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* cifs: remove set but not used variable 'smb_buf'YueHaibing2018-12-241-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning: fs/cifs/sess.c: In function '_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_assemble_req': fs/cifs/sess.c:1157:18: warning: variable 'smb_buf' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] It never used since commit cc87c47d9d7a ("cifs: Separate rawntlmssp auth from CIFS_SessSetup()") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
* cifs: suppress some implicit-fallthrough warningsGustavo A. R. Silva2018-12-241-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | To avoid the warning: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
* cifs: check kmalloc before useNicholas Mc Guire2018-08-231-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | The kmalloc was not being checked - if it fails issue a warning and return -ENOMEM to the caller. Signed-off-by: Nicholas Mc Guire <hofrat@osadl.org> Fixes: b8da344b74c8 ("cifs: dynamic allocation of ntlmssp blob") Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>`
* smb2: Enforce sec= mount optionSachin Prabhu2017-03-031-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If the security type specified using a mount option is not supported, the SMB2 session setup code changes the security type to RawNTLMSSP. We should instead fail the mount and return an error. The patch changes the code for SMB2 to make it similar to the code used for SMB1. Like in SMB1, we now use the global security flags to select the security method to be used when no security method is specified and to return an error when the requested auth method is not available. For SMB2, we also use ntlmv2 as a synonym for nltmssp. Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phasePavel Shilovsky2017-02-011-12/+10
| | | | | | | In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
* CIFS: Make SendReceive2() takes resp iovPavel Shilovsky2017-02-011-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | Now SendReceive2 frees the first iov and returns a response buffer in it that increases a code complexity. Simplify this by making a caller responsible for freeing request buffer itself and returning a response buffer in a separate iov. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
* cifs: check hash calculating succeededLuis de Bethencourt2016-06-241-0/+2
| | | | | | | | calc_lanman_hash() could return -ENOMEM or other errors, we should check that everything went fine before using the calculated key. Signed-off-by: Luis de Bethencourt <luisbg@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: dynamic allocation of ntlmssp blobJerome Marchand2016-06-241-34/+42
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate(), the ntlmssp blob is allocated statically and its size is an "empirical" 5*sizeof(struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE) (320B on x86_64). I don't know where this value comes from or if it was ever appropriate, but it is currently insufficient: the user and domain name in UTF16 could take 1kB by themselves. Because of that, build_ntlmssp_auth_blob() might corrupt memory (out-of-bounds write). The size of ntlmssp_blob in SMB2_sess_setup() is too small too (sizeof(struct _NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE) + 500). This patch allocates the blob dynamically in build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(). Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
* cifs: use CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN when converting the domain nameJerome Marchand2016-06-241-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | Currently in build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(), when converting the domain name to UTF16, CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN limit is used. It should be CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN. This patch fixes this. Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* fs/cifs: correctly to anonymous authentication for the NTLM(v2) authenticationStefan Metzmacher2016-05-171-14/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Only server which map unknown users to guest will allow access using a non-null NTLMv2_Response. For Samba it's the "map to guest = bad user" option. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11913 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* fs/cifs: correctly to anonymous authentication for the NTLM(v1) authenticationStefan Metzmacher2016-05-171-18/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Only server which map unknown users to guest will allow access using a non-null NTChallengeResponse. For Samba it's the "map to guest = bad user" option. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11913 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* fs/cifs: correctly to anonymous authentication for the LANMAN authenticationStefan Metzmacher2016-05-171-12/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Only server which map unknown users to guest will allow access using a non-null LMChallengeResponse. For Samba it's the "map to guest = bad user" option. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11913 Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* fs/cifs: correctly to anonymous authentication via NTLMSSPStefan Metzmacher2016-05-171-12/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | See [MS-NLMP] 3.2.5.1.2 Server Receives an AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE from the Client: ... Set NullSession to FALSE If (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE.UserNameLen == 0 AND AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE.NtChallengeResponse.Length == 0 AND (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE.LmChallengeResponse == Z(1) OR AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE.LmChallengeResponse.Length == 0)) -- Special case: client requested anonymous authentication Set NullSession to TRUE ... Only server which map unknown users to guest will allow access using a non-null NTChallengeResponse. For Samba it's the "map to guest = bad user" option. BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11913 CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload dataDavid Howells2015-10-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk as it seems pointless to keep them separate. Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded user-defined keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
* Merge branch 'akpm' (patchbomb from Andrew)Linus Torvalds2014-12-111-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Merge first patchbomb from Andrew Morton: - a few minor cifs fixes - dma-debug upadtes - ocfs2 - slab - about half of MM - procfs - kernel/exit.c - panic.c tweaks - printk upates - lib/ updates - checkpatch updates - fs/binfmt updates - the drivers/rtc tree - nilfs - kmod fixes - more kernel/exit.c - various other misc tweaks and fixes * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (190 commits) exit: pidns: fix/update the comments in zap_pid_ns_processes() exit: pidns: alloc_pid() leaks pid_namespace if child_reaper is exiting exit: exit_notify: re-use "dead" list to autoreap current exit: reparent: call forget_original_parent() under tasklist_lock exit: reparent: avoid find_new_reaper() if no children exit: reparent: introduce find_alive_thread() exit: reparent: introduce find_child_reaper() exit: reparent: document the ->has_child_subreaper checks exit: reparent: s/while_each_thread/for_each_thread/ in find_new_reaper() exit: reparent: fix the cross-namespace PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER reparenting exit: reparent: fix the dead-parent PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER reparenting exit: proc: don't try to flush /proc/tgid/task/tgid exit: release_task: fix the comment about group leader accounting exit: wait: drop tasklist_lock before psig->c* accounting exit: wait: don't use zombie->real_parent exit: wait: cleanup the ptrace_reparented() checks usermodehelper: kill the kmod_thread_locker logic usermodehelper: don't use CLONE_VFORK for ____call_usermodehelper() fs/hfs/catalog.c: fix comparison bug in hfs_cat_keycmp nilfs2: fix the nilfs_iget() vs. nilfs_new_inode() races ...
| * fs/cifs: remove obsolete __constantFabian Frederick2014-12-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace all __constant_foo to foo() except in smb2status.h (1700 lines to update). Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Set UID in sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate tooSachin Prabhu2014-12-081-0/+5
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A user complained that they were unable to login to their cifs share after a kernel update. From the wiretrace we can see that the server returns different UIDs as response to NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE and NTLMSSP_AUTH phases. With changes in the authentication code, we no longer set the cifs_sess->Suid returned in response to the NTLM_AUTH phase and continue to use the UID sent in response to the NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE phase. This results in the server denying access to the user when the user attempts to do a tcon connect. See https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1163927 A test kernel containing patch was tested successfully by the user. Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <steve.french@primarydata.com>
* cifs: remove dead codeArnd Bergmann2014-09-161-17/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | cifs provides two dummy functions 'sess_auth_lanman' and 'sess_auth_kerberos' for the case in which the respective features are not defined. However, the caller is also under an #ifdef, so we just get warnings about unused code: fs/cifs/sess.c:1109:1: warning: 'sess_auth_kerberos' defined but not used [-Wunused-function] sess_auth_kerberos(struct sess_data *sess_data) Removing the dead functions gets rid of the warnings without any downsides that I can see. (Yalin Wang reported the identical problem and fix so added him) Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Yalin Wang <yalin.wang@sonymobile.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: fix a possible null pointer deref in decode_ascii_ssetupNamjae Jeon2014-08-211-3/+4
| | | | | | | | When kzalloc fails, we will end up doing NULL pointer derefrence Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Ashish Sangwan <a.sangwan@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* Remove sparse build warningSteve French2014-08-021-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | The recent session setup patch set (cifs-Separate-rawntlmssp-auth-from-CIFS_SessSetup.patch) had introduced a trivial sparse build warning. Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Cc: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
* cifs: Separate rawntlmssp auth from CIFS_SessSetup()Sachin Prabhu2014-08-011-227/+263
| | | | | | | | | Separate rawntlmssp authentication from CIFS_SessSetup(). Also cleanup CIFS_SessSetup() since we no longer do any auth within it. Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: Split Kerberos authentication off CIFS_SessSetup()Sachin Prabhu2014-08-011-62/+153
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: Split ntlm and ntlmv2 authentication methods off CIFS_SessSetup()Sachin Prabhu2014-08-011-84/+232
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: Split lanman auth from CIFS_SessSetup()Sachin Prabhu2014-08-011-45/+258
| | | | | | | | | | | In preparation for splitting CIFS_SessSetup() into smaller more manageable chunks, we first add helper functions. We then proceed to split out lanman auth out of CIFS_SessSetup() Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: Allow LANMAN auth method for servers supporting unencapsulated ↵Sachin Prabhu2013-10-071-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | authentication methods This allows users to use LANMAN authentication on servers which support unencapsulated authentication. The patch fixes a regression where users using plaintext authentication were no longer able to do so because of changed bought in by patch 3f618223dc0bdcbc8d510350e78ee2195ff93768 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1011621 Reported-by: Panos Kavalagios <Panagiotis.Kavalagios@eurodyn.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: stop trying to use virtual circuitsJeff Layton2013-09-181-83/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, we try to ensure that we use vcnum of 0 on the first established session on a connection and then try to use a different vcnum on each session after that. This is a little odd, since there's no real reason to use a different vcnum for each SMB session. I can only assume there was some confusion between SMB sessions and VCs. That's somewhat understandable since they both get created during SESSION_SETUP, but the documentation indicates that they are really orthogonal. The comment on max_vcs in particular looks quite misguided. An SMB session is already uniquely identified by the SMB UID value -- there's no need to again uniquely ID with a VC. Furthermore, a vcnum of 0 is a cue to the server that it should release any resources that were previously held by the client. This sounds like a good thing, until you consider that: a) it totally ignores the fact that other programs on the box (e.g. smbclient) might have connections established to the server. Using a vcnum of 0 causes them to get kicked off. b) it causes problems with NAT. If several clients are connected to the same server via the same NAT'ed address, whenever one connects to the server it kicks off all the others, which then reconnect and kick off the first one...ad nauseum. I don't see any reason to ignore the advice in "Implementing CIFS" which has a comprehensive treatment of virtual circuits. In there, it states "...and contrary to the specs the client should always use a VcNumber of one, never zero." Have the client just use a hardcoded vcnum of 1, and stop abusing the special behavior of vcnum 0. Reported-by: Sauron99@gmx.de <sauron99@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: Add a variable specific to NTLMSSP for key exchange.Shirish Pargaonkar2013-09-081-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a variable specific to NTLMSSP authentication to determine whether to exchange keys during negotiation and authentication phases. Since session key for smb1 is per smb connection, once a very first sesion is established, there is no need for key exchange during subsequent session setups. As a result, smb1 session setup code sets this variable as false. Since session key for smb2 and smb3 is per smb connection, we need to exchange keys to generate session key for every sesion being established. As a result, smb2/3 session setup code sets this variable as true. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: Process post session setup code in respective dialect functions.Shirish Pargaonkar2013-09-081-3/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the post (successful) session setup code to respective dialect routines. For smb1, session key is per smb connection. For smb2/smb3, session key is per smb session. If client and server do not require signing, free session key for smb1/2/3. If client and server require signing smb1 - Copy (kmemdup) session key for the first session to connection. Free session key of that and subsequent sessions on this connection. smb2 - For every session, keep the session key and free it when the session is being shutdown. smb3 - For every session, generate the smb3 signing key using the session key and then free the session key. There are two unrelated line formatting changes as well. Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: Move string length definitions to uapiScott Lovenberg2013-09-081-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | The max string length definitions for user name, domain name, password, and share name have been moved into their own header file in uapi so the mount helper can use autoconf to define them instead of keeping the kernel side and userland side definitions in sync manually. The names have also been standardized with a "CIFS" prefix and "LEN" suffix. Signed-off-by: Scott Lovenberg <scott.lovenberg@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: extend the buffer length enought for sprintf() usingChen Gang2013-07-311-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For cifs_set_cifscreds() in "fs/cifs/connect.c", 'desc' buffer length is 'CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE' (56 is less than 256), and 'ses->domainName' length may be "255 + '\0'". The related sprintf() may cause memory overflow, so need extend related buffer enough to hold all things. It is also necessary to be sure of 'ses->domainName' must be less than 256, and define the related macro instead of hard code number '256'. Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Scott Lovenberg <scott.lovenberg@gmail.com> CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* move sectype to the cifs_ses instead of TCP_Server_InfoJeff Layton2013-06-241-1/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that we track what sort of NEGOTIATE response was received, stop mandating that every session on a socket use the same type of auth. Push that decision out into the session setup code, and make the sectype a per-session property. This should allow us to mix multiple sectypes on a socket as long as they are compatible with the NEGOTIATE response. With this too, we can now eliminate the ses->secFlg field since that info is redundant and harder to work with than a securityEnum. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: track the enablement of signing in the TCP_Server_InfoJeff Layton2013-06-241-6/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, we determine this according to flags in the sec_mode, flags in the global_secflags and via other methods. That makes the semantics very hard to follow and there are corner cases where we don't handle this correctly. Add a new bool to the TCP_Server_Info that acts as a simple flag to tell us whether signing is enabled on this connection or not, and fix up the places that need to determine this to use that flag. This is a bit weird for the SMB2 case, where signing is per-session. SMB2 needs work in this area already though. The existing SMB2 code has similar logic to what we're using here, so there should be no real change in behavior. These changes should make it easier to implement per-session signing in the future though. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: remove the cifs_ses->flags fieldJeff Layton2013-06-241-6/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | This field is completely unused: CIFS_SES_W9X is completely unused. CIFS_SES_LANMAN and CIFS_SES_OS2 are set but never checked. CIFS_SES_NT4 is checked, but never set. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: throw a warning if negotiate or sess_setup ops are passed NULL server ↵Jeff Layton2013-06-241-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | or session pointers These look pretty cargo-culty to me, but let's be certain. Leave them in place for now. Pop a WARN if it ever does happen. Also, move to a more standard idiom for setting the "server" pointer. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: make decode_ascii_ssetup void returnJeff Layton2013-06-241-11/+7
| | | | | | | | ...rc is always set to 0. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] cifs: Rename cERROR and cFYI to cifs_dbgJoe Perches2013-05-051-32/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It's not obvious from reading the macro names that these macros are for debugging. Convert the names to a single more typical kernel style cifs_dbg macro. cERROR(1, ...) -> cifs_dbg(VFS, ...) cFYI(1, ...) -> cifs_dbg(FYI, ...) cFYI(DBG2, ...) -> cifs_dbg(NOISY, ...) Move the terminating format newline from the macro to the call site. Add CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG function cifs_vfs_err to emit the "CIFS VFS: " prefix for VFS messages. Size is reduced ~ 1% when CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG is set (default y) $ size fs/cifs/cifs.ko* text data bss dec hex filename 265245 2525 132 267902 4167e fs/cifs/cifs.ko.new 268359 2525 132 271016 422a8 fs/cifs/cifs.ko.old Other miscellaneous changes around these conversions: o Miscellaneous typo fixes o Add terminating \n's to almost all formats and remove them from the macros to be more kernel style like. A few formats previously had defective \n's o Remove unnecessary OOM messages as kmalloc() calls dump_stack o Coalesce formats to make grep easier, added missing spaces when coalescing formats o Use %s, __func__ instead of embedded function name o Removed unnecessary "cifs: " prefixes o Convert kzalloc with multiply to kcalloc o Remove unused cifswarn macro Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* fs: cifs: use kmemdup instead of kmalloc + memcpySilviu-Mihai Popescu2013-05-051-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | This replaces calls to kmalloc followed by memcpy with a single call to kmemdup. This was found via make coccicheck. Signed-off-by: Silviu-Mihai Popescu <silviupopescu1990@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* CIFS: Fix possible freed pointer dereference in CIFS_SessSetupPavel Shilovsky2012-09-271-1/+2
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* CIFS: Add session setup/logoff capability for SMB2Pavel Shilovsky2012-07-241-3/+3
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* CIFS: Move protocol specific session setup/logoff code to ops structPavel Shilovsky2012-07-241-1/+1
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* CIFS: Move protocol specific negotiate code to ops structPavel Shilovsky2012-07-241-1/+1
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: after upcalling for krb5 creds, invalidate key rather than revoking itJeff Layton2012-07-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Calling key_revoke here isn't ideal as further requests for the key will end up returning -EKEYREVOKED until it gets purged from the cache. What we really intend here is to force a new upcall on the next request_key. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: Fix oops in session setup code for null user mountsShirish Pargaonkar2012-02-021-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | For null user mounts, do not invoke string length function during session setup. Cc: <stable@kernel.org Reported-and-Tested-by: Chris Clayton <chris2553@googlemail.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: check offset in decode_ntlmssp_challenge()Dan Carpenter2012-01-311-0/+4
| | | | | | | | We should check that we're not copying memory from beyond the end of the blob. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
* CIFS: Rename *UCS* functions to *UTF16*Steve French2012-01-191-17/+17
| | | | | | | | to reflect the unicode encoding used by CIFS protocol. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
* cifs: Assume passwords are encoded according to iocharset (try #2)Shirish Pargaonkar2011-10-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Re-posting a patch originally posted by Oskar Liljeblad after rebasing on 3.2. Modify cifs to assume that the supplied password is encoded according to iocharset. Before this patch passwords would be treated as raw 8-bit data, which made authentication with Unicode passwords impossible (at least passwords with characters > 0xFF). The previous code would as a side effect accept passwords encoded with ISO 8859-1, since Unicode < 0x100 basically is ISO 8859-1. Software which relies on that will no longer support password chars > 0x7F unless it also uses iocharset=iso8859-1. (mount.cifs does not care about the encoding so it will work as expected.) Signed-off-by: Oskar Liljeblad <oskar@osk.mine.nu> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Tested-by: A <nimbus1_03087@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: untangle server->maxBuf and CIFSMaxBufSizeJeff Layton2011-10-131-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | server->maxBuf is the maximum SMB size (including header) that the server can handle. CIFSMaxBufSize is the maximum amount of data (sans header) that the client can handle. Currently maxBuf is being capped at CIFSMaxBufSize + the max headers size, and the two values are used somewhat interchangeably in the code. This makes little sense as these two values are not related at all. Separate them and make sure the code uses the right values in the right places. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* Revert "cifs: advertise the right receive buffer size to the server"Steve French2011-08-031-2/+1
| | | | | | | This reverts commit c4d3396b261473ded6f370edd1e79ba34e089d7e. Problems discovered with readdir to Samba due to not accounting for header size properly with this change
* cifs: advertise the right receive buffer size to the serverJeff Layton2011-07-311-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Currently, we mirror the same size back to the server that it sends us. That makes little sense. Instead we should be sending the server the maximum buffer size that we can handle -- CIFSMaxBufSize minus the 4 byte RFC1001 header. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: Fix signing failure when server mandates signing for NTLMSSPShirish Pargaonkar2011-07-121-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When using NTLMSSP authentication mechanism, if server mandates signing, keep the flags in type 3 messages of the NTLMSSP exchange same as in type 1 messages (i.e. keep the indicated capabilities same). Some of the servers such as Samba, expect the flags such as Negotiate_Key_Exchange in type 3 message of NTLMSSP exchange as well. Some servers like Windows do not. https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8212 Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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