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* audit: allow unsetting the loginuid (with priv)Eric Paris2013-11-051-4/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | If a task has CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL allow that task to unset their loginuid. This would allow a child of that task to set their loginuid without CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. Thus when launching a new login daemon, a priviledged helper would be able to unset the loginuid and then the daemon, which may be malicious user facing, do not need priv to function correctly. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* proc_fill_cache(): clean up, get rid of pointless find_inode_number() useAl Viro2013-06-291-23/+13
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* proc_fill_cache(): just make instantiate_t return intAl Viro2013-06-291-31/+28
| | | | | | all instances always return ERR_PTR(-E...) or NULL, anyway Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* proc_pid_readdir(): stop wanking with proc_fill_cache() for /proc/selfAl Viro2013-06-291-3/+3
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* proc_fill_cache(): kill pointless checkAl Viro2013-06-291-4/+2
| | | | | | we'd just checked that child->d_inode is non-NULL, for fuck sake! Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [readdir] convert procfsAl Viro2013-06-291-230/+133
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* posix-timers: Show clock ID in proc filePavel Tikhomirov2013-05-281-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Expand information about posix-timers in /proc/<pid>/timers by adding info about clock, with which the timer was created. I.e. in the forth line of timer info after "notify:" line go "ClockID: <clock_id>". Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <snorcht@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Helsley <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1368742323-46949-2-git-send-email-snorcht@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2013-05-021-4/+52
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull VFS updates from Al Viro, Misc cleanups all over the place, mainly wrt /proc interfaces (switch create_proc_entry to proc_create(), get rid of the deprecated create_proc_read_entry() in favor of using proc_create_data() and seq_file etc). 7kloc removed. * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (204 commits) don't bother with deferred freeing of fdtables proc: Move non-public stuff from linux/proc_fs.h to fs/proc/internal.h proc: Make the PROC_I() and PDE() macros internal to procfs proc: Supply a function to remove a proc entry by PDE take cgroup_open() and cpuset_open() to fs/proc/base.c ppc: Clean up scanlog ppc: Clean up rtas_flash driver somewhat hostap: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree() drm: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree() drm: proc: Use minor->index to label things, not PDE->name drm: Constify drm_proc_list[] zoran: Don't print proc_dir_entry data in debug reiserfs: Don't access the proc_dir_entry in r_open(), r_start() r_show() proc: Supply an accessor for getting the data from a PDE's parent airo: Use remove_proc_subtree() rtl8192u: Don't need to save device proc dir PDE rtl8187se: Use a dir under /proc/net/r8180/ proc: Add proc_mkdir_data() proc: Move some bits from linux/proc_fs.h to linux/{of.h,signal.h,tty.h} proc: Move PDE_NET() to fs/proc/proc_net.c ...
| * take cgroup_open() and cpuset_open() to fs/proc/base.cAl Viro2013-05-011-0/+31
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * proc: Uninline pid_delete_dentry()David Howells2013-05-011-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Uninline pid_delete_dentry() as it's only used by three function pointers. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * procfs: switch /proc/self away from proc_dir_entryAl Viro2013-04-091-4/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Just have it pinned in dcache all along and let procfs ->kill_sb() drop it before kill_anon_super(). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | fs, proc: truncate /proc/pid/comm writes to first TASK_COMM_LEN bytesDavid Rientjes2013-05-011-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, a write to a procfs file will return the number of bytes successfully written. If the actual string is longer than this, the remainder of the string will not be be written and userspace will complete the operation by issuing additional write()s. Hence $ echo -n "abcdefghijklmnopqrs" > /proc/self/comm results in $ cat /proc/$$/comm pqrs since the final four bytes were written with a second write() since TASK_COMM_LEN == 16. This is obviously an undesired result and not equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_NAME). The implementation should not need to know the definition of TASK_COMM_LEN. This patch truncates the string to the first TASK_COMM_LEN bytes and returns the bytes written as the length of the string written so the second write() is suppressed. $ cat /proc/$$/comm abcdefghijklmno Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | posix-timers: Show sigevent info in proc filePavel Emelyanov2013-04-171-0/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Previous patch added proc file to list posix timers created by task. Expand the information provided in this file by adding info about notification method, with which timers were created. I.e. after the "ID:" line there go 1. "signal:" line, that shows signal number and sigval bits; 2. "notify:" line, that shows the timer notification method. Thus the timer entry would looke like this: ID: 123 signal: 14/0000000000b005d0 notify: signal/pid.732 This information is enough to understand how timer_create() was called for each particular timer. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Helsley <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/513DA024.80404@parallels.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* | posix-timers: Introduce /proc/PID/timers filePavel Emelyanov2013-04-171-0/+83
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently kernel doesn't provide any API for getting info about what posix timers are configured by processes. It's implied, that a process which configured some timers, knows what it did. However, for external tools it's impossible to get this information. In particular, this is critical for checkpoint-restore project to have this info. Introduce a per-pid proc file with information about posix timers. Since these timers are shared between threads, this file is present on tgid level only, no such thing in tid subdirs. The file format is expected to be the "/proc/<pid>/smaps"-like, i.e. each timer will occupy seveal lines to allow for future extending. Each new timer entry starts with the ID: <number> line which is added by this patch. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Helsley <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/513DA00D.6070009@parallels.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* fs/proc: clean up printksAndrew Morton2013-02-281-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | - use pr_foo() throughout - remove a couple of duplicated KERN_WARNINGs, via WARN(KERN_WARNING "...") - nuke a few warnings which I've never seen happen, ever. Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs: change return values from -EACCES to -EPERMZhao Hongjiang2013-02-261-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | According to SUSv3: [EACCES] Permission denied. An attempt was made to access a file in a way forbidden by its file access permissions. [EPERM] Operation not permitted. An attempt was made to perform an operation limited to processes with appropriate privileges or to the owner of a file or other resource. So -EPERM should be returned if capability checks fails. Strictly speaking this is an API change since the error code user sees is altered. Signed-off-by: Zhao Hongjiang <zhaohongjiang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* d_hash_and_lookup(): export, switch open-coded instancesAl Viro2013-02-261-0/+1
| | | | | | | | * calling conventions change - ERR_PTR() is returned on ->d_hash() errors; NULL is just for dcache miss now. * exported, open-coded instances in ncpfs and cifs converted. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* new helper: file_inode(file)Al Viro2013-02-231-19/+19
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* procfs: drop vmtruncateMarco Stornelli2012-12-201-7/+0
| | | | | | | Removed vmtruncate Signed-off-by: Marco Stornelli <marco.stornelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-12-181-166/+3
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace changes from Eric Biederman: "While small this set of changes is very significant with respect to containers in general and user namespaces in particular. The user space interface is now complete. This set of changes adds support for unprivileged users to create user namespaces and as a user namespace root to create other namespaces. The tyranny of supporting suid root preventing unprivileged users from using cool new kernel features is broken. This set of changes completes the work on setns, adding support for the pid, user, mount namespaces. This set of changes includes a bunch of basic pid namespace cleanups/simplifications. Of particular significance is the rework of the pid namespace cleanup so it no longer requires sending out tendrils into all kinds of unexpected cleanup paths for operation. At least one case of broken error handling is fixed by this cleanup. The files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ have been converted from regular files to magic symlinks which prevents incorrect caching by the VFS, ensuring the files always refer to the namespace the process is currently using and ensuring that the ptrace_mayaccess permission checks are always applied. The files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ have been given stable inode numbers so it is now possible to see if different processes share the same namespaces. Through the David Miller's net tree are changes to relax many of the permission checks in the networking stack to allowing the user namespace root to usefully use the networking stack. Similar changes for the mount namespace and the pid namespace are coming through my tree. Two small changes to add user namespace support were commited here adn in David Miller's -net tree so that I could complete the work on the /proc/<pid>/ns/ files in this tree. Work remains to make it safe to build user namespaces and 9p, afs, ceph, cifs, coda, gfs2, ncpfs, nfs, nfsd, ocfs2, and xfs so the Kconfig guard remains in place preventing that user namespaces from being built when any of those filesystems are enabled. Future design work remains to allow root users outside of the initial user namespace to mount more than just /proc and /sys." * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (38 commits) proc: Usable inode numbers for the namespace file descriptors. proc: Fix the namespace inode permission checks. proc: Generalize proc inode allocation userns: Allow unprivilged mounts of proc and sysfs userns: For /proc/self/{uid,gid}_map derive the lower userns from the struct file procfs: Print task uids and gids in the userns that opened the proc file userns: Implement unshare of the user namespace userns: Implent proc namespace operations userns: Kill task_user_ns userns: Make create_new_namespaces take a user_ns parameter userns: Allow unprivileged use of setns. userns: Allow unprivileged users to create new namespaces userns: Allow setting a userns mapping to your current uid. userns: Allow chown and setgid preservation userns: Allow unprivileged users to create user namespaces. userns: Ignore suid and sgid on binaries if the uid or gid can not be mapped userns: fix return value on mntns_install() failure vfs: Allow unprivileged manipulation of the mount namespace. vfs: Only support slave subtrees across different user namespaces vfs: Add a user namespace reference from struct mnt_namespace ...
| * pidns: Make the pidns proc mount/umount logic obvious.Eric W. Biederman2012-11-191-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Track the number of pids in the proc hash table. When the number of pids goes to 0 schedule work to unmount the kernel mount of proc. Move the mount of proc into alloc_pid when we allocate the pid for init. Remove the surprising calls of pid_ns_release proc in fork and proc_flush_task. Those code paths really shouldn't know about proc namespace implementation details and people have demonstrated several times that finding and understanding those code paths is difficult and non-obvious. Because of the call path detach pid is alwasy called with the rtnl_lock held free_pid is not allowed to sleep, so the work to unmounting proc is moved to a work queue. This has the side benefit of not blocking the entire world waiting for the unnecessary rcu_barrier in deactivate_locked_super. In the process of making the code clear and obvious this fixes a bug reported by Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> where we would leak a mount of proc during clone(CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWNET) if copy_pid_ns succeeded and copy_net_ns failed. Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * procfs: Don't cache a pid in the root inode.Eric W. Biederman2012-11-191-10/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that we have s_fs_info pointing to our pid namespace the original reason for the proc root inode having a struct pid is gone. Caching a pid in the root inode has led to some complicated code. Now that we don't need the struct pid, just remove it. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * procfs: Use the proc generic infrastructure for proc/self.Eric W. Biederman2012-11-191-152/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I had visions at one point of splitting proc into two filesystems. If that had happened proc/self being the the part of proc that actually deals with pids would have been a nice cleanup. As it is proc/self requires a lot of unnecessary infrastructure for a single file. The only user visible change is that a mounted /proc for a pid namespace that is dead now shows a broken proc symlink, instead of being completely invisible. I don't think anyone will notice or care. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | mm, oom: change type of oom_score_adj to shortDavid Rientjes2012-12-121-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The maximum oom_score_adj is 1000 and the minimum oom_score_adj is -1000, so this range can be represented by the signed short type with no functional change. The extra space this frees up in struct signal_struct will be used for per-thread oom kill flags in the next patch. Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton.vorontsov@linaro.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | proc: check vma->vm_file before dereferencingStanislav Kinsbursky2012-11-271-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 7b540d0646ce ("proc_map_files_readdir(): don't bother with grabbing files") switched proc_map_files_readdir() to use @f_mode directly instead of grabbing @file reference, but same time the test for @vm_file presence was lost leading to nil dereference. The patch brings the test back. The all proc_map_files feature is CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE wrapped (which is set to 'n' by default) so the bug doesn't affect regular kernels. The regression is 3.7-rc1 only as far as I can tell. [gorcunov@openvz.org: provided changelog] Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com> Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | mm, oom: reintroduce /proc/pid/oom_adjDavid Rientjes2012-11-161-0/+109
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is mostly a revert of 01dc52ebdf47 ("oom: remove deprecated oom_adj") from Davidlohr Bueso. It reintroduces /proc/pid/oom_adj for backwards compatibility with earlier kernels. It simply scales the value linearly when /proc/pid/oom_score_adj is written. The major difference is that its scheduled removal is no longer included in Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt. We do warn users with a single printk, though, to suggest the more powerful and supported /proc/pid/oom_score_adj interface. Reported-by: Artem S. Tashkinov <t.artem@lycos.com> Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* procfs: don't need a PATH_MAX allocation to hold a string representation of ↵Jeff Layton2012-10-131-2/+3
| | | | | | | an int Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* oom: remove deprecated oom_adjDavidlohr Bueso2012-10-091-116/+1
| | | | | | | | | | The deprecated /proc/<pid>/oom_adj is scheduled for removal this month. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@gnu.org> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-10-031-406/+11
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs update from Al Viro: - big one - consolidation of descriptor-related logics; almost all of that is moved to fs/file.c (BTW, I'm seriously tempted to rename the result to fd.c. As it is, we have a situation when file_table.c is about handling of struct file and file.c is about handling of descriptor tables; the reasons are historical - file_table.c used to be about a static array of struct file we used to have way back). A lot of stray ends got cleaned up and converted to saner primitives, disgusting mess in android/binder.c is still disgusting, but at least doesn't poke so much in descriptor table guts anymore. A bunch of relatively minor races got fixed in process, plus an ext4 struct file leak. - related thing - fget_light() partially unuglified; see fdget() in there (and yes, it generates the code as good as we used to have). - also related - bits of Cyrill's procfs stuff that got entangled into that work; _not_ all of it, just the initial move to fs/proc/fd.c and switch of fdinfo to seq_file. - Alex's fs/coredump.c spiltoff - the same story, had been easier to take that commit than mess with conflicts. The rest is a separate pile, this was just a mechanical code movement. - a few misc patches all over the place. Not all for this cycle, there'll be more (and quite a few currently sit in akpm's tree)." Fix up trivial conflicts in the android binder driver, and some fairly simple conflicts due to two different changes to the sock_alloc_file() interface ("take descriptor handling from sock_alloc_file() to callers" vs "net: Providing protocol type via system.sockprotoname xattr of /proc/PID/fd entries" adding a dentry name to the socket) * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (72 commits) MAX_LFS_FILESIZE should be a loff_t compat: fs: Generic compat_sys_sendfile implementation fs: push rcu_barrier() from deactivate_locked_super() to filesystems btrfs: reada_extent doesn't need kref for refcount coredump: move core dump functionality into its own file coredump: prevent double-free on an error path in core dumper usb/gadget: fix misannotations fcntl: fix misannotations ceph: don't abuse d_delete() on failure exits hypfs: ->d_parent is never NULL or negative vfs: delete surplus inode NULL check switch simple cases of fget_light to fdget new helpers: fdget()/fdput() switch o2hb_region_dev_write() to fget_light() proc_map_files_readdir(): don't bother with grabbing files make get_file() return its argument vhost_set_vring(): turn pollstart/pollstop into bool switch prctl_set_mm_exe_file() to fget_light() switch xfs_find_handle() to fget_light() switch xfs_swapext() to fget_light() ...
| * proc_map_files_readdir(): don't bother with grabbing filesAl Viro2012-09-271-19/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | all we need is their ->f_mode, so just collect _that_ Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * make get_file() return its argumentAl Viro2012-09-271-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | simplifies a bunch of callers... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * procfs: Move /proc/pid/fd[info] handling code to fd.[ch]Cyrill Gorcunov2012-09-271-386/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch prepares the ground for further extension of /proc/pid/fd[info] handling code by moving fdinfo handling code into fs/proc/fd.c. I think such move makes both fs/proc/base.c and fs/proc/fd.c easier to read. Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> CC: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> CC: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> CC: James Bottomley <jbottomley@parallels.com> CC: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> CC: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> CC: Matthew Helsley <matt.helsley@gmail.com> CC: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> CC: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | userns: Add kprojid_t and associated infrastructure in projid.hEric W. Biederman2012-09-181-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement kprojid_t a cousin of the kuid_t and kgid_t. The per user namespace mapping of project id values can be set with /proc/<pid>/projid_map. A full compliment of helpers is provided: make_kprojid, from_kprojid, from_kprojid_munged, kporjid_has_mapping, projid_valid, projid_eq, projid_eq, projid_lt. Project identifiers are part of the generic disk quota interface, although it appears only xfs implements project identifiers currently. The xfs code allows anyone who has permission to set the project identifier on a file to use any project identifier so when setting up the user namespace project identifier mappings I do not require a capability. Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | userns: Convert the audit loginuid to be a kuidEric W. Biederman2012-09-181-2/+10
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Always store audit loginuids in type kuid_t. Print loginuids by converting them into uids in the appropriate user namespace, and then printing the resulting uid. Modify audit_get_loginuid to return a kuid_t. Modify audit_set_loginuid to take a kuid_t. Modify /proc/<pid>/loginuid on read to convert the loginuid into the user namespace of the opener of the file. Modify /proc/<pid>/loginud on write to convert the loginuid rom the user namespace of the opener of the file. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> ? Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* proc: do not allow negative offsets on /proc/<pid>/environDjalal Harouni2012-07-311-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | __mem_open() which is called by both /proc/<pid>/environ and /proc/<pid>/mem ->open() handlers will allow the use of negative offsets. /proc/<pid>/mem has negative offsets but not /proc/<pid>/environ. Clean this by moving the 'force FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET flag' to mem_open() to allow negative offsets only on /proc/<pid>/mem. Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* proc: environ_read() make sure offset points to environment address rangeDjalal Harouni2012-07-311-6/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently the following offset and environment address range check in environ_read() of /proc/<pid>/environ is buggy: int this_len = mm->env_end - (mm->env_start + src); if (this_len <= 0) break; Large or negative offsets on /proc/<pid>/environ converted to 'unsigned long' may pass this check since '(mm->env_start + src)' can overflow and 'this_len' will be positive. This can turn /proc/<pid>/environ to act like /proc/<pid>/mem since (mm->env_start + src) will point and read from another VMA. There are two fixes here plus some code cleaning: 1) Fix the overflow by checking if the offset that was converted to unsigned long will always point to the [mm->env_start, mm->env_end] address range. 2) Remove the truncation that was made to the result of the check, storing the result in 'int this_len' will alter its value and we can not depend on it. For kernels that have commit b409e578d ("proc: clean up /proc/<pid>/environ handling") which adds the appropriate ptrace check and saves the 'mm' at ->open() time, this is not a security issue. This patch is taken from the grsecurity patch since it was just made available. Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs: add nd_jump_linkChristoph Hellwig2012-07-141-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Add a helper that abstracts out the jump to an already parsed struct path from ->follow_link operation from procfs. Not only does this clean up the code by moving the two sides of this game into a single helper, but it also prepares for making struct nameidata private to namei.c Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* fs: move path_put on failure out of ->follow_linkChristoph Hellwig2012-07-141-4/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | Currently the non-nd_set_link based versions of ->follow_link are expected to do a path_put(&nd->path) on failure. This calling convention is unexpected, undocumented and doesn't match what the nd_set_link-based instances do. Move the path_put out of the only non-nd_set_link based ->follow_link instance into the caller. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* stop passing nameidata to ->lookup()Al Viro2012-07-141-8/+10
| | | | | | | | | Just the flags; only NFS cares even about that, but there are legitimate uses for such argument. And getting rid of that completely would require splitting ->lookup() into a couple of methods (at least), so let's leave that alone for now... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* stop passing nameidata * to ->d_revalidate()Al Viro2012-07-141-11/+11
| | | | | | Just the lookup flags. Die, bastard, die... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* vfs: Fix /proc/<tid>/fdinfo/<fd> file handlingLinus Torvalds2012-06-041-7/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Cyrill Gorcunov reports that I broke the fdinfo files with commit 30a08bf2d31d ("proc: move fd symlink i_mode calculations into tid_fd_revalidate()"), and he's quite right. The tid_fd_revalidate() function is not just used for the <tid>/fd symlinks, it's also used for the <tid>/fdinfo/<fd> files, and the permission model for those are different. So do the dynamic symlink permission handling just for symlinks, making the fdinfo files once more appear as the proper regular files they are. Of course, Al Viro argued (probably correctly) that we shouldn't do the symlink permission games at all, and make the symlinks always just be the normal 'lrwxrwxrwx'. That would have avoided this issue too, but since somebody noticed that the permissions had changed (which was the reason for that original commit 30a08bf2d31d in the first place), people do apparently use this feature. [ Basically, you can use the symlink permission data as a cheap "fdinfo" replacement, since you see whether the file is open for reading and/or writing by just looking at st_mode of the symlink. So the feature does make sense, even if the pain it has caused means we probably shouldn't have done it to begin with. ] Reported-and-tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs, proc: introduce /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children entryCyrill Gorcunov2012-06-011-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When we do checkpoint of a task we need to know the list of children the task, has but there is no easy and fast way to generate reverse parent->children chain from arbitrary <pid> (while a parent pid is provided in "PPid" field of /proc/<pid>/status). So instead of walking over all pids in the system (creating one big process tree in memory, just to figure out which children a task has) -- we add explicit /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children entry, because the kernel already has this kind of information but it is not yet exported. This is a first level children, not the whole process tree. Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* proc: pass "fd" by value in /proc/*/{fd,fdinfo} codeAlexey Dobriyan2012-06-011-4/+4
| | | | | | | | Pass "fd" directly, not via pointer -- one less memory read. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* proc: don't do dummy rcu_read_lock/rcu_read_unlock on error pathAlexey Dobriyan2012-06-011-6/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() is nop for TINY_RCU, but is not a nop for, say, PREEMPT_RCU. proc_fill_cache() is called without RCU lock, there is no need to lock/unlock on error path, simply jump out of the loop. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* proc: use mm_access() instead of ptrace_may_access()Cong Wang2012-06-011-5/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | mm_access() handles this much better, and avoids some race conditions. Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* proc: remove mm_for_maps()Cong Wang2012-06-011-6/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | mm_for_maps() is a simple wrapper for mm_access(), and the name is misleading, so just remove it and use mm_access() directly. Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* proc: clean up /proc/<pid>/environ handlingCong Wang2012-06-011-21/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Similar to e268337dfe26 ("proc: clean up and fix /proc/<pid>/mem handling"), move the check of permission to open(), this will simplify read() code. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm, oom: normalize oom scores to oom_score_adj scale only for userspaceDavid Rientjes2012-05-301-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The oom_score_adj scale ranges from -1000 to 1000 and represents the proportion of memory available to the process at allocation time. This means an oom_score_adj value of 300, for example, will bias a process as though it was using an extra 30.0% of available memory and a value of -350 will discount 35.0% of available memory from its usage. The oom killer badness heuristic also uses this scale to report the oom score for each eligible process in determining the "best" process to kill. Thus, it can only differentiate each process's memory usage by 0.1% of system RAM. On large systems, this can end up being a large amount of memory: 256MB on 256GB systems, for example. This can be fixed by having the badness heuristic to use the actual memory usage in scoring threads and then normalizing it to the oom_score_adj scale for userspace. This results in better comparison between eligible threads for kill and no change from the userspace perspective. Suggested-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-05-241-8/+85
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman: "This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete implementation. Highlights: - Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe. - Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe. - All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial user namespace before they are processed. Removing the need to add an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared uids remains the same. - With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or better than it is today. - For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or operationally with the user namespace enabled. - The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1 billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code enabled. This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to 164ns per stat operation). - (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value. Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause entertaining failures in userspace. - If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails. I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and handle the case where setuid fails. - If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid. The LFS experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we can't map. - Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities. My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1." Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits) userns: Silence silly gcc warning. cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids. userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate. userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces. userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace. userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs ...
| * userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriateEric W. Biederman2012-05-151-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-12-19 16:06:58 +0100