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* fscrypt: fix renaming and linking special filesEric Biggers2016-12-311-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Attempting to link a device node, named pipe, or socket file into an encrypted directory through rename(2) or link(2) always failed with EPERM. This happened because fscrypt_has_permitted_context() saw that the file was unencrypted and forbid creating the link. This behavior was unexpected because such files are never encrypted; only regular files, directories, and symlinks can be encrypted. To fix this, make fscrypt_has_permitted_context() always return true on special files. This will be covered by a test in my encryption xfstests patchset. Fixes: 9bd8212f981e ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: fix the test_dummy_encryption mount optionTheodore Ts'o2016-12-281-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit f1c131b45410a: "crypto: xts - Convert to skcipher" now fails the setkey operation if the AES key is the same as the tweak key. Previously this check was only done if FIPS mode is enabled. Now this check is also done if weak key checking was requested. This is reasonable, but since we were using the dummy key which was a constant series of 0x42 bytes, it now caused dummy encrpyption test mode to fail. Fix this by using 0x42... and 0x24... for the two keys, so they are different. Fixes: f1c131b45410a202eb45cc55980a7a9e4e4b4f40 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: Rename FS_WRITE_PATH_FL to FS_CTX_HAS_BOUNCE_BUFFER_FLDavid Gstir2016-12-112-4/+4
| | | | | | | | ... to better explain its purpose after introducing in-place encryption without bounce buffer. Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: Delay bounce page pool allocation until neededDavid Gstir2016-12-113-4/+9
| | | | | | | | | | Since fscrypt users can now indicated if fscrypt_encrypt_page() should use a bounce page, we can delay the bounce page pool initialization util it is really needed. That is until fscrypt_operations has no FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES flag set. Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: Cleanup page locking requirements for fscrypt_{decrypt,encrypt}_page()David Gstir2016-12-111-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | | Rename the FS_CFLG_INPLACE_ENCRYPTION flag to FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES which, when set, indicates that the fs uses pages under its own control as opposed to writeback pages which require locking and a bounce buffer for encryption. Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: Cleanup fscrypt_{decrypt,encrypt}_page()David Gstir2016-12-111-41/+52
| | | | | | | | | | - Improve documentation - Add BUG_ON(len == 0) to avoid accidental switch of offs and len parameters - Improve variable names for readability Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: Never allocate fscrypt_ctx on in-place encryptionDavid Gstir2016-12-111-11/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | In case of in-place encryption fscrypt_ctx was allocated but never released. Since we don't need it for in-place encryption, we skip allocating it. Fixes: 1c7dcf69eea3 ("fscrypt: Add in-place encryption mode") Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: Use correct index in decrypt path.David Gstir2016-12-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Actually use the fs-provided index instead of always using page->index which is only set for page-cache pages. Fixes: 9c4bb8a3a9b4 ("fscrypt: Let fs select encryption index/tweak") Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: move non-public structures and constants to fscrypt_private.hTheodore Ts'o2016-12-113-2/+73
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: unexport fscrypt_initialize()Theodore Ts'o2016-12-112-1/+3
| | | | | | | | The fscrypt_initalize() function isn't used outside fs/crypto, so there's no point making it be an exported symbol. Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypt: rename get_crypt_info() to fscrypt_get_crypt_info()Theodore Ts'o2016-12-113-5/+24
| | | | | | | | | | To avoid namespace collisions, rename get_crypt_info() to fscrypt_get_crypt_info(). The function is only used inside the fs/crypto directory, so declare it in the new header file, fscrypt_private.h. Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* fscrypto: move ioctl processing more fully into common codeEric Biggers2016-12-111-13/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | Multiple bugs were recently fixed in the "set encryption policy" ioctl. To make it clear that fscrypt_process_policy() and fscrypt_get_policy() implement ioctls and therefore their implementations must take standard security and correctness precautions, rename them to fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy() and fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(). Make the latter take in a struct file * to make it consistent with the former. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypto: remove unneeded Kconfig dependenciesEric Biggers2016-12-111-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | SHA256 and ENCRYPTED_KEYS are not needed. CTR shouldn't be needed either, but I left it for now because it was intentionally added by commit 71dea01ea2ed ("ext4 crypto: require CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTR if ext4 encryption is enabled"). So it sounds like there may be a dependency problem elsewhere, which I have not been able to identify specifically, that must be solved before CTR can be removed. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypto: don't use on-stack buffer for key derivationEric Biggers2016-11-141-3/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the new (in 4.9) option to use a virtually-mapped stack (CONFIG_VMAP_STACK), stack buffers cannot be used as input/output for the scatterlist crypto API because they may not be directly mappable to struct page. get_crypt_info() was using a stack buffer to hold the output from the encryption operation used to derive the per-file key. Fix it by using a heap buffer. This bug could most easily be observed in a CONFIG_DEBUG_SG kernel because this allowed the BUG in sg_set_buf() to be triggered. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypto: don't use on-stack buffer for filename encryptionEric Biggers2016-11-141-32/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the new (in 4.9) option to use a virtually-mapped stack (CONFIG_VMAP_STACK), stack buffers cannot be used as input/output for the scatterlist crypto API because they may not be directly mappable to struct page. For short filenames, fname_encrypt() was encrypting a stack buffer holding the padded filename. Fix it by encrypting the filename in-place in the output buffer, thereby making the temporary buffer unnecessary. This bug could most easily be observed in a CONFIG_DEBUG_SG kernel because this allowed the BUG in sg_set_buf() to be triggered. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: Let fs select encryption index/tweakDavid Gstir2016-11-141-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | Avoid re-use of page index as tweak for AES-XTS when multiple parts of same page are encrypted. This will happen on multiple (partial) calls of fscrypt_encrypt_page on same page. page->index is only valid for writeback pages. Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: Constify struct inode pointerDavid Gstir2016-11-142-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | Some filesystems, such as UBIFS, maintain a const pointer for struct inode. Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: Enable partial page encryptionDavid Gstir2016-11-141-16/+26
| | | | | | | | | Not all filesystems work on full pages, thus we should allow them to hand partial pages to fscrypt for en/decryption. Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: Allow fscrypt_decrypt_page() to function with non-writeback pagesDavid Gstir2016-11-141-5/+6
| | | | | | | | | | Some filesystem might pass pages which do not have page->mapping->host set to the encrypted inode. We want the caller to explicitly pass the corresponding inode. Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: Add in-place encryption modeDavid Gstir2016-11-141-10/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | ext4 and f2fs require a bounce page when encrypting pages. However, not all filesystems will need that (eg. UBIFS). This is handled via a flag on fscrypt_operations where a fs implementation can select in-place encryption over using a bounce page (which is the default). Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypto: lock inode while setting encryption policyEric Biggers2016-10-151-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | i_rwsem needs to be acquired while setting an encryption policy so that concurrent calls to FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY are correctly serialized (especially the ->get_context() + ->set_context() pair), and so that new files cannot be created in the directory during or after the ->empty_dir() check. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
* fscrypto: make XTS tweak initialization endian-independentEric Biggers2016-10-131-7/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The XTS tweak (or IV) was initialized differently on little endian and big endian systems. Because the ciphertext depends on the XTS tweak, it was not possible to use an encrypted filesystem created by a little endian system on a big endian system and vice versa, even if they shared the same PAGE_SIZE. Fix this by always using little endian. This will break hypothetical big endian users of ext4 or f2fs encryption. However, all users we are aware of are little endian, and it's believed that "real" big endian users are unlikely to exist yet. So this might as well be fixed now before it's too late. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
* Merge tag 'ext4_for_linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-10-083-74/+93
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4 Pull ext4 updates from Ted Ts'o: "Lots of bug fixes and cleanups" * tag 'ext4_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4: (40 commits) ext4: remove unused variable ext4: use journal inode to determine journal overhead ext4: create function to read journal inode ext4: unmap metadata when zeroing blocks ext4: remove plugging from ext4_file_write_iter() ext4: allow unlocked direct IO when pages are cached ext4: require encryption feature for EXT4_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY fscrypto: use standard macros to compute length of fname ciphertext ext4: do not unnecessarily null-terminate encrypted symlink data ext4: release bh in make_indexed_dir ext4: Allow parallel DIO reads ext4: allow DAX writeback for hole punch jbd2: fix lockdep annotation in add_transaction_credits() blockgroup_lock.h: simplify definition of NR_BG_LOCKS blockgroup_lock.h: remove debris from bgl_lock_ptr() conversion fscrypto: make filename crypto functions return 0 on success fscrypto: rename completion callbacks to reflect usage fscrypto: remove unnecessary includes fscrypto: improved validation when loading inode encryption metadata ext4: fix memory leak when symlink decryption fails ...
| * fscrypto: use standard macros to compute length of fname ciphertextEric Biggers2016-09-301-12/+5
| | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
| * fscrypto: make filename crypto functions return 0 on successEric Biggers2016-09-151-24/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Several filename crypto functions: fname_decrypt(), fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(), and fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk(), returned the output length on success or -errno on failure. However, the output length was redundant with the value written to 'oname->len'. It is also potentially error-prone to make callers have to check for '< 0' instead of '!= 0'. Therefore, make these functions return 0 instead of a length, and make the callers who cared about the return value being a length use 'oname->len' instead. For consistency also make other callers check for a nonzero result rather than a negative result. This change also fixes the inconsistency of fname_encrypt() actually already returning 0 on success, not a length like the other filename crypto functions and as documented in its function comment. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
| * fscrypto: rename completion callbacks to reflect usageEric Biggers2016-09-152-9/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | fscrypt_complete() was used only for data pages, not for all encryption/decryption. Rename it to page_crypt_complete(). dir_crypt_complete() was used for filename encryption/decryption for both directory entries and symbolic links. Rename it to fname_crypt_complete(). Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
| * fscrypto: remove unnecessary includesEric Biggers2016-09-153-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch removes some #includes that are clearly not needed, such as a reference to ecryptfs, which is unrelated to the new filesystem encryption code. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
| * fscrypto: improved validation when loading inode encryption metadataEric Biggers2016-09-151-23/+45
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Validate fscrypt_context.format and fscrypt_context.flags. If unrecognized values are set, then the kernel may not know how to interpret the encrypted file, so it should fail the operation. - Validate that AES_256_XTS is used for contents and that AES_256_CTS is used for filenames. It was previously possible for the kernel to accept these reversed, though it would have taken manual editing of the block device. This was not intended. - Fail cleanly rather than BUG()-ing if a file has an unexpected type. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypto: require write access to mount to set encryption policyEric Biggers2016-09-101-13/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since setting an encryption policy requires writing metadata to the filesystem, it should be guarded by mnt_want_write/mnt_drop_write. Otherwise, a user could cause a write to a frozen or readonly filesystem. This was handled correctly by f2fs but not by ext4. Make fscrypt_process_policy() handle it rather than relying on the filesystem to get it right. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.1+; check fs/{ext4,f2fs} Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Acked-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
* | fscrypto: only allow setting encryption policy on directoriesEric Biggers2016-09-101-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl allowed setting an encryption policy on nondirectory files. This was unintentional, and in the case of nonempty regular files did not behave as expected because existing data was not actually encrypted by the ioctl. In the case of ext4, the user could also trigger filesystem errors in ->empty_dir(), e.g. due to mismatched "directory" checksums when the kernel incorrectly tried to interpret a regular file as a directory. This bug affected ext4 with kernels v4.8-rc1 or later and f2fs with kernels v4.6 and later. It appears that older kernels only permitted directories and that the check was accidentally lost during the refactoring to share the file encryption code between ext4 and f2fs. This patch restores the !S_ISDIR() check that was present in older kernels. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypto: add authorization check for setting encryption policyEric Biggers2016-09-101-0/+3
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On an ext4 or f2fs filesystem with file encryption supported, a user could set an encryption policy on any empty directory(*) to which they had readonly access. This is obviously problematic, since such a directory might be owned by another user and the new encryption policy would prevent that other user from creating files in their own directory (for example). Fix this by requiring inode_owner_or_capable() permission to set an encryption policy. This means that either the caller must own the file, or the caller must have the capability CAP_FOWNER. (*) Or also on any regular file, for f2fs v4.6 and later and ext4 v4.8-rc1 and later; a separate bug fix is coming for that. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.1+; check fs/{ext4,f2fs} Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* block, fs, mm, drivers: use bio set/get op accessorsMike Christie2016-06-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch converts the simple bi_rw use cases in the block, drivers, mm and fs code to set/get the bio operation using bio_set_op_attrs/bio_op These should be simple one or two liner cases, so I just did them in one patch. The next patches handle the more complicated cases in a module per patch. Signed-off-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
* block/fs/drivers: remove rw argument from submit_bioMike Christie2016-06-071-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | This has callers of submit_bio/submit_bio_wait set the bio->bi_rw instead of passing it in. This makes that use the same as generic_make_request and how we set the other bio fields. Signed-off-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com> Fixed up fs/ext4/crypto.c Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
* fscrypto/f2fs: allow fs-specific key prefix for fs encryptionJaegeuk Kim2016-05-071-44/+76
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch allows fscrypto to handle a second key prefix given by filesystem. The main reason is to provide backward compatibility, since previously f2fs used "f2fs:" as a crypto prefix instead of "fscrypt:". Later, ext4 should also provide key_prefix() to give "ext4:". One concern decribed by Ted would be kinda double check overhead of prefixes. In x86, for example, validate_user_key consumes 8 ms after boot-up, which turns out derive_key_aes() consumed most of the time to load specific crypto module. After such the cold miss, it shows almost zero latencies, which treats as a negligible overhead. Note that request_key() detects wrong prefix in prior to derive_key_aes() even. Cc: Ted Tso <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.6 Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
* ext4/fscrypto: avoid RCU lookup in d_revalidateJaegeuk Kim2016-04-131-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | As Al pointed, d_revalidate should return RCU lookup before using d_inode. This was originally introduced by: commit 34286d666230 ("fs: rcu-walk aware d_revalidate method"). Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
* fscrypto: don't let data integrity writebacks fail with ENOMEMJaegeuk Kim2016-04-121-16/+20
| | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes the issue introduced by the ext4 crypto fix in a same manner. For F2FS, however, we flush the pending IOs and wait for a while to acquire free memory. Fixes: c9af28fdd4492 ("ext4 crypto: don't let data integrity writebacks fail with ENOMEM") Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
* fscrypto: use dget_parent() in fscrypt_d_revalidate()Jaegeuk Kim2016-04-121-3/+8
| | | | | | | | This patch updates fscrypto along with the below ext4 crypto change. Fixes: 3d43bcfef5f0 ("ext4 crypto: use dget_parent() in ext4_d_revalidate()") Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
* mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macrosKirill A. Shutemov2016-04-041-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE. This promise never materialized. And unlikely will. We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case, especially on the border between fs and mm. Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much breakage to be doable. Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are not. The changes are pretty straight-forward: - <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN}; - page_cache_get() -> get_page(); - page_cache_release() -> put_page(); This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files. I've called spatch for them manually. The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later. There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also will be addressed with the separate patch. virtual patch @@ expression E; @@ - E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ expression E; @@ - E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_MASK + PAGE_MASK @@ expression E; @@ - PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E) + PAGE_ALIGN(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_get(E) + get_page(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_release(E) + put_page(E) Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* f2fs/crypto: fix xts_tweak initializationLinus Torvalds2016-03-261-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 0b81d07790726 ("fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto") moved the f2fs crypto files to fs/crypto/ and renamed the symbol prefixes from "f2fs_" to "fscrypt_" (and from "F2FS_" to just "FS" for preprocessor symbols). Because of the symbol renaming, it's a bit hard to see it as a file move: use git show -M30 0b81d07790726 to lower the rename detection to just 30% similarity and make git show the files as renamed (the header file won't be shown as a rename even then - since all it contains is symbol definitions, it looks almost completely different). Even with the renames showing as renames, the diffs are not all that easy to read, since so much is just the renames. But Eric Biggers noticed that it's not just all renames: the initialization of the xts_tweak had been broken too, using the inode number rather than the page offset. That's not right - it makes the xfs_tweak the same for all pages of each inode. It _might_ make sense to make the xfs_tweak contain both the offset _and_ the inode number, but not just the inode number. Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-03-213-51/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim: "New Features: - uplift filesystem encryption into fs/crypto/ - give sysfs entries to control memroy consumption Enhancements: - aio performance by preallocating blocks in ->write_iter - use writepages lock for only WB_SYNC_ALL - avoid redundant inline_data conversion - enhance forground GC - use wait_for_stable_page as possible - speed up SEEK_DATA and fiiemap Bug Fixes: - corner case in terms of -ENOSPC for inline_data - hung task caused by long latency in shrinker - corruption between atomic write and f2fs_trace_pid - avoid garbage lengths in dentries - revoke atomicly written pages if an error occurs In addition, there are various minor bug fixes and clean-ups" * tag 'for-f2fs-4.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (81 commits) f2fs: submit node page write bios when really required f2fs: add missing argument to f2fs_setxattr stub f2fs: fix to avoid unneeded unlock_new_inode f2fs: clean up opened code with f2fs_update_dentry f2fs: declare static functions f2fs: use cryptoapi crc32 functions f2fs: modify the readahead method in ra_node_page() f2fs crypto: sync ext4_lookup and ext4_file_open fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto f2fs: mutex can't be used by down_write_nest_lock() f2fs: recovery missing dot dentries in root directory f2fs: fix to avoid deadlock when merging inline data f2fs: introduce f2fs_flush_merged_bios for cleanup f2fs: introduce f2fs_update_data_blkaddr for cleanup f2fs crypto: fix incorrect positioning for GCing encrypted data page f2fs: fix incorrect upper bound when iterating inode mapping tree f2fs: avoid hungtask problem caused by losing wake_up f2fs: trace old block address for CoWed page f2fs: try to flush inode after merging inline data f2fs: show more info about superblock recovery ...
* fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/cryptoJaegeuk Kim2016-03-186-0/+1511
This patch adds the renamed functions moved from the f2fs crypto files. 1. definitions for per-file encryption used by ext4 and f2fs. 2. crypto.c for encrypt/decrypt functions a. IO preparation: - fscrypt_get_ctx / fscrypt_release_ctx b. before IOs: - fscrypt_encrypt_page - fscrypt_decrypt_page - fscrypt_zeroout_range c. after IOs: - fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages - fscrypt_pullback_bio_page - fscrypt_restore_control_page 3. policy.c supporting context management. a. For ioctls: - fscrypt_process_policy - fscrypt_get_policy b. For context permission - fscrypt_has_permitted_context - fscrypt_inherit_context 4. keyinfo.c to handle permissions - fscrypt_get_encryption_info - fscrypt_free_encryption_info 5. fname.c to support filename encryption a. general wrapper functions - fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr - fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk - fscrypt_setup_filename - fscrypt_free_filename b. specific filename handling functions - fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer - fscrypt_fname_free_buffer 6. Makefile and Kconfig Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ildar Muslukhov <ildarm@google.com> Signed-off-by: Uday Savagaonkar <savagaon@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>