summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/mm/mmap.c (follow)
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* lib/interval_tree: fast overlap detectionDavidlohr Bueso2017-09-091-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow interval trees to quickly check for overlaps to avoid unnecesary tree lookups in interval_tree_iter_first(). As of this patch, all interval tree flavors will require using a 'rb_root_cached' such that we can have the leftmost node easily available. While most users will make use of this feature, those with special functions (in addition to the generic insert, delete, search calls) will avoid using the cached option as they can do funky things with insertions -- for example, vma_interval_tree_insert_after(). [jglisse@redhat.com: fix deadlock from typo vm_lock_anon_vma()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170808225719.20723-1-jglisse@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170719014603.19029-12-dave@stgolabs.net Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Cc: Christian Benvenuti <benve@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: oom: let oom_reap_task and exit_mmap run concurrentlyAndrea Arcangeli2017-09-071-0/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is purely required because exit_aio() may block and exit_mmap() may never start, if the oom_reap_task cannot start running on a mm with mm_users == 0. At the same time if the OOM reaper doesn't wait at all for the memory of the current OOM candidate to be freed by exit_mmap->unmap_vmas, it would generate a spurious OOM kill. If it wasn't because of the exit_aio or similar blocking functions in the last mmput, it would be enough to change the oom_reap_task() in the case it finds mm_users == 0, to wait for a timeout or to wait for __mmput to set MMF_OOM_SKIP itself, but it's not just exit_mmap the problem here so the concurrency of exit_mmap and oom_reap_task is apparently warranted. It's a non standard runtime, exit_mmap() runs without mmap_sem, and oom_reap_task runs with the mmap_sem for reading as usual (kind of MADV_DONTNEED). The race between the two is solved with a combination of tsk_is_oom_victim() (serialized by task_lock) and MMF_OOM_SKIP (serialized by a dummy down_write/up_write cycle on the same lines of the ksm_exit method). If the oom_reap_task() may be running concurrently during exit_mmap, exit_mmap will wait it to finish in down_write (before taking down mm structures that would make the oom_reap_task fail with use after free). If exit_mmap comes first, oom_reap_task() will skip the mm if MMF_OOM_SKIP is already set and in turn all memory is already freed and furthermore the mm data structures may already have been taken down by free_pgtables. [aarcange@redhat.com: incremental one liner] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170726164319.GC29716@redhat.com [rientjes@google.com: remove unused mmput_async] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1708141733130.50317@chino.kir.corp.google.com [aarcange@redhat.com: microoptimization] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170817171240.GB5066@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170726162912.GA29716@redhat.com Fixes: 26db62f179d1 ("oom: keep mm of the killed task available") Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Reported-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Tested-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* userfaultfd: call userfaultfd_unmap_prep only if __split_vma succeedsAndrea Arcangeli2017-09-071-7/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A __split_vma is not a worthy event to report, and it's definitely not a unmap so it would be incorrect to report unmap for the whole region to the userfaultfd manager if a __split_vma fails. So only call userfaultfd_unmap_prep after the __vma_splitting is over and do_munmap cannot fail anymore. Also add unlikely because it's better to optimize for the vast majority of apps that aren't using userfaultfd in a non cooperative way. Ideally we should also find a way to eliminate the branch entirely if CONFIG_USERFAULTFD=n, but it would complicate things so stick to unlikely for now. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170802165145.22628-5-aarcange@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Perevalov <a.perevalov@samsung.com> Cc: Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: rename global_page_state to global_zone_page_stateMichal Hocko2017-09-071-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | global_page_state is error prone as a recent bug report pointed out [1]. It only returns proper values for zone based counters as the enum it gets suggests. We already have global_node_page_state so let's rename global_page_state to global_zone_page_state to be more explicit here. All existing users seems to be correct: $ git grep "global_page_state(NR_" | sed 's@.*(\(NR_[A-Z_]*\)).*@\1@' | sort | uniq -c 2 NR_BOUNCE 2 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES 11 NR_FREE_PAGES 1 NR_KERNEL_STACK_KB 1 NR_MLOCK 2 NR_PAGETABLE This patch shouldn't introduce any functional change. [1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201707260628.v6Q6SmaS030814@www262.sakura.ne.jp Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170801134256.5400-2-hannes@cmpxchg.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: fix overflow check in expand_upwards()Helge Deller2017-07-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Jörn Engel noticed that the expand_upwards() function might not return -ENOMEM in case the requested address is (unsigned long)-PAGE_SIZE and if the architecture didn't defined TASK_SIZE as multiple of PAGE_SIZE. Affected architectures are arm, frv, m68k, blackfin, h8300 and xtensa which all define TASK_SIZE as 0xffffffff, but since none of those have an upwards-growing stack we currently have no actual issue. Nevertheless let's fix this just in case any of the architectures with an upward-growing stack (currently parisc, metag and partly ia64) define TASK_SIZE similar. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170702192452.GA11868@p100.box Fixes: bd726c90b6b8 ("Allow stack to grow up to address space limit") Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Reported-by: Jörn Engel <joern@purestorage.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: use dedicated helper to access rlimit valueKrzysztof Opasiak2017-07-111-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Use rlimit() helper instead of manually writing whole chain from current task to rlim_cur. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170705172811.8027-1-k.opasiak@samsung.com Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Opasiak <k.opasiak@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm/mmap.c: expand_downwards: don't require the gap if !vm_prevOleg Nesterov2017-07-111-7/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | expand_stack(vma) fails if address < stack_guard_gap even if there is no vma->vm_prev. I don't think this makes sense, and we didn't do this before the recent commit 1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas"). We do not need a gap in this case, any address is fine as long as security_mmap_addr() doesn't object. This also simplifies the code, we know that address >= prev->vm_end and thus underflow is not possible. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170628175258.GA24881@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm/mmap.c: do not blow on PROT_NONE MAP_FIXED holes in the stackMichal Hocko2017-07-111-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas") has introduced a regression in some rust and Java environments which are trying to implement their own stack guard page. They are punching a new MAP_FIXED mapping inside the existing stack Vma. This will confuse expand_{downwards,upwards} into thinking that the stack expansion would in fact get us too close to an existing non-stack vma which is a correct behavior wrt safety. It is a real regression on the other hand. Let's work around the problem by considering PROT_NONE mapping as a part of the stack. This is a gros hack but overflowing to such a mapping would trap anyway an we only can hope that usespace knows what it is doing and handle it propely. Fixes: 1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170705182849.GA18027@dhcp22.suse.cz Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Debugged-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.armlinux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-armLinus Torvalds2017-07-081-0/+4
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull ARM updates from Russell King: - add support for ftrace-with-registers, which is needed for kgraft and other ftrace tools - support for mremap() for the sigpage/vDSO so that checkpoint/restore can work - add timestamps to each line of the register dump output - remove the unused KTHREAD_SIZE from nommu - align the ARM bitops APIs with the generic API (using unsigned long pointers rather than void pointers) - make the configuration of userspace Thumb support an expert option so that we can default it on, and avoid some hard to debug userspace crashes * 'for-linus' of git://git.armlinux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm: ARM: 8684/1: NOMMU: Remove unused KTHREAD_SIZE definition ARM: 8683/1: ARM32: Support mremap() for sigpage/vDSO ARM: 8679/1: bitops: Align prototypes to generic API ARM: 8678/1: ftrace: Adds support for CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS ARM: make configuration of userspace Thumb support an expert option ARM: 8673/1: Fix __show_regs output timestamps
| * ARM: 8683/1: ARM32: Support mremap() for sigpage/vDSODmitry Safonov2017-06-211-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CRIU restores application mappings on the same place where they were before Checkpoint. That means, that we need to move vDSO and sigpage during restore on exactly the same place where they were before C/R. Make mremap() code update mm->context.{sigpage,vdso} pointers during VMA move. Sigpage is used for landing after handling a signal - if the pointer is not updated during moving, the application might crash on any signal after mremap(). vDSO pointer on ARM32 is used only for setting auxv at this moment, update it during mremap() in case of future usage. Without those updates, current work of CRIU on ARM32 is not reliable. Historically, we error Checkpointing if we find vDSO page on ARM32 and suggest user to disable CONFIG_VDSO. But that's not correct - it goes from x86 where signal processing is ended in vDSO blob. For arm32 it's sigpage, which is not disabled with `CONFIG_VDSO=n'. Looks like C/R was working by luck - because userspace on ARM32 at this moment always sets SA_RESTORER. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Christopher Covington <cov@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
* | mm/mmap.c: mark protection_map as __ro_after_initDaniel Micay2017-07-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The protection map is only modified by per-arch init code so it can be protected from writes after the init code runs. This change was extracted from PaX where it's part of KERNEXEC. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170510174441.26163-1-danielmicay@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Allow stack to grow up to address space limitHelge Deller2017-06-211-5/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix expand_upwards() on architectures with an upward-growing stack (parisc, metag and partly IA-64) to allow the stack to reliably grow exactly up to the address space limit given by TASK_SIZE. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | mm: fix new crash in unmapped_area_topdown()Hugh Dickins2017-06-211-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Trinity gets kernel BUG at mm/mmap.c:1963! in about 3 minutes of mmap testing. That's the VM_BUG_ON(gap_end < gap_start) at the end of unmapped_area_topdown(). Linus points out how MAP_FIXED (which does not have to respect our stack guard gap intentions) could result in gap_end below gap_start there. Fix that, and the similar case in its alternative, unmapped_area(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas") Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Debugged-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmasHugh Dickins2017-06-191-60/+89
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping. But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX] which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN. This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical, unfortunatelly. Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot. One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace, but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units). Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page: because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point, a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK and strict non-overcommit mode. Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start (or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(), and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that. Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm/mmap: replace SHM_HUGE_MASK with MAP_HUGE_MASK inside mmap_pgoffAnshuman Khandual2017-05-041-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 091d0d55b286 ("shm: fix null pointer deref when userspace specifies invalid hugepage size") had replaced MAP_HUGE_MASK with SHM_HUGE_MASK. Though both of them contain the same numeric value of 0x3f, MAP_HUGE_MASK flag sounds more appropriate than the other one in the context. Hence change it back. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170404045635.616-1-khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-03-031-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs pile two from Al Viro: - orangefs fix - series of fs/namei.c cleanups from me - VFS stuff coming from overlayfs tree * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: orangefs: Use RCU for destroy_inode vfs: use helper for calling f_op->fsync() mm: use helper for calling f_op->mmap() vfs: use helpers for calling f_op->{read,write}_iter() vfs: pass type instead of fn to do_{loop,iter}_readv_writev() vfs: extract common parts of {compat_,}do_readv_writev() vfs: wrap write f_ops with file_{start,end}_write() vfs: deny copy_file_range() for non regular files vfs: deny fallocate() on directory vfs: create vfs helper vfs_tmpfile() namei.c: split unlazy_walk() namei.c: fold the check for DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE into d_revalidate() lookup_fast(): clean up the logics around the fallback to non-rcu mode namei: fold unlazy_link() into its sole caller
| * Merge remote-tracking branch 'ovl/for-viro' into for-linusAl Viro2017-03-021-1/+1
| |\ | | | | | | | | | Overlayfs-related series from Miklos and Amir
| | * mm: use helper for calling f_op->mmap()Miklos Szeredi2017-02-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
* | | mm, madvise: fail with ENOMEM when splitting vma will hit max_map_countDavid Rientjes2017-02-251-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If madvise(2) advice will result in the underlying vma being split and the number of areas mapped by the process will exceed /proc/sys/vm/max_map_count as a result, return ENOMEM instead of EAGAIN. EAGAIN is returned by madvise(2) when a kernel resource, such as slab, is temporarily unavailable. It indicates that userspace should retry the advice in the near future. This is important for advice such as MADV_DONTNEED which is often used by malloc implementations to free memory back to the system: we really do want to free memory back when madvise(2) returns EAGAIN because slab allocations (for vmas, anon_vmas, or mempolicies) cannot be allocated. Encountering /proc/sys/vm/max_map_count is not a temporary failure, however, so return ENOMEM to indicate this is a more serious issue. A followup patch to the man page will specify this behavior. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1701241431120.42507@chino.kir.corp.google.com Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | userfaultfd: non-cooperative: add event for memory unmapsMike Rapoport2017-02-251-15/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When a non-cooperative userfaultfd monitor copies pages in the background, it may encounter regions that were already unmapped. Addition of UFFD_EVENT_UNMAP allows the uffd monitor to track precisely changes in the virtual memory layout. Since there might be different uffd contexts for the affected VMAs, we first should create a temporary representation for the unmap event for each uffd context and then notify them one by one to the appropriate userfault file descriptors. The event notification occurs after the mmap_sem has been released. [arnd@arndb.de: fix nommu build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170203165141.3665284-1-arnd@arndb.de [mhocko@suse.com: fix nommu build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170202091503.GA22823@dhcp22.suse.cz Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485542673-24387-3-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Hillf Danton <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | mm: call vm_munmap in munmap syscall instead of using open coded versionMike Rapoport2017-02-251-8/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Patch series "userfaultfd: non-cooperative: better tracking for mapping changes", v2. These patches try to address issues I've encountered during integration of userfaultfd with CRIU. Previously added userfaultfd events for fork(), madvise() and mremap() unfortunately do not cover all possible changes to a process virtual memory layout required for uffd monitor. When one or more VMAs is removed from the process mm, the external uffd monitor has no way to detect those changes and will attempt to fill the removed regions with userfaultfd_copy. Another problematic event is the exit() of the process. Here again, the external uffd monitor will try to use userfaultfd_copy, although mm owning the memory has already gone. The first patch in the series is a minor cleanup and it's not strictly related to the rest of the series. The patches 2 and 3 below add UFFD_EVENT_UNMAP and UFFD_EVENT_EXIT to allow the uffd monitor track changes in the memory layout of a process. The patches 4 and 5 amend error codes returned by userfaultfd_copy to make the uffd monitor able to cope with races that might occur between delivery of unmap and exit events and outstanding userfaultfd_copy's. This patch (of 5): Commit dc0ef0df7b6a ("mm: make mmap_sem for write waits killable for mm syscalls") replaced call to vm_munmap in munmap syscall with open coded version to allow different waits on mmap_sem in munmap syscall and vm_munmap. Now both functions use down_write_killable, so we can restore the call to vm_munmap from the munmap system call. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485542673-24387-2-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Hillf Danton <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | mm: fix comments for mmap_init()seokhoon.yoon2017-02-251-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | mmap_init() is no longer associated with VMA slab. So fix it. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485182601-9294-1-git-send-email-iamyooon@gmail.com Signed-off-by: seokhoon.yoon <iamyooon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | mm, fs: reduce fault, page_mkwrite, and pfn_mkwrite to take only vmfDave Jiang2017-02-251-5/+4
|/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ->fault(), ->page_mkwrite(), and ->pfn_mkwrite() calls do not need to take a vma and vmf parameter when the vma already resides in vmf. Remove the vma parameter to simplify things. [arnd@arndb.de: fix ARM build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170125223558.1451224-1-arnd@arndb.de Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148521301778.19116.10840599906674778980.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* / powerpc: do not make the entire heap executableDenys Vlasenko2017-02-231-5/+19
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On 32-bit powerpc the ELF PLT sections of binaries (built with --bss-plt, or with a toolchain which defaults to it) look like this: [17] .sbss NOBITS 0002aff8 01aff8 000014 00 WA 0 0 4 [18] .plt NOBITS 0002b00c 01aff8 000084 00 WAX 0 0 4 [19] .bss NOBITS 0002b090 01aff8 0000a4 00 WA 0 0 4 Which results in an ELF load header: Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr FileSiz MemSiz Flg Align LOAD 0x019c70 0x00029c70 0x00029c70 0x01388 0x014c4 RWE 0x10000 This is all correct, the load region containing the PLT is marked as executable. Note that the PLT starts at 0002b00c but the file mapping ends at 0002aff8, so the PLT falls in the 0 fill section described by the load header, and after a page boundary. Unfortunately the generic ELF loader ignores the X bit in the load headers when it creates the 0 filled non-file backed mappings. It assumes all of these mappings are RW BSS sections, which is not the case for PPC. gcc/ld has an option (--secure-plt) to not do this, this is said to incur a small performance penalty. Currently, to support 32-bit binaries with PLT in BSS kernel maps *entire brk area* with executable rights for all binaries, even --secure-plt ones. Stop doing that. Teach the ELF loader to check the X bit in the relevant load header and create 0 filled anonymous mappings that are executable if the load header requests that. Test program showing the difference in /proc/$PID/maps: int main() { char buf[16*1024]; char *p = malloc(123); /* make "[heap]" mapping appear */ int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); int len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); write(1, buf, len); printf("%p\n", p); return 0; } Compiled using: gcc -mbss-plt -m32 -Os test.c -otest Unpatched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10690000-106c0000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] f7f70000-f7fa0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fa0000-f7fb0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7fb0000-f7fc0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ffa90000-ffac0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10690008 Patched ppc64 kernel: 00100000-00120000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] 0fe10000-0ffd0000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffd0000-0ffe0000 r--p 001b0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 0ffe0000-0fff0000 rw-p 001c0000 fd:00 67898094 /usr/lib/libc-2.17.so 10000000-10010000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10010000-10020000 r--p 00000000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10020000-10030000 rw-p 00010000 fd:00 100674505 /home/user/test 10180000-101b0000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap] ^^^^ this has changed f7c60000-f7c90000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7c90000-f7ca0000 r--p 00020000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so f7ca0000-f7cb0000 rw-p 00030000 fd:00 67898089 /usr/lib/ld-2.17.so ff860000-ff890000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 0x10180008 The patch was originally posted in 2012 by Jason Gunthorpe and apparently ignored: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/30/138 Lightly run-tested. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161215131950.23054-1-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Replace <asm/uaccess.h> with <linux/uaccess.h> globallyLinus Torvalds2016-12-241-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This was entirely automated, using the script by Al: PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>' sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \ $(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h) to do the replacement at the end of the merge window. Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: vma_merge: correct false positive from __vma_unlink->validate_mm_rbAndrea Arcangeli2016-10-081-18/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The old code was always doing: vma->vm_end = next->vm_end vma_rb_erase(next) // in __vma_unlink vma->vm_next = next->vm_next // in __vma_unlink next = vma->vm_next vma_gap_update(next) The new code still does the above for remove_next == 1 and 2, but for remove_next == 3 it has been changed and it does: next->vm_start = vma->vm_start vma_rb_erase(vma) // in __vma_unlink vma_gap_update(next) In the latter case, while unlinking "vma", validate_mm_rb() is told to ignore "vma" that is being removed, but next->vm_start was reduced instead. So for the new case, to avoid the false positive from validate_mm_rb, it should be "next" that is ignored when "vma" is being unlinked. "vma" and "next" in the above comment, considered pre-swap(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474492522-2261-4-git-send-email-aarcange@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Tested-by: Shaun Tancheff <shaun.tancheff@seagate.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Jan Vorlicek <janvorli@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: vma_adjust: minor comment correctionAndrea Arcangeli2016-10-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The cases are three not two. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474492522-2261-3-git-send-email-aarcange@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Jan Vorlicek <janvorli@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: vma_adjust: remove superfluous check for next not NULLAndrea Arcangeli2016-10-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | If next would be NULL we couldn't reach such code path. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474309513-20313-2-git-send-email-aarcange@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Jan Vorlicek <janvorli@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: vma_merge: fix vm_page_prot SMP race condition against rmap_walkAndrea Arcangeli2016-10-081-27/+130
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The rmap_walk can access vm_page_prot (and potentially vm_flags in the pte/pmd manipulations). So it's not safe to wait the caller to update the vm_page_prot/vm_flags after vma_merge returned potentially removing the "next" vma and extending the "current" vma over the next->vm_start,vm_end range, but still with the "current" vma vm_page_prot, after releasing the rmap locks. The vm_page_prot/vm_flags must be transferred from the "next" vma to the current vma while vma_merge still holds the rmap locks. The side effect of this race condition is pte corruption during migrate as remove_migration_ptes when run on a address of the "next" vma that got removed, used the vm_page_prot of the current vma. migrate mprotect ------------ ------------- migrating in "next" vma vma_merge() # removes "next" vma and # extends "current" vma # current vma is not with # vm_page_prot updated remove_migration_ptes read vm_page_prot of current "vma" establish pte with wrong permissions vm_set_page_prot(vma) # too late! change_protection in the old vma range only, next range is not updated This caused segmentation faults and potentially memory corruption in heavy mprotect loads with some light page migration caused by compaction in the background. Hugh Dickins pointed out the comment about the Odd case 8 in vma_merge which confirms the case 8 is only buggy one where the race can trigger, in all other vma_merge cases the above cannot happen. This fix removes the oddness factor from case 8 and it converts it from: AAAA PPPPNNNNXXXX -> PPPPNNNNNNNN to: AAAA PPPPNNNNXXXX -> PPPPXXXXXXXX XXXX has the right vma properties for the whole merged vma returned by vma_adjust, so it solves the problem fully. It has the added benefits that the callers could stop updating vma properties when vma_merge succeeds however the callers are not updated by this patch (there are bits like VM_SOFTDIRTY that still need special care for the whole range, as the vma merging ignores them, but as long as they're not processed by rmap walks and instead they're accessed with the mmap_sem at least for reading, they are fine not to be updated within vma_adjust before releasing the rmap_locks). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474309513-20313-1-git-send-email-aarcange@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Reported-by: Aditya Mandaleeka <adityam@microsoft.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Jan Vorlicek <janvorli@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: vma_adjust: remove superfluous confusing update in remove_next == 1 caseAndrea Arcangeli2016-10-081-2/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | mm->highest_vm_end doesn't need any update. After finally removing the oddness from vma_merge case 8 that was causing: 1) constant risk of trouble whenever anybody would check vma fields from rmap_walks, like it happened when page migration was introduced and it read the vma->vm_page_prot from a rmap_walk 2) the callers of vma_merge to re-initialize any value different from the current vma, instead of vma_merge() more reliably returning a vma that already matches all fields passed as parameter .. it is also worth to take the opportunity of cleaning up superfluous code in vma_adjust(), that if not removed adds up to the hard readability of the function. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474492522-2261-5-git-send-email-aarcange@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Jan Vorlicek <janvorli@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: vm_page_prot: update with WRITE_ONCE/READ_ONCEAndrea Arcangeli2016-10-081-7/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | vma->vm_page_prot is read lockless from the rmap_walk, it may be updated concurrently and this prevents the risk of reading intermediate values. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474660305-19222-1-git-send-email-aarcange@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Jan Vorlicek <janvorli@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'x86-vdso-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-10-041-0/+8
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 vdso updates from Ingo Molnar: "The main changes in this cycle centered around adding support for 32-bit compatible C/R of the vDSO on 64-bit kernels, by Dmitry Safonov" * 'x86-vdso-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/vdso: Use CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI to enable vdso prctl x86/vdso: Only define map_vdso_randomized() if CONFIG_X86_64 x86/vdso: Only define prctl_map_vdso() if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE x86/signal: Add SA_{X32,IA32}_ABI sa_flags x86/ptrace: Down with test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) x86/coredump: Use pr_reg size, rather that TIF_IA32 flag x86/arch_prctl/vdso: Add ARCH_MAP_VDSO_* x86/vdso: Replace calculate_addr in map_vdso() with addr x86/vdso: Unmap vdso blob on vvar mapping failure
| * x86/arch_prctl/vdso: Add ARCH_MAP_VDSO_*Dmitry Safonov2016-09-141-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add API to change vdso blob type with arch_prctl. As this is usefull only by needs of CRIU, expose this interface under CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: 0x7f454c46@gmail.com Cc: oleg@redhat.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: gorcunov@openvz.org Cc: xemul@virtuozzo.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160905133308.28234-4-dsafonov@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* | arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissionsCatalin Marinas2016-08-251-0/+5
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The ARMv8 architecture allows execute-only user permissions by clearing the PTE_UXN and PTE_USER bits. However, the kernel running on a CPU implementation without User Access Override (ARMv8.2 onwards) can still access such page, so execute-only page permission does not protect against read(2)/write(2) etc. accesses. Systems requiring such protection must enable features like SECCOMP. This patch changes the arm64 __P100 and __S100 protection_map[] macros to the new __PAGE_EXECONLY attributes. A side effect is that pte_user() no longer triggers for __PAGE_EXECONLY since PTE_USER isn't set. To work around this, the check is done on the PTE_NG bit via the pte_ng() macro. VM_READ is also checked now for page faults. Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
* mm: refuse wrapped vm_brk requestsKees Cook2016-08-031-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The vm_brk() alignment calculations should refuse to overflow. The ELF loader depending on this, but it has been fixed now. No other unsafe callers have been found. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468014494-25291-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Ismael Ripoll Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: fix use-after-free if memory allocation failed in vma_adjust()Kirill A. Shutemov2016-07-291-5/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There's one case when vma_adjust() expands the vma, overlapping with *two* next vma. See case 6 of mprotect, described in the comment to vma_merge(). To handle this (and only this) situation we iterate twice over main part of the function. See "goto again". Vegard reported[1] that he sees out-of-bounds access complain from KASAN, if anon_vma_clone() on the *second* iteration fails. This happens because we free 'next' vma by the end of first iteration and don't have a way to undo this if anon_vma_clone() fails on the second iteration. The solution is to do all required allocations upfront, before we touch vmas. The allocation on the second iteration is only required if first two vmas don't have anon_vma, but third does. So we need, in total, one anon_vma_clone() call. It's easy to adjust 'exporter' to the third vma for such case. [1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1469514843-23778-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1469625255-126641-1-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* shmem: get_unmapped_area align huge pageHugh Dickins2016-07-271-2/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide a shmem_get_unmapped_area method in file_operations, called at mmap time to decide the mapping address. It could be conditional on CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE, but save #ifdefs in other places by making it unconditional. shmem_get_unmapped_area() first calls the usual mm->get_unmapped_area (which we treat as a black box, highly dependent on architecture and config and executable layout). Lots of conditions, and in most cases it just goes with the address that chose; but when our huge stars are rightly aligned, yet that did not provide a suitable address, go back to ask for a larger arena, within which to align the mapping suitably. There have to be some direct calls to shmem_get_unmapped_area(), not via the file_operations: because of the way shmem_zero_setup() is called to create a shmem object late in the mmap sequence, when MAP_SHARED is requested with MAP_ANONYMOUS or /dev/zero. Though this only matters when /proc/sys/vm/shmem_huge has been set. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466021202-61880-29-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* thp, mlock: do not mlock PTE-mapped file huge pagesKirill A. Shutemov2016-07-271-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As with anon THP, we only mlock file huge pages if we can prove that the page is not mapped with PTE. This way we can avoid mlock leak into non-mlocked vma on split. We rely on PageDoubleMap() under lock_page() to check if the the page may be PTE mapped. PG_double_map is set by page_add_file_rmap() when the page mapped with PTEs. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466021202-61880-21-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* thp: run vma_adjust_trans_huge() outside i_mmap_rwsemKirill A. Shutemov2016-07-271-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | vma_addjust_trans_huge() splits pmd if it's crossing VMA boundary. During split we munlock the huge page which requires rmap walk. rmap wants to take the lock on its own. Let's move vma_adjust_trans_huge() outside i_mmap_rwsem to fix this. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466021202-61880-19-git-send-email-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* x86/vdso: Add mremap hook to vm_special_mappingDmitry Safonov2016-07-081-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add possibility for 32-bit user-space applications to move the vDSO mapping. Previously, when a user-space app called mremap() for the vDSO address, in the syscall return path it would land on the previous address of the vDSOpage, resulting in segmentation violation. Now it lands fine and returns to userspace with a remapped vDSO. This will also fix the context.vdso pointer for 64-bit, which does not affect the user of vDSO after mremap() currently, but this may change in the future. As suggested by Andy, return -EINVAL for mremap() that would split the vDSO image: that operation cannot possibly result in a working system so reject it. Renamed and moved the text_mapping structure declaration inside map_vdso(), as it used only there and now it complements the vvar_mapping variable. There is still a problem for remapping the vDSO in glibc applications: the linker relocates addresses for syscalls on the vDSO page, so you need to relink with the new addresses. Without that the next syscall through glibc may fail: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. #0 0xf7fd9b80 in __kernel_vsyscall () #1 0xf7ec8238 in _exit () from /usr/lib32/libc.so.6 Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: 0x7f454c46@gmail.com Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160628113539.13606-2-dsafonov@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* mm: remove more IS_ERR_VALUE abusesLinus Torvalds2016-05-281-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The do_brk() and vm_brk() return value was "unsigned long" and returned the starting address on success, and an error value on failure. The reasons are entirely historical, and go back to it basically behaving like the mmap() interface does. However, nobody actually wanted that interface, and it causes totally pointless IS_ERR_VALUE() confusion. What every single caller actually wants is just the simpler integer return of zero for success and negative error number on failure. So just convert to that much clearer and more common calling convention, and get rid of all the IS_ERR_VALUE() uses wrt vm_brk(). Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: make vm_brk killableMichal Hocko2016-05-241-6/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that all the callers handle vm_brk failure we can change it wait for mmap_sem killable to help oom_reaper to not get blocked just because vm_brk gets blocked behind mmap_sem readers. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: make vm_munmap killableMichal Hocko2016-05-241-5/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Almost all current users of vm_munmap are ignoring the return value and so they do not handle potential error. This means that some VMAs might stay behind. This patch doesn't try to solve those potential problems. Quite contrary it adds a new failure mode by using down_write_killable in vm_munmap. This should be safer than other failure modes, though, because the process is guaranteed to die as soon as it leaves the kernel and exit_mmap will clean the whole address space. This will help in the OOM conditions when the oom victim might be stuck waiting for the mmap_sem for write which in turn can block oom_reaper which relies on the mmap_sem for read to make a forward progress and reclaim the address space of the victim. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: make vm_mmap killableMichal Hocko2016-05-241-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | All the callers of vm_mmap seem to check for the failure already and bail out in one way or another on the error which means that we can change it to use killable version of vm_mmap_pgoff and return -EINTR if the current task gets killed while waiting for mmap_sem. This also means that vm_mmap_pgoff can be killable by default and drop the additional parameter. This will help in the OOM conditions when the oom victim might be stuck waiting for the mmap_sem for write which in turn can block oom_reaper which relies on the mmap_sem for read to make a forward progress and reclaim the address space of the victim. Please note that load_elf_binary is ignoring vm_mmap error for current->personality & MMAP_PAGE_ZERO case but that shouldn't be a problem because the address is not used anywhere and we never return to the userspace if we got killed. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: make mmap_sem for write waits killable for mm syscallsMichal Hocko2016-05-241-4/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is a follow up work for oom_reaper [1]. As the async OOM killing depends on oom_sem for read we would really appreciate if a holder for write didn't stood in the way. This patchset is changing many of down_write calls to be killable to help those cases when the writer is blocked and waiting for readers to release the lock and so help __oom_reap_task to process the oom victim. Most of the patches are really trivial because the lock is help from a shallow syscall paths where we can return EINTR trivially and allow the current task to die (note that EINTR will never get to the userspace as the task has fatal signal pending). Others seem to be easy as well as the callers are already handling fatal errors and bail and return to userspace which should be sufficient to handle the failure gracefully. I am not familiar with all those code paths so a deeper review is really appreciated. As this work is touching more areas which are not directly connected I have tried to keep the CC list as small as possible and people who I believed would be familiar are CCed only to the specific patches (all should have received the cover though). This patchset is based on linux-next and it depends on down_write_killable for rw_semaphores which got merged into tip locking/rwsem branch and it is merged into this next tree. I guess it would be easiest to route these patches via mmotm because of the dependency on the tip tree but if respective maintainers prefer other way I have no objections. I haven't covered all the mmap_write(mm->mmap_sem) instances here $ git grep "down_write(.*\<mmap_sem\>)" next/master | wc -l 98 $ git grep "down_write(.*\<mmap_sem\>)" | wc -l 62 I have tried to cover those which should be relatively easy to review in this series because this alone should be a nice improvement. Other places can be changed on top. [0] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1456752417-9626-1-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.org [1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1452094975-551-1-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.org [2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1456750705-7141-1-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.org This patch (of 18): This is the first step in making mmap_sem write waiters killable. It focuses on the trivial ones which are taking the lock early after entering the syscall and they are not changing state before. Therefore it is very easy to change them to use down_write_killable and immediately return with -EINTR. This will allow the waiter to pass away without blocking the mmap_sem which might be required to make a forward progress. E.g. the oom reaper will need the lock for reading to dismantle the OOM victim address space. The only tricky function in this patch is vm_mmap_pgoff which has many call sites via vm_mmap. To reduce the risk keep vm_mmap with the original non-killable semantic for now. vm_munmap callers do not bother checking the return value so open code it into the munmap syscall path for now for simplicity. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: enable RLIMIT_DATA by default with workaround for valgrindKonstantin Khlebnikov2016-05-211-4/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since commit 84638335900f ("mm: rework virtual memory accounting") RLIMIT_DATA limits both brk() and private mmap() but this's disabled by default because of incompatibility with older versions of valgrind. Valgrind always set limit to zero and fails if RLIMIT_DATA is enabled. Fortunately it changes only rlim_cur and keeps rlim_max for reverting limit back when needed. This patch checks current usage also against rlim_max if rlim_cur is zero. This is safe because task anyway can increase rlim_cur up to rlim_max. Size of brk is still checked against rlim_cur, so this part is completely compatible - zero rlim_cur forbids brk() but allows private mmap(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/56A28613.5070104@de.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm/mmap: kill hook arch_rebalance_pgtables()Konstantin Khlebnikov2016-05-201-5/+0
| | | | | | | | Nobody uses it. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'mm-pkeys-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-03-211-1/+9
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 protection key support from Ingo Molnar: "This tree adds support for a new memory protection hardware feature that is available in upcoming Intel CPUs: 'protection keys' (pkeys). There's a background article at LWN.net: https://lwn.net/Articles/643797/ The gist is that protection keys allow the encoding of user-controllable permission masks in the pte. So instead of having a fixed protection mask in the pte (which needs a system call to change and works on a per page basis), the user can map a (handful of) protection mask variants and can change the masks runtime relatively cheaply, without having to change every single page in the affected virtual memory range. This allows the dynamic switching of the protection bits of large amounts of virtual memory, via user-space instructions. It also allows more precise control of MMU permission bits: for example the executable bit is separate from the read bit (see more about that below). This tree adds the MM infrastructure and low level x86 glue needed for that, plus it adds a high level API to make use of protection keys - if a user-space application calls: mmap(..., PROT_EXEC); or mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC); (note PROT_EXEC-only, without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will notice this special case, and will set a special protection key on this memory range. It also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection Keys User Rights (PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable and unwritable. So using protection keys the kernel is able to implement 'true' PROT_EXEC on x86 CPUs: without protection keys PROT_EXEC implies PROT_READ as well. Unreadable executable mappings have security advantages: they cannot be read via information leaks to figure out ASLR details, nor can they be scanned for ROP gadgets - and they cannot be used by exploits for data purposes either. We know about no user-space code that relies on pure PROT_EXEC mappings today, but binary loaders could start making use of this new feature to map binaries and libraries in a more secure fashion. There is other pending pkeys work that offers more high level system call APIs to manage protection keys - but those are not part of this pull request. Right now there's a Kconfig that controls this feature (CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) that is default enabled (like most x86 CPU feature enablement code that has no runtime overhead), but it's not user-configurable at the moment. If there's any serious problem with this then we can make it configurable and/or flip the default" * 'mm-pkeys-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits) x86/mm/pkeys: Fix mismerge of protection keys CPUID bits mm/pkeys: Fix siginfo ABI breakage caused by new u64 field x86/mm/pkeys: Fix access_error() denial of writes to write-only VMA mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support x86/mm/pkeys: Create an x86 arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() for VMA flags x86/mm/pkeys: Allow kernel to modify user pkey rights register x86/fpu: Allow setting of XSAVE state x86/mm: Factor out LDT init from context init mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add arch_validate_pkey() mm/core, arch, powerpc: Pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits() x86/mm/pkeys: Actually enable Memory Protection Keys in the CPU x86/mm/pkeys: Add Kconfig prompt to existing config option x86/mm/pkeys: Dump pkey from VMA in /proc/pid/smaps x86/mm/pkeys: Dump PKRU with other kernel registers mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Differentiate instruction fetches x86/mm/pkeys: Optimize fault handling in access_error() mm/core: Do not enforce PKEY permissions on remote mm access um, pkeys: Add UML arch_*_access_permitted() methods mm/gup, x86/mm/pkeys: Check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys x86/mm/gup: Simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling ...
| * mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys supportDave Hansen2016-02-181-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Protection keys provide new page-based protection in hardware. But, they have an interesting attribute: they only affect data accesses and never affect instruction fetches. That means that if we set up some memory which is set as "access-disabled" via protection keys, we can still execute from it. This patch uses protection keys to set up mappings to do just that. If a user calls: mmap(..., PROT_EXEC); or mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC); (note PROT_EXEC-only without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will notice this, and set a special protection key on the memory. It also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection Keys User Rights (PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable and unwritable. I haven't found any userspace that does this today. With this facility in place, we expect userspace to move to use it eventually. Userspace _could_ start doing this today. Any PROT_EXEC calls get converted to PROT_READ inside the kernel, and would transparently be upgraded to "true" PROT_EXEC with this code. IOW, userspace never has to do any PROT_EXEC runtime detection. This feature provides enhanced protection against leaking executable memory contents. This helps thwart attacks which are attempting to find ROP gadgets on the fly. But, the security provided by this approach is not comprehensive. The PKRU register which controls access permissions is a normal user register writable from unprivileged userspace. An attacker who can execute the 'wrpkru' instruction can easily disable the protection provided by this feature. The protection key that is used for execute-only support is permanently dedicated at compile time. This is fine for now because there is currently no API to set a protection key other than this one. Despite there being a constant PKRU value across the entire system, we do not set it unless this feature is in use in a process. That is to preserve the PKRU XSAVE 'init state', which can lead to faster context switches. PKRU *is* a user register and the kernel is modifying it. That means that code doing: pkru = rdpkru() pkru |= 0x100; mmap(..., PROT_EXEC); wrpkru(pkru); could lose the bits in PKRU that enforce execute-only permissions. To avoid this, we suggest avoiding ever calling mmap() or mprotect() when the PKRU value is expected to be unstable. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Piotr Kwapulinski <kwapulinski.piotr@gmail.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210240.CB4BB5CA@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
| * mm/core, arch, powerpc: Pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits()Dave Hansen2016-02-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This plumbs a protection key through calc_vm_flag_bits(). We could have done this in calc_vm_prot_bits(), but I did not feel super strongly which way to go. It was pretty arbitrary which one to use. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@leon.nu> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Maxime Coquelin <mcoquelin.stm32@gmail.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Riley Andrews <riandrews@android.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: devel@driverdev.osuosl.org Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210231.E6F1F0D6@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-12-16 03:42:07 +0100