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* binfmt_misc: fix shift-out-of-bounds in check_special_flagsLiu Shixin2022-12-021-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | UBSAN reported a shift-out-of-bounds warning: left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type 'int' Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xcf lib/dump_stack.c:106 ubsan_epilogue+0xa/0x44 lib/ubsan.c:151 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e7/0x208 lib/ubsan.c:322 check_special_flags fs/binfmt_misc.c:241 [inline] create_entry fs/binfmt_misc.c:456 [inline] bm_register_write+0x9d3/0xa20 fs/binfmt_misc.c:654 vfs_write+0x11e/0x580 fs/read_write.c:582 ksys_write+0xcf/0x120 fs/read_write.c:637 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x4194e1 Since the type of Node's flags is unsigned long, we should define these macros with same type too. Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221102025123.1117184-1-liushixin2@huawei.com
* Fix regression due to "fs: move binfmt_misc sysctl to its own file"Domenico Andreoli2022-02-091-5/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 3ba442d5331f ("fs: move binfmt_misc sysctl to its own file") did not go unnoticed, binfmt-support stopped to work on my Debian system since v5.17-rc2 (did not check with -rc1). The existance of the /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc is a precondition for attempting to mount the binfmt_misc fs, which in turn triggers the autoload of the binfmt_misc module. Without it, no module is loaded and no binfmt is available at boot. Building as built-in or manually loading the module and mounting the fs works fine, it's therefore only a matter of interaction with user-space. I could try to improve the Debian systemd configuration but I can't say anything about the other distributions. This patch restores a working system right after boot. Fixes: 3ba442d5331f ("fs: move binfmt_misc sysctl to its own file") Signed-off-by: Domenico Andreoli <domenico.andreoli@linux.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* binfmt_misc: fix crash when load/unload moduleTong Zhang2022-01-301-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We should unregister the table upon module unload otherwise something horrible will happen when we load binfmt_misc module again. Also note that we should keep value returned by register_sysctl_mount_point() and release it later, otherwise it will leak. Also, per Christian's comment, to fully restore the old behavior that won't break userspace the check(binfmt_misc_header) should be eliminated. To reproduce: modprobe binfmt_misc modprobe -r binfmt_misc modprobe binfmt_misc modprobe -r binfmt_misc modprobe binfmt_misc resulting in modprobe: can't load module binfmt_misc (kernel/fs/binfmt_misc.ko): Cannot allocate memory and an unhappy kernel: binfmt_misc: Failed to create fs/binfmt_misc sysctl mount point binfmt_misc: Failed to create fs/binfmt_misc sysctl mount point BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff8004802 Call Trace: init_misc_binfmt+0x2d/0x1000 [binfmt_misc] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124181812.1869535-2-ztong0001@gmail.com Fixes: 3ba442d5331f ("fs: move binfmt_misc sysctl to its own file") Signed-off-by: Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner<brauner@kernel.org> Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs: move binfmt_misc sysctl to its own fileLuis Chamberlain2022-01-221-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | kernel/sysctl.c is a kitchen sink where everyone leaves their dirty dishes, this makes it very difficult to maintain. To help with this maintenance let's start by moving sysctls to places where they actually belong. The proc sysctl maintainers do not want to know what sysctl knobs you wish to add for your own piece of code, we just care about the core logic. This moves the binfmt_misc sysctl to its own file to help remove clutter from kernel/sysctl.c. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211124231435.1445213-5-mcgrof@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Antti Palosaari <crope@iki.fi> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org> Cc: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com> Cc: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de> Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@inria.fr> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Lukas Middendorf <kernel@tuxforce.de> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Phillip Potter <phil@philpotter.co.uk> Cc: Qing Wang <wangqing@vivo.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Cc: Sebastian Reichel <sre@kernel.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org> Cc: Stephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* binfmt_misc: fix possible deadlock in bm_register_writeLior Ribak2021-03-131-15/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is a deadlock in bm_register_write: First, in the begining of the function, a lock is taken on the binfmt_misc root inode with inode_lock(d_inode(root)). Then, if the user used the MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE flag, the function will call open_exec on the user-provided interpreter. open_exec will call a path lookup, and if the path lookup process includes the root of binfmt_misc, it will try to take a shared lock on its inode again, but it is already locked, and the code will get stuck in a deadlock To reproduce the bug: $ echo ":iiiii:E::ii::/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/bla:F" > /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register backtrace of where the lock occurs (#5): 0 schedule () at ./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:15 1 0xffffffff81b51237 in rwsem_down_read_slowpath (sem=0xffff888003b202e0, count=<optimized out>, state=state@entry=2) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:992 2 0xffffffff81b5150a in __down_read_common (state=2, sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1213 3 __down_read (sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1222 4 down_read (sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1355 5 0xffffffff811ee22a in inode_lock_shared (inode=<optimized out>) at ./include/linux/fs.h:783 6 open_last_lookups (op=0xffffc9000022fe34, file=0xffff888004098600, nd=0xffffc9000022fd10) at fs/namei.c:3177 7 path_openat (nd=nd@entry=0xffffc9000022fd10, op=op@entry=0xffffc9000022fe34, flags=flags@entry=65) at fs/namei.c:3366 8 0xffffffff811efe1c in do_filp_open (dfd=<optimized out>, pathname=pathname@entry=0xffff8880031b9000, op=op@entry=0xffffc9000022fe34) at fs/namei.c:3396 9 0xffffffff811e493f in do_open_execat (fd=fd@entry=-100, name=name@entry=0xffff8880031b9000, flags=<optimized out>, flags@entry=0) at fs/exec.c:913 10 0xffffffff811e4a92 in open_exec (name=<optimized out>) at fs/exec.c:948 11 0xffffffff8124aa84 in bm_register_write (file=<optimized out>, buffer=<optimized out>, count=19, ppos=<optimized out>) at fs/binfmt_misc.c:682 12 0xffffffff811decd2 in vfs_write (file=file@entry=0xffff888004098500, buf=buf@entry=0xa758d0 ":iiiii:E::ii::i:CF ", count=count@entry=19, pos=pos@entry=0xffffc9000022ff10) at fs/read_write.c:603 13 0xffffffff811defda in ksys_write (fd=<optimized out>, buf=0xa758d0 ":iiiii:E::ii::i:CF ", count=19) at fs/read_write.c:658 14 0xffffffff81b49813 in do_syscall_64 (nr=<optimized out>, regs=0xffffc9000022ff58) at arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 15 0xffffffff81c0007c in entry_SYSCALL_64 () at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120 To solve the issue, the open_exec call is moved to before the write lock is taken by bm_register_write Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210228224414.95962-1-liorribak@gmail.com Fixes: 948b701a607f1 ("binfmt_misc: add persistent opened binary handler for containers") Signed-off-by: Lior Ribak <liorribak@gmail.com> Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* binfmt_misc: pass binfmt_misc flags to the interpreterLaurent Vivier2021-02-151-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It can be useful to the interpreter to know which flags are in use. For instance, knowing if the preserve-argv[0] is in use would allow to skip the pathname argument. This patch uses an unused auxiliary vector, AT_FLAGS, to add a flag to inform interpreter if the preserve-argv[0] is enabled. Note by Helge Deller: The real-world user of this patch is qemu-user, which needs to know if it has to preserve the argv[0]. See Debian bug #970460. Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu> Reviewed-by: YunQiang Su <ysu@wavecomp.com> URL: http://bugs.debian.org/970460 Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
* Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)Linus Torvalds2020-06-051-2/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Merge yet more updates from Andrew Morton: - More MM work. 100ish more to go. Mike Rapoport's "mm: remove __ARCH_HAS_5LEVEL_HACK" series should fix the current ppc issue - Various other little subsystems * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (127 commits) lib/ubsan.c: fix gcc-10 warnings tools/testing/selftests/vm: remove duplicate headers selftests: vm: pkeys: fix multilib builds for x86 selftests: vm: pkeys: use the correct page size on powerpc selftests/vm/pkeys: override access right definitions on powerpc selftests/vm/pkeys: test correct behaviour of pkey-0 selftests/vm/pkeys: introduce a sub-page allocator selftests/vm/pkeys: detect write violation on a mapped access-denied-key page selftests/vm/pkeys: associate key on a mapped page and detect write violation selftests/vm/pkeys: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation selftests/vm/pkeys: improve checks to determine pkey support selftests/vm/pkeys: fix assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust() selftests/vm/pkeys: fix number of reserved powerpc pkeys selftests/vm/pkeys: introduce powerpc support selftests/vm/pkeys: introduce generic pkey abstractions selftests: vm: pkeys: use the correct huge page size selftests/vm/pkeys: fix alloc_random_pkey() to make it really random selftests/vm/pkeys: fix assertion in pkey_disable_set/clear() selftests/vm/pkeys: fix pkey_disable_clear() selftests: vm: pkeys: add helpers for pkey bits ...
| * exec: simplify the copy_strings_kernel calling conventionChristoph Hellwig2020-06-051-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | copy_strings_kernel is always used with a single argument, adjust the calling convention to that. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200501104105.2621149-2-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | exec: Compute file based creds only onceEric W. Biederman2020-05-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the computation of creds from prepare_binfmt into begin_new_exec so that the creds need only be computed once. This is just code reorganization no semantic changes of any kind are made. Moving the computation is safe. I have looked through the kernel and verified none of the binfmts look at bprm->cred directly, and that there are no helpers that look at bprm->cred indirectly. Which means that it is not a problem to compute the bprm->cred later in the execution flow as it is not used until it becomes current->cred. A new function bprm_creds_from_file is added to contain the work that needs to be done. bprm_creds_from_file first computes which file bprm->executable or most likely bprm->file that the bprm->creds will be computed from. The funciton bprm_fill_uid is updated to receive the file instead of accessing bprm->file. The now unnecessary work needed to reset the bprm->cred->euid, and bprm->cred->egid is removed from brpm_fill_uid. A small comment to document that bprm_fill_uid now only deals with the work to handle suid and sgid files. The default case is already heandled by prepare_exec_creds. The function security_bprm_repopulate_creds is renamed security_bprm_creds_from_file and now is explicitly passed the file from which to compute the creds. The documentation of the bprm_creds_from_file security hook is updated to explain when the hook is called and what it needs to do. The file is passed from cap_bprm_creds_from_file into get_file_caps so that the caps are computed for the appropriate file. The now unnecessary work in cap_bprm_creds_from_file to reset the ambient capabilites has been removed. A small comment to document that the work of cap_bprm_creds_from_file is to read capabilities from the files secureity attribute and derive capabilities from the fact the user had uid 0 has been added. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handlerEric W. Biederman2020-05-211-15/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Recursion in kernel code is generally a bad idea as it can overflow the kernel stack. Recursion in exec also hides that the code is looping and that the loop changes bprm->file. Instead of recursing in search_binary_handler have the methods that would recurse set bprm->interpreter and return 0. Modify exec_binprm to loop when bprm->interpreter is set. Consolidate all of the reassignments of bprm->file in that loop to make it clear what is going on. The structure of the new loop in exec_binprm is that all errors return immediately, while successful completion (ret == 0 && !bprm->interpreter) just breaks out of the loop and runs what exec_bprm has always run upon successful completion. Fail if the an interpreter is being call after execfd has been set. The code has never properly handled an interpreter being called with execfd being set and with reassignments of bprm->file and the assignment of bprm->executable in generic code it has finally become possible to test and fail when if this problematic condition happens. With the reassignments of bprm->file and the assignment of bprm->executable moved into the generic code add a test to see if bprm->executable is being reassigned. In search_binary_handler remove the test for !bprm->file. With all reassignments of bprm->file moved to exec_binprm bprm->file can never be NULL in search_binary_handler. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87sgfwyd84.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | exec: Generic execfd supportEric W. Biederman2020-05-211-32/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Most of the support for passing the file descriptor of an executable to an interpreter already lives in the generic code and in binfmt_elf. Rework the fields in binfmt_elf that deal with executable file descriptor passing to make executable file descriptor passing a first class concept. Move the fd_install from binfmt_misc into begin_new_exec after the new creds have been installed. This means that accessing the file through /proc/<pid>/fd/N is able to see the creds for the new executable before allowing access to the new executables files. Performing the install of the executables file descriptor after the point of no return also means that nothing special needs to be done on error. The exiting of the process will close all of it's open files. Move the would_dump from binfmt_misc into begin_new_exec right after would_dump is called on the bprm->file. This makes it obvious this case exists and that no nesting of bprm->file is currently supported. In binfmt_misc the movement of fd_install into generic code means that it's special error exit path is no longer needed. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87y2poyd91.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handlerEric W. Biederman2020-05-211-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The code in prepare_binary_handler needs to be run every time search_binary_handler is called so move the call into search_binary_handler itself to make the code simpler and easier to understand. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87d070zrvx.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binprm unconditionallyEric W. Biederman2020-05-211-12/+3
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a flag preserve_creds that binfmt_misc can set to prevent credentials from being updated. This allows binfmt_misc to always call prepare_binprm. Allowing the credential computation logic to be consolidated. Not replacing the credentials with the interpreters credentials is safe because because an open file descriptor to the executable is passed to the interpreter. As the interpreter does not need to reopen the executable it is guaranteed to see the same file that exec sees. Ref: c407c033de84 ("[PATCH] binfmt_misc: improve calculation of interpreter's credentials") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87imgszrwo.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* Merge branch 'work.mount0' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-07-191-5/+15
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs mount updates from Al Viro: "The first part of mount updates. Convert filesystems to use the new mount API" * 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits) mnt_init(): call shmem_init() unconditionally constify ksys_mount() string arguments don't bother with registering rootfs init_rootfs(): don't bother with init_ramfs_fs() vfs: Convert smackfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert selinuxfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert securityfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert apparmorfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert openpromfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert xenfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert gadgetfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert oprofilefs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert ibmasmfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert qib_fs/ipathfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert efivarfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert configfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert binfmt_misc to use the new mount API convenience helper: get_tree_single() convenience helper get_tree_nodev() vfs: Kill sget_userns() ...
| * vfs: Convert binfmt_misc to use the new mount APIDavid Howells2019-07-051-5/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert the binfmt_misc filesystem to the new internal mount API as the old one will be obsoleted and removed. This allows greater flexibility in communication of mount parameters between userspace, the VFS and the filesystem. See Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt for more information. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for more missed filesThomas Gleixner2019-05-211-0/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which: - Have no license information of any form - Have MODULE_LICENCE("GPL*") inside which was used in the initial scan/conversion to ignore the file These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* turn filp_clone_open() into inline wrapper for dentry_open()Al Viro2018-07-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | it's exactly the same thing as dentry_open(&file->f_path, file->f_flags, file->f_cred) ... and rename it to file_clone_open(), while we are at it. 'filp' naming convention is bogus; sure, it's "file pointer", but we generally don't do that kind of Hungarian notation. Some of the instances have too many callers to touch, but this one has only two, so let's sanitize it while we can... Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* docs: Fix more broken referencesMauro Carvalho Chehab2018-06-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of them via this script: ./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix Manually checked that produced results are valid. Acked-by: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Acked-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com> Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Acked-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* fs/binfmt_misc.c: do not allow offset overflowThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo2018-06-081-3/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | WHen registering a new binfmt_misc handler, it is possible to overflow the offset to get a negative value, which might crash the system, or possibly leak kernel data. Here is a crash log when 2500000000 was used as an offset: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff989cfd6edca0 IP: load_misc_binary+0x22b/0x470 [binfmt_misc] PGD 1ef3e067 P4D 1ef3e067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI Modules linked in: binfmt_misc kvm_intel ppdev kvm irqbypass joydev input_leds serio_raw mac_hid parport_pc qemu_fw_cfg parpy CPU: 0 PID: 2499 Comm: bash Not tainted 4.15.0-22-generic #24-Ubuntu Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.1-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:load_misc_binary+0x22b/0x470 [binfmt_misc] Call Trace: search_binary_handler+0x97/0x1d0 do_execveat_common.isra.34+0x667/0x810 SyS_execve+0x31/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 Use kstrtoint instead of simple_strtoul. It will work as the code already set the delimiter byte to '\0' and we only do it when the field is not empty. Tested with offsets -1, 2500000000, UINT_MAX and INT_MAX. Also tested with examples documented at Documentation/admin-guide/binfmt-misc.rst and other registrations from packages on Ubuntu. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180529135648.14254-1-cascardo@canonical.com Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs: add ksys_close() wrapper; remove in-kernel calls to sys_close()Dominik Brodowski2018-04-021-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Using the ksys_close() wrapper allows us to get rid of in-kernel calls to the sys_close() syscall. The ksys_ prefix denotes that this function is meant as a drop-in replacement for the syscall. In particular, it uses the same calling convention as sys_close(), with one subtle difference: The few places which checked the return value did not care about the return value re-writing in sys_close(), so simply use a wrapper around __close_fd(). This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls. On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
* fs/binfmt_misc.c: node could be NULL when evicting inodeEryu Guan2017-10-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | inode->i_private is assigned by a Node pointer only after registering a new binary format, so it could be NULL if inode was created by bm_fill_super() (or iput() was called by the error path in bm_register_write()), and this could result in NULL pointer dereference when evicting such an inode. e.g. mount binfmt_misc filesystem then umount it immediately: mount -t binfmt_misc binfmt_misc /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc umount /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc will result in BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000013 IP: bm_evict_inode+0x16/0x40 [binfmt_misc] ... Call Trace: evict+0xd3/0x1a0 iput+0x17d/0x1d0 dentry_unlink_inode+0xb9/0xf0 __dentry_kill+0xc7/0x170 shrink_dentry_list+0x122/0x280 shrink_dcache_parent+0x39/0x90 do_one_tree+0x12/0x40 shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x2d/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x1f/0x120 kill_litter_super+0x29/0x40 deactivate_locked_super+0x43/0x70 deactivate_super+0x45/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0x3f/0x70 __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20 task_work_run+0x86/0xa0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x6d/0x99 syscall_return_slowpath+0xba/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xa3/0xa Fix it by making sure Node (e) is not NULL. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171010100642.31786-1-eguan@redhat.com Fixes: 83f918274e4b ("exec: binfmt_misc: shift filp_close(interp_file) from kill_node() to bm_evict_inode()") Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <eguan@redhat.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: binfmt_misc: kill the onstack iname[BINPRM_BUF_SIZE] arrayOleg Nesterov2017-10-041-9/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After the previous change "fmt" can't go away, we can kill iname/iname_addr and use fmt->interpreter. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922143653.GA17232@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ben Woodard <woodard@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Jim Foraker <foraker1@llnl.gov> Cc: <tdhooge@llnl.gov> Cc: Travis Gummels <tgummels@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: binfmt_misc: fix race between load_misc_binary() and kill_node()Oleg Nesterov2017-10-041-4/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | load_misc_binary() makes a local copy of fmt->interpreter under entries_lock to avoid the race with kill_node() but this is not enough; the whole Node can be freed after we drop entries_lock, not only the ->interpreter string. Add dget/dput(fmt->dentry) to ensure bm_evict_inode() can't destroy/free this Node. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922143650.GA17227@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ben Woodard <woodard@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Jim Foraker <foraker1@llnl.gov> Cc: Travis Gummels <tgummels@redhat.com> Cc: <tdhooge@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: binfmt_misc: remove the confusing e->interp_file != NULL checksOleg Nesterov2017-10-041-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE flag is set e->interp_file must be valid or we have a bug which should not be silently ignored. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922143647.GA17222@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ben Woodard <woodard@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Jim Foraker <foraker1@llnl.gov> Cc: <tdhooge@llnl.gov> Cc: Travis Gummels <tgummels@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: binfmt_misc: shift filp_close(interp_file) from kill_node() to ↵Oleg Nesterov2017-10-041-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | bm_evict_inode() To ensure that load_misc_binary() can't use the partially destroyed Node, see also the next patch. The current logic looks wrong in any case, once we close interp_file it doesn't make any sense to delay kfree(inode->i_private), this Node is no longer valid. Even if the MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE/interp_file checks were not racy (they are), load_misc_binary() should not try to reopen ->interpreter if MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE is set but ->interp_file is NULL. And I can't understand why do we use filp_close(), not fput(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922143644.GA17216@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ben Woodard <woodard@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Jim Foraker <foraker1@llnl.gov> Cc: <tdhooge@llnl.gov> Cc: Travis Gummels <tgummels@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: binfmt_misc: don't nullify Node->dentry in kill_node()Oleg Nesterov2017-10-041-13/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | kill_node() nullifies/checks Node->dentry to avoid double free. This complicates the next changes and this is very confusing: - we do not need to check dentry != NULL under entries_lock, kill_node() is always called under inode_lock(d_inode(root)) and we rely on this inode_lock() anyway, without this lock the MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE cleanup could race with itself. - if kill_inode() was already called and ->dentry == NULL we should not even try to close e->interp_file. We can change bm_entry_write() to simply check !list_empty(list) before kill_node. Again, we rely on inode_lock(), in particular it saves us from the race with bm_status_write(), another caller of kill_node(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922143641.GA17210@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ben Woodard <woodard@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Jim Foraker <foraker1@llnl.gov> Cc: <tdhooge@llnl.gov> Cc: Travis Gummels <tgummels@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs: fix kernel_read prototypeChristoph Hellwig2017-09-051-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | Use proper ssize_t and size_t types for the return value and count argument, move the offset last and make it an in/out argument like all other read/write helpers, and make the buf argument a void pointer to get rid of lots of casts in the callers. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* fs: constify tree_descr arrays passed to simple_fill_super()Eric Biggers2017-04-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | simple_fill_super() is passed an array of tree_descr structures which describe the files to create in the filesystem's root directory. Since these arrays are never modified intentionally, they should be 'const' so that they are placed in .rodata and benefit from memory protection. This patch updates the function signature and all users, and also constifies tree_descr.name. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* sched/headers: Prepare to remove the <linux/mm_types.h> dependency from ↵Ingo Molnar2017-03-021-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | <linux/sched.h> Update code that relied on sched.h including various MM types for them. This will allow us to remove the <linux/mm_types.h> include from <linux/sched.h>. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* fs: Replace current_fs_time() with current_time()Deepa Dinamani2016-09-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | current_fs_time() uses struct super_block* as an argument. As per Linus's suggestion, this is changed to take struct inode* as a parameter instead. This is because the function is primarily meant for vfs inode timestamps. Also the function was renamed as per Arnd's suggestion. Change all calls to current_fs_time() to use the new current_time() function instead. current_fs_time() will be deleted. Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge tag 'binfmt-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-08-071-2/+39
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/binfmt_misc Pull binfmt_misc update from James Bottomley: "This update is to allow architecture emulation containers to function such that the emulation binary can be housed outside the container itself. The container and fs parts both have acks from relevant experts. To use the new feature you have to add an F option to your binfmt_misc configuration" From the docs: "The usual behaviour of binfmt_misc is to spawn the binary lazily when the misc format file is invoked. However, this doesn't work very well in the face of mount namespaces and changeroots, so the F mode opens the binary as soon as the emulation is installed and uses the opened image to spawn the emulator, meaning it is always available once installed, regardless of how the environment changes" * tag 'binfmt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/binfmt_misc: binfmt_misc: add F option description to documentation binfmt_misc: add persistent opened binary handler for containers fs: add filp_clone_open API
| * binfmt_misc: add persistent opened binary handler for containersJames Bottomley2016-03-301-2/+39
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds a new flag 'F' to the binfmt handlers. If you pass in 'F' the binary that runs the emulation will be opened immediately and in future, will be cloned from the open file. The net effect is that the handler survives both changeroots and mount namespace changes, making it easy to work with foreign architecture containers without contaminating the container image with the emulator. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
* | binfmt_misc: ->s_root is not going anywhereAl Viro2016-05-301-8/+4
|/ | | | | | ... no need to dget/dput it. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* wrappers for ->i_mutex accessAl Viro2016-01-231-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested}, inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex). Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle ->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held only shared. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-04-271-8/+8
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull fourth vfs update from Al Viro: "d_inode() annotations from David Howells (sat in for-next since before the beginning of merge window) + four assorted fixes" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: RCU pathwalk breakage when running into a symlink overmounting something fix I_DIO_WAKEUP definition direct-io: only inc/dec inode->i_dio_count for file systems fs/9p: fix readdir() VFS: assorted d_backing_inode() annotations VFS: fs/inode.c helpers: d_inode() annotations VFS: fs/cachefiles: d_backing_inode() annotations VFS: fs library helpers: d_inode() annotations VFS: assorted weird filesystems: d_inode() annotations VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations VFS: security/: d_inode() annotations VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations VFS: net/: d_inode() annotations VFS: net/unix: d_backing_inode() annotations VFS: kernel/: d_inode() annotations VFS: audit: d_backing_inode() annotations VFS: Fix up some ->d_inode accesses in the chelsio driver VFS: Cachefiles should perform fs modifications on the top layer only VFS: AF_UNIX sockets should call mknod on the top layer only
| * VFS: assorted weird filesystems: d_inode() annotationsDavid Howells2015-04-151-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | fs/binfmt_misc.c: simplify entry_status()Rasmus Villemoes2015-04-171-21/+9
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | sprintf() reliably returns the number of characters printed, so we don't need to ask strlen() where we are. Also replace calling sprintf("%02x") in a loop with the much simpler bin2hex(). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: it's odd to include kernel.h after everything else] Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* unfuck binfmt_misc.c (broken by commit e6084d4)Al Viro2014-12-171-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | scanarg(s, del) never returns s; the empty field results in s + 1. Restore the correct checks, and move NUL-termination into scanarg(), while we are at it. Incidentally, mixing "coding style cleanups" (for small values of cleanup) with functional changes is a Bad Idea(tm)... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* syscalls: implement execveat() system callDavid Drysdale2014-12-131-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patchset adds execveat(2) for x86, and is derived from Meredydd Luff's patch from Sept 2012 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/11/528). The primary aim of adding an execveat syscall is to allow an implementation of fexecve(3) that does not rely on the /proc filesystem, at least for executables (rather than scripts). The current glibc version of fexecve(3) is implemented via /proc, which causes problems in sandboxed or otherwise restricted environments. Given the desire for a /proc-free fexecve() implementation, HPA suggested (https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/556) that an execveat(2) syscall would be an appropriate generalization. Also, having a new syscall means that it can take a flags argument without back-compatibility concerns. The current implementation just defines the AT_EMPTY_PATH and AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flags, but other flags could be added in future -- for example, flags for new namespaces (as suggested at https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/474). Related history: - https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/12/27/123 is an example of someone realizing that fexecve() is likely to fail in a chroot environment. - http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=514043 covered documenting the /proc requirement of fexecve(3) in its manpage, to "prevent other people from wasting their time". - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=241609 described a problem where a process that did setuid() could not fexecve() because it no longer had access to /proc/self/fd; this has since been fixed. This patch (of 4): Add a new execveat(2) system call. execveat() is to execve() as openat() is to open(): it takes a file descriptor that refers to a directory, and resolves the filename relative to that. In addition, if the filename is empty and AT_EMPTY_PATH is specified, execveat() executes the file to which the file descriptor refers. This replicates the functionality of fexecve(), which is a system call in other UNIXen, but in Linux glibc it depends on opening "/proc/self/fd/<fd>" (and so relies on /proc being mounted). The filename fed to the executed program as argv[0] (or the name of the script fed to a script interpreter) will be of the form "/dev/fd/<fd>" (for an empty filename) or "/dev/fd/<fd>/<filename>", effectively reflecting how the executable was found. This does however mean that execution of a script in a /proc-less environment won't work; also, script execution via an O_CLOEXEC file descriptor fails (as the file will not be accessible after exec). Based on patches by Meredydd Luff. Signed-off-by: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Meredydd Luff <meredydd@senatehouse.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah.kh@samsung.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs/binfmt_misc.c: use GFP_KERNEL instead of GFP_USERAndrew Morton2014-12-111-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | GFP_USER means "honour cpuset nodes-allowed beancounting". These are regular old kernel objects and there seems no reason to give them this treatment. Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* binfmt_misc: clean up code style a bitMike Frysinger2014-12-111-148/+145
| | | | | | | | | | | Clean up various coding style issues that checkpatch complains about. No functional changes here. Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* binfmt_misc: add comments & debug logsMike Frysinger2014-12-111-15/+121
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When trying to develop a custom format handler, the errors returned all effectively get bucketed as EINVAL with no kernel messages. The other errors (ENOMEM/EFAULT) are internal/obvious and basic. Thus any time a bad handler is rejected, the developer has to walk the dense code and try to guess where it went wrong. Needing to dive into kernel code is itself a fairly high barrier for a lot of people. To improve this situation, let's deploy extensive pr_debug markers at logical parse points, and add comments to the dense parsing logic. It let's you see exactly where the parsing aborts, the string the kernel received (useful when dealing with shell code), how it translated the buffers to binary data, and how it will apply the mask at runtime. Some example output: $ echo ':qemu-foo:M::\x7fELF\xAD\xAD\x01\x00:\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\xff\x00:/usr/bin/qemu-foo:POC' > register $ dmesg binfmt_misc: register: received 92 bytes binfmt_misc: register: delim: 0x3a {:} binfmt_misc: register: name: {qemu-foo} binfmt_misc: register: type: M (magic) binfmt_misc: register: offset: 0x0 binfmt_misc: register: magic[raw]: 5c 78 37 66 45 4c 46 5c 78 41 44 5c 78 41 44 5c \x7fELF\xAD\xAD\ binfmt_misc: register: magic[raw]: 78 30 31 5c 78 30 30 00 x01\x00. binfmt_misc: register: mask[raw]: 5c 78 66 66 5c 78 66 66 5c 78 66 66 5c 78 66 66 \xff\xff\xff\xff binfmt_misc: register: mask[raw]: 5c 78 66 66 5c 78 30 30 5c 78 66 66 5c 78 30 30 \xff\x00\xff\x00 binfmt_misc: register: mask[raw]: 00 . binfmt_misc: register: magic/mask length: 8 binfmt_misc: register: magic[decoded]: 7f 45 4c 46 ad ad 01 00 .ELF.... binfmt_misc: register: mask[decoded]: ff ff ff ff ff 00 ff 00 ........ binfmt_misc: register: magic[masked]: 7f 45 4c 46 ad 00 01 00 .ELF.... binfmt_misc: register: interpreter: {/usr/bin/qemu-foo} binfmt_misc: register: flag: P (preserve argv0) binfmt_misc: register: flag: O (open binary) binfmt_misc: register: flag: C (preserve creds) The [raw] lines show us exactly what was received from userspace. The lines after that show us how the kernel has decoded things. Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* binfmt_misc: replace get_unused_fd() with get_unused_fd_flags(0)Yann Droneaud2014-12-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch replaces calls to get_unused_fd() with equivalent call to get_unused_fd_flags(0) to preserve current behavor for existing code. In a further patch, get_unused_fd() will be removed so that new code start using get_unused_fd_flags(), with the hope O_CLOEXEC could be used, either by default or choosen by userspace. Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* binfmt_misc: work around gcc-4.9 warningArnd Bergmann2014-10-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | gcc-4.9 on ARM gives us a mysterious warning about the binfmt_misc parse_command function: fs/binfmt_misc.c: In function 'parse_command.part.3': fs/binfmt_misc.c:405:7: warning: array subscript is above array bounds [-Warray-bounds] I've managed to trace this back to the ARM implementation of memset, which is called from copy_from_user in case of a fault and which does #define memset(p,v,n) \ ({ \ void *__p = (p); size_t __n = n; \ if ((__n) != 0) { \ if (__builtin_constant_p((v)) && (v) == 0) \ __memzero((__p),(__n)); \ else \ memset((__p),(v),(__n)); \ } \ (__p); \ }) Apparently gcc gets confused by the check for "size != 0" and believes that the size might be zero when it gets to the line that does "if (s[count-1] == '\n')", so it would access data outside of the array. gcc is clearly wrong here, since this condition was already checked earlier in the function and the 'size' value can not change in the meantime. Fortunately, we can work around it and get rid of the warning by rearranging the function to check for zero size after doing the copy_from_user. It is still safe to pass a zero size into copy_from_user, so it does not cause any side effects. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* binfmt_misc: expand the register format limit to 1920 bytesMike Frysinger2014-10-141-2/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current code places a 256 byte limit on the registration format. This ends up being fairly limited when you try to do matching against a binary format like ELF: - the magic & mask formats cannot have any embedded NUL chars (string_unescape_inplace halts at the first NUL) - each escape sequence quadruples the size: \x00 is needed for NUL - trying to match bytes at the start of the file as well as further on leads to a lot of \x00 sequences in the mask - magic & mask have to be the same length (when decoded) - still need bytes for the other fields - impossible! Let's look at a concrete (and common) example: using QEMU to run MIPS ELFs. The name field uses 11 bytes "qemu-mipsel". The interp uses 20 bytes "/usr/bin/qemu-mipsel". The type & flags takes up 4 bytes. We need 7 bytes for the delimiter (usually ":"). We can skip offset. So already we're down to 107 bytes to use with the magic/mask instead of the real limit of 128 (BINPRM_BUF_SIZE). If people use shell code to register (which they do the majority of the time), they're down to ~26 possible bytes since the escape sequence must be \x##. The ELF format looks like (both 32 & 64 bit): e_ident: 16 bytes e_type: 2 bytes e_machine: 2 bytes Those 20 bytes are enough for most architectures because they have so few formats in the first place, thus they can be uniquely identified. That also means for shell users, since 20 is smaller than 26, they can sanely register a handler. But for some targets (like MIPS), we need to poke further. The ELF fields continue on: e_entry: 4 or 8 bytes e_phoff: 4 or 8 bytes e_shoff: 4 or 8 bytes e_flags: 4 bytes We only care about e_flags here as that includes the bits to identify whether the ELF is O32/N32/N64. But now we have to consume another 16 bytes (for 32 bit ELFs) or 28 bytes (for 64 bit ELFs) just to match the flags. If every byte is escaped, we send 288 more bytes to the kernel ((20 {e_ident,e_type,e_machine} + 12 {e_entry,e_phoff,e_shoff} + 4 {e_flags}) * 2 {mask,magic} * 4 {escape}) and we've clearly blown our budget. Even if we try to be clever and do the decoding ourselves (rather than relying on the kernel to process \x##), we still can't hit the mark -- string_unescape_inplace treats mask & magic as C strings so NUL cannot be embedded. That leaves us with having to pass \x00 for the 12/24 entry/phoff/shoff bytes (as those will be completely random addresses), and that is a minimum requirement of 48/96 bytes for the mask alone. Add up the rest and we blow through it (this is for 64 bit ELFs): magic: 20 {e_ident,e_type,e_machine} + 24 {e_entry,e_phoff,e_shoff} + 4 {e_flags} = 48 # ^^ See note below. mask: 20 {e_ident,e_type,e_machine} + 96 {e_entry,e_phoff,e_shoff} + 4 {e_flags} = 120 Remember above we had 107 left over, and now we're at 168. This is of course the *best* case scenario -- you'll also want to have NUL bytes in the magic & mask too to match literal zeros. Note: the reason we can use 24 in the magic is that we can work off of the fact that for bytes the mask would clobber, we can stuff any value into magic that we want. So when mask is \x00, we don't need the magic to also be \x00, it can be an unescaped raw byte like '!'. This lets us handle more formats (barely) under the current 256 limit, but that's a pretty tall hoop to force people to jump through. With all that said, let's bump the limit from 256 bytes to 1920. This way we support escaping every byte of the mask & magic field (which is 1024 bytes by themselves -- 128 * 4 * 2), and we leave plenty of room for other fields. Like long paths to the interpreter (when you have source in your /really/long/homedir/qemu/foo). Since the current code stuffs more than one structure into the same buffer, we leave a bit of space to easily round up to 2k. 1920 is just as arbitrary as 256 ;). Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* binfmt_misc: add missing 'break' statementLuis Henriques2014-04-041-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | A missing 'break' statement in bm_status_write() results in a user program receiving '3' when doing the following: write(fd, "-1", 2); Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com> Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* binfmt_misc: reuse string_unescape_inplace()Andy Shevchenko2013-05-011-20/+4
| | | | | | | | | | There is string_unescape_inplace() function which decodes strings in generic way. Let's use it. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules.Eric W. Biederman2013-03-041-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Modify the request_module to prefix the file system type with "fs-" and add aliases to all of the filesystems that can be built as modules to match. A common practice is to build all of the kernel code and leave code that is not commonly needed as modules, with the result that many users are exposed to any bug anywhere in the kernel. Looking for filesystems with a fs- prefix limits the pool of possible modules that can be loaded by mount to just filesystems trivially making things safer with no real cost. Using aliases means user space can control the policy of which filesystem modules are auto-loaded by editing /etc/modprobe.d/*.conf with blacklist and alias directives. Allowing simple, safe, well understood work-arounds to known problematic software. This also addresses a rare but unfortunate problem where the filesystem name is not the same as it's module name and module auto-loading would not work. While writing this patch I saw a handful of such cases. The most significant being autofs that lives in the module autofs4. This is relevant to user namespaces because we can reach the request module in get_fs_type() without having any special permissions, and people get uncomfortable when a user specified string (in this case the filesystem type) goes all of the way to request_module. After having looked at this issue I don't think there is any particular reason to perform any filtering or permission checks beyond making it clear in the module request that we want a filesystem module. The common pattern in the kernel is to call request_module() without regards to the users permissions. In general all a filesystem module does once loaded is call register_filesystem() and go to sleep. Which means there is not much attack surface exposed by loading a filesytem module unless the filesystem is mounted. In a user namespace filesystems are not mounted unless .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT, which most filesystems do not set today. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* new helper: file_inode(file)Al Viro2013-02-231-2/+2
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stackKees Cook2012-12-211-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak into the command line. Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively. However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the userspace argv areas. After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As such, we need to protect the changes to interp. This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or binfmt_misc does an allocation take place. For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from: http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/ Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net> Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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