| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|---|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
two requirements: no file creations in IS_DEADDIR and no cross-directory
renames whatsoever.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
If on boot up, lockdown is activated for tracefs, don't even bother creating
the files. This can also prevent instances from being created if lockdown is
in effect.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=whC6Ji=fWnjh2+eS4b15TnbsS4VPVtvBOwCy1jjEG_JHQ@mail.gmail.com
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
locked down")
Running the latest kernel through my "make instances" stress tests, I
triggered the following bug (with KASAN and kmemleak enabled):
mkdir invoked oom-killer:
gfp_mask=0x40cd0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_RECLAIMABLE), order=0,
oom_score_adj=0
CPU: 1 PID: 2229 Comm: mkdir Not tainted 5.4.0-rc2-test #325
Hardware name: MSI MS-7823/CSM-H87M-G43 (MS-7823), BIOS V1.6 02/22/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x64/0x8c
dump_header+0x43/0x3b7
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x48/0x4a
oom_kill_process+0x68/0x2d5
out_of_memory+0x2aa/0x2d0
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x96d/0xb67
__alloc_pages_node+0x19/0x1e
alloc_slab_page+0x17/0x45
new_slab+0xd0/0x234
___slab_alloc.constprop.86+0x18f/0x336
? alloc_inode+0x2c/0x74
? irq_trace+0x12/0x1e
? tracer_hardirqs_off+0x1d/0xd7
? __slab_alloc.constprop.85+0x21/0x53
__slab_alloc.constprop.85+0x31/0x53
? __slab_alloc.constprop.85+0x31/0x53
? alloc_inode+0x2c/0x74
kmem_cache_alloc+0x50/0x179
? alloc_inode+0x2c/0x74
alloc_inode+0x2c/0x74
new_inode_pseudo+0xf/0x48
new_inode+0x15/0x25
tracefs_get_inode+0x23/0x7c
? lookup_one_len+0x54/0x6c
tracefs_create_file+0x53/0x11d
trace_create_file+0x15/0x33
event_create_dir+0x2a3/0x34b
__trace_add_new_event+0x1c/0x26
event_trace_add_tracer+0x56/0x86
trace_array_create+0x13e/0x1e1
instance_mkdir+0x8/0x17
tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x39/0x50
? get_dname+0x31/0x31
vfs_mkdir+0x78/0xa3
do_mkdirat+0x71/0xb0
sys_mkdir+0x19/0x1b
do_fast_syscall_32+0xb0/0xed
I bisected this down to the addition of the proxy_ops into tracefs for
lockdown. It appears that the allocation of the proxy_ops and then freeing
it in the destroy_inode callback, is causing havoc with the memory system.
Reading the documentation about destroy_inode and talking with Linus about
this, this is buggy and wrong. When defining the destroy_inode() method, it
is expected that the destroy_inode() will also free the inode, and not just
the extra allocations done in the creation of the inode. The faulty commit
causes a memory leak of the inode data structure when they are deleted.
Instead of allocating the proxy_ops (and then having to free it) the checks
should be done by the open functions themselves, and not hack into the
tracefs directory. First revert the tracefs updates for locked_down and then
later we can add the locked_down checks in the kernel/trace files.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191011135458.7399da44@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: ccbd54ff54e8 ("tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down")
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
| |\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.
From the original description:
This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.
The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.
There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:
- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/
- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.
The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.
The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:
lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}
Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.
This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.
New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.
The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.
Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf
when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
this under category (c) of the DCO"
* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
kexec: Fix file verification on S390
security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
...
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Tracefs may release more information about the kernel than desirable, so
restrict it when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by
preventing open().
(Fixed by Ben Hutchings to avoid a null dereference in
default_file_open())
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
| |\ \
| |/
|/|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs
Pull fsnotify updates from Jan Kara:
"This contains cleanups of the fsnotify name removal hook and also a
patch to disable fanotify permission events for 'proc' filesystem"
* tag 'fsnotify_for_v5.3-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
fsnotify: get rid of fsnotify_nameremove()
fsnotify: move fsnotify_nameremove() hook out of d_delete()
configfs: call fsnotify_rmdir() hook
debugfs: call fsnotify_{unlink,rmdir}() hooks
debugfs: simplify __debugfs_remove_file()
devpts: call fsnotify_unlink() hook
tracefs: call fsnotify_{unlink,rmdir}() hooks
rpc_pipefs: call fsnotify_{unlink,rmdir}() hooks
btrfs: call fsnotify_rmdir() hook
fsnotify: add empty fsnotify_{unlink,rmdir}() hooks
fanotify: Disallow permission events for proc filesystem
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
This will allow generating fsnotify delete events after the
fsnotify_nameremove() hook is removed from d_delete().
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
|
| |/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:
- Have no license information of any form
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
tracefs_ops is initialized inside tracefs_create_instance_dir and not
modified after. tracefs_create_instance_dir allows for initialization
only once, and is called from create_trace_instances(marked __init),
which is called from tracer_init_tracefs(marked __init). Also, mark
tracefs_create_instance_dir as __init.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180725171901.4468-1-zsm@chromium.org
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
btrfs, debugfs, reiserfs and tracefs call save_mount_options() and reiserfs
calls replace_mount_options(), but they then implement their own
->show_options() methods and don't touch s_options, rendering the saved
options unnecessary. I'm trying to eliminate s_options to make it easier
to implement a context-based mount where the mount options can be passed
individually over a file descriptor.
Remove the calls to save/replace_mount_options() call in these cases.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
simple_fill_super() is passed an array of tree_descr structures which
describe the files to create in the filesystem's root directory. Since
these arrays are never modified intentionally, they should be 'const' so
that they are placed in .rodata and benefit from memory protection.
This patch updates the function signature and all users, and also
constifies tree_descr.name.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
CURRENT_TIME macro is not appropriate for filesystems as it
doesn't use the right granularity for filesystem timestamps.
Use current_time() instead.
CURRENT_TIME is also not y2038 safe.
This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions
vfs timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them
y2038 safe. As part of the effort current_time() will be
extended to do range checks. Hence, it is necessary for all
file system timestamps to use current_time(). Also,
current_time() will be transitioned along with vfs to be
y2038 safe.
Note that whenever a single call to current_time() is used
to change timestamps in different inodes, it is because they
share the same time granularity.
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| |
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested},
inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex).
Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle
->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held
only shared.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
In tracefs' start_creating(), we pin the file system to safely access
its root. When we failed to create a file, we unpin the file system via
failed_creating() to release the mount count and eventually the reference
of the singleton vfsmount.
However, when we run into an error during lookup_one_len() when still
in start_creating(), we only release the parent's mutex but not so the
reference on the mount.
F.e., in securityfs_create_file(), after doing simple_pin_fs() when
lookup_one_len() fails there, we infact do simple_release_fs(). This
seems necessary here as well.
Same issue seen in debugfs due to 190afd81e4a5 ("debugfs: split the
beginning and the end of __create_file() off"), which seemed to got
carried over into tracefs, too. Noticed during code review.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/68efa86101b778cf7517ed7c6ad573bd69f60ec6.1446672850.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
Fixes: 4282d60689d4 ("tracefs: Add new tracefs file system")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.1+
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
| |\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted VFS fixes and related cleanups (IMO the most interesting in
that part are f_path-related things and Eric's descriptor-related
stuff). UFS regression fixes (it got broken last cycle). 9P fixes.
fs-cache series, DAX patches, Jan's file_remove_suid() work"
[ I'd say this is much more than "fixes and related cleanups". The
file_table locking rule change by Eric Dumazet is a rather big and
fundamental update even if the patch isn't huge. - Linus ]
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (49 commits)
9p: cope with bogus responses from server in p9_client_{read,write}
p9_client_write(): avoid double p9_free_req()
9p: forgetting to cancel request on interrupted zero-copy RPC
dax: bdev_direct_access() may sleep
block: Add support for DAX reads/writes to block devices
dax: Use copy_from_iter_nocache
dax: Add block size note to documentation
fs/file.c: __fget() and dup2() atomicity rules
fs/file.c: don't acquire files->file_lock in fd_install()
fs:super:get_anon_bdev: fix race condition could cause dev exceed its upper limitation
vfs: avoid creation of inode number 0 in get_next_ino
namei: make set_root_rcu() return void
make simple_positive() public
ufs: use dir_pages instead of ufs_dir_pages()
pagemap.h: move dir_pages() over there
remove the pointless include of lglock.h
fs: cleanup slight list_entry abuse
xfs: Correctly lock inode when removing suid and file capabilities
fs: Call security_ops->inode_killpriv on truncate
fs: Provide function telling whether file_remove_privs() will do anything
...
|
| | |
| |
| |
| | |
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
| |/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This allows for better documentation in the code and
it allows for a simpler and fully correct version of
fs_fully_visible to be written.
The mount points converted and their filesystems are:
/sys/hypervisor/s390/ s390_hypfs
/sys/kernel/config/ configfs
/sys/kernel/debug/ debugfs
/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/ efivarfs
/sys/fs/fuse/connections/ fusectl
/sys/fs/pstore/ pstore
/sys/kernel/tracing/ tracefs
/sys/fs/cgroup/ cgroup
/sys/kernel/security/ securityfs
/sys/fs/selinux/ selinuxfs
/sys/fs/smackfs/ smackfs
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The tracing "instances" directory can create sub tracing buffers
with mkdir, and remove them with rmdir. As a mkdir will also create
all the files and directories that control the sub buffer the inode
mutexes need to be released before this is done, to avoid deadlocks.
It is better to let the tracing system unlock the inode mutexes before
calling the functions that create the files within the new directory
(or deletes the files from the one being destroyed).
Now that tracing has been converted over to tracefs, the tracefs file
system can be modified to accommodate this feature. It still releases
the locks, but the filesystem itself can take care of the ugly
business and let the user just do what it needs.
The tracing system now attaches a descriptor to the directory dentry
that can have userspace create or remove sub directories. If this
descriptor does not exist for a dentry, then that dentry can not be
used to create other directories. This descriptor holds a mkdir and
rmdir method that only takes a character string as an argument.
The tracefs file system will first make a copy of the dentry name
before releasing the locks. Then it will pass the copied name to the
methods. It is up to the tracing system that supplied the methods to
handle races with duplicate names and such as all the inode mutexes
would be released when the functions are called.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
When tracefs is configured, have the directory /sys/kernel/tracing appear
just like /sys/kernel/debug appears when debugfs is configured.
This will give a consistent place for system admins to mount tracefs.
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
|
|
Add a separate file system to handle the tracing directory. Currently it
is part of debugfs, but that is starting to show its limits.
One thing is that in order to access the tracing infrastructure, you need
to mount debugfs. As that includes debugging from all sorts of sub systems
in the kernel, it is not considered advisable to mount such an all
encompassing debugging system.
Having the tracing system in its own file systems gives access to the
tracing sub system without needing to include all other systems.
Another problem with tracing using the debugfs system is that the
instances use mkdir to create sub buffers. debugfs does not support mkdir
from userspace so to implement it, special hacks were used. By controlling
the file system that the tracing infrastructure uses, this can be properly
done without hacks.
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
