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* eCryptfs: Regression in unencrypted filename symlinksTyler Hicks2009-02-071-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The addition of filename encryption caused a regression in unencrypted filename symlink support. ecryptfs_copy_filename() is used when dealing with unencrypted filenames and it reported that the new, copied filename was a character longer than it should have been. This caused the return value of readlink() to count the NULL byte of the symlink target. Most applications don't care about the extra NULL byte, but a version control system (bzr) helped in discovering the bug. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs/Kconfig: move ecryptfs outAlexey Dobriyan2009-01-221-0/+11
| | | | Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
* fs/ecryptfs/inode.c: cleanup kerneldocQinghuang Feng2009-01-071-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | Arguments lower_dentry and ecryptfs_dentry in ecryptfs_create_underlying_file() have been merged into dentry, now fix it. Signed-off-by: Qinghuang Feng <qhfeng.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Clean up ecryptfs_decode_from_filename()Michael Halcrow2009-01-071-27/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Flesh out the comments for ecryptfs_decode_from_filename(). Remove the return condition, since it is always 0. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: kerneldoc for ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet()Michael Halcrow2009-01-071-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | Kerneldoc updates for ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet(). Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Fix data types (int/size_t)Michael Halcrow2009-01-074-16/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Correct several format string data type specifiers. Correct filename size data types; they should be size_t rather than int when passed as parameters to some other functions (although note that the filenames will never be larger than int). Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Replace %Z with %zMichael Halcrow2009-01-074-24/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | %Z is a gcc-ism. Using %z instead. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: mount optionMichael Halcrow2009-01-071-27/+99
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Enable mount-wide filename encryption by providing the Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) signature as a mount option. Note that the ecryptfs-utils userspace package versions 61 or later support this option. When mounting with ecryptfs-utils version 61 or later, the mount helper will detect the availability of the passphrase-based filename encryption in the kernel (via the eCryptfs sysfs handle) and query the user interactively as to whether or not he wants to enable the feature for the mount. If the user enables filename encryption, the mount helper will then prompt for the FNEK signature that the user wishes to use, suggesting by default the signature for the mount passphrase that the user has already entered for encrypting the file contents. When not using the mount helper, the user can specify the signature for the passphrase key with the ecryptfs_fnek_sig= mount option. This key must be available in the user's keyring. The mount helper usually takes care of this step. If, however, the user is not mounting with the mount helper, then he will need to enter the passphrase key into his keyring with some other utility prior to mounting, such as ecryptfs-manager. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: filldir, lookup, and readlinkMichael Halcrow2009-01-074-242/+195
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the requisite modifications to ecryptfs_filldir(), ecryptfs_lookup(), and ecryptfs_readlink() to call out to filename encryption functions. Propagate filename encryption policy flags from mount-wide crypt_stat to inode crypt_stat. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functionsMichael Halcrow2009-01-071-0/+433
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These functions support encrypting and encoding the filename contents. The encrypted filename contents may consist of any ASCII characters. This patch includes a custom encoding mechanism to map the ASCII characters to a reduced character set that is appropriate for filenames. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Header updatesMichael Halcrow2009-01-072-14/+51
| | | | | | | | | | | | Extensions to the header file to support filename encryption. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Tag 70 packetsMichael Halcrow2009-01-073-70/+613
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patchset implements filename encryption via a passphrase-derived mount-wide Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) specified as a mount parameter. Each encrypted filename has a fixed prefix indicating that eCryptfs should try to decrypt the filename. When eCryptfs encounters this prefix, it decodes the filename into a tag 70 packet and then decrypts the packet contents using the FNEK, setting the filename to the decrypted filename. Both unencrypted and encrypted filenames can reside in the same lower filesystem. Because filename encryption expands the length of the filename during the encoding stage, eCryptfs will not properly handle filenames that are already near the maximum filename length. In the present implementation, eCryptfs must be able to produce a match against the lower encrypted and encoded filename representation when given a plaintext filename. Therefore, two files having the same plaintext name will encrypt and encode into the same lower filename if they are both encrypted using the same FNEK. This can be changed by finding a way to replace the prepended bytes in the blocked-aligned filename with random characters; they are hashes of the FNEK right now, so that it is possible to deterministically map from a plaintext filename to an encrypted and encoded filename in the lower filesystem. An implementation using random characters will have to decode and decrypt every single directory entry in any given directory any time an event occurs wherein the VFS needs to determine whether a particular file exists in the lower directory and the decrypted and decoded filenames have not yet been extracted for that directory. Thanks to Tyler Hicks and David Kleikamp for assistance in the development of this patchset. This patch: A tag 70 packet contains a filename encrypted with a Filename Encryption Key (FNEK). This patch implements functions for writing and parsing tag 70 packets. This patch also adds definitions and extends structures to support filename encryption. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2009-01-062-14/+4
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: inotify: fix type errors in interfaces fix breakage in reiserfs_new_inode() fix the treatment of jfs special inodes vfs: remove duplicate code in get_fs_type() add a vfs_fsync helper sys_execve and sys_uselib do not call into fsnotify zero i_uid/i_gid on inode allocation inode->i_op is never NULL ntfs: don't NULL i_op isofs check for NULL ->i_op in root directory is dead code affs: do not zero ->i_op kill suid bit only for regular files vfs: lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_CUR) race condition
| * add a vfs_fsync helperChristoph Hellwig2009-01-051-12/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fsync currently has a fdatawrite/fdatawait pair around the method call, and a mutex_lock/unlock of the inode mutex. All callers of fsync have to duplicate this, but we have a few and most of them don't quite get it right. This patch adds a new vfs_fsync that takes care of this. It's a little more complicated as usual as ->fsync might get a NULL file pointer and just a dentry from nfsd, but otherwise gets afile and we want to take the mapping and file operations from it when it is there. Notes on the fsync callers: - ecryptfs wasn't calling filemap_fdatawrite / filemap_fdatawait on the lower file - coda wasn't calling filemap_fdatawrite / filemap_fdatawait on the host file, and returning 0 when ->fsync was missing - shm wasn't calling either filemap_fdatawrite / filemap_fdatawait nor taking i_mutex. Now given that shared memory doesn't have disk backing not doing anything in fsync seems fine and I left it out of the vfs_fsync conversion for now, but in that case we might just not pass it through to the lower file at all but just call the no-op simple_sync_file directly. [and now actually export vfs_fsync] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * inode->i_op is never NULLAl Viro2009-01-051-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We used to have rather schizophrenic set of checks for NULL ->i_op even though it had been eliminated years ago. You'd need to go out of your way to set it to NULL explicitly _and_ a bunch of code would die on such inodes anyway. After killing two remaining places that still did that bogosity, all that crap can go away. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | fs: symlink write_begin allocation context fixNick Piggin2009-01-041-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the write_begin/write_end aops, page_symlink was broken because it could no longer pass a GFP_NOFS type mask into the point where the allocations happened. They are done in write_begin, which would always assume that the filesystem can be entered from reclaim. This bug could cause filesystem deadlocks. The funny thing with having a gfp_t mask there is that it doesn't really allow the caller to arbitrarily tinker with the context in which it can be called. It couldn't ever be GFP_ATOMIC, for example, because it needs to take the page lock. The only thing any callers care about is __GFP_FS anyway, so turn that into a single flag. Add a new flag for write_begin, AOP_FLAG_NOFS. Filesystems can now act on this flag in their write_begin function. Change __grab_cache_page to accept a nofs argument as well, to honour that flag (while we're there, change the name to grab_cache_page_write_begin which is more instructive and does away with random leading underscores). This is really a more flexible way to go in the end anyway -- if a filesystem happens to want any extra allocations aside from the pagecache ones in ints write_begin function, it may now use GFP_KERNEL (rather than GFP_NOFS) for common case allocations (eg. ocfs2_alloc_write_ctxt, for a random example). [kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: fix ubifs] [kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com: fix fuse] Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.28.x] Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> [ Cleaned up the calling convention: just pass in the AOP flags untouched to the grab_cache_page_write_begin() function. That just simplifies everybody, and may even allow future expansion of the logic. - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: check readlink result was not an error before using itDuane Griffin2009-01-011-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The result from readlink is being used to index into the link name buffer without checking whether it is a valid length. If readlink returns an error this will fault or cause memory corruption. Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.launchpad.net Signed-off-by: Duane Griffin <duaneg@dghda.com> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2008-12-041-17/+14
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c Manually fixed above to use new creds API functions, e.g. nfs4_save_creds(). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * eCryptfs: Allocate up to two scatterlists for crypto ops on keysMichael Halcrow2008-11-201-17/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I have received some reports of out-of-memory errors on some older AMD architectures. These errors are what I would expect to see if crypt_stat->key were split between two separate pages. eCryptfs should not assume that any of the memory sent through virt_to_scatterlist() is all contained in a single page, and so this patch allocates two scatterlist structs instead of one when processing keys. I have received confirmation from one person affected by this bug that this patch resolves the issue for him, and so I am submitting it for inclusion in a future stable release. Note that virt_to_scatterlist() runs sg_init_table() on the scatterlist structs passed to it, so the calls to sg_init_table() in decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key() are redundant. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Reported-by: Paulo J. S. Silva <pjssilva@ime.usp.br> Cc: "Leon Woestenberg" <leon.woestenberg@gmail.com> Cc: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2)Serge Hallyn2008-11-252-19/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are here as well. Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply: 1. The task pins the user struct. 2. The user struct pins its user namespace. 3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it. User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user namespaces). When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty keyrings and a clean group_info. This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here is his original patch description: >I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following >changes: > > (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user > namespace. > > (2) Fixes eCryptFS. > > (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent > with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is > superfluous. > > (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the > beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts > at allocation. > > (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds > to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine > the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred > struct. > > This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the > reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be > transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer. > > (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under > preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds(). > >David >Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Changelog: Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments 1. leave thread_keyring alone 2. use current_user_ns() in set_user() Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
* | CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open()David Howells2008-11-143-6/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself when it opens its null chardev. The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the dentry_open hook in struct security_operations. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the eCryptFS filesystemDavid Howells2008-11-142-16/+22
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds. Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id(). Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be addressed by later patches. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Mike Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net> Cc: ecryptfs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* ecryptfs: fix memory corruption when storing crypto info in xattrsEric Sandeen2008-10-301-7/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When ecryptfs allocates space to write crypto headers into, before copying it out to file headers or to xattrs, it looks at the value of crypt_stat->num_header_bytes_at_front to determine how much space it needs. This is also used as the file offset to the actual encrypted data, so for xattr-stored crypto info, the value was zero. So, we kzalloc'd 0 bytes, and then ran off to write to that memory. (Which returned as ZERO_SIZE_PTR, so we explode quickly). The right answer is to always allocate a page to write into; the current code won't ever write more than that (this is enforced by the (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - offset) length in the call to ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set). To be explicit about this, we now send in a "max" parameter, rather than magically using PAGE_CACHE_SIZE there. Also, since the pointer we pass down the callchain eventually gets the virt_to_page() treatment, we should be using a alloc_page variant, not kzalloc (see also 7fcba054373d5dfc43d26e243a5c9b92069972ee) Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] assorted path_lookup() -> kern_path() conversionsAl Viro2008-10-231-14/+9
| | | | | | more nameidata eviction Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* eCryptfs: remove netlink transportTyler Hicks2008-10-166-388/+60
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The netlink transport code has not worked for a while and the miscdev transport is a simpler solution. This patch removes the netlink code and makes the miscdev transport the only eCryptfs kernel to userspace transport. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* ecryptfs: convert to use new aopsBadari Pulavarty2008-10-161-31/+50
| | | | | | | | | | | Convert ecryptfs to use write_begin/write_end Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Badari Pulavarty <pbadari@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: remove retry loop in ecryptfs_readdir()Michael Halcrow2008-10-161-9/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | The retry block in ecryptfs_readdir() has been in the eCryptfs code base for a while, apparently for no good reason. This loop could potentially run without terminating. This patch removes the loop, instead erroring out if vfs_readdir() on the lower file fails. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZinIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* vfs: Use const for kernel parser tableSteven Whitehouse2008-10-131-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is a much better version of a previous patch to make the parser tables constant. Rather than changing the typedef, we put the "const" in all the various places where its required, allowing the __initconst exception for nfsroot which was the cause of the previous trouble. This was posted for review some time ago and I believe its been in -mm since then. Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <aviro@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: use page_alloc not kmalloc to get a page of memoryEric Sandeen2008-07-291-12/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With SLUB debugging turned on in 2.6.26, I was getting memory corruption when testing eCryptfs. The root cause turned out to be that eCryptfs was doing kmalloc(PAGE_CACHE_SIZE); virt_to_page() and treating that as a nice page-aligned chunk of memory. But at least with SLUB debugging on, this is not always true, and the page we get from virt_to_page does not necessarily match the PAGE_CACHE_SIZE worth of memory we got from kmalloc. My simple testcase was 2 loops doing "rm -f fileX; cp /tmp/fileX ." for 2 different multi-megabyte files. With this change I no longer see the corruption. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.25.x, 2.6.26.x] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] kill nameidata passing to permission(), rename to inode_permission()Al Viro2008-07-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | Incidentally, the name that gives hundreds of false positives on grep is not a good idea... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [patch 5/5] vfs: remove mode parameter from vfs_symlink()Miklos Szeredi2008-07-271-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | Remove the unused mode parameter from vfs_symlink and callers. Thanks to Tetsuo Handa for noticing. CC: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
* [PATCH] sanitize ->permission() prototypeAl Viro2008-07-271-15/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * kill nameidata * argument; map the 3 bits in ->flags anybody cares about to new MAY_... ones and pass with the mask. * kill redundant gfs2_iop_permission() * sanitize ecryptfs_permission() * fix remaining places where ->permission() instances might barf on new MAY_... found in mask. The obvious next target in that direction is permission(9) folded fix for nfs_permission() breakage from Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* SL*B: drop kmem cache argument from constructorAlexey Dobriyan2008-07-261-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Kmem cache passed to constructor is only needed for constructors that are themselves multiplexeres. Nobody uses this "feature", nor does anybody uses passed kmem cache in non-trivial way, so pass only pointer to object. Non-trivial places are: arch/powerpc/mm/init_64.c arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage.c This is flag day, yes. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jon Tollefson <kniht@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mm/slab.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix ubifs] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Make all persistent file opens delayedMichael Halcrow2008-07-244-26/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is no good reason to immediately open the lower file, and that can cause problems with files that the user does not intend to immediately open, such as device nodes. This patch removes the persistent file open from the interpose step and pushes that to the locations where eCryptfs really does need the lower persistent file, such as just before reading or writing the metadata stored in the lower file header. Two functions are jumping to out_dput when they should just be jumping to out on error paths. This patch also fixes these. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: do not try to open device files on mknodMichael Halcrow2008-07-244-13/+42
| | | | | | | | | | | | When creating device nodes, eCryptfs needs to delay actually opening the lower persistent file until an application tries to open. Device handles may not be backed by anything when they first come into existence. [Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu: build fix] Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu} Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* ecryptfs: inode.c mmap.c use unaligned byteorder helpersHarvey Harrison2008-07-242-10/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fixe sparse warnings: fs/ecryptfs/inode.c:368:15: warning: cast to restricted __be64 fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c:385:12: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c:385:12: expected unsigned long long [unsigned] [assigned] [usertype] file_size fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c:385:12: got restricted __be64 [usertype] <noident> fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c:428:12: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c:428:12: expected unsigned long long [unsigned] [assigned] [usertype] file_size fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c:428:12: got restricted __be64 [usertype] <noident> Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* ecryptfs: crypto.c use unaligned byteorder helpersHarvey Harrison2008-07-241-23/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fixes the following sparse warnings: fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1036:8: warning: cast to restricted __be32 fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1038:8: warning: cast to restricted __be32 fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1077:10: warning: cast to restricted __be32 fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1103:6: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1105:6: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1124:8: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1241:21: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1244:30: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types) fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1414:23: warning: cast to restricted __be32 fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:1417:32: warning: cast to restricted __be16 Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* ecryptfs: string copy cleanupMiklos Szeredi2008-07-241-12/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Clean up overcomplicated string copy, which also gets rid of this bogus warning: fs/ecryptfs/main.c: In function 'ecryptfs_parse_options': include/asm/arch/string_32.h:75: warning: array subscript is above array bounds Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* ecryptfs: propagate key errors up at mount timeEric Sandeen2008-07-242-7/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Mounting with invalid key signatures should probably fail, if they were specifically requested but not available. Also fix case checks in process_request_key_err() for the right sign of the errnos, as spotted by Jan Tluka. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Tluka <jtluka@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* ecryptfs: discard ecryptfsd registration messages in miscdevTyler Hicks2008-07-241-59/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The userspace eCryptfs daemon sends HELO and QUIT messages to the kernel for per-user daemon (un)registration. These messages are required when netlink is used as the transport, but (un)registration is handled by opening and closing the device file when miscdev is the transport. These messages should be discarded in the miscdev transport so that a daemon isn't registered twice. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* eCryptfs: Privileged kthread for lower file opensMichael Halcrow2008-07-245-22/+251
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | eCryptfs would really like to have read-write access to all files in the lower filesystem. Right now, the persistent lower file may be opened read-only if the attempt to open it read-write fails. One way to keep from having to do that is to have a privileged kthread that can open the lower persistent file on behalf of the user opening the eCryptfs file; this patch implements this functionality. This patch will properly allow a less-privileged user to open the eCryptfs file, followed by a more-privileged user opening the eCryptfs file, with the first user only being able to read and the second user being able to both read and write. eCryptfs currently does this wrong; it will wind up calling vfs_write() on a file that was opened read-only. This is fixed in this patch. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge commit 'v2.6.26' into bkl-removalJonathan Corbet2008-07-144-41/+13
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| * ecryptfs: remove unnecessary mux from ecryptfs_init_ecryptfs_miscdev()Michael Halcrow2008-07-041-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The misc_mtx should provide all the protection required to keep the daemon hash table sane during miscdev registration. Since this mutex is causing gratuitous lockdep warnings, this patch removes it. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Reported-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * eCryptfs: remove unnecessary page decrypt callMichael Halcrow2008-06-062-24/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The page decrypt calls in ecryptfs_write() are both pointless and buggy. Pointless because ecryptfs_get_locked_page() has already brought the page up to date, and buggy because prior mmap writes will just be blown away by the decrypt call. This patch also removes the declaration of a now-nonexistent function ecryptfs_write_zeros(). Thanks to Eric Sandeen and David Kleikamp for helping to track this down. Eric said: fsx w/ mmap dies quickly ( < 100 ops) without this, and survives nicely (to millions of ops+) with it in place. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * ecryptfs: fix missed mutex_unlockCyrill Gorcunov2008-05-241-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * ecryptfs fixesAl Viro2008-05-221-14/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | memcpy() from userland pointer is a Bad Thing(tm) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | ecryptfs: fasync BKL pushdownJonathan Corbet2008-07-021-0/+3
|/ | | | Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* eCryptFS: fix imbalanced mutex lockingCyrill Gorcunov2008-05-131-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Fix imbalanced calls for mutex lock/unlock on ecryptfs_daemon_hash_mux Revealed by Ingo Molnar: http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/5/7/260 Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* ecryptfs: clean up (un)lock_parentMiklos Szeredi2008-05-131-9/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | dget(dentry->d_parent) --> dget_parent(dentry) unlock_parent() is racy and unnecessary. Replace single caller with unlock_dir(). There are several other suspect uses of ->d_parent in ecryptfs... Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Remove duplicated unlikely() in IS_ERR()Hirofumi Nakagawa2008-04-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some drivers have duplicated unlikely() macros. IS_ERR() already has unlikely() in itself. This patch cleans up such pointless code. Signed-off-by: Hirofumi Nakagawa <hnakagawa@miraclelinux.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org> Cc: Paul Clements <paul.clements@steeleye.com> Cc: Richard Purdie <rpurdie@rpsys.net> Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it> Cc: David Brownell <david-b@pacbell.net> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Anton Altaparmakov <aia21@cantab.net> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com> Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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