted packet is being sent and subsequently dropped
on the path.
vmxnet3_xdp_xmit_frame() which is called e.g. via vmxnet3_run_xdp()
through vmxnet3_xdp_xmit_back() calculates an incorrect DMA address:
page = virt_to_page(xdpf->data);
tbi->dma_addr = page_pool_get_dma_addr(page) +
VMXNET3_XDP_HEADROOM;
dma_sync_single_for_device(&adapter->pdev->dev,
tbi->dma_addr, buf_size,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
The above assumes a fixed offset (VMXNET3_XDP_HEADROOM), but the XDP
BPF program could have moved xdp->data. While the passed buf_size is
correct (xdpf->len), the dma_addr needs to have a dynamic offset which
can be calculated as xdpf->data - (void *)xdpf, that is, xdp->data -
xdp->data_hard_start.
Fixes: 54f00cce1178 ("vmxnet3: Add XDP support.")
Reported-by: Andrew Sauber <andrew.sauber@isovalent.com>
Reported-by: Nikolay Nikolaev <nikolay.nikolaev@isovalent.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Nikolay Nikolaev <nikolay.nikolaev@isovalent.com>
Acked-by: Anton Protopopov <aspsk@isovalent.com>
Cc: William Tu <witu@nvidia.com>
Cc: Ronak Doshi <ronak.doshi@broadcom.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/a0888656d7f09028f9984498cc698bb5364d89fc.1728931137.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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lru_gen_shrink_node() unconditionally clears kswapd_failures, which can
prevent kswapd from sleeping and cause 100% kswapd cpu usage even when
kswapd repeatedly fails to make progress in reclaim.
Only clear kswap_failures in lru_gen_shrink_node() if reclaim makes some
progress, similar to shrink_node().
I happened to run into this problem in one of my tests recently. It
requires a combination of several conditions: The allocator needs to
allocate a right amount of pages such that it can wake up kswapd
without itself being OOM killed; there is no memory for kswapd to
reclaim (My test disables swap and cleans page cache first); no other
process frees enough memory at the same time.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241014221211.832591-1-weixugc@google.com
Fixes: e4dde56cd208 ("mm: multi-gen LRU: per-node lru_gen_folio lists")
Signed-off-by: Wei Xu <weixugc@google.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Cc: Jan Alexander Steffens <heftig@archlinux.org>
Cc: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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I got a bad pud error and lost a 1GB HugeTLB when calling swapoff. The
problem can be reproduced by the following steps:
1. Allocate an anonymous 1GB HugeTLB and some other anonymous memory.
2. Swapout the above anonymous memory.
3. run swapoff and we will get a bad pud error in kernel message:
mm/pgtable-generic.c:42: bad pud 00000000743d215d(84000001400000e7)
We can tell that pud_clear_bad is called by pud_none_or_clear_bad in
unuse_pud_range() by ftrace. And therefore the HugeTLB pages will never
be freed because we lost it from page table. We can skip HugeTLB pages
for unuse_vma to fix it.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241015014521.570237-1-liushixin2@huawei.com
Fixes: 0fe6e20b9c4c ("hugetlb, rmap: add reverse mapping for hugepage")
Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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