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* KEYS: fix refcount_inc() on zeroMark Rutland2017-06-091-7/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If a key's refcount is dropped to zero between key_lookup() peeking at the refcount and subsequently attempting to increment it, refcount_inc() will see a zero refcount. Here, refcount_inc() will WARN_ONCE(), and will *not* increment the refcount, which will remain zero. Once key_lookup() drops key_serial_lock, it is possible for the key to be freed behind our back. This patch uses refcount_inc_not_zero() to perform the peek and increment atomically. Fixes: fff292914d3a2f1e ("security, keys: convert key.usage from atomic_t to refcount_t") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: Convert KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE to use the crypto KPP APIMat Martineau2017-06-092-103/+171
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The initial Diffie-Hellman computation made direct use of the MPI library because the crypto module did not support DH at the time. Now that KPP is implemented, KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE should use it to get rid of duplicate code and leverage possible hardware acceleration. This fixes an issue whereby the input to the KDF computation would include additional uninitialized memory when the result of the Diffie-Hellman computation was shorter than the input prime number. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: DH: ensure the KDF counter is properly alignedEric Biggers2017-06-091-13/+3
| | | | | | | | | | Accessing a 'u8[4]' through a '__be32 *' violates alignment rules. Just make the counter a __be32 instead. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: DH: don't feed uninitialized "otherinfo" into KDFEric Biggers2017-06-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | If userspace called KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE with kdf_params containing NULL otherinfo but nonzero otherinfolen, the kernel would allocate a buffer for the otherinfo, then feed it into the KDF without initializing it. Fix this by always doing the copy from userspace (which will fail with EFAULT in this scenario). Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: DH: forbid using digest_null as the KDF hashEric Biggers2017-06-091-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | Requesting "digest_null" in the keyctl_kdf_params caused an infinite loop in kdf_ctr() because the "null" hash has a digest size of 0. Fix it by rejecting hash algorithms with a digest size of 0. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: sanitize key structs before freeingEric Biggers2017-06-091-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While a 'struct key' itself normally does not contain sensitive information, Documentation/security/keys.txt actually encourages this: "Having a payload is not required; and the payload can, in fact, just be a value stored in the struct key itself." In case someone has taken this advice, or will take this advice in the future, zero the key structure before freeing it. We might as well, and as a bonus this could make it a bit more difficult for an adversary to determine which keys have recently been in use. This is safe because the key_jar cache does not use a constructor. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key materialEric Biggers2017-06-091-28/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | As the previous patch did for encrypted-keys, zero sensitive any potentially sensitive data related to the "trusted" key type before it is freed. Notably, we were not zeroing the tpm_buf structures in which the actual key is stored for TPM seal and unseal, nor were we zeroing the trusted_key_payload in certain error paths. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: encrypted: sanitize all key materialEric Biggers2017-06-091-18/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For keys of type "encrypted", consistently zero sensitive key material before freeing it. This was already being done for the decrypted payloads of encrypted keys, but not for the master key and the keys derived from the master key. Out of an abundance of caution and because it is trivial to do so, also zero buffers containing the key payload in encrypted form, although depending on how the encrypted-keys feature is used such information does not necessarily need to be kept secret. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: user_defined: sanitize key payloadsEric Biggers2017-06-091-4/+12
| | | | | | | | | | Zero the payloads of user and logon keys before freeing them. This prevents sensitive key material from being kept around in the slab caches after a key is released. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: sanitize add_key() and keyctl() key payloadsEric Biggers2017-06-091-3/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | Before returning from add_key() or one of the keyctl() commands that takes in a key payload, zero the temporary buffer that was allocated to hold the key payload copied from userspace. This may contain sensitive key material that should not be kept around in the slab caches. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: fix freeing uninitialized memory in key_update()Eric Biggers2017-06-091-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | key_update() freed the key_preparsed_payload even if it was not initialized first. This would cause a crash if userspace called keyctl_update() on a key with type like "asymmetric" that has a ->preparse() method but not an ->update() method. Possibly it could even be triggered for other key types by racing with keyctl_setperm() to make the KEY_NEED_WRITE check fail (the permission was already checked, so normally it wouldn't fail there). Reproducer with key type "asymmetric", given a valid cert.der: keyctl new_session keyid=$(keyctl padd asymmetric desc @s < cert.der) keyctl setperm $keyid 0x3f000000 keyctl update $keyid data [ 150.686666] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001 [ 150.687601] IP: asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30 [ 150.688139] PGD 38a3d067 [ 150.688141] PUD 3b3de067 [ 150.688447] PMD 0 [ 150.688745] [ 150.689160] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 150.689455] Modules linked in: [ 150.689769] CPU: 1 PID: 2478 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.11.0-rc4-xfstests-00187-ga9f6b6b8cd2f #742 [ 150.690916] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014 [ 150.692199] task: ffff88003b30c480 task.stack: ffffc90000350000 [ 150.692952] RIP: 0010:asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30 [ 150.693556] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000353e58 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 150.694142] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000004 [ 150.694845] RDX: ffffffff81ee3920 RSI: ffff88003d4b0700 RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 150.697569] RBP: ffffc90000353e60 R08: ffff88003d5d2140 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 150.702483] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 150.707393] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: ffff880038a4d2d8 R15: 000000000040411f [ 150.709720] FS: 00007fcbcee35700(0000) GS:ffff88003fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 150.711504] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 150.712733] CR2: 0000000000000001 CR3: 0000000039eab000 CR4: 00000000003406e0 [ 150.714487] Call Trace: [ 150.714975] asymmetric_key_free_preparse+0x2f/0x40 [ 150.715907] key_update+0xf7/0x140 [ 150.716560] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20 [ 150.717319] keyctl_update_key+0xb0/0xe0 [ 150.718066] SyS_keyctl+0x109/0x130 [ 150.718663] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 [ 150.719440] RIP: 0033:0x7fcbce75ff19 [ 150.719926] RSP: 002b:00007ffd5d167088 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa [ 150.720918] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000404d80 RCX: 00007fcbce75ff19 [ 150.721874] RDX: 00007ffd5d16785e RSI: 000000002866cd36 RDI: 0000000000000002 [ 150.722827] RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000000002866cd36 R09: 00007ffd5d16785e [ 150.723781] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000404d80 [ 150.724650] R13: 00007ffd5d16784d R14: 00007ffd5d167238 R15: 000000000040411f [ 150.725447] Code: 83 c4 08 31 c0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 85 ff 74 23 55 48 89 e5 53 48 89 fb <48> 8b 3f e8 06 21 c5 ff 48 8b 7b 08 e8 fd 20 c5 ff 48 89 df e8 [ 150.727489] RIP: asymmetric_key_free_kids+0x12/0x30 RSP: ffffc90000353e58 [ 150.728117] CR2: 0000000000000001 [ 150.728430] ---[ end trace f7f8fe1da2d5ae8d ]--- Fixes: 4d8c0250b841 ("KEYS: Call ->free_preparse() even after ->preparse() returns an error") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero lengthEric Biggers2017-06-091-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | sys_add_key() and the KEYCTL_UPDATE operation of sys_keyctl() allowed a NULL payload with nonzero length to be passed to the key type's ->preparse(), ->instantiate(), and/or ->update() methods. Various key types including asymmetric, cifs.idmap, cifs.spnego, and pkcs7_test did not handle this case, allowing an unprivileged user to trivially cause a NULL pointer dereference (kernel oops) if one of these key types was present. Fix it by doing the copy_from_user() when 'plen' is nonzero rather than when '_payload' is non-NULL, causing the syscall to fail with EFAULT as expected when an invalid buffer is specified. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.10+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: encrypted: use constant-time HMAC comparisonEric Biggers2017-06-091-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | MACs should, in general, be compared using crypto_memneq() to prevent timing attacks. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: encrypted: fix race causing incorrect HMAC calculationsEric Biggers2017-06-091-83/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The encrypted-keys module was using a single global HMAC transform, which could be rekeyed by multiple threads concurrently operating on different keys, causing incorrect HMAC values to be calculated. Fix this by allocating a new HMAC transform whenever we need to calculate a HMAC. Also simplify things a bit by allocating the shash_desc's using SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK() for both the HMAC and unkeyed hashes. The following script reproduces the bug: keyctl new_session keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s for i in $(seq 2); do ( set -e for j in $(seq 1000); do keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc$i "new user:master 25" @s) datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)" keyctl unlink $keyid > /dev/null keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc$i "load $datablob" @s) keyctl unlink $keyid > /dev/null done ) & done Output with bug: [ 439.691094] encrypted_key: bad hmac (-22) add_key: Invalid argument add_key: Invalid argument Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()Eric Biggers2017-06-091-16/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected, e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.] Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: encrypted: avoid encrypting/decrypting stack buffersEric Biggers2017-06-091-8/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since v4.9, the crypto API cannot (normally) be used to encrypt/decrypt stack buffers because the stack may be virtually mapped. Fix this for the padding buffers in encrypted-keys by using ZERO_PAGE for the encryption padding and by allocating a temporary heap buffer for the decryption padding. Tested with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y: keyctl new_session keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "new user:master 25" @s) datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)" keyctl unlink $keyid keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "load $datablob" @s) datablob2="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)" [ "$datablob" = "$datablob2" ] && echo "Success!" Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: put keyring if install_session_keyring_to_cred() failsEric Biggers2017-06-091-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | In join_session_keyring(), if install_session_keyring_to_cred() were to fail, we would leak the keyring reference, just like in the bug fixed by commit 23567fd052a9 ("KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring()"). Fortunately this cannot happen currently, but we really should be more careful. Do this by adding and using a new error label at which the keyring reference is dropped. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in ↵Markus Elfring2017-06-091-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | get_derived_key() Omit an extra message for a memory allocation failure in this function. This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software. Link: http://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/LCJ16-Refactor_Strings-WSang_0.pdf Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* security: use READ_ONCE instead of deprecated ACCESS_ONCEDavidlohr Bueso2017-06-091-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the new standardized functions, we can replace all ACCESS_ONCE() calls across relevant security/keyrings/. ACCESS_ONCE() does not work reliably on non-scalar types. For example gcc 4.6 and 4.7 might remove the volatile tag for such accesses during the SRA (scalar replacement of aggregates) step: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58145 Update the new calls regardless of if it is a scalar type, this is cleaner than having three alternatives. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* security/keys: add CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT to KconfigBilal Amarni2017-06-091-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT is defined in arch-specific Kconfigs and is missing for several 64-bit architectures : mips, parisc, tile. At the moment and for those architectures, calling in 32-bit userspace the keyctl syscall would return an ENOSYS error. This patch moves the CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT option to security/keys/Kconfig, to make sure the compatibility wrapper is registered by default for any 64-bit architecture as long as it is configured with CONFIG_COMPAT. [DH: Modified to remove arm64 compat enablement also as requested by Eric Biggers] Signed-off-by: Bilal Amarni <bilal.amarni@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* treewide: use kv[mz]alloc* rather than opencoded variantsMichal Hocko2017-05-091-16/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There are many code paths opencoding kvmalloc. Let's use the helper instead. The main difference to kvmalloc is that those users are usually not considering all the aspects of the memory allocator. E.g. allocation requests <= 32kB (with 4kB pages) are basically never failing and invoke OOM killer to satisfy the allocation. This sounds too disruptive for something that has a reasonable fallback - the vmalloc. On the other hand those requests might fallback to vmalloc even when the memory allocator would succeed after several more reclaim/compaction attempts previously. There is no guarantee something like that happens though. This patch converts many of those places to kv[mz]alloc* helpers because they are more conservative. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306103327.2766-2-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> # Xen bits Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Andreas Dilger <andreas.dilger@intel.com> # Lustre Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> # KVM/s390 Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> # nvdim Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> # btrfs Acked-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> # Ceph Acked-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> # mlx4 Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> # mlx5 Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com> Cc: Santosh Raspatur <santosh@chelsio.com> Cc: Hariprasad S <hariprasad@chelsio.com> Cc: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com> Cc: Oleg Drokin <oleg.drokin@intel.com> Cc: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-05-0313-63/+567
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: IMA: - provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules KEYS: - add a system blacklist keyring - add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction functionality to userland via keyctl() LSM: - harden LSM API with __ro_after_init - add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux - revive security_task_alloc hook TPM: - implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits) tpm: Fix reference count to main device tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836 apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls(). smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str() KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type ...
| * keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDFStephan Müller2017-04-121-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Select CONFIG_CRYPTO in addition to CONFIG_HASH to ensure that also CONFIG_HASH2 is selected. Both are needed for the shash cipher support required for the KDF operation. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DHStephan Mueller2017-04-047-18/+275
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SP800-56A defines the use of DH with key derivation function based on a counter. The input to the KDF is defined as (DH shared secret || other information). The value for the "other information" is to be provided by the caller. The KDF is implemented using the hash support from the kernel crypto API. The implementation uses the symmetric hash support as the input to the hash operation is usually very small. The caller is allowed to specify the hash name that he wants to use to derive the key material allowing the use of all supported hashes provided with the kernel crypto API. As the KDF implements the proper truncation of the DH shared secret to the requested size, this patch fills the caller buffer up to its size. The patch is tested with a new test added to the keyutils user space code which uses a CAVS test vector testing the compliance with SP800-56A. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRINGMat Martineau2017-04-044-0/+170
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Keyrings recently gained restrict_link capabilities that allow individual keys to be validated prior to linking. This functionality was only available using internal kernel APIs. With the KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING command existing keyrings can be configured to check the content of keys before they are linked, and then allow or disallow linkage of that key to the keyring. To restrict a keyring, call: keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, key_serial_t keyring, const char *type, const char *restriction) where 'type' is the name of a registered key type and 'restriction' is a string describing how key linkage is to be restricted. The restriction option syntax is specific to each key type. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
| * KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict checkMat Martineau2017-04-041-11/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The keyring restrict callback was sometimes called before __key_link_begin and sometimes after, which meant that the keyring semaphores were not always held during the restrict callback. If the semaphores are consistently acquired before checking link restrictions, keyring contents cannot be changed after the restrict check is complete but before the evaluated key is linked to the keyring. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
| * KEYS: Use structure to capture key restriction function and dataMat Martineau2017-04-044-14/+90
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the restriction. The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by unregistering key types. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
| * KEYS: Split role of the keyring pointer for keyring restrict functionsMat Martineau2017-04-032-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring. Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
| * KEYS: Use a typedef for restrict_link function pointersMat Martineau2017-04-032-9/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This pointer type needs to be returned from a lookup function, and without a typedef the syntax gets cumbersome. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
| * security, keys: convert key_user.usage from atomic_t to refcount_tElena Reshetova2017-04-034-6/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | refcount_t type and corresponding API should be used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free situations. Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * security, keys: convert key.usage from atomic_t to refcount_tElena Reshetova2017-04-035-10/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | refcount_t type and corresponding API should be used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free situations. Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyringsEric Biggers2017-04-182-24/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes CVE-2017-7472. Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel memory by leaking thread keyrings: #include <keyutils.h> int main() { for (;;) keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING); } Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before. To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred() and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding keyring is already present. Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.29+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | KEYS: Change the name of the dead type to ".dead" to prevent user accessDavid Howells2017-04-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes CVE-2017-6951. Userspace should not be able to do things with the "dead" key type as it doesn't have some of the helper functions set upon it that the kernel needs. Attempting to use it may cause the kernel to crash. Fix this by changing the name of the type to ".dead" so that it's rejected up front on userspace syscalls by key_get_type_from_user(). Though this doesn't seem to affect recent kernels, it does affect older ones, certainly those prior to: commit c06cfb08b88dfbe13be44a69ae2fdc3a7c902d81 Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Tue Sep 16 17:36:06 2014 +0100 KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse which went in before 3.18-rc1. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
* | KEYS: Disallow keyrings beginning with '.' to be joined as session keyringsDavid Howells2017-04-181-2/+7
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes CVE-2016-9604. Keyrings whose name begin with a '.' are special internal keyrings and so userspace isn't allowed to create keyrings by this name to prevent shadowing. However, the patch that added the guard didn't fix KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING. Not only can that create dot-named keyrings, it can also subscribe to them as a session keyring if they grant SEARCH permission to the user. This, for example, allows a root process to set .builtin_trusted_keys as its session keyring, at which point it has full access because now the possessor permissions are added. This permits root to add extra public keys, thereby bypassing module verification. This also affects kexec and IMA. This can be tested by (as root): keyctl session .builtin_trusted_keys keyctl add user a a @s keyctl list @s which on my test box gives me: 2 keys in keyring: 180010936: ---lswrv 0 0 asymmetric: Build time autogenerated kernel key: ae3d4a31b82daa8e1a75b49dc2bba949fd992a05 801382539: --alswrv 0 0 user: a Fix this by rejecting names beginning with a '.' in the keyctl. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
* Merge branch 'WIP.sched-core-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-03-034-0/+6
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull sched.h split-up from Ingo Molnar: "The point of these changes is to significantly reduce the <linux/sched.h> header footprint, to speed up the kernel build and to have a cleaner header structure. After these changes the new <linux/sched.h>'s typical preprocessed size goes down from a previous ~0.68 MB (~22K lines) to ~0.45 MB (~15K lines), which is around 40% faster to build on typical configs. Not much changed from the last version (-v2) posted three weeks ago: I eliminated quirks, backmerged fixes plus I rebased it to an upstream SHA1 from yesterday that includes most changes queued up in -next plus all sched.h changes that were pending from Andrew. I've re-tested the series both on x86 and on cross-arch defconfigs, and did a bisectability test at a number of random points. I tried to test as many build configurations as possible, but some build breakage is probably still left - but it should be mostly limited to architectures that have no cross-compiler binaries available on kernel.org, and non-default configurations" * 'WIP.sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (146 commits) sched/headers: Clean up <linux/sched.h> sched/headers: Remove #ifdefs from <linux/sched.h> sched/headers: Remove the <linux/topology.h> include from <linux/sched.h> sched/headers, hrtimer: Remove the <linux/wait.h> include from <linux/hrtimer.h> sched/headers, x86/apic: Remove the <linux/pm.h> header inclusion from <asm/apic.h> sched/headers, timers: Remove the <linux/sysctl.h> include from <linux/timer.h> sched/headers: Remove <linux/magic.h> from <linux/sched/task_stack.h> sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/init.h> sched/core: Remove unused prefetch_stack() sched/headers: Remove <linux/rculist.h> from <linux/sched.h> sched/headers: Remove the 'init_pid_ns' prototype from <linux/sched.h> sched/headers: Remove <linux/signal.h> from <linux/sched.h> sched/headers: Remove <linux/rwsem.h> from <linux/sched.h> sched/headers: Remove the runqueue_is_locked() prototype sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/hotplug.h> sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/debug.h> sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/nohz.h> sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/stat.h> sched/headers: Remove the <linux/gfp.h> include from <linux/sched.h> sched/headers: Remove <linux/rtmutex.h> from <linux/sched.h> ...
| * sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar2017-03-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | <linux/sched/task.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/task.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
| * sched/headers: Prepare to remove <linux/cred.h> inclusion from <linux/sched.h>Ingo Molnar2017-03-023-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h doing that for them. Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high, it's still a net win, because <linux/sched.h> is included in over 2,200 files ... Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
| * sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar2017-03-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | <linux/sched/user.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/user.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/user.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* | KEYS: Differentiate uses of rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload()David Howells2017-03-024-8/+8
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in two different, incompatible ways: (1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used to protect the key. (2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is used to protect the key and the may be being modified. Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce: (1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked: dereference_key_locked() user_key_payload_locked() (2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock: dereference_key_rcu() user_key_payload_rcu() This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W ------------------------------- ./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987: #0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable) lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190 nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4] nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4] nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4] rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc] call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc] __rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc] rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc] nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4] _nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4] nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4] nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4] nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4] nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4] nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 do_mount+0x254/0xf70 SyS_mount+0x94/0x100 system_call+0x38/0xe0 Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* Merge tag 'driver-core-4.11-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-02-221-3/+4
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core Pull driver core updates from Greg KH: "Here is the "small" driver core patches for 4.11-rc1. Not much here, some firmware documentation and self-test updates, a debugfs code formatting issue, and a new feature for call_usermodehelper to make it more robust on systems that want to lock it down in a more secure way. All of these have been linux-next for a while now with no reported issues" * tag 'driver-core-4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: kernfs: handle null pointers while printing node name and path Introduce STATIC_USERMODEHELPER to mediate call_usermodehelper() Make static usermode helper binaries constant kmod: make usermodehelper path a const string firmware: revamp firmware documentation selftests: firmware: send expected errors to /dev/null selftests: firmware: only modprobe if driver is missing platform: Print the resource range if device failed to claim kref: prefer atomic_inc_not_zero to atomic_add_unless debugfs: improve formatting of debugfs_real_fops()
| * Make static usermode helper binaries constantGreg Kroah-Hartman2017-01-191-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There are a number of usermode helper binaries that are "hard coded" in the kernel today, so mark them as "const" to make it harder for someone to change where the variables point to. Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Thomas Sailer <t.sailer@alumni.ethz.ch> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Cc: Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org> Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | KEYS: Use memzero_explicit() for secret dataDan Carpenter2017-02-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I don't think GCC has figured out how to optimize the memset() away, but they might eventually so let's future proof this code a bit. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | KEYS: Fix an error code in request_master_key()Dan Carpenter2017-02-101-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | This function has two callers and neither are able to handle a NULL return. Really, -EINVAL is the correct thing return here anyway. This fixes some static checker warnings like: security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c:709 encrypted_key_decrypt() error: uninitialized symbol 'master_key'. Fixes: 7e70cb497850 ("keys: add new key-type encrypted") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* Replace <asm/uaccess.h> with <linux/uaccess.h> globallyLinus Torvalds2016-12-244-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This was entirely automated, using the script by Al: PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>' sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \ $(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h) to do the replacement at the end of the merge window. Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [iov_iter] new primitives - copy_from_iter_full() and friendsAl Viro2016-12-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | copy_from_iter_full(), copy_from_iter_full_nocache() and csum_and_copy_from_iter_full() - counterparts of copy_from_iter() et.al., advancing iterator only in case of successful full copy and returning whether it had been successful or not. Convert some obvious users. *NOTE* - do not blindly assume that something is a good candidate for those unless you are sure that not advancing iov_iter in failure case is the right thing in this case. Anything that does short read/short write kind of stuff (or is in a loop, etc.) is unlikely to be a good one. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* security/keys: make BIG_KEYS dependent on stdrng.Artem Savkov2016-10-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since BIG_KEYS can't be compiled as module it requires one of the "stdrng" providers to be compiled into kernel. Otherwise big_key_crypto_init() fails on crypto_alloc_rng step and next dereference of big_key_skcipher (e.g. in big_key_preparse()) results in a NULL pointer dereference. Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted') Signed-off-by: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisationDavid Howells2016-10-271-27/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type. However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not, big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type. Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the crypto is set up, leading to the same effect. Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the crypto initialisation. The fix also includes message printing on failure. If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing: dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s ought to cause an oops. Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted') Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Peter Hlavaty <zer0mem@yahoo.com> cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com> cc: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: Fix short sprintf buffer in /proc/keys show functionDavid Howells2016-10-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes CVE-2016-7042. Fix a short sprintf buffer in proc_keys_show(). If the gcc stack protector is turned on, this can cause a panic due to stack corruption. The problem is that xbuf[] is not big enough to hold a 64-bit timeout rendered as weeks: (gdb) p 0xffffffffffffffffULL/(60*60*24*7) $2 = 30500568904943 That's 14 chars plus NUL, not 11 chars plus NUL. Expand the buffer to 16 chars. I think the unpatched code apparently works if the stack-protector is not enabled because on a 32-bit machine the buffer won't be overflowed and on a 64-bit machine there's a 64-bit aligned pointer at one side and an int that isn't checked again on the other side. The panic incurred looks something like: Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffff81352ebe CPU: 0 PID: 1692 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.7.2-201.fc24.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 0000000000000086 00000000fbbd2679 ffff8800a044bc00 ffffffff813d941f ffffffff81a28d58 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc88 ffffffff811b2cb6 ffff880000000010 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc30 00000000fbbd2679 Call Trace: [<ffffffff813d941f>] dump_stack+0x63/0x84 [<ffffffff811b2cb6>] panic+0xde/0x22a [<ffffffff81352ebe>] ? proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff8109f7f9>] __stack_chk_fail+0x19/0x30 [<ffffffff81352ebe>] proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff81350410>] ? key_validate+0x50/0x50 [<ffffffff8134db30>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20 [<ffffffff8126b31c>] seq_read+0x2cc/0x390 [<ffffffff812b6b12>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70 [<ffffffff81244fc7>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x150 [<ffffffff81357020>] ? security_file_permission+0xa0/0xc0 [<ffffffff81246156>] vfs_read+0x96/0x130 [<ffffffff81247635>] SyS_read+0x55/0xc0 [<ffffffff817eb872>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4 Reported-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: Fix skcipher IV clobberingHerbert Xu2016-09-221-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | | The IV must not be modified by the skcipher operation so we need to duplicate it. Fixes: c3917fd9dfbc ("KEYS: Use skcipher") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-07-302-2/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - TPM core and driver updates/fixes - IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO) - Lots of Apparmor fixes - Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change syscall #" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits) apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family) tpm: Factor out common startup code tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr() apparmor: do not expose kernel stack apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds ...
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