| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
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Evgeniy does not have the time nor capacity to maintain the
connector subsystem any longer, so just move it under networking
as that is effectively what has been happening lately.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Fix the assert during VF driver installation when the personality is iWARP
Fixes: 1fe614d10f45 ("qed: Relax VF firmware requirements")
Signed-off-by: Igor Russkikh <irusskikh@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Kalderon <michal.kalderon@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Bogdanov <dbogdanov@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In some configurations ARFS cannot be used, so disable it if device
is not capable.
Fixes: e4917d46a653 ("qede: Add aRFS support")
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Igor Russkikh <irusskikh@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Kalderon <michal.kalderon@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Bogdanov <dbogdanov@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In CMT and NPAR the PF is unknown when the GFS block processes the
packet. Therefore cannot use searcher as it has a per PF database,
and thus ARFS must be disabled.
Fixes: d51e4af5c209 ("qed: aRFS infrastructure support")
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Igor Russkikh <irusskikh@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Kalderon <michal.kalderon@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Bogdanov <dbogdanov@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Eric's suggested fix for the previous commit's mentioned race condition
was to simply take the table->lock in wg_index_hashtable_replace(). The
table->lock of the hash table is supposed to protect the bucket heads,
not the entires, but actually, since all the mutator functions are
already taking it, it makes sense to take it too for the test to
hlist_unhashed, as a defense in depth measure, so that it no longer
races with deletions, regardless of what other locks are protecting
individual entries. This is sensible from a performance perspective
because, as Eric pointed out, the case of being unhashed is already the
unlikely case, so this won't add common contention. And comparing
instructions, this basically doesn't make much of a difference other
than pushing and popping %r13, used by the new `bool ret`. More
generally, I like the idea of locking consistency across table mutator
functions, and this might let me rest slightly easier at night.
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/wireguard/20200908145911.4090480-1-edumazet@google.com/
Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Eric reported that syzkaller found a race of this variety:
CPU 1 CPU 2
-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------
wg_index_hashtable_replace(old, ...) |
if (hlist_unhashed(&old->index_hash)) |
| wg_index_hashtable_remove(old)
| hlist_del_init_rcu(&old->index_hash)
| old->index_hash.pprev = NULL
hlist_replace_rcu(&old->index_hash, ...) |
*old->index_hash.pprev |
Syzbot wasn't actually able to reproduce this more than once or create a
reproducer, because the race window between checking "hlist_unhashed" and
calling "hlist_replace_rcu" is just so small. Adding an mdelay(5) or
similar there helps make this demonstrable using this simple script:
#!/bin/bash
set -ex
trap 'kill $pid1; kill $pid2; ip link del wg0; ip link del wg1' EXIT
ip link add wg0 type wireguard
ip link add wg1 type wireguard
wg set wg0 private-key <(wg genkey) listen-port 9999
wg set wg1 private-key <(wg genkey) peer $(wg show wg0 public-key) endpoint 127.0.0.1:9999 persistent-keepalive 1
wg set wg0 peer $(wg show wg1 public-key)
ip link set wg0 up
yes link set wg1 up | ip -force -batch - &
pid1=$!
yes link set wg1 down | ip -force -batch - &
pid2=$!
wait
The fundumental underlying problem is that we permit calls to wg_index_
hashtable_remove(handshake.entry) without requiring the caller to take
the handshake mutex that is intended to protect members of handshake
during mutations. This is consistently the case with calls to wg_index_
hashtable_insert(handshake.entry) and wg_index_hashtable_replace(
handshake.entry), but it's missing from a pertinent callsite of wg_
index_hashtable_remove(handshake.entry). So, this patch makes sure that
mutex is taken.
The original code was a little bit funky though, in the form of:
remove(handshake.entry)
lock(), memzero(handshake.some_members), unlock()
remove(handshake.entry)
The original intention of that double removal pattern outside the lock
appears to be some attempt to prevent insertions that might happen while
locks are dropped during expensive crypto operations, but actually, all
callers of wg_index_hashtable_insert(handshake.entry) take the write
lock and then explicitly check handshake.state, as they should, which
the aforementioned memzero clears, which means an insertion should
already be impossible. And regardless, the original intention was
necessarily racy, since it wasn't guaranteed that something else would
run after the unlock() instead of after the remove(). So, from a
soundness perspective, it seems positive to remove what looks like a
hack at best.
The crash from both syzbot and from the script above is as follows:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 0 PID: 7395 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: wg-kex-wg1 wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker
RIP: 0010:hlist_replace_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:505 [inline]
RIP: 0010:wg_index_hashtable_replace+0x176/0x330 drivers/net/wireguard/peerlookup.c:174
Code: 00 fc ff df 48 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 80 3c 01 00 0f 85 44 01 00 00 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 45 10 48 89 c6 48 c1 ee 03 <80> 3c 0e 00 0f 85 06 01 00 00 48 85 d2 4c 89 28 74 47 e8 a3 4f b5
RSP: 0018:ffffc90006a97bf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888050ffc4f8 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88808e04e010
RBP: ffff88808e04e000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8880543d0000
R10: ffffed100a87a000 R11: 000000000000016e R12: ffff8880543d0000
R13: ffff88808e04e008 R14: ffff888050ffc508 R15: ffff888050ffc500
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000f5505db0 CR3: 0000000097cf7000 CR4: 00000000001526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
wg_noise_handshake_begin_session+0x752/0xc9a drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c:820
wg_receive_handshake_packet drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:183 [inline]
wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker+0x33b/0x730 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:220
process_one_work+0x94c/0x1670 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
kthread+0x3b5/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:292
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/wireguard/20200908145911.4090480-1-edumazet@google.com/
Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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clean follow coccicheck warning:
net//hsr/hsr_netlink.c:94:8-42: WARNING avoid newline at end of message
in NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD
net//hsr/hsr_netlink.c:87:30-57: WARNING avoid newline at end of message
in NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD
net//hsr/hsr_netlink.c:79:29-53: WARNING avoid newline at end of message
in NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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skb_put_padto() and __skb_put_padto() callers
must check return values or risk use-after-free.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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If skb_put_padto() returns an error, skb has been freed.
Better not touch it anymore, as reported by syzbot [1]
Note to qrtr maintainers : this suggests qrtr_sendmsg()
should adjust sock_alloc_send_skb() second parameter
to account for the potential added alignment to avoid
reallocation.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __skb_insert include/linux/skbuff.h:1907 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __skb_queue_before include/linux/skbuff.h:2016 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __skb_queue_tail include/linux/skbuff.h:2049 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_queue_tail+0x6b/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3146
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88804d8ab3c0 by task syz-executor.4/4316
CPU: 1 PID: 4316 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1d6/0x29e lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description+0x66/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:383
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
kasan_report+0x132/0x1d0 mm/kasan/report.c:530
__skb_insert include/linux/skbuff.h:1907 [inline]
__skb_queue_before include/linux/skbuff.h:2016 [inline]
__skb_queue_tail include/linux/skbuff.h:2049 [inline]
skb_queue_tail+0x6b/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3146
qrtr_tun_send+0x1a/0x40 net/qrtr/tun.c:23
qrtr_node_enqueue+0x44f/0xc00 net/qrtr/qrtr.c:364
qrtr_bcast_enqueue+0xbe/0x140 net/qrtr/qrtr.c:861
qrtr_sendmsg+0x680/0x9c0 net/qrtr/qrtr.c:960
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:671 [inline]
sock_write_iter+0x317/0x470 net/socket.c:998
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1882 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:503 [inline]
vfs_write+0xa96/0xd10 fs/read_write.c:578
ksys_write+0x11b/0x220 fs/read_write.c:631
do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45d5b9
Code: 5d b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 2b b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f84b5b81c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000038b40 RCX: 000000000045d5b9
RDX: 0000000000000055 RSI: 0000000020001240 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f84b5b81ca0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000f
R13: 00007ffcbbf86daf R14: 00007f84b5b829c0 R15: 000000000118cf4c
Allocated by task 4316:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x100/0x130 mm/kasan/common.c:461
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x3e/0x290 mm/slab.h:518
slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3312 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x1c1/0x2d0 mm/slab.c:3482
skb_clone+0x1b2/0x370 net/core/skbuff.c:1449
qrtr_bcast_enqueue+0x6d/0x140 net/qrtr/qrtr.c:857
qrtr_sendmsg+0x680/0x9c0 net/qrtr/qrtr.c:960
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:671 [inline]
sock_write_iter+0x317/0x470 net/socket.c:998
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1882 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:503 [inline]
vfs_write+0xa96/0xd10 fs/read_write.c:578
ksys_write+0x11b/0x220 fs/read_write.c:631
do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Freed by task 4316:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline]
kasan_set_track+0x3d/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:56
kasan_set_free_info+0x17/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:355
__kasan_slab_free+0xdd/0x110 mm/kasan/common.c:422
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3418 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x82/0xf0 mm/slab.c:3693
__skb_pad+0x3f5/0x5a0 net/core/skbuff.c:1823
__skb_put_padto include/linux/skbuff.h:3233 [inline]
skb_put_padto include/linux/skbuff.h:3252 [inline]
qrtr_node_enqueue+0x62f/0xc00 net/qrtr/qrtr.c:360
qrtr_bcast_enqueue+0xbe/0x140 net/qrtr/qrtr.c:861
qrtr_sendmsg+0x680/0x9c0 net/qrtr/qrtr.c:960
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:671 [inline]
sock_write_iter+0x317/0x470 net/socket.c:998
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1882 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:503 [inline]
vfs_write+0xa96/0xd10 fs/read_write.c:578
ksys_write+0x11b/0x220 fs/read_write.c:631
do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88804d8ab3c0
which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
224-byte region [ffff88804d8ab3c0, ffff88804d8ab4a0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:00000000ea8cccfb refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88804d8abb40 pfn:0x4d8ab
flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab)
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea0002237ec8 ffffea00029b3388 ffff88821bb66800
raw: ffff88804d8abb40 ffff88804d8ab000 000000010000000b 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Fixes: ce57785bf91b ("net: qrtr: fix len of skb_put_padto in qrtr_node_enqueue")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Carl Huang <cjhuang@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Cc: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Currently, in tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack() and tcp_v4_send_reset(), we
echo the TOS value of the received packets in the response.
However, we do not want to echo the lower 2 ECN bits in accordance
with RFC 3168 6.1.5 robustness principles.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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John's email has bounced and Thomas confirms he no longer
works on ibmvnic.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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If CONFIG_IPV6=m, the IPV6 functions won't be found by the linker:
ld: net/core/fib_rules.o: in function `fib_rules_lookup':
fib_rules.c:(.text+0x606): undefined reference to `fib6_rule_match'
ld: fib_rules.c:(.text+0x611): undefined reference to `fib6_rule_match'
ld: fib_rules.c:(.text+0x68c): undefined reference to `fib6_rule_action'
ld: fib_rules.c:(.text+0x693): undefined reference to `fib6_rule_action'
ld: fib_rules.c:(.text+0x6aa): undefined reference to `fib6_rule_suppress'
ld: fib_rules.c:(.text+0x6bc): undefined reference to `fib6_rule_suppress'
make: *** [Makefile:1166: vmlinux] Error 1
Reported-by: Sven Joachim <svenjoac@gmx.de>
Fixes: b9aaec8f0be5 ("fib: use indirect call wrappers in the most common fib_rules_ops")
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested
Signed-off-by: Brian Vazquez <brianvv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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syzbot reported twice a lockdep issue in fib6_del() [1]
which I think is caused by net->ipv6.fib6_null_entry
having a NULL fib6_table pointer.
fib6_del() already checks for fib6_null_entry special
case, we only need to return earlier.
Bug seems to occur very rarely, I have thus chosen
a 'bug origin' that makes backports not too complex.
[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1996 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
4 locks held by syz-executor.5/8095:
#0: ffffffff8a7ea708 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ppp_release+0x178/0x240 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:401
#1: ffff88804c422dd8 (&net->ipv6.fib6_gc_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_trylock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:414 [inline]
#1: ffff88804c422dd8 (&net->ipv6.fib6_gc_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: fib6_run_gc+0x21b/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2312
#2: ffffffff89bd6a40 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __fib6_clean_all+0x0/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2613
#3: ffff8880a82e6430 (&tb->tb6_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:359 [inline]
#3: ffff8880a82e6430 (&tb->tb6_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __fib6_clean_all+0x107/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2245
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 8095 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118
fib6_del+0x12b4/0x1630 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1996
fib6_clean_node+0x39b/0x570 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2180
fib6_walk_continue+0x4aa/0x8e0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2102
fib6_walk+0x182/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2150
fib6_clean_tree+0xdb/0x120 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2230
__fib6_clean_all+0x120/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2246
fib6_clean_all net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2257 [inline]
fib6_run_gc+0x113/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2320
ndisc_netdev_event+0x217/0x350 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1805
notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:83
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x130 net/core/dev.c:2033
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2045 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2059 [inline]
dev_close_many+0x30b/0x650 net/core/dev.c:1634
rollback_registered_many+0x3a8/0x1210 net/core/dev.c:9261
rollback_registered net/core/dev.c:9329 [inline]
unregister_netdevice_queue+0x2dd/0x570 net/core/dev.c:10410
unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:2774 [inline]
ppp_release+0x216/0x240 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:403
__fput+0x285/0x920 fs/file_table.c:281
task_work_run+0xdd/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:141
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:163 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e1/0x200 kernel/entry/common.c:190
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7e/0x2e0 kernel/entry/common.c:265
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: 421842edeaf6 ("net/ipv6: Add fib6_null_entry")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Since commit 845e0ebb4408 ("net: change addr_list_lock back to static
key"), cascaded DSA setups (DSA switch port as DSA master for another
DSA switch port) are emitting this lockdep warning:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
5.8.0-rc1-00133-g923e4b5032dd-dirty #208 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
dhcpcd/323 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff000066dd4268 (&dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key/1){+...}-{2:2}, at: dev_mc_sync+0x44/0x90
but task is already holding lock:
ffff00006608c268 (&dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key/1){+...}-{2:2}, at: dev_mc_sync+0x44/0x90
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key/1);
lock(&dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key/1);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
3 locks held by dhcpcd/323:
#0: ffffdbd1381dda18 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x24/0x30
#1: ffff00006614b268 (_xmit_ETHER){+...}-{2:2}, at: dev_set_rx_mode+0x28/0x48
#2: ffff00006608c268 (&dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key/1){+...}-{2:2}, at: dev_mc_sync+0x44/0x90
stack backtrace:
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1e0
show_stack+0x20/0x30
dump_stack+0xec/0x158
__lock_acquire+0xca0/0x2398
lock_acquire+0xe8/0x440
_raw_spin_lock_nested+0x64/0x90
dev_mc_sync+0x44/0x90
dsa_slave_set_rx_mode+0x34/0x50
__dev_set_rx_mode+0x60/0xa0
dev_mc_sync+0x84/0x90
dsa_slave_set_rx_mode+0x34/0x50
__dev_set_rx_mode+0x60/0xa0
dev_set_rx_mode+0x30/0x48
__dev_open+0x10c/0x180
__dev_change_flags+0x170/0x1c8
dev_change_flags+0x2c/0x70
devinet_ioctl+0x774/0x878
inet_ioctl+0x348/0x3b0
sock_do_ioctl+0x50/0x310
sock_ioctl+0x1f8/0x580
ksys_ioctl+0xb0/0xf0
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0x38
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x7c/0x180
do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x98
el0_sync_handler+0x9c/0x1b8
el0_sync+0x158/0x180
Since DSA never made use of the netdev API for describing links between
upper devices and lower devices, the dev->lower_level value of a DSA
switch interface would be 1, which would warn when it is a DSA master.
We can use netdev_upper_dev_link() to describe the relationship between
a DSA slave and a DSA master. To be precise, a DSA "slave" (switch port)
is an "upper" to a DSA "master" (host port). The relationship is "many
uppers to one lower", like in the case of VLAN. So, for that reason, we
use the same function as VLAN uses.
There might be a chance that somebody will try to take hold of this
interface and use it immediately after register_netdev() and before
netdev_upper_dev_link(). To avoid that, we do the registration and
linkage while holding the RTNL, and we use the RTNL-locked cousin of
register_netdev(), which is register_netdevice().
Since this warning was not there when lockdep was using dynamic keys for
addr_list_lock, we are blaming the lockdep patch itself. The network
stack _has_ been using static lockdep keys before, and it _is_ likely
that stacked DSA setups have been triggering these lockdep warnings
since forever, however I can't test very old kernels on this particular
stacked DSA setup, to ensure I'm not in fact introducing regressions.
Fixes: 845e0ebb4408 ("net: change addr_list_lock back to static key")
Suggested-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
syzbot reported a bug in ieee802154_tx() [1]
A similar issue in ieee802154_xmit_worker() is also fixed in this patch.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ieee802154_tx+0x3d2/0x480 net/mac802154/tx.c:88
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880251a8c70 by task syz-executor.3/928
CPU: 0 PID: 928 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xae/0x497 mm/kasan/report.c:383
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x1f/0x37 mm/kasan/report.c:530
ieee802154_tx+0x3d2/0x480 net/mac802154/tx.c:88
ieee802154_subif_start_xmit+0xbe/0xe4 net/mac802154/tx.c:130
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4634 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4648 [inline]
dev_direct_xmit+0x4e9/0x6e0 net/core/dev.c:4203
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2989 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x2413/0x5290 net/packet/af_packet.c:3014
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:671
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2353
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2407
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2440
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45d5b9
Code: 5d b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 2b b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fc98e749c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000002ccc0 RCX: 000000000045d5b9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020007780 RDI: 000000000000000b
RBP: 000000000118d020 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000118cfec
R13: 00007fff690c720f R14: 00007fc98e74a9c0 R15: 000000000118cfec
Allocated by task 928:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:461
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:518 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slab.c:3254 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x136/0x3e0 mm/slab.c:3574
__alloc_skb+0x71/0x550 net/core/skbuff.c:198
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1094 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0x92/0x570 net/core/skbuff.c:5771
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x72a/0x880 net/core/sock.c:2348
packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2837 [inline]
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2932 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x19fb/0x5290 net/packet/af_packet.c:3014
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:671
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2353
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2407
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2440
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Freed by task 928:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48
kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:56
kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:355
__kasan_slab_free+0xd8/0x120 mm/kasan/common.c:422
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3418 [inline]
kmem_cache_free.part.0+0x74/0x1e0 mm/slab.c:3693
kfree_skbmem+0xef/0x1b0 net/core/skbuff.c:622
__kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:679 [inline]
consume_skb net/core/skbuff.c:838 [inline]
consume_skb+0xcf/0x160 net/core/skbuff.c:832
__dev_kfree_skb_any+0x9c/0xc0 net/core/dev.c:3107
fakelb_hw_xmit+0x20e/0x2a0 drivers/net/ieee802154/fakelb.c:81
drv_xmit_async net/mac802154/driver-ops.h:16 [inline]
ieee802154_tx+0x282/0x480 net/mac802154/tx.c:81
ieee802154_subif_start_xmit+0xbe/0xe4 net/mac802154/tx.c:130
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4634 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4648 [inline]
dev_direct_xmit+0x4e9/0x6e0 net/core/dev.c:4203
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2989 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x2413/0x5290 net/packet/af_packet.c:3014
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:671
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2353
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2407
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2440
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880251a8c00
which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224
The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of
224-byte region [ffff8880251a8c00, ffff8880251a8ce0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:0000000062b6a4f1 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x251a8
flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab)
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea0000435c88 ffffea00028b6c08 ffff8880a9055d00
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff8880251a80c0 000000010000000c 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8880251a8b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880251a8b80: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8880251a8c00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8880251a8c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
ffff8880251a8d00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 409c3b0c5f03 ("mac802154: tx: move stats tx increment")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>
Cc: linux-wpan@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200908104025.4009085-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>
|
|
... instead of using init_user_ns.
Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Tested-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
|
The openvswitch module fails initialization when used in a kernel
without IPv6 enabled. nf_conncount_init() fails because the ct code
unconditionally tries to initialize the netns IPv6 related bit,
regardless of the build option. The change below ignores the IPv6
part if not enabled.
Note that the corresponding _put() function already has this IPv6
configuration check.
Fixes: 11efd5cb04a1 ("openvswitch: Support conntrack zone limit")
Signed-off-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
|
conntrack mark based dump filtering may falsely skip entries if a mask
is given: If the mask-based check does not filter out the entry, the
else-if check is always true and compares the mark without considering
the mask. The if/else-if logic seems wrong.
Given that the mask during filter setup is implicitly set to 0xffffffff
if not specified explicitly, the mark filtering flags seem to just
complicate things. Restore the previously used approach by always
matching against a zero mask is no filter mark is given.
Fixes: cb8aa9a3affb ("netfilter: ctnetlink: add kernel side filtering for dump")
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
|
On x86_64, each notification results in one skbuff allocation which
consumes at least 768 bytes due to the skbuff overhead.
This patch coalesces several notifications into one single skbuff, so
each notification consumes at least ~211 bytes, that ~3.5 times less
memory consumption. As a result, this is reducing the chances to exhaust
the netlink socket receive buffer.
Rule of thumb is that each notification batch only contains netlink
messages whose report flag is the same, nfnetlink_send() requires this
to do appropriate delivery to userspace, either via unicast (echo
mode) or multicast (monitor mode).
The skbuff control buffer is used to annotate the report flag for later
handling at the new coalescing routine.
The batch skbuff notification size is NLMSG_GOODSIZE, using a larger
skbuff would allow for more socket receiver buffer savings (to amortize
the cost of the skbuff even more), however, going over that size might
break userspace applications, so let's be conservative and stick to
NLMSG_GOODSIZE.
Reported-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Acked-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
|
The indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So
check the tuple's family, e.g. l3num, when creating the conntrack in
order to prevent an OOB memory access during setup. Here is an example
kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an index greater than
NFPROTO_NUMPROTO.
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:...
Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121)
CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S W O 4.14.180-g051355490483
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM
task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121
pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
...
Call trace:
__cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468
nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258
ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x4c/0x228
ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x590/0xc40
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x31c/0x4d4
netlink_rcv_skb+0x100/0x184
nfnetlink_rcv+0xf4/0x180
netlink_unicast+0x360/0x770
netlink_sendmsg+0x5a0/0x6a4
___sys_sendmsg+0x314/0x46c
SyS_sendmsg+0xb4/0x108
el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
This crash is not happening since 5.4+, however, ctnetlink still
allows for creating entries with unsupported layer 3 protocol number.
Fixes: c1d10adb4a521 ("[NETFILTER]: Add ctnetlink port for nf_conntrack")
Signed-off-by: Will McVicker <willmcvicker@google.com>
[pablo@netfilter.org: rebased original patch on top of nf.git]
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
|
|
mlx5_suspend()/resume() keep the network interface, so during hibernation
netvsc_unregister_vf() and netvsc_register_vf() are not called, and hence
netvsc_resume() should call netvsc_vf_changed() to switch the data path
back to the VF after hibernation. Note: after we close and re-open the
vmbus channel of the netvsc NIC in netvsc_suspend() and netvsc_resume(),
the data path is implicitly switched to the netvsc NIC. Similarly,
netvsc_suspend() should not call netvsc_unregister_vf(), otherwise the VF
can no longer be used after hibernation.
For mlx4, since the VF network interafce is explicitly destroyed and
re-created during hibernation (see mlx4_suspend()/resume()), hv_netvsc
already explicitly switches the data path from and to the VF automatically
via netvsc_register_vf() and netvsc_unregister_vf(), so mlx4 doesn't need
this fix. Note: mlx4 can still work with the fix because in
netvsc_suspend()/resume() ndev_ctx->vf_netdev is NULL for mlx4.
Fixes: 0efeea5fb153 ("hv_netvsc: Add the support of hibernation")
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
This reverts commit 8d7e5dee972f1cde2ba96c621f1541fa36e7d4f4.
To protect netns id, the nsid_lock is used when netns id is being
allocated and removed by peernet2id_alloc() and unhash_nsid().
The nsid_lock can be used in BH context but only spin_lock() is used
in this code.
Using spin_lock() instead of spin_lock_bh() can result in a deadlock in
the following scenario reported by the lockdep.
In order to avoid a deadlock, the spin_lock_bh() should be used instead
of spin_lock() to acquire nsid_lock.
Test commands:
ip netns del nst
ip netns add nst
ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2
ip link set veth1 netns nst
ip netns exec nst ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1
ip netns exec nst ip link set dev br1 up
ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 master br1
ip netns exec nst ip link set dev veth1 up
ip netns exec nst ip link add macvlan0 link br1 up type macvlan
Splat looks like:
[ 33.615860][ T607] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
[ 33.617194][ T607] 5.9.0-rc1+ #665 Not tainted
[ ... ]
[ 33.670615][ T607] Chain exists of:
[ 33.670615][ T607] &mc->mca_lock --> &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key --> &net->nsid_lock
[ 33.670615][ T607]
[ 33.673118][ T607] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
[ 33.673118][ T607]
[ 33.674599][ T607] CPU0 CPU1
[ 33.675557][ T607] ---- ----
[ 33.676516][ T607] lock(&net->nsid_lock);
[ 33.677306][ T607] local_irq_disable();
[ 33.678517][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock);
[ 33.679725][ T607] lock(&bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key);
[ 33.681166][ T607] <Interrupt>
[ 33.681791][ T607] lock(&mc->mca_lock);
[ 33.682579][ T607]
[ 33.682579][ T607] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ ... ]
[ 33.922046][ T607] stack backtrace:
[ 33.922999][ T607] CPU: 3 PID: 607 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #665
[ 33.924099][ T607] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 33.925714][ T607] Call Trace:
[ 33.926238][ T607] dump_stack+0x78/0xab
[ 33.926905][ T607] check_irq_usage+0x70b/0x720
[ 33.927708][ T607] ? iterate_chain_key+0x60/0x60
[ 33.928507][ T607] ? check_path+0x22/0x40
[ 33.929201][ T607] ? check_noncircular+0xcf/0x180
[ 33.930024][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20
[ 33.930860][ T607] __lock_acquire+0x1952/0x1f20
[ 33.931667][ T607] lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0
[ 33.932366][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170
[ 33.933147][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x54c/0x6b0 [bridge]
[ 33.934140][ T607] ? br_port_fill_attrs+0x5de/0x6b0 [bridge]
[ 33.935113][ T607] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30
[ 33.935974][ T607] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70
[ 33.936728][ T607] ? peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170
[ 33.937523][ T607] peernet2id_alloc+0x3a/0x170
[ 33.938313][ T607] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xb5e/0x1400
[ 33.939091][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x8a/0xf0
[ 33.939953][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo_event.part.39+0x17/0x50
[ 33.940863][ T607] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x1f/0x30
[ 33.941571][ T607] __dev_notify_flags+0xa5/0xf0
[ 33.942376][ T607] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x49/0x50
[ 33.943249][ T607] ? irq_work_queue+0x1d/0x30
[ 33.943993][ T607] ? __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0
[ 33.944878][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x7b/0x1a0
[ 33.945758][ T607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x1e/0x50
[ 33.946582][ T607] br_port_set_promisc+0x1f/0x40 [bridge]
[ 33.947487][ T607] br_manage_promisc+0x8b/0xe0 [bridge]
[ 33.948388][ T607] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x123/0x1a0
[ 33.949244][ T607] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x68/0x90
[ 33.950021][ T607] dev_uc_add+0x50/0x60
[ 33.950720][ T607] macvlan_open+0x18e/0x1f0 [macvlan]
[ 33.951601][ T607] __dev_open+0xd6/0x170
[ 33.952269][ T607] __dev_change_flags+0x181/0x1d0
[ 33.953056][ T607] rtnl_configure_link+0x2f/0xa0
[ 33.953884][ T607] __rtnl_newlink+0x6b9/0x8e0
[ 33.954665][ T607] ? __lock_acquire+0x95d/0x1f20
[ 33.955450][ T607] ? lock_acquire+0xaf/0x3a0
[ 33.956193][ T607] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0xe0
[ 33.956999][ T607] rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70
Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Fixes: 8d7e5dee972f ("netns: don't disable BHs when locking "nsid_lock"")
Reported-by: syzbot+3f960c64a104eaa2c813@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Indentation and logic clearly show that this code is missing
parenthesis.
Fixes: 9f1345737790 ("ibmvnic fix NULL tx_pools and rx_tools issue at do_reset")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Fix kernel-doc warning in <linux/netdevice.h>:
../include/linux/netdevice.h:2158: warning: Function parameter or member 'xdp_state' not described in 'net_device'
Fixes: 7f0a838254bd ("bpf, xdp: Maintain info on attached XDP BPF programs in net_device")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Fix kernel-doc warning in <linux/netdevice.h>:
../include/linux/netdevice.h:2158: warning: Function parameter or member 'proto_down_reason' not described in 'net_device'
Fixes: 829eb208e80d ("rtnetlink: add support for protodown reason")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
bnxt_fw_reset_task() which runs from a workqueue can race with
bnxt_remove_one(). For example, if firmware reset and VF FLR are
happening at about the same time.
bnxt_remove_one() already cancels the workqueue and waits for it
to finish, but we need to do this earlier before the devlink
reporters are destroyed. This will guarantee that
the devlink reporters will always be valid when bnxt_fw_reset_task()
is still running.
Fixes: b148bb238c02 ("bnxt_en: Fix possible crash in bnxt_fw_reset_task().")
Reviewed-by: Edwin Peer <edwin.peer@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasundhara Volam <vasundhara-v.volam@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
When the driver goes through PCIe AER reset in error state, all
firmware messages will timeout because the PCIe bus is no longer
accessible. This can lead to AER reset taking many minutes to
complete as each firmware command takes time to timeout.
Define a new macro BNXT_NO_FW_ACCESS() to skip these firmware messages
when either firmware is in fatal error state or when
pci_channel_offline() is true. It now takes a more reasonable 20 to
30 seconds to complete AER recovery.
Fixes: b4fff2079d10 ("bnxt_en: Do not send firmware messages if firmware is in error state.")
Signed-off-by: Vasundhara Volam <vasundhara-v.volam@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
This patch causes a regression betwen Kernel 5.7 and 5.8 at wlcore:
with it applied, WiFi stops working, and the Kernel starts printing
this message every second:
wlcore: PHY firmware version: Rev 8.2.0.0.242
wlcore: firmware booted (Rev 8.9.0.0.79)
wlcore: ERROR command execute failure 14
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 133 at drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/main.c:795 wl12xx_queue_recovery_work.part.0+0x6c/0x74 [wlcore]
Modules linked in: wl18xx wlcore mac80211 libarc4 cfg80211 rfkill snd_soc_hdmi_codec crct10dif_ce wlcore_sdio adv7511 cec kirin9xx_drm(C) kirin9xx_dw_drm_dsi(C) drm_kms_helper drm ip_tables x_tables ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6
CPU: 0 PID: 133 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G WC 5.8.0+ #186
Hardware name: HiKey970 (DT)
Workqueue: events_freezable ieee80211_restart_work [mac80211]
pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
pc : wl12xx_queue_recovery_work.part.0+0x6c/0x74 [wlcore]
lr : wl12xx_queue_recovery_work+0x24/0x30 [wlcore]
sp : ffff8000126c3a60
x29: ffff8000126c3a60 x28: 00000000000025de
x27: 0000000000000010 x26: 0000000000000005
x25: ffff0001a5d49e80 x24: ffff8000092cf580
x23: ffff0001b7c12623 x22: ffff0001b6fcf2e8
x21: ffff0001b7e46200 x20: 00000000fffffffb
x19: ffff0001a78e6400 x18: 0000000000000030
x17: 0000000000000001 x16: 0000000000000001
x15: ffff0001b7e46670 x14: ffffffffffffffff
x13: ffff8000926c37d7 x12: ffff8000126c37e0
x11: ffff800011e01000 x10: ffff8000120526d0
x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 3431206572756c69
x7 : 6166206574756365 x6 : 0000000000000c2c
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff0001bf1361e8
x3 : ffff0001bf1790b0 x2 : 0000000000000000
x1 : ffff0001a5d49e80 x0 : 0000000000000001
Call trace:
wl12xx_queue_recovery_work.part.0+0x6c/0x74 [wlcore]
wl12xx_queue_recovery_work+0x24/0x30 [wlcore]
wl1271_cmd_set_sta_key+0x258/0x25c [wlcore]
wl1271_set_key+0x7c/0x2dc [wlcore]
wlcore_set_key+0xe4/0x360 [wlcore]
wl18xx_set_key+0x48/0x1d0 [wl18xx]
wlcore_op_set_key+0xa4/0x180 [wlcore]
ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel+0xb0/0x2d0 [mac80211]
ieee80211_reenable_keys+0x70/0x110 [mac80211]
ieee80211_reconfig+0xa00/0xca0 [mac80211]
ieee80211_restart_work+0xc4/0xfc [mac80211]
process_one_work+0x1cc/0x350
worker_thread+0x13c/0x470
kthread+0x154/0x160
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
---[ end trace b1f722abf9af5919 ]---
wlcore: WARNING could not set keys
wlcore: ERROR Could not add or replace key
wlan0: failed to set key (4, ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) to hardware (-5)
wlcore: Hardware recovery in progress. FW ver: Rev 8.9.0.0.79
wlcore: pc: 0x0, hint_sts: 0x00000040 count: 39
wlcore: down
wlcore: down
ieee80211 phy0: Hardware restart was requested
mmc_host mmc0: Bus speed (slot 0) = 400000Hz (slot req 400000Hz, actual 400000HZ div = 0)
mmc_host mmc0: Bus speed (slot 0) = 25000000Hz (slot req 25000000Hz, actual 25000000HZ div = 0)
wlcore: PHY firmware version: Rev 8.2.0.0.242
wlcore: firmware booted (Rev 8.9.0.0.79)
wlcore: ERROR command execute failure 14
------------[ cut here ]------------
Tested on Hikey 970.
This reverts commit 2b7aadd3b9e17e8b81eeb8d9cc46756ae4658265.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f0a2cb7ea606f1a284d4c23cbf983da2954ce9b6.1598420968.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
|
|
When removing a port from a VLAN we are just erasing the
member config for the VLAN, which is wrong: other ports
can be using it.
Just mask off the port and only zero out the rest of the
member config once ports using of the VLAN are removed
from it.
Reported-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Fixes: d8652956cf37 ("net: dsa: realtek-smi: Add Realtek SMI driver")
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
PAE bit of NCFGR register, when set, pauses transmission
if a non-zero 802.3 classic pause frame is received.
Fixes: 7897b071ac3b ("net: macb: convert to phylink")
Signed-off-by: Parshuram Thombare <pthombar@cadence.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Pass the correct offset to clear the stale filter hit
bytes counter. Otherwise, the counter starts incrementing
from the stale information, instead of 0.
Fixes: 12b276fbf6e0 ("cxgb4: add support to create hash filters")
Signed-off-by: Ganji Aravind <ganji.aravind@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Firmware erases the entire flash region which may take several
seconds before flashing, so we bump up the timeout to ensure this
cmd won't return failure.
Fixes: 5e126e7c4e52 ("hinic: add firmware update support")
Signed-off-by: Luo bin <luobin9@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
We free memory regardless of the return value of SET_FUNC_STATE
cmd in hinic_close function to avoid memory leak and this cmd may
timeout when fw is busy with handling other cmds, so we bump up the
timeout of this cmd to ensure it won't return failure.
Fixes: 00e57a6d4ad3 ("net-next/hinic: Add Tx operation")
Signed-off-by: Luo bin <luobin9@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
The following deadlock scenario is triggered by syzbot:
Thread A: Thread B:
tcf_idr_check_alloc()
...
populate_metalist()
rtnl_unlock()
rtnl_lock()
...
request_module() tcf_idr_check_alloc()
rtnl_lock()
At this point, thread A is waiting for thread B to release RTNL
lock, while thread B is waiting for thread A to commit the IDR
change with tcf_idr_insert() later.
Break this deadlock situation by preloading ife modules earlier,
before tcf_idr_check_alloc(), this is fine because we only need
to load modules we need potentially.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+80e32b5d1f9923f8ace6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 0190c1d452a9 ("net: sched: atomically check-allocate action")
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
eni_init_one() misses to call pci_disable_device() in an error path.
Jump to err_disable to fix it.
Fixes: ede58ef28e10 ("atm: remove deprecated use of pci api")
Signed-off-by: Jing Xiangfeng <jingxiangfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
PVC devices are virtual devices in this driver stacked on top of the
actual HDLC device. They are the devices normal users would use.
PVC devices have two types: normal PVC devices and Ethernet-emulating
PVC devices.
When transmitting data with PVC devices, the ndo_start_xmit function
will prepend a header of 4 or 10 bytes. Currently this driver requests
this headroom to be reserved for normal PVC devices by setting their
hard_header_len to 10. However, this does not work when these devices
are used with AF_PACKET/RAW sockets. Also, this driver does not request
this headroom for Ethernet-emulating PVC devices (but deals with this
problem by reallocating the skb when needed, which is not optimal).
This patch replaces hard_header_len with needed_headroom, and set
needed_headroom for Ethernet-emulating PVC devices, too. This makes
the driver to request headroom for all PVC devices in all cases.
Cc: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
Cc: Martin Schiller <ms@dev.tdt.de>
Signed-off-by: Xie He <xie.he.0141@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
Using tp_reserve to calculate netoff can overflow as
tp_reserve is unsigned int and netoff is unsigned short.
This may lead to macoff receving a smaller value then
sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr), and if po->has_vnet_hdr
is set, an out-of-bounds write will occur when
calling virtio_net_hdr_from_skb.
The bug is fixed by converting netoff to unsigned int
and checking if it exceeds USHRT_MAX.
This addresses CVE-2020-14386
Fixes: 8913336a7e8d ("packet: add PACKET_RESERVE sockopt")
Signed-off-by: Or Cohen <orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This accounts for wp_page_reuse() case, where we reused a page for COW.
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
With the more strict (but greatly simplified) page reuse logic in
do_wp_page(), we can safely go back to the world where cow is not
enforced with writes.
This essentially reverts commit 17839856fd58 ("gup: document and work
around 'COW can break either way' issue"). There are some context
differences due to some changes later on around it:
2170ecfa7688 ("drm/i915: convert get_user_pages() --> pin_user_pages()", 2020-06-03)
376a34efa4ee ("mm/gup: refactor and de-duplicate gup_fast() code", 2020-06-03)
Some lines moved back and forth with those, but this revert patch should
have striped out and covered all the enforced cow bits anyways.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Remove the function as the last reference has gone away with the do_wp_page()
changes.
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
How about we just make sure we're the only possible valid user fo the
page before we bother to reuse it?
Simplify, simplify, simplify.
And get rid of the nasty serialization on the page lock at the same time.
[peterx: add subject prefix]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
GCOV built with GCC 10 doesn't initialize n_function variable. This
produces different kernel panics as was seen by Colin in Ubuntu and me
in FC 32.
As a workaround, let's disable GCOV build for broken GCC 10 version.
Link: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1891288
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200827133932.3338519-1-leon@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whbijeSdSvx-Xcr0DPMj0BiwhJ+uiNnDSVZcr_h_kg7UA@mail.gmail.com/
Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
init_stat() returns 0 on success, same as vfs_lstat(). When it replaced
vfs_lstat(), the '!' was dropped.
Fixes: 716308a5331b ("init: add an init_stat helper")
Signed-off-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The user-after-free bug in thermal_zone_device_unregister() is reported by
KASAN. It happens because struct thermal_zone_device is released during of
device_unregister() invocation, and hence the "tz" variable shouldn't be
touched by thermal_notify_tz_delete(tz->id).
Fixes: 55cdf0a283b8 ("thermal: core: Add notifications call in the framework")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200817235854.26816-1-digetx@gmail.com
|
|
Currently driver is suppressing the negative temperature
readings from the vadc. Consumers of the thermal zones need
to read the negative temperature too. Don't suppress the
readings.
Fixes: c610afaa21d3c6e ("thermal: Add QPNP PMIC temperature alarm driver")
Signed-off-by: Veera Vegivada <vvegivad@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Guru Das Srinagesh <gurus@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/944856eb819081268fab783236a916257de120e4.1596040416.git.gurus@codeaurora.org
|
|
We can sometimes get bogus thermal shutdowns on omap4430 at least with
droid4 running idle with a battery charger connected:
thermal thermal_zone0: critical temperature reached (143 C), shutting down
Dumping out the register values shows we can occasionally get a 0x7f value
that is outside the TRM listed values in the ADC conversion table. And then
we get a normal value when reading again after that. Reading the register
multiple times does not seem help avoiding the bogus values as they stay
until the next sample is ready.
Looking at the TRM chapter "18.4.10.2.3 ADC Codes Versus Temperature", we
should have values from 13 to 107 listed with a total of 95 values. But
looking at the omap4430_adc_to_temp array, the values are off, and the
end values are missing. And it seems that the 4430 ADC table is similar
to omap3630 rather than omap4460.
Let's fix the issue by using values based on the omap3630 table and just
ignoring invalid values. Compared to the 4430 TRM, the omap3630 table has
the missing values added while the TRM table only shows every second
value.
Note that sometimes the ADC register values within the valid table can
also be way off for about 1 out of 10 values. But it seems that those
just show about 25 C too low values rather than too high values. So those
do not cause a bogus thermal shutdown.
Fixes: 1a31270e54d7 ("staging: omap-thermal: add OMAP4 data structures")
Cc: Merlijn Wajer <merlijn@wizzup.org>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706183338.25622-1-tony@atomide.com
|
|
The existing code accepted process_vm_readv() success or failure as long
as it didn't return garbage. This is too weak: if the vsyscall page is
readable, then process_vm_readv() should succeed and, if the page is not
readable, then it should fail.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Gate pages were missed when converting from get to pin_user_pages().
This can lead to refcount imbalances. This is reliably and quickly
reproducible running the x86 selftests when vsyscall=emulate is enabled
(the default). Fix by using try_grab_page() with appropriate flags
passed.
The long story:
Today, pin_user_pages() and get_user_pages() are similar interfaces for
manipulating page reference counts. However, "pins" use a "bias" value
and manipulate the actual reference count by 1024 instead of 1 used by
plain "gets".
That means that pin_user_pages() must be matched with unpin_user_pages()
and can't be mixed with a plain put_user_pages() or put_page().
Enter gate pages, like the vsyscall page. They are pages usually in the
kernel image, but which are mapped to userspace. Userspace is allowed
access to them, including interfaces using get/pin_user_pages(). The
refcount of these kernel pages is manipulated just like a normal user
page on the get/pin side so that the put/unpin side can work the same
for normal user pages or gate pages.
get_gate_page() uses try_get_page() which only bumps the refcount by
1, not 1024, even if called in the pin_user_pages() path. If someone
pins a gate page, this happens:
pin_user_pages()
get_gate_page()
try_get_page() // bump refcount +1
... some time later
unpin_user_pages()
page_ref_sub_and_test(page, 1024))
... and boom, we get a refcount off by 1023. This is reliably and
quickly reproducible running the x86 selftests when booted with
vsyscall=emulate (the default). The selftests use ptrace(), but I
suspect anything using pin_user_pages() on gate pages could hit this.
To fix it, simply use try_grab_page() instead of try_get_page(), and
pass 'gup_flags' in so that FOLL_PIN can be respected.
This bug traces back to the very beginning of the FOLL_PIN support in
commit 3faa52c03f44 ("mm/gup: track FOLL_PIN pages"), which showed up in
the 5.7 release.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Fixes: 3faa52c03f44 ("mm/gup: track FOLL_PIN pages")
Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
When an ISM device is removed, all its linkgroups are terminated,
i.e. all the corresponding connections are killed.
Connection killing invokes smc_close_active_abort(), which decreases
the sock refcount for certain states to simulate passive closing.
And it cancels the close worker and has to give up the sock lock for
this timeframe. This opens the door for a passive close worker or a
socket close to run in between. In this case smc_close_active_abort() and
passive close worker resp. smc_release() might do a sock_put for passive
closing. This causes:
[ 1323.315943] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
[ 1323.316055] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 54469 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xe8/0x130
[ 1323.316069] Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
[ 1323.316084] CPU: 3 PID: 54469 Comm: uperf Not tainted 5.9.0-20200826.rc2.git0.46328853ed20.300.fc32.s390x+debug #1
[ 1323.316096] Hardware name: IBM 2964 NC9 702 (z/VM 6.4.0)
[ 1323.316108] Call Trace:
[ 1323.316125] [<00000000c0d4aae8>] show_stack+0x90/0xf8
[ 1323.316143] [<00000000c15989b0>] dump_stack+0xa8/0xe8
[ 1323.316158] [<00000000c0d8344e>] panic+0x11e/0x288
[ 1323.316173] [<00000000c0d83144>] __warn+0xac/0x158
[ 1323.316187] [<00000000c1597a7a>] report_bug+0xb2/0x130
[ 1323.316201] [<00000000c0d36424>] monitor_event_exception+0x44/0xc0
[ 1323.316219] [<00000000c195c716>] pgm_check_handler+0x1da/0x238
[ 1323.316234] [<00000000c151844c>] refcount_warn_saturate+0xec/0x130
[ 1323.316280] ([<00000000c1518448>] refcount_warn_saturate+0xe8/0x130)
[ 1323.316310] [<000003ff801f2e2a>] smc_release+0x192/0x1c8 [smc]
[ 1323.316323] [<00000000c169f1fa>] __sock_release+0x5a/0xe0
[ 1323.316334] [<00000000c169f2ac>] sock_close+0x2c/0x40
[ 1323.316350] [<00000000c1086de0>] __fput+0xb8/0x278
[ 1323.316362] [<00000000c0db1e0e>] task_work_run+0x76/0xb8
[ 1323.316393] [<00000000c0d8ab84>] do_exit+0x26c/0x520
[ 1323.316408] [<00000000c0d8af08>] do_group_exit+0x48/0xc0
[ 1323.316421] [<00000000c0d8afa8>] __s390x_sys_exit_group+0x28/0x38
[ 1323.316433] [<00000000c195c32c>] system_call+0xe0/0x2b4
[ 1323.316446] 1 lock held by uperf/54469:
[ 1323.316456] #0: 0000000044125e60 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __sock_release+0x44/0xe0
The patch rechecks sock state in smc_close_active_abort() after
smc_close_cancel_work() to avoid duplicate decrease of sock
refcount for the same purpose.
Fixes: 611b63a12732 ("net/smc: cancel tx worker in case of socket aborts")
Reviewed-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
When an SMC connection is created, and there is a problem to
create an RMB or DMB, the previously created send buffer is
thrown away as well including buffer descriptor freeing.
Make sure the connection no longer references the freed
buffer descriptor, otherwise bugs like this are possible:
[71556.835148] =============================================================================
[71556.835168] BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G B OE ): Poison overwritten
[71556.835172] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[71556.835179] INFO: 0x00000000d20894be-0x00000000aaef63e9 @offset=2724. First byte 0x0 instead of 0x6b
[71556.835215] INFO: Allocated in __smc_buf_create+0x184/0x578 [smc] age=0 cpu=5 pid=46726
[71556.835234] ___slab_alloc+0x5a4/0x690
[71556.835239] __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x70/0xb0
[71556.835243] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x38e/0x3f8
[71556.835250] __smc_buf_create+0x184/0x578 [smc]
[71556.835257] smc_buf_create+0x2e/0xe8 [smc]
[71556.835264] smc_listen_work+0x516/0x6a0 [smc]
[71556.835275] process_one_work+0x280/0x478
[71556.835280] worker_thread+0x66/0x368
[71556.835287] kthread+0x17a/0x1a0
[71556.835294] ret_from_fork+0x28/0x2c
[71556.835301] INFO: Freed in smc_buf_create+0xd8/0xe8 [smc] age=0 cpu=5 pid=46726
[71556.835307] __slab_free+0x246/0x560
[71556.835311] kfree+0x398/0x3f8
[71556.835318] smc_buf_create+0xd8/0xe8 [smc]
[71556.835324] smc_listen_work+0x516/0x6a0 [smc]
[71556.835328] process_one_work+0x280/0x478
[71556.835332] worker_thread+0x66/0x368
[71556.835337] kthread+0x17a/0x1a0
[71556.835344] ret_from_fork+0x28/0x2c
[71556.835348] INFO: Slab 0x00000000a0744551 objects=51 used=51 fp=0x0000000000000000 flags=0x1ffff00000010200
[71556.835352] INFO: Object 0x00000000563480a1 @offset=2688 fp=0x00000000289567b2
[71556.835359] Redzone 000000006783cde2: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ................
[71556.835363] Redzone 00000000e35b876e: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ................
[71556.835367] Redzone 0000000023074562: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ................
[71556.835372] Redzone 00000000b9564b8c: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ................
[71556.835376] Redzone 00000000810c6362: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ................
[71556.835380] Redzone 0000000065ef52c3: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ................
[71556.835384] Redzone 00000000c5dd6984: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ................
[71556.835388] Redzone 000000004c480f8f: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ................
[71556.835392] Object 00000000563480a1: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
[71556.835397] Object 000000009c479d06: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
[71556.835401] Object 000000006e1dce92: 6b 6b 6b 6b 00 00 00 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkk....kkkkkkkk
[71556.835405] Object 00000000227f7cf8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
[71556.835410] Object 000000009a701215: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
[71556.835414] Object 000000003731ce76: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
[71556.835418] Object 00000000f7085967: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
[71556.835422] Object 0000000007f99927: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
[71556.835427] Redzone 00000000579c4913: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........
[71556.835431] Padding 00000000305aef82: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
[71556.835435] Padding 00000000b1cdd722: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
[71556.835438] Padding 00000000c7568199: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
[71556.835442] Padding 00000000fad4c4d4: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
[71556.835451] CPU: 0 PID: 47939 Comm: kworker/0:15 Tainted: G B OE 5.9.0-rc1uschi+ #54
[71556.835456] Hardware name: IBM 3906 M03 703 (LPAR)
[71556.835464] Workqueue: events smc_listen_work [smc]
[71556.835470] Call Trace:
[71556.835478] [<00000000d5eaeb10>] show_stack+0x90/0xf8
[71556.835493] [<00000000d66fc0f8>] dump_stack+0xa8/0xe8
[71556.835499] [<00000000d61a511c>] check_bytes_and_report+0x104/0x130
[71556.835504] [<00000000d61a57b2>] check_object+0x26a/0x2e0
[71556.835509] [<00000000d61a59bc>] alloc_debug_processing+0x194/0x238
[71556.835514] [<00000000d61a8c14>] ___slab_alloc+0x5a4/0x690
[71556.835519] [<00000000d61a9170>] __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x70/0xb0
[71556.835524] [<00000000d61aaf66>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x38e/0x3f8
[71556.835530] [<000003ff80549bbc>] __smc_buf_create+0x184/0x578 [smc]
[71556.835538] [<000003ff8054a396>] smc_buf_create+0x2e/0xe8 [smc]
[71556.835545] [<000003ff80540c16>] smc_listen_work+0x516/0x6a0 [smc]
[71556.835549] [<00000000d5f0f448>] process_one_work+0x280/0x478
[71556.835554] [<00000000d5f0f6a6>] worker_thread+0x66/0x368
[71556.835559] [<00000000d5f18692>] kthread+0x17a/0x1a0
[71556.835563] [<00000000d6abf3b8>] ret_from_fork+0x28/0x2c
[71556.835569] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[71556.835573] FIX kmalloc-128: Restoring 0x00000000d20894be-0x00000000aaef63e9=0x6b
[71556.835577] FIX kmalloc-128: Marking all objects used
Fixes: fd7f3a746582 ("net/smc: remove freed buffer from list")
Reviewed-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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