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* xfrm: Add Direction to the SA in or outAntony Antony2024-05-011-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch introduces the 'dir' attribute, 'in' or 'out', to the xfrm_state, SA, enhancing usability by delineating the scope of values based on direction. An input SA will restrict values pertinent to input, effectively segregating them from output-related values. And an output SA will restrict attributes for output. This change aims to streamline the configuration process and improve the overall consistency of SA attributes during configuration. This feature sets the groundwork for future patches, including the upcoming IP-TFS patch. Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* net: xfrm: Amend XFRMA_SEC_CTX nla_policy structureLin Ma2023-07-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | According to all consumers code of attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX], like * verify_sec_ctx_len(), convert to xfrm_user_sec_ctx* * xfrm_state_construct(), call security_xfrm_state_alloc whose prototype is int security_xfrm_state_alloc(.., struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx); * copy_from_user_sec_ctx(), convert to xfrm_user_sec_ctx * ... It seems that the expected parsing result for XFRMA_SEC_CTX should be structure xfrm_user_sec_ctx, and the current xfrm_sec_ctx is confusing and misleading (Luckily, they happen to have same size 8 bytes). This commit amend the policy structure to xfrm_user_sec_ctx to avoid ambiguity. Fixes: cf5cb79f6946 ("[XFRM] netlink: Establish an attribute policy") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm/compat: prevent potential spectre v1 gadget in xfrm_xlate32_attr()Eric Dumazet2023-01-231-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | int type = nla_type(nla); if (type > XFRMA_MAX) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } @type is then used as an array index and can be used as a Spectre v1 gadget. if (nla_len(nla) < compat_policy[type].len) { array_index_nospec() can be used to prevent leaking content of kernel memory to malicious users. Fixes: 5106f4a8acff ("xfrm/compat: Add 32=>64-bit messages translator") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm: compat: change expression for switch in xfrm_xlate64Anastasia Belova2023-01-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Compare XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO (value from netlink configuration messages enum) with nlh_src->nlmsg_type instead of nlh_src->nlmsg_type - XFRM_MSG_BASE. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: 4e9505064f58 ("net/xfrm/compat: Copy xfrm_spdattr_type_t atributes") Signed-off-by: Anastasia Belova <abelova@astralinux.ru> Acked-by: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change message to user spaceAntony Antony2021-12-231-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Kernel generates mapping change message, XFRM_MSG_MAPPING, when a source port chage is detected on a input state with UDP encapsulation set. Kernel generates a message for each IPsec packet with new source port. For a high speed flow per packet mapping change message can be excessive, and can overload the user space listener. Introduce rate limiting for XFRM_MSG_MAPPING message to the user space. The rate limiting is configurable via netlink, when adding a new SA or updating it. Use the new attribute XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH in seconds. v1->v2 change: update xfrm_sa_len() v2->v3 changes: use u32 insted unsigned long to reduce size of struct xfrm_state fix xfrm_ompat size Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> accept XFRM_MSG_MAPPING only when XFRMA_ENCAP is present Co-developed-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* net/xfrm/compat: Copy xfrm_spdattr_type_t atributesDmitry Safonov2021-07-211-5/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The attribute-translator has to take in mind maxtype, that is xfrm_link::nla_max. When it is set, attributes are not of xfrm_attr_type_t. Currently, they can be only XFRMA_SPD_MAX (message XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO), their UABI is the same for 64/32-bit, so just copy them. Thanks to YueHaibing for reporting this: In xfrm_user_rcv_msg_compat() if maxtype is not zero and less than XFRMA_MAX, nlmsg_parse_deprecated() do not initialize attrs array fully. xfrm_xlate32() will access uninit 'attrs[i]' while iterating all attrs array. KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000041b58ab0-0x0000000041b58ab7] CPU: 0 PID: 15799 Comm: syz-executor.2 Tainted: G W 5.14.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 RIP: 0010:nla_type include/net/netlink.h:1130 [inline] RIP: 0010:xfrm_xlate32_attr net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c:410 [inline] RIP: 0010:xfrm_xlate32 net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c:532 [inline] RIP: 0010:xfrm_user_rcv_msg_compat+0x5e5/0x1070 net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c:577 [...] Call Trace: xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x556/0x8b0 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:2774 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6b/0x90 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:2824 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340 netlink_sendmsg+0x86d/0xdb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:702 [inline] Fixes: 5106f4a8acff ("xfrm/compat: Add 32=>64-bit messages translator") Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Reported-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm/compat: Cleanup WARN()s that can be user-triggeredDmitry Safonov2021-03-301-3/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace WARN_ONCE() that can be triggered from userspace with pr_warn_once(). Those still give user a hint what's the issue. I've left WARN()s that are not possible to trigger with current code-base and that would mean that the code has issues: - relying on current compat_msg_min[type] <= xfrm_msg_min[type] - expected 4-byte padding size difference between compat_msg_min[type] and xfrm_msg_min[type] - compat_policy[type].len <= xfrma_policy[type].len (for every type) Reported-by: syzbot+834ffd1afc7212eb8147@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 5f3eea6b7e8f ("xfrm/compat: Attach xfrm dumps to 64=>32 bit translator") Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm/compat: Don't allocate memory with __GFP_ZERODmitry Safonov2020-11-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | 32-bit to 64-bit messages translator zerofies needed paddings in the translation, the rest is the actual payload. Don't allocate zero pages as they are not needed. Fixes: 5106f4a8acff ("xfrm/compat: Add 32=>64-bit messages translator") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm/compat: memset(0) 64-bit padding at right placeDmitry Safonov2020-11-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 32-bit messages translated by xfrm_compat can have attributes attached. For all, but XFRMA_SA, XFRMA_POLICY the size of payload is the same in 32-bit UABI and 64-bit UABI. For XFRMA_SA (struct xfrm_usersa_info) and XFRMA_POLICY (struct xfrm_userpolicy_info) it's only tail-padding that is present in 64-bit payload, but not in 32-bit. The proper size for destination nlattr is already calculated by xfrm_user_rcv_calculate_len64() and allocated with kvmalloc(). xfrm_attr_cpy32() copies 32-bit copy_len into 64-bit attribute translated payload, zero-filling possible padding for SA/POLICY. Due to a typo, *pos already has 64-bit payload size, in a result next memset(0) is called on the memory after the translated attribute, not on the tail-padding of it. Fixes: 5106f4a8acff ("xfrm/compat: Add 32=>64-bit messages translator") Reported-by: syzbot+c43831072e7df506a646@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm/compat: Translate by copying XFRMA_UNSPEC attributeDmitry Safonov2020-11-091-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | xfrm_xlate32() translates 64-bit message provided by kernel to be sent for 32-bit listener (acknowledge or monitor). Translator code doesn't expect XFRMA_UNSPEC attribute as it doesn't know its payload. Kernel never attaches such attribute, but a user can. I've searched if any opensource does it and the answer is no. Nothing on github and google finds only tfcproject that has such code commented-out. What will happen if a user sends a netlink message with XFRMA_UNSPEC attribute? Ipsec code ignores this attribute. But if there is a monitor-process or 32-bit user requested ack - kernel will try to translate such message and will hit WARN_ONCE() in xfrm_xlate64_attr(). Deal with XFRMA_UNSPEC by copying the attribute payload with xfrm_nla_cpy(). In result, the default switch-case in xfrm_xlate64_attr() becomes an unused code. Leave those 3 lines in case a new xfrm attribute will be added. Fixes: 5461fc0c8d9f ("xfrm/compat: Add 64=>32-bit messages translator") Reported-by: syzbot+a7e701c8385bd8543074@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm/compat: Translate 32-bit user_policy from sockptrDmitry Safonov2020-09-241-0/+26
| | | | | | | | Provide compat_xfrm_userpolicy_info translation for xfrm setsocketopt(). Reallocate buffer and put the missing padding for 64-bit message. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm/compat: Add 32=>64-bit messages translatorDmitry Safonov2020-09-241-0/+274
| | | | | | | | | | Provide the user-to-kernel translator under XFRM_USER_COMPAT, that creates for 32-bit xfrm-user message a 64-bit translation. The translation is afterwards reused by xfrm_user code just as if userspace had sent 64-bit message. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm/compat: Add 64=>32-bit messages translatorDmitry Safonov2020-09-241-0/+296
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide the kernel-to-user translator under XFRM_USER_COMPAT, that creates for 64-bit xfrm-user message a 32-bit translation and puts it in skb's frag_list. net/compat.c layer provides MSG_CMSG_COMPAT to decide if the message should be taken from skb or frag_list. (used by wext-core which has also an ABI difference) Kernel sends 64-bit xfrm messages to the userspace for: - multicast (monitor events) - netlink dumps Wire up the translator to xfrm_nlmsg_multicast(). Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm: Provide API to register translator moduleDmitry Safonov2020-09-241-0/+29
Add a skeleton for xfrm_compat module and provide API to register it in xfrm_state.ko. struct xfrm_translator will have function pointers to translate messages received from 32-bit userspace or to be sent to it from 64-bit kernel. module_get()/module_put() are used instead of rcu_read_lock() as the module will vmalloc() memory for translation. The new API is registered with xfrm_state module, not with xfrm_user as the former needs translator for user_policy set by setsockopt() and xfrm_user already uses functions from xfrm_state. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>