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No one checks the return value of debugfs_create_bool(), as it's not
needed, so make the return value void, so that no one tries to do so in
the future.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210521184519.1356639-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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There is no need to keep the dentry around for the debugfs trace files,
as we can just look it up when we want to remove it later on. Simplify
the structure by removing the dentries and relying on debugfs to find
the dentry to remove when we want to.
By doing this change, we remove the last in-kernel user that was storing
the result of debugfs_create_bool(), so that api can be cleaned up.
Cc: Karan Tilak Kumar <kartilak@cisco.com>
Cc: Sesidhar Baddela <sebaddel@cisco.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: <linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210518161625.3696996-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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There is no need to keep around the dentry pointers for the debugfs
files as they will all be automatically removed when the subdir is
removed. So save the space and logic involved in keeping them around by
just getting rid of them entirely.
By doing this change, we remove one of the last in-kernel user that was
storing the result of debugfs_create_bool(), so that api can be cleaned
up.
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Cc: b43-dev@lists.infradead.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210518163304.3702015-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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There is no need to keep around the dentry pointers for the debugfs
files as they will all be automatically removed when the subdir is
removed. So save the space and logic involved in keeping them around by
just getting rid of them entirely.
By doing this change, we remove one of the last in-kernel user that was
storing the result of debugfs_create_bool(), so that api can be cleaned
up.
Cc: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Cc: b43-dev@lists.infradead.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210518163309.3702100-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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There is no need to keep the dentry around for the debugfs kvmgt cache
file, as we can just look it up when we want to remove it later on.
Simplify the structure by removing the dentry and relying on debugfs
to find the dentry to remove when we want to.
By doing this change, we remove the last in-kernel user that was storing
the result of debugfs_create_long(), so that api can be cleaned up.
Cc: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Zhi Wang <zhi.a.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: intel-gvt-dev@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Reviewed-by: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210518161705.3697143-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The CRC calculation done by genksyms is triggered when the parser hits
EXPORT_SYMBOL*() macros. At this point, genksyms recursively expands the
types, and uses that as the input for the CRC calculation. In the case
of forward-declared structs, the type expands to 'UNKNOWN'. Next, the
result of the expansion of each type is cached, and is re-used when/if
the same type is seen again for another exported symbol in the file.
Unfortunately, this can cause CRC 'stability' issues when a struct
definition becomes visible in the middle of a C file. For example, let's
assume code with the following pattern:
struct foo;
int bar(struct foo *arg)
{
/* Do work ... */
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bar);
/* This contains struct foo's definition */
#include "foo.h"
int baz(struct foo *arg)
{
/* Do more work ... */
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(baz);
Here, baz's CRC will be computed using the expansion of struct foo that
was cached after bar's CRC calculation ('UNKOWN' here). But if
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bar) is removed from the file (because of e.g. symbol
trimming using CONFIG_TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS), struct foo will be expanded
late, during baz's CRC calculation, which now has visibility over the
full struct definition, hence resulting in a different CRC for baz.
This can cause annoying issues for distro kernel (such as the Android
Generic Kernel Image) which use CONFIG_UNUSED_KSYMS_WHITELIST. Indeed,
as per the above, adding a symbol to the whitelist can change the CRC of
symbols that are already kept exported. As such, modules built against a
kernel with a trimmed ABI may not load against the same kernel built
with an extended whitelist, even though they are still strictly binary
compatible. While rebuilding the modules would obviously solve the
issue, I believe this classifies as an odd genksyms corner case, and it
gets in the way of kernel updates in the GKI context.
To work around the issue, make sure to keep issuing the
__GENKSYMS_EXPORT_SYMBOL macros for all trimmed symbols, hence making
the genksyms parsing insensitive to symbol trimming.
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408180105.2496212-1-qperret@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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syzbot is reporting OOB write at vga16fb_imageblit() [1], for
resize_screen() from ioctl(VT_RESIZE) returns 0 without checking whether
requested rows/columns fit the amount of memory reserved for the graphical
screen if current mode is KD_GRAPHICS.
----------
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kd.h>
#include <linux/vt.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
const int fd = open("/dev/char/4:1", O_RDWR);
struct vt_sizes vt = { 0x4100, 2 };
ioctl(fd, KDSETMODE, KD_GRAPHICS);
ioctl(fd, VT_RESIZE, &vt);
ioctl(fd, KDSETMODE, KD_TEXT);
return 0;
}
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Allow framebuffer drivers to return -EINVAL, by moving vc->vc_mode !=
KD_GRAPHICS check from resize_screen() to fbcon_resize().
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1f29e126cf461c4de3b3 [1]
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+1f29e126cf461c4de3b3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+1f29e126cf461c4de3b3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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iomap_max_page_shift is expected to contain a page shift, so it can't be a
'bool', has to be an 'unsigned int'
And fix the default values: P4D_SHIFT is when huge iomap is allowed.
However, on some architectures (eg: powerpc book3s/64), P4D_SHIFT is not a
constant so it can't be used to initialise a static variable. So,
initialise iomap_max_page_shift with a maximum shift supported by the
architecture, it is gated by P4D_SHIFT in vmap_try_huge_p4d() anyway.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ad2d366015794a9f21320dcbdd0a8eb98979e9df.1620898113.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Fixes: bbc180a5adb0 ("mm: HUGE_VMAP arch support cleanup")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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When I added CONFIG_MODPROBE_PATH, I neglected to update Documentation/.
It's still true that this defaults to /sbin/modprobe, but now via a level
of indirection. So document that the kernel might have been built with
something other than /sbin/modprobe as the initial value.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210420125324.1246826-1-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk
Fixes: 17652f4240f7a ("modules: add CONFIG_MODPROBE_PATH")
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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I believe there are some issues introduced by commit 31651c607151
("hfsplus: avoid deadlock on file truncation")
HFS+ has extent records which always contains 8 extents. In case the
first extent record in catalog file gets full, new ones are allocated from
extents overflow file.
In case shrinking truncate happens to middle of an extent record which
locates in extents overflow file, the logic in hfsplus_file_truncate() was
changed so that call to hfs_brec_remove() is not guarded any more.
Right action would be just freeing the extents that exceed the new size
inside extent record by calling hfsplus_free_extents(), and then check if
the whole extent record should be removed. However since the guard
(blk_cnt > start) is now after the call to hfs_brec_remove(), this has
unfortunate effect that the last matching extent record is removed
unconditionally.
To reproduce this issue, create a file which has at least 10 extents, and
then perform shrinking truncate into middle of the last extent record, so
that the number of remaining extents is not under or divisible by 8. This
causes the last extent record (8 extents) to be removed totally instead of
truncating into middle of it. Thus this causes corruption, and lost data.
Fix for this is simply checking if the new truncated end is below the
start of this extent record, making it safe to remove the full extent
record. However call to hfs_brec_remove() can't be moved to it's previous
place since we're dropping ->tree_lock and it can cause a race condition
and the cached info being invalidated possibly corrupting the node data.
Another issue is related to this one. When entering into the block
(blk_cnt > start) we are not holding the ->tree_lock. We break out from
the loop not holding the lock, but hfs_find_exit() does unlock it. Not
sure if it's possible for someone else to take the lock under our feet,
but it can cause hard to debug errors and premature unlocking. Even if
there's no real risk of it, the locking should still always be kept in
balance. Thus taking the lock now just before the check.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210429165139.3082828-1-jouni.roivas@tuxera.com
Fixes: 31651c607151f ("hfsplus: avoid deadlock on file truncation")
Signed-off-by: Jouni Roivas <jouni.roivas@tuxera.com>
Reviewed-by: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com>
Cc: Anatoly Trosinenko <anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com>
Cc: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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A readahead request will not allocate more memory than can be represented
by a size_t, even on systems that have HIGHMEM available. Change the
length functions from returning an loff_t to a size_t.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210510201201.1558972-1-willy@infradead.org
Fixes: 32c0a6bcaa1f57 ("btrfs: add and use readahead_batch_length")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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These tests deliberately access these arrays out of bounds, which will
cause the dynamic local bounds checks inserted by
CONFIG_UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS to fail and panic the kernel. To avoid this
problem, access the arrays via volatile pointers, which will prevent the
compiler from being able to determine the array bounds.
These accesses use volatile pointers to char (char *volatile) rather than
the more conventional pointers to volatile char (volatile char *) because
we want to prevent the compiler from making inferences about the pointer
itself (i.e. its array bounds), not the data that it refers to.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210507025915.1464056-1-pcc@google.com
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I90b1713fbfa1bf68ff895aef099ea77b98a7c3b9
Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: George Popescu <georgepope@android.com>
Cc: Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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32-bit architectures which expect 8-byte alignment for 8-byte integers and
need 64-bit DMA addresses (arm, mips, ppc) had their struct page
inadvertently expanded in 2019. When the dma_addr_t was added, it forced
the alignment of the union to 8 bytes, which inserted a 4 byte gap between
'flags' and the union.
Fix this by storing the dma_addr_t in one or two adjacent unsigned longs.
This restores the alignment to that of an unsigned long. We always
store the low bits in the first word to prevent the PageTail bit from
being inadvertently set on a big endian platform. If that happened,
get_user_pages_fast() racing against a page which was freed and
reallocated to the page_pool could dereference a bogus compound_head(),
which would be hard to trace back to this cause.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210510153211.1504886-1-willy@infradead.org
Fixes: c25fff7171be ("mm: add dma_addr_t to struct page")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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remove_rmap_item_from_tree()"
This reverts commit 3e96b6a2e9ad929a3230a22f4d64a74671a0720b. General
Protection Fault in rmap_walk_ksm() under memory pressure:
remove_rmap_item_from_tree() needs to take page lock, of course.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.2105092253500.1127@eggly.anvils
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Consider the following sequence of events:
1. Userspace issues a UFFD ioctl, which ends up calling into
shmem_mfill_atomic_pte(). We successfully account the blocks, we
shmem_alloc_page(), but then the copy_from_user() fails. We return
-ENOENT. We don't release the page we allocated.
2. Our caller detects this error code, tries the copy_from_user() after
dropping the mmap_lock, and retries, calling back into
shmem_mfill_atomic_pte().
3. Meanwhile, let's say another process filled up the tmpfs being used.
4. So shmem_mfill_atomic_pte() fails to account blocks this time, and
immediately returns - without releasing the page.
This triggers a BUG_ON in our caller, which asserts that the page
should always be consumed, unless -ENOENT is returned.
To fix this, detect if we have such a "dangling" page when accounting
fails, and if so, release it before returning.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210428230858.348400-1-axelrasmussen@google.com
Fixes: cb658a453b93 ("userfaultfd: shmem: avoid leaking blocks and used blocks in UFFDIO_COPY")
Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Sysbot has reported a "divide error" which has been identified as being
caused by a corrupted file_size value within the file inode. This value
has been corrupted to a much larger value than expected.
Calculate_skip() is passed i_size_read(inode) >> msblk->block_log. Due to
the file_size value corruption this overflows the int argument/variable in
that function, leading to the divide error.
This patch changes the function to use u64. This will accommodate any
unexpectedly large values due to corruption.
The value returned from calculate_skip() is clamped to be never more than
SQUASHFS_CACHED_BLKS - 1, or 7. So file_size corruption does not lead to
an unexpectedly large return result here.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210507152618.9447-1-phillip@squashfs.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Reported-by: <syzbot+e8f781243ce16ac2f962@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Reported-by: <syzbot+7b98870d4fec9447b951@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Splitting an earlier version of a patch that allowed calling
__request_region() while holding the resource lock into a series of
patches required changing the return code for the newly introduced
__request_region_locked().
Unfortunately this change was not carried through to a subsequent commit
56fd94919b8b ("kernel/resource: fix locking in request_free_mem_region")
in the series. This resulted in a use-after-free due to freeing the
struct resource without properly releasing it. Fix this by correcting the
return code check so that the struct is not freed if the request to add it
was successful.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210512073528.22334-1-apopple@nvidia.com
Fixes: 56fd94919b8b ("kernel/resource: fix locking in request_free_mem_region")
Signed-off-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <smuchun@gmail.com>
Cc: Oliver Sang <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Paul E. McKenney reported [1] that commit 1f0723a4c0df ("mm, slub: enable
slub_debug static key when creating cache with explicit debug flags")
results in the lockdep complaint:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.12.0+ #15 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
rcu_torture_sta/109 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff96063cd0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: static_key_enable+0x9/0x20
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff96173c28 (slab_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x2d/0x250
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (slab_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
lock_acquire+0xb9/0x3a0
__mutex_lock+0x8d/0x920
slub_cpu_dead+0x15/0xf0
cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x17a/0x7c0
cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x3b/0x80
_cpu_down+0xdf/0x2a0
cpu_down+0x2c/0x50
device_offline+0x82/0xb0
remove_cpu+0x1a/0x30
torture_offline+0x80/0x140
torture_onoff+0x147/0x260
kthread+0x10a/0x140
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
-> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
check_prev_add+0x8f/0xbf0
__lock_acquire+0x13f0/0x1d80
lock_acquire+0xb9/0x3a0
cpus_read_lock+0x21/0xa0
static_key_enable+0x9/0x20
__kmem_cache_create+0x38d/0x430
kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x146/0x250
kmem_cache_create+0xd/0x10
rcu_torture_stats+0x79/0x280
kthread+0x10a/0x140
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(slab_mutex);
lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
lock(slab_mutex);
lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by rcu_torture_sta/109:
#0: ffffffff96173c28 (slab_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x2d/0x250
stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 PID: 109 Comm: rcu_torture_sta Not tainted 5.12.0+ #15
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x6d/0x89
check_noncircular+0xfe/0x110
? lock_is_held_type+0x98/0x110
check_prev_add+0x8f/0xbf0
__lock_acquire+0x13f0/0x1d80
lock_acquire+0xb9/0x3a0
? static_key_enable+0x9/0x20
? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
cpus_read_lock+0x21/0xa0
? static_key_enable+0x9/0x20
static_key_enable+0x9/0x20
__kmem_cache_create+0x38d/0x430
kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x146/0x250
? rcu_torture_stats_print+0xd0/0xd0
kmem_cache_create+0xd/0x10
rcu_torture_stats+0x79/0x280
? rcu_torture_stats_print+0xd0/0xd0
kthread+0x10a/0x140
? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
This is because there's one order of locking from the hotplug callbacks:
lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); // from hotplug machinery itself
lock(slab_mutex); // in e.g. slab_mem_going_offline_callback()
And commit 1f0723a4c0df made the reverse sequence possible:
lock(slab_mutex); // in kmem_cache_create_usercopy()
lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); // kmem_cache_open() -> static_key_enable()
The simplest fix is to move static_key_enable() to a place before slab_mutex is
taken. That means kmem_cache_create_usercopy() in mm/slab_common.c which is not
ideal for SLUB-specific code, but the #ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG makes it
at least self-contained and obvious.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210502171827.GA3670492@paulmck-ThinkPad-P17-Gen-1/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210504120019.26791-1-vbabka@suse.cz
Fixes: 1f0723a4c0df ("mm, slub: enable slub_debug static key when creating cache with explicit debug flags")
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
When rework early cow of pinned hugetlb pages, we moved huge_ptep_get()
upper but overlooked a side effect that the huge_ptep_get() will fetch the
pte after wr-protection. After moving it upwards, we need explicit
wr-protect of child pte or we will keep the write bit set in the child
process, which could cause data corrution where the child can write to the
original page directly.
This issue can also be exposed by "memfd_test hugetlbfs" kselftest.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210503234356.9097-3-peterx@redhat.com
Fixes: 4eae4efa2c299 ("hugetlb: do early cow when page pinned on src mm")
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "mm/hugetlb: Fix issues on file sealing and fork", v2.
Hugh reported issue with F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE not applied correctly to
hugetlbfs, which I can easily verify using the memfd_test program, which
seems that the program is hardly run with hugetlbfs pages (as by default
shmem).
Meanwhile I found another probably even more severe issue on that hugetlb
fork won't wr-protect child cow pages, so child can potentially write to
parent private pages. Patch 2 addresses that.
After this series applied, "memfd_test hugetlbfs" should start to pass.
This patch (of 2):
F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE is missing for hugetlb starting from the first day.
There is a test program for that and it fails constantly.
$ ./memfd_test hugetlbfs
memfd-hugetlb: CREATE
memfd-hugetlb: BASIC
memfd-hugetlb: SEAL-WRITE
memfd-hugetlb: SEAL-FUTURE-WRITE
mmap() didn't fail as expected
Aborted (core dumped)
I think it's probably because no one is really running the hugetlbfs test.
Fix it by checking FUTURE_WRITE also in hugetlbfs_file_mmap() as what we
do in shmem_mmap(). Generalize a helper for that.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210503234356.9097-1-peterx@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210503234356.9097-2-peterx@redhat.com
Fixes: ab3948f58ff84 ("mm/memfd: add an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal to memfd")
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
To ensure that instructions are observable in a new mapping, the arm64
set_pte_at() implementation cleans the D-cache and invalidates the
I-cache to the PoU. As an optimisation, this is only done on executable
mappings and the PG_dcache_clean page flag is set to avoid future cache
maintenance on the same page.
When two different processes map the same page (e.g. private executable
file or shared mapping) there's a potential race on checking and setting
PG_dcache_clean via set_pte_at() -> __sync_icache_dcache(). While on the
fault paths the page is locked (PG_locked), mprotect() does not take the
page lock. The result is that one process may see the PG_dcache_clean
flag set but the I/D cache maintenance not yet performed.
Avoid test_and_set_bit(PG_dcache_clean) in favour of separate test_bit()
and set_bit(). In the rare event of a race, the cache maintenance is
done twice.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210514095001.13236-1-catalin.marinas@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
|
|
Fix the following kernel-doc warning:
block/partitions/efi.c:685: warning: wrong kernel-doc identifier on line:
* efi_partition(struct parsed_partitions *state)
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@math.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210513171708.8391-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
If a tag set is shared across request queues (e.g. SCSI LUNs) then the
block layer core keeps track of the number of active request queues in
tags->active_queues. blk_mq_tag_busy() and blk_mq_tag_idle() update that
atomic counter if the hctx flag BLK_MQ_F_TAG_QUEUE_SHARED is set. Make
sure that blk_mq_exit_queue() calls blk_mq_tag_idle() before that flag is
cleared by blk_mq_del_queue_tag_set().
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Fixes: 0d2602ca30e4 ("blk-mq: improve support for shared tags maps")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210513171529.7977-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
In case of shared sbitmap, request won't be held in plug list any more
sine commit 32bc15afed04 ("blk-mq: Facilitate a shared sbitmap per
tagset"), this way makes request merge from flush plug list & batching
submission not possible, so cause performance regression.
Yanhui reports performance regression when running sequential IO
test(libaio, 16 jobs, 8 depth for each job) in VM, and the VM disk
is emulated with image stored on xfs/megaraid_sas.
Fix the issue by recovering original behavior to allow to hold request
in plug list.
Cc: Yanhui Ma <yama@redhat.com>
Cc: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Cc: kashyap.desai@broadcom.com
Fixes: 32bc15afed04 ("blk-mq: Facilitate a shared sbitmap per tagset")
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210514022052.1047665-1-ming.lei@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
xen_swiotlb_init calls swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl, which fails with
-ENOMEM if the swiotlb has already been initialized.
Add an explicit check io_tlb_default_mem != NULL at the beginning of
xen_swiotlb_init. If the swiotlb is already initialized print a warning
and return -EEXIST.
On x86, the error propagates.
On ARM, we don't actually need a special swiotlb buffer (yet), any
buffer would do. So ignore the error and continue.
CC: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
CC: jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrvsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210512201823.1963-3-sstabellini@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
|
|
Although SWIOTLB_NO_FORCE is meant to allow later calls to swiotlb_init,
today dma_direct_map_page returns error if SWIOTLB_NO_FORCE.
For now, without a larger overhaul of SWIOTLB_NO_FORCE, the best we can
do is to avoid setting SWIOTLB_NO_FORCE in mem_init when we know that it
is going to be required later (e.g. Xen requires it).
CC: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
CC: jgross@suse.com
CC: catalin.marinas@arm.com
CC: will@kernel.org
CC: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Fixes: 2726bf3ff252 ("swiotlb: Make SWIOTLB_NO_FORCE perform no allocation")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210512201823.1963-2-sstabellini@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
|
|
Move xen_swiotlb_detect to a static inline function to make it available
to !CONFIG_XEN builds.
CC: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
CC: jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210512201823.1963-1-sstabellini@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
|
|
Mohammed reports (https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=213029)
the commit e4ab4658f1cf ("clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: Handle vDSO
differences inline") broke vDSO on x86. The problem appears to be that
VDSO_CLOCKMODE_HVCLOCK is an enum value in 'enum vdso_clock_mode' and
'#ifdef VDSO_CLOCKMODE_HVCLOCK' branch evaluates to false (it is not
a define).
Use a dedicated HAVE_VDSO_CLOCKMODE_HVCLOCK define instead.
Fixes: e4ab4658f1cf ("clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: Handle vDSO differences inline")
Reported-by: Mohammed Gamal <mgamal@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210513073246.1715070-1-vkuznets@redhat.com
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|
Since recent changes instead of storing a large array of struct
io_mapped_ubuf, we store pointers to them, that is 4 times slimmer and
we should not to so worry about restricting max number of registererd
buffer slots, increase the limit 4 times.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d3dee1da37f46da416aa96a16bf9e5094e10584d.1620990371.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
There are three types of requests that left disabled for sqpoll, namely
epoll ctx, statx, and resources update. Since SQPOLL task is now closely
mimics a userspace thread, remove the restrictions.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/909b52d70c45636d8d7897582474ea5aab5eed34.1620990306.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Always remove linked timeout on io_link_timeout_fn() from the master
request link list, otherwise we may get use-after-free when first
io_link_timeout_fn() puts linked timeout in the fail path, and then
will be found and put on master's free.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Fixes: 90cd7e424969d ("io_uring: track link timeout's master explicitly")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5a864149dd970b546223@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/69c46bf6ce37fec4fdcd98f0882e18eb07ce693a.1620990121.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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|
Ensure that all error handling branches print error information. In this
way, when this function fails, the upper-layer functions can directly
return an error code without missing debugging information. Otherwise,
the error message will be printed redundantly or missing.
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210428063203.691-1-thunder.leizhen@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Fix the following make W=1 kernel build warnings:
drivers/base/attribute_container.c:304: warning: Function parameter or member 'fn' not described in 'attribute_container_device_trigger_safe'
drivers/base/attribute_container.c:304: warning: Function parameter or member 'undo' not described in 'attribute_container_device_trigger_safe'
drivers/base/attribute_container.c:357: warning: Function parameter or member 'fn' not described in 'attribute_container_device_trigger'
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210512072233.3817056-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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Using the right wrapper makes it easier to associate this assert
statement with the device_[un]lock() helpers.
Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210512141054.2180373-1-jwi@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Blobs can only be read. So, keep only 'read' file attributes because the
others will not work and only confuse users.
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210504131350.46586-1-wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Some interrupt handlers have an "extra" that saves 1 or 2
registers (r14, r15) in the paca save area and makes them available to
use by the handler.
The change to always save nvgprs in exception handlers lead to some
interrupt handlers saving those scratch r14 / r15 registers into the
interrupt frame's GPR saves, which get restored on interrupt exit.
Fix this by always reloading those scratch registers from paca before
the EXCEPTION_COMMON that saves nvgprs.
Fixes: 4228b2c3d20e ("powerpc/64e/interrupt: always save nvgprs on interrupt")
Reported-by: Christian Zigotzky <chzigotzky@xenosoft.de>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Christian Zigotzky <chzigotzky@xenosoft.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210514044008.1955783-1-npiggin@gmail.com
|
|
scv support introduced the notion of code that implicitly soft-masks
irqs due to the instruction addresses. This is required because scv
enters the kernel with MSR[EE]=1.
If a NMI (including soft-NMI) interrupt hits when we are implicitly
soft-masked then its regs->softe does not reflect this because it is
derived from the explicit soft mask state (paca->irq_soft_mask). This
makes arch_irq_disabled_regs(regs) return false.
This can trigger a warning in the soft-NMI watchdog code (shown below).
Fix it by having NMI interrupts set regs->softe to disabled in case of
interrupting an implicit soft-masked region.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 41 PID: 1103 at arch/powerpc/kernel/watchdog.c:259 soft_nmi_interrupt+0x3e4/0x5f0
CPU: 41 PID: 1103 Comm: (spawn) Not tainted
NIP: c000000000039534 LR: c000000000039234 CTR: c000000000009a00
REGS: c000007fffbcf940 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted
MSR: 9000000000021033 <SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 22042482 XER: 200400ad
CFAR: c000000000039260 IRQMASK: 3
GPR00: c000000000039204 c000007fffbcfbe0 c000000001d6c300 0000000000000003
GPR04: 00007ffffa45d078 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 0000000000000020
GPR08: 0000007ffd4e0000 0000000000000000 c000007ffffceb00 7265677368657265
GPR12: 9000000000009033 c000007ffffceb00 00000f7075bf4480 000000000000002a
GPR16: 00000f705745a528 00007ffffa45ddd8 00000f70574d0008 0000000000000000
GPR20: 00000f7075c58d70 00000f7057459c38 0000000000000001 0000000000000040
GPR24: 0000000000000000 0000000000000029 c000000001dae058 0000000000000029
GPR28: 0000000000000000 0000000000000800 0000000000000009 c000007fffbcfd60
NIP [c000000000039534] soft_nmi_interrupt+0x3e4/0x5f0
LR [c000000000039234] soft_nmi_interrupt+0xe4/0x5f0
Call Trace:
[c000007fffbcfbe0] [c000000000039204] soft_nmi_interrupt+0xb4/0x5f0 (unreliable)
[c000007fffbcfcf0] [c00000000000c0e8] soft_nmi_common+0x138/0x1c4
--- interrupt: 900 at end_real_trampolines+0x0/0x1000
NIP: c000000000003000 LR: 00007ca426adb03c CTR: 900000000280f033
REGS: c000007fffbcfd60 TRAP: 0900
MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 44042482 XER: 200400ad
CFAR: 00007ca426946020 IRQMASK: 0
GPR00: 00000000000000ad 00007ffffa45d050 00007ca426b07f00 0000000000000035
GPR04: 00007ffffa45d078 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 0000000000000020
GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000100000 0000000010000000 00007ffffa45d110
GPR12: 0000000000000001 00007ca426d4e680 00000f7075bf4480 000000000000002a
GPR16: 00000f705745a528 00007ffffa45ddd8 00000f70574d0008 0000000000000000
GPR20: 00000f7075c58d70 00000f7057459c38 0000000000000001 0000000000000040
GPR24: 0000000000000000 00000f7057473f68 0000000000000003 000000000000041b
GPR28: 00007ffffa45d4c4 0000000000000035 0000000000000000 00000f7057473f68
NIP [c000000000003000] end_real_trampolines+0x0/0x1000
LR [00007ca426adb03c] 0x7ca426adb03c
--- interrupt: 900
Instruction dump:
60000000 60000000 60420000 38600001 482b3ae5 60000000 e93f0138 a36d0008
7daa6b78 71290001 7f7907b4 4082fd34 <0fe00000> 4bfffd2c 60420000 ea6100a8
---[ end trace dc75f67d819779da ]---
Fixes: 118178e62e2e ("powerpc: move NMI entry/exit code into wrapper")
Reported-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503111708.758261-1-npiggin@gmail.com
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The stf entry barrier fallback is unsafe to execute in a semi-patched
state, which can happen when enabling/disabling the mitigation with
strict kernel RWX enabled and using the hash MMU.
See the previous commit for more details.
Fix it by changing the order in which we patch the instructions.
Note the stf barrier fallback is only used on Power6 or earlier.
Fixes: bd573a81312f ("powerpc/mm/64s: Allow STRICT_KERNEL_RWX again")
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210513140800.1391706-2-mpe@ellerman.id.au
|
|
The entry flush mitigation can be enabled/disabled at runtime. When this
happens it results in the kernel patching its own instructions to
enable/disable the mitigation sequence.
With strict kernel RWX enabled instruction patching happens via a
secondary mapping of the kernel text, so that we don't have to make the
primary mapping writable. With the hash MMU this leads to a hash fault,
which causes us to execute the exception entry which contains the entry
flush mitigation.
This means we end up executing the entry flush in a semi-patched state,
ie. after we have patched the first instruction but before we patch the
second or third instruction of the sequence.
On machines with updated firmware the entry flush is a series of special
nops, and it's safe to to execute in a semi-patched state.
However when using the fallback flush the sequence is mflr/branch/mtlr,
and so it's not safe to execute if we have patched out the mflr but not
the other two instructions. Doing so leads to us corrputing LR, leading
to an oops, for example:
# echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/entry_flush
kernel tried to execute exec-protected page (c000000002971000) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: Unable to handle kernel instruction fetch
Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000002971000
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
CPU: 0 PID: 2215 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1-00010-gda3bb206c9ce #1
NIP: c000000002971000 LR: c000000002971000 CTR: c000000000120c40
REGS: c000000013243840 TRAP: 0400 Not tainted (5.13.0-rc1-00010-gda3bb206c9ce)
MSR: 8000000010009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48428482 XER: 00000000
...
NIP 0xc000000002971000
LR 0xc000000002971000
Call Trace:
do_patch_instruction+0xc4/0x340 (unreliable)
do_entry_flush_fixups+0x100/0x3b0
entry_flush_set+0x50/0xe0
simple_attr_write+0x160/0x1a0
full_proxy_write+0x8c/0x110
vfs_write+0xf0/0x340
ksys_write+0x84/0x140
system_call_exception+0x164/0x2d0
system_call_common+0xec/0x278
The simplest fix is to change the order in which we patch the
instructions, so that the sequence is always safe to execute. For the
non-fallback flushes it doesn't matter what order we patch in.
Fixes: bd573a81312f ("powerpc/mm/64s: Allow STRICT_KERNEL_RWX again")
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210513140800.1391706-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
|
|
The entry flush mitigation can be enabled/disabled at runtime via a
debugfs file (entry_flush), which causes the kernel to patch itself to
enable/disable the relevant mitigations.
However depending on which mitigation we're using, it may not be safe to
do that patching while other CPUs are active. For example the following
crash:
sleeper[15639]: segfault (11) at c000000000004c20 nip c000000000004c20 lr c000000000004c20
Shows that we returned to userspace with a corrupted LR that points into
the kernel, due to executing the partially patched call to the fallback
entry flush (ie. we missed the LR restore).
Fix it by doing the patching under stop machine. The CPUs that aren't
doing the patching will be spinning in the core of the stop machine
logic. That is currently sufficient for our purposes, because none of
the patching we do is to that code or anywhere in the vicinity.
Fixes: f79643787e0a ("powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506044959.1298123-2-mpe@ellerman.id.au
|
|
The STF (store-to-load forwarding) barrier mitigation can be
enabled/disabled at runtime via a debugfs file (stf_barrier), which
causes the kernel to patch itself to enable/disable the relevant
mitigations.
However depending on which mitigation we're using, it may not be safe to
do that patching while other CPUs are active. For example the following
crash:
User access of kernel address (c00000003fff5af0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
segfault (11) at c00000003fff5af0 nip 7fff8ad12198 lr 7fff8ad121f8 code 1
code: 40820128 e93c00d0 e9290058 7c292840 40810058 38600000 4bfd9a81 e8410018
code: 2c030006 41810154 3860ffb6 e9210098 <e94d8ff0> 7d295279 39400000 40820a3c
Shows that we returned to userspace without restoring the user r13
value, due to executing the partially patched STF exit code.
Fix it by doing the patching under stop machine. The CPUs that aren't
doing the patching will be spinning in the core of the stop machine
logic. That is currently sufficient for our purposes, because none of
the patching we do is to that code or anywhere in the vicinity.
Fixes: a048a07d7f45 ("powerpc/64s: Add support for a store forwarding barrier at kernel entry/exit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.17+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506044959.1298123-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
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If a trace event uses the %*.s notation, the trace_check_vprintf() will
fail and will warn about a bad processing of strings, because it does not
take into account the length field when processing the star (*) part.
Have it handle this case as well.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/238C0E2D-C2A4-4578-ADD2-C565B3B99842@oracle.com/
Reported-by: Chuck Lever III <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Fixes: 9a6944fee68e2 ("tracing: Add a verifier to check string pointers for trace events")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Restore the original intent of the VT_RESIZEX ioctl's `v_clin' parameter
which is the number of pixel rows per character (cell) rather than the
height of the font used.
For framebuffer devices the two values are always the same, because the
former is inferred from the latter one. For VGA used as a true text
mode device these two parameters are independent from each other: the
number of pixel rows per character is set in the CRT controller, while
font height is in fact hardwired to 32 pixel rows and fonts of heights
below that value are handled by padding their data with blanks when
loaded to hardware for use by the character generator. One can change
the setting in the CRT controller and it will update the screen contents
accordingly regardless of the font loaded.
The `v_clin' parameter is used by the `vgacon' driver to set the height
of the character cell and then the cursor position within. Make the
parameter explicit then, by defining a new `vc_cell_height' struct
member of `vc_data', set it instead of `vc_font.height' from `v_clin' in
the VT_RESIZEX ioctl, and then use it throughout the `vgacon' driver
except where actual font data is accessed which as noted above is
independent from the CRTC setting.
This way the framebuffer console driver is free to ignore the `v_clin'
parameter as irrelevant, as it always should have, avoiding any issues
attempts to give the parameter a meaning there could have caused, such
as one that has led to commit 988d0763361b ("vt_ioctl: make VT_RESIZEX
behave like VT_RESIZE"):
"syzbot is reporting UAF/OOB read at bit_putcs()/soft_cursor() [1][2],
for vt_resizex() from ioctl(VT_RESIZEX) allows setting font height
larger than actual font height calculated by con_font_set() from
ioctl(PIO_FONT). Since fbcon_set_font() from con_font_set() allocates
minimal amount of memory based on actual font height calculated by
con_font_set(), use of vt_resizex() can cause UAF/OOB read for font
data."
The problem first appeared around Linux 2.5.66 which predates our repo
history, but the origin could be identified with the old MIPS/Linux repo
also at: <git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ralf/linux.git>
as commit 9736a3546de7 ("Merge with Linux 2.5.66."), where VT_RESIZEX
code in `vt_ioctl' was updated as follows:
if (clin)
- video_font_height = clin;
+ vc->vc_font.height = clin;
making the parameter apply to framebuffer devices as well, perhaps due
to the use of "font" in the name of the original `video_font_height'
variable. Use "cell" in the new struct member then to avoid ambiguity.
References:
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=32577e96d88447ded2d3b76d71254fb855245837
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=6b8355d27b2b94fb5cedf4655e3a59162d9e48e3
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.12+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Revert the removal of code handling extra VT_RESIZEX ioctl's parameters
beyond those that VT_RESIZE supports, fixing a functional regression
causing `svgatextmode' not to resize the VT anymore.
As a consequence of the reverted change when the video adapter is
reprogrammed from the original say 80x25 text mode using a 9x16
character cell (720x400 pixel resolution) to say 80x37 text mode and the
same character cell (720x592 pixel resolution), the VT geometry does not
get updated and only upper two thirds of the screen are used for the VT,
and the lower part remains blank. The proportions change according to
text mode geometries chosen.
Revert the change verbatim then, bringing back previous VT resizing.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Fixes: 988d0763361b ("vt_ioctl: make VT_RESIZEX behave like VT_RESIZE")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Fix an issue with VGA console font size changes made after the initial
video text mode has been changed with a user tool like `svgatextmode'
calling the VT_RESIZEX ioctl. As it stands in that case the original
screen geometry continues being used to validate further VT resizing.
Consequently when the video adapter is firstly reprogrammed from the
original say 80x25 text mode using a 9x16 character cell (720x400 pixel
resolution) to say 80x37 text mode and the same character cell (720x592
pixel resolution), and secondly the CRTC character cell updated to 9x8
(by loading a suitable font with the KD_FONT_OP_SET request of the
KDFONTOP ioctl), the VT geometry does not get further updated from 80x37
and only upper half of the screen is used for the VT, with the lower
half showing rubbish corresponding to whatever happens to be there in
the video memory that maps to that part of the screen. Of course the
proportions change according to text mode geometries and font sizes
chosen.
Address the problem then, by updating the text mode geometry defaults
rather than checking against them whenever the VT is resized via a user
ioctl.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Fixes: e400b6ec4ede ("vt/vgacon: Check if screen resize request comes from userspace")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.24+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Anshuman suggested this.
Suggested-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210513151819.12526-1-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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update suspend register settings in Non-DPG mode.
Signed-off-by: Sathishkumar S <sathishkumar.sundararaju@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Leo Liu <leo.liu@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
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enable vcn mgcg flag for picasso.
Signed-off-by: Sathishkumar S <sathishkumar.sundararaju@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Leo Liu <leo.liu@amd.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
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are connected
Screen flickers rapidly when two 4K 60Hz monitors are in use. This issue
doesn't happen when one monitor is 4K 60Hz (pixelclock 594MHz) and
another one is 4K 30Hz (pixelclock 297MHz).
The issue is gone after setting "power_dpm_force_performance_level" to
"high". Following the indication, we found that the issue occurs when
sclk is too low.
So resolve the issue by disabling sclk switching when there are two
monitors requires high pixelclock (> 297MHz).
v2:
- Only apply the fix to Oland.
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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