| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux
Pull nfsd fix from Chuck Lever:
- Fix a crash when using NFS with krb5p
* tag 'nfsd-6.3-4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux:
SUNRPC: Fix a crash in gss_krb5_checksum()
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Anna says:
> KASAN reports [...] a slab-out-of-bounds in gss_krb5_checksum(),
> and it can cause my client to panic when running cthon basic
> tests with krb5p.
> Running faddr2line gives me:
>
> gss_krb5_checksum+0x4b6/0x630:
> ahash_request_free at
> /home/anna/Programs/linux-nfs.git/./include/crypto/hash.h:619
> (inlined by) gss_krb5_checksum at
> /home/anna/Programs/linux-nfs.git/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c:358
My diagnosis is that the memcpy() at the end of gss_krb5_checksum()
reads past the end of the buffer containing the checksum data
because the callers have ignored gss_krb5_checksum()'s API contract:
* Caller provides the truncation length of the output token (h) in
* cksumout.len.
Instead they provide the fixed length of the hmac buffer. This
length happens to be larger than the value returned by
crypto_ahash_digestsize().
Change these errant callers to work like krb5_etm_{en,de}crypt().
As a defensive measure, bound the length of the byte copy at the
end of gss_krb5_checksum().
Kunit sez:
Testing complete. Ran 68 tests: passed: 68
Elapsed time: 81.680s total, 5.875s configuring, 75.610s building, 0.103s running
Reported-by: Anna Schumaker <schumaker.anna@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8270dbfcebea ("SUNRPC: Obscure Kerberos integrity keys")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux
Pull nfsd fixes from Chuck Lever:
- Protect NFSD writes against filesystem freezing
- Fix a potential memory leak during server shutdown
* tag 'nfsd-6.3-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux:
SUNRPC: Fix a server shutdown leak
NFSD: Protect against filesystem freezing
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Fix a race where kthread_stop() may prevent the threadfn from ever getting
called. If that happens the svc_rqst will not be cleaned up.
Fixes: ed6473ddc704 ("NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux
Pull nfsd fix from Chuck Lever:
- Make new GSS Kerberos Kunit tests work on non-x86 platforms
* tag 'nfsd-6.3-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux:
SUNRPC: Properly terminate test case arrays
SUNRPC: Let Kunit tests run with some enctypes compiled out
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Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 73657420 when execute
[73657420] *pgd=00000000
Internal error: Oops: 80000005 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Tainted: G N 6.2.0-rc7-00133-g373f26a81164-dirty #9
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
PC is at 0x73657420
LR is at kunit_run_tests+0x3e0/0x5f4
On x86 with GCC 12, the missing array terminators did not seem to
matter. Other platforms appear to be more picky.
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Allow the new GSS Kerberos encryption type test suites to run
outside of the kunit infrastructure. Replace the assertion that
fires when lookup_enctype() so that the case is skipped instead of
failing outright.
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Pull NFS client updates from Anna Schumaker:
"New Features:
- Convert the read and write paths to use folios
Bugfixes and Cleanups:
- Fix tracepoint state manager flag printing
- Fix disabling swap files
- Fix NFSv4 client identifier sysfs path in the documentation
- Don't clear NFS_CAP_COPY if server returns NFS4ERR_OFFLOAD_DENIED
- Treat GETDEVICEINFO errors as a layout failure
- Replace kmap_atomic() calls with kmap_local_page()
- Constify sunrpc sysfs kobj_type structures"
* tag 'nfs-for-6.3-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/anna/linux-nfs: (25 commits)
fs/nfs: Replace kmap_atomic() with kmap_local_page() in dir.c
pNFS/filelayout: treat GETDEVICEINFO errors as layout failure
Documentation: Fix sysfs path for the NFSv4 client identifier
nfs42: do not fail with EIO if ssc returns NFS4ERR_OFFLOAD_DENIED
NFS: fix disabling of swap
SUNRPC: make kobj_type structures constant
nfs4trace: fix state manager flag printing
NFS: Remove unnecessary check in nfs_read_folio()
NFS: Improve tracing of nfs_wb_folio()
NFS: Enable tracing of nfs_invalidate_folio() and nfs_launder_folio()
NFS: fix up nfs_release_folio() to try to release the page
NFS: Clean up O_DIRECT request allocation
NFS: Fix up nfs_vm_page_mkwrite() for folios
NFS: Convert nfs_write_begin/end to use folios
NFS: Remove unused function nfs_wb_page()
NFS: Convert buffered writes to use folios
NFS: Convert the function nfs_wb_page() to use folios
NFS: Convert buffered reads to use folios
NFS: Add a helper nfs_wb_folio()
NFS: Convert the remaining pagelist helper functions to support folios
...
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When swap is activated to a file on an NFSv4 mount we arrange that the
state manager thread is always present as starting a new thread requires
memory allocations that might block waiting for swap.
Unfortunately the code for allowing the state manager thread to exit when
swap is disabled was not tested properly and does not work.
This can be seen by examining /proc/fs/nfsfs/servers after disabling swap
and unmounting the filesystem. The servers file will still list one
entry. Also a "ps" listing will show the state manager thread is still
present.
There are two problems.
1/ rpc_clnt_swap_deactivate() doesn't walk up the ->cl_parent list to
find the primary client on which the state manager runs.
2/ The thread is not woken up properly and it immediately goes back to
sleep without checking whether it is really needed. Using
nfs4_schedule_state_manager() ensures a proper wake-up.
Reported-by: Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@umich.edu>
Fixes: 4dc73c679114 ("NFSv4: keep state manager thread active if swap is enabled")
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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Since commit ee6d3dd4ed48 ("driver core: make kobj_type constant.")
the driver core allows the usage of const struct kobj_type.
Take advantage of this to constify the structure definitions to prevent
modification at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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Pull nfsd updates from Chuck Lever:
"Two significant security enhancements are part of this release:
- NFSD's RPC header encoding and decoding, including RPCSEC GSS and
gssproxy header parsing, has been overhauled to make it more
memory-safe.
- Support for Kerberos AES-SHA2-based encryption types has been added
for both the NFS client and server. This provides a clean path for
deprecating and removing insecure encryption types based on DES and
SHA-1. AES-SHA2 is also FIPS-140 compliant, so that NFS with
Kerberos may now be used on systems with fips enabled.
In addition to these, NFSD is now able to handle crossing into an
auto-mounted mount point on an exported NFS mount. A number of fixes
have been made to NFSD's server-side copy implementation.
RPC metrics have been converted to per-CPU variables. This helps
reduce unnecessary cross-CPU and cross-node memory bus traffic, and
significantly reduces noise when KCSAN is enabled"
* tag 'nfsd-6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux: (121 commits)
NFSD: Clean up nfsd_symlink()
NFSD: copy the whole verifier in nfsd_copy_write_verifier
nfsd: don't fsync nfsd_files on last close
SUNRPC: Fix occasional warning when destroying gss_krb5_enctypes
nfsd: fix courtesy client with deny mode handling in nfs4_upgrade_open
NFSD: fix problems with cleanup on errors in nfsd4_copy
nfsd: fix race to check ls_layouts
nfsd: don't hand out delegation on setuid files being opened for write
SUNRPC: Remove ->xpo_secure_port()
SUNRPC: Clean up the svc_xprt_flags() macro
nfsd: remove fs/nfsd/fault_inject.c
NFSD: fix leaked reference count of nfsd4_ssc_umount_item
nfsd: clean up potential nfsd_file refcount leaks in COPY codepath
nfsd: zero out pointers after putting nfsd_files on COPY setup error
SUNRPC: Fix whitespace damage in svcauth_unix.c
nfsd: eliminate __nfs4_get_fd
nfsd: add some kerneldoc comments for stateid preprocessing functions
nfsd: eliminate find_deleg_file_locked
nfsd: don't take nfsd4_copy ref for OP_OFFLOAD_STATUS
SUNRPC: Add encryption self-tests
...
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I'm guessing that the warning fired because there's some code path
that is called on module unload where the gss_krb5_enctypes file
was never set up.
name 'gss_krb5_enctypes'
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6187 at fs/proc/generic.c:712 remove_proc_entry+0x38d/0x460 fs/proc/generic.c:712
destroy_krb5_enctypes_proc_entry net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c:1543 [inline]
gss_svc_shutdown_net+0x7d/0x2b0 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c:2120
ops_exit_list+0xb0/0x170 net/core/net_namespace.c:169
setup_net+0x9bd/0xe60 net/core/net_namespace.c:356
copy_net_ns+0x320/0x6b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:483
create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xb20 kernel/nsproxy.c:110
copy_namespaces+0x410/0x500 kernel/nsproxy.c:179
copy_process+0x311d/0x76b0 kernel/fork.c:2272
kernel_clone+0xeb/0x9a0 kernel/fork.c:2684
__do_sys_clone+0xba/0x100 kernel/fork.c:2825
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Reported-by: syzbot+04a8437497bcfb4afa95@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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There's no need for the cost of this extra virtual function call
during every RPC transaction: the RQ_SECURE bit can be set properly
in ->xpo_recvfrom() instead.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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With the KUnit infrastructure recently added, we are free to define
other unit tests particular to our implementation. As an example,
I've added a self-test that encrypts then decrypts a string, and
checks the result.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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RFC 8009 provides sample encryption results. Add KUnit tests to
ensure our implementation derives the expected results for the
provided sample input.
I hate how large this test is, but using non-standard key usage
values means rfc8009_encrypt_case() can't simply reuse ->import_ctx
to allocate and key its ciphers; and the test provides its own
confounders, which means krb5_etm_encrypt() can't be used directly.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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RFC 8009 provides sample checksum results. Add KUnit tests to ensure
our implementation derives the expected results for the provided
sample input.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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RFC 8009 provides sample key derivation results, so Kunit tests are
added to ensure our implementation derives the expected keys for the
provided sample input.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Add tests for the new-to-RPCSEC Camellia cipher.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Test the new-to-RPCSEC CMAC digest algorithm.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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The Camellia enctypes use a new KDF, so add some tests to ensure it
is working properly.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Add Kunit tests for ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96. The test
vectors come from RFC 3962 Appendix B.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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RFC 3961 Appendix A provides tests for the KDF specified in that
document as well as other parts of Kerberos. The other three usage
scenarios in Section 10 are not implemented by the Linux kernel's
RPCSEC GSS Kerberos 5 mechanism, so tests are not added for those.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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I plan to add KUnit tests that will need enctype profile
information. Export the enctype profile lookup function.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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The Kerberos RFCs provide test vectors to verify the operation of
an implementation. Introduce a KUnit test framework to exercise the
Linux kernel's implementation of Kerberos.
Start with test cases for the RFC 3961-defined n-fold function. The
sample vectors for that are found in RFC 3961 Section 10.
Run the GSS Kerberos 5 mechanism's unit tests with this command:
$ ./tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run \
--kunitconfig ./net/sunrpc/.kunitconfig
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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The goal is to leave only protocol-defined items in gss_krb5.h so
that it can be easily replaced by a generic header. Implementation
specific items are moved to the new internal header.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Add the RFC 6803 encryption types to the string of integers that is
reported to gssd during upcalls. This enables gssd to utilize keys
with these encryption types when support for them is built into the
kernel.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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The Camellia enctypes use the KDF_FEEDBACK_CMAC Key Derivation
Function defined in RFC 6803 Section 3.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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RFC 6803 defines two encryption types that use Camellia ciphers (RFC
3713) and CMAC digests. Implement support for those in SunRPC's GSS
Kerberos 5 mechanism.
There has not been an explicit request to support these enctypes.
However, this new set of enctypes provides a good alternative to the
AES-SHA1 enctypes that are to be deprecated at some point.
As this implementation is still a "beta", the default is to not
build it automatically.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Add the RFC 8009 encryption types to the string of integers that is
reported to gssd during upcalls. This enables gssd to utilize keys
with these encryption types when support for them is built into the
kernel.
Link: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=400
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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RFC 8009 enctypes use different crypt formulae than previous
Kerberos 5 encryption types. Section 1 of RFC 8009 explains the
reason for this change:
> The new types conform to the framework specified in [RFC3961],
> but do not use the simplified profile, as the simplified profile
> is not compliant with modern cryptographic best practices such as
> calculating Message Authentication Codes (MACs) over ciphertext
> rather than plaintext.
Add new .encrypt and .decrypt functions to handle this variation.
The new approach described above is referred to as Encrypt-then-MAC
(or EtM). Hence the names of the new functions added here are
prefixed with "krb5_etm_".
A critical second difference with previous crypt formulae is that
the cipher state is included in the computed HMAC. Note however that
for RPCSEC, the initial cipher state is easy to compute on both
initiator and acceptor because it is always all zeroes.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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The RFC 8009 encryption types use a different key derivation
function than the RFC 3962 encryption types. The new key derivation
function is defined in Section 3 of RFC 8009.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Fill in entries in the supported_gss_krb5_enctypes array for the
encryption types defined in RFC 8009. These new enctypes use the
SHA-256 and SHA-384 message digest algorithms (as defined in
FIPS-180) instead of the deprecated SHA-1 algorithm, and are thus
more secure.
Note that NIST has scheduled SHA-1 for deprecation:
https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2022/12/nist-retires-sha-1-cryptographic-algorithm
Thus these new encryption types are placed under a separate CONFIG
option to enable distributors to separately introduce support for
the AES-SHA2 enctypes and deprecate support for the current set of
AES-SHA1 encryption types as their user space allows.
As this implementation is still a "beta", the default is to not
build it automatically.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Cryptosystem profile enctypes all use cipher block chaining
with ciphertext steal (CBC-with-CTS). However enctypes that are
currently supported in the Linux kernel SunRPC implementation
use only the encrypt-&-MAC approach. The RFC 8009 enctypes use
encrypt-then-MAC, which performs encryption and checksumming in
a different order.
Refactor to make it possible to share the CBC with CTS encryption
and decryption mechanisms between e&M and etM enctypes.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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The aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192 enctype specifies the length of its
checksum and integrity subkeys as 192 bits, but the length of its
encryption subkey (Ke) as 256 bits. Add new fields to struct
gss_krb5_enctype that specify the key lengths individually, and
where needed, use the correct new field instead of ->keylength.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Although the Kerberos specs have always listed separate subkey
lengths, the Linux kernel's SunRPC GSS Kerberos enctype profiles
assume the base key and the derived keys have identical lengths.
The aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192 enctype specifies the length of its
checksum and integrity subkeys as 192 bits, but the length of its
encryption subkey (Ke) as 256 bits.
To support that enctype, parametrize context_v2_alloc_cipher() so
that each of its call sites can pass in its desired key length. For
now it will be the same length as before (gk5e->keylength), but a
subsequent patch will change this.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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De-duplicate some common code.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Each Kerberos enctype can have a different KDF. Refactor the key
derivation path to support different KDFs for the enctypes
introduced in subsequent patches.
In particular, expose the key derivation function in struct
gss_krb5_enctype instead of the enctype's preferred random-to-key
function. The latter is usually the identity function and is only
ever called during key derivation, so have each KDF call it
directly.
A couple of extra clean-ups:
- Deduplicate the set_cdata() helper
- Have ->derive_key return negative errnos, in accordance with usual
kernel coding conventions
This patch is a little bigger than I'd like, but these are all
mechanical changes and they are all to the same areas of code. No
behavior change is intended.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Clean up: there is now only one encrypt and only one decrypt method,
thus there is no longer a need for the v2-suffixed method names.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Clean up: ->encrypt is set to only one value. Replace the two
remaining call sites with direct calls to krb5_encrypt().
There have never been any call sites for the ->decrypt() method.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Because the DES block cipher has been deprecated by Internet
standard, highly secure configurations might require that DES
support be blacklisted or not installed. NFS Kerberos should still
be able to work correctly with only the AES-based enctypes in that
situation.
Also note that MIT Kerberos has begun a deprecation process for DES
encryption types. Their README for 1.19.3 states:
> Beginning with the krb5-1.19 release, a warning will be issued
> if initial credentials are acquired using the des3-cbc-sha1
> encryption type. In future releases, this encryption type will
> be disabled by default and eventually removed.
>
> Beginning with the krb5-1.18 release, single-DES encryption
> types have been removed.
Aside from the CONFIG option name change, there are two important
policy changes:
1. The 'insecure enctype' group is now disabled by default.
Distributors have to take action to enable support for deprecated
enctypes. Implementation of these enctypes will be removed in a
future kernel release.
2. des3-cbc-sha1 is now considered part of the 'insecure enctype'
group, having been deprecated by RFC 8429, and is thus disabled
by default
After this patch is applied, SunRPC support can be built with
Kerberos 5 support but without CRYPTO_DES enabled in the kernel.
And, when these enctypes are disabled, the Linux kernel's SunRPC
RPCSEC GSS implementation fully complies with BCP 179 / RFC 6649
and BCP 218 / RFC 8429.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Now that all consumers of the KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES macro are
within the SunRPC layer, the macro can be replaced with something
private and more flexible.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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I would like to replace the KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES macro so that
there is finer granularity about what enctype support is built in
to the kernel and then advertised by it.
The /proc/fs/nfsd/supported_krb5_enctypes file is a legacy API
that advertises supported enctypes to rpc.svcgssd (I think?). It
simply prints the value of the KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES macro, so it
will need to be replaced with something that can instead display
exactly which enctypes are configured and built into the SunRPC
layer.
Completely decommissioning such APIs is hard. Instead, add a file
that is managed by SunRPC's GSS Kerberos mechanism, which is
authoritative about enctype support status. A subsequent patch will
replace /proc/fs/nfsd/supported_krb5_enctypes with a symlink to this
new file.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Replace another switch on encryption type so that it does not have
to be modified when adding or removing support for an enctype.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Replace a number of switches on encryption type so that all of them don't
have to be modified when adding or removing support for an enctype.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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There's no need to keep the integrity keys around if we instead
allocate and key a pair of ahashes and keep those. This not only
enables the subkeys to be destroyed immediately after deriving
them, but it makes the Kerberos integrity code path more efficient.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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There's no need to keep the signing keys around if we instead allocate
and key an ahash and keep that. This not only enables the subkeys to
be destroyed immediately after deriving them, but it makes the
Kerberos signing code path more efficient.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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The encryption subkeys are not used after the cipher transforms have
been allocated and keyed. There is no need to retain them in struct
krb5_ctx.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Hoist the name of the aux_cipher into struct gss_krb5_enctype to
prepare for obscuring the encryption keys just after they are
derived.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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ctx->Ksess is never used after import has completed. Obscure it
immediately so it cannot be re-used or copied.
Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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