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* selinux: ensure av_permissions.h is built when neededPaul Moore2023-04-131-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | The Makefile rule responsible for building flask.h and av_permissions.h only lists flask.h as a target which means that av_permissions.h is only generated when flask.h needs to be generated. This patch fixes this by adding av_permissions.h as a target to the rule. Fixes: 8753f6bec352 ("selinux: generate flask headers during kernel build") Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* selinux: fix Makefile dependencies of flask.hOndrej Mosnacek2023-04-121-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the flask.h target depend on the genheaders binary instead of classmap.h to ensure that it is rebuilt if any of the dependencies of genheaders are changed. Notably this fixes flask.h not being rebuilt when initial_sid_to_string.h is modified. Fixes: 8753f6bec352 ("selinux: generate flask headers during kernel build") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* selinux: stop returning node from avc_insert()Stephen Smalley2023-04-041-13/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | The callers haven't used the returned node since commit 21193dcd1f3570dd ("SELinux: more careful use of avd in avc_has_perm_noaudit") and the return value assignments were removed in commit 0a9876f36b08706d ("selinux: Remove redundant assignments"). Stop returning the node altogether and make the functions return void. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> PM: minor subj tweak, repair whitespace damage Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* selinux: remove the runtime disable functionalityPaul Moore2023-03-204-137/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After working with the larger SELinux-based distros for several years, we're finally at a place where we can disable the SELinux runtime disable functionality. The existing kernel deprecation notice explains the functionality and why we want to remove it: The selinuxfs "disable" node allows SELinux to be disabled at runtime prior to a policy being loaded into the kernel. If disabled via this mechanism, SELinux will remain disabled until the system is rebooted. The preferred method of disabling SELinux is via the "selinux=0" boot parameter, but the selinuxfs "disable" node was created to make it easier for systems with primitive bootloaders that did not allow for easy modification of the kernel command line. Unfortunately, allowing for SELinux to be disabled at runtime makes it difficult to secure the kernel's LSM hooks using the "__ro_after_init" feature. It is that last sentence, mentioning the '__ro_after_init' hardening, which is the real motivation for this change, and if you look at the diffstat you'll see that the impact of this patch reaches across all the different LSMs, helping prevent tampering at the LSM hook level. From a SELinux perspective, it is important to note that if you continue to disable SELinux via "/etc/selinux/config" it may appear that SELinux is disabled, but it is simply in an uninitialized state. If you load a policy with `load_policy -i`, you will see SELinux come alive just as if you had loaded the policy during early-boot. It is also worth noting that the "/sys/fs/selinux/disable" file is always writable now, regardless of the Kconfig settings, but writing to the file has no effect on the system, other than to display an error on the console if a non-zero/true value is written. Finally, in the several years where we have been working on deprecating this functionality, there has only been one instance of someone mentioning any user visible breakage. In this particular case it was an individual's kernel test system, and the workaround documented in the deprecation notice ("selinux=0" on the kernel command line) resolved the issue without problem. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* selinux: remove the 'checkreqprot' functionalityPaul Moore2023-03-204-56/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We originally promised that the SELinux 'checkreqprot' functionality would be removed no sooner than June 2021, and now that it is March 2023 it seems like it is a good time to do the final removal. The deprecation notice in the kernel provides plenty of detail on why 'checkreqprot' is not desirable, with the key point repeated below: This was a compatibility mechanism for legacy userspace and for the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag. However, if set to 1, it weakens security by allowing mappings to be made executable without authorization by policy. The default value of checkreqprot at boot was changed starting in Linux v4.4 to 0 (i.e. check the actual protection), and Android and Linux distributions have been explicitly writing a "0" to /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot during initialization for some time. Along with the official deprecation notice, we have been discussing this on-list and directly with several of the larger SELinux-based distros and everyone is happy to see this feature finally removed. In an attempt to catch all of the smaller, and DIY, Linux systems we have been writing a deprecation notice URL into the kernel log, along with a growing ssleep() penalty, when admins enabled checkreqprot at runtime or via the kernel command line. We have yet to have anyone come to us and raise an objection to the deprecation or planned removal. It is worth noting that while this patch removes the checkreqprot functionality, it leaves the user visible interfaces (kernel command line and selinuxfs file) intact, just inert. This should help prevent breakages with existing userspace tools that correctly, but unnecessarily, disable checkreqprot at boot or runtime. Admins that attempt to enable checkreqprot will be met with a removal message in the kernel log. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* selinux: stop passing selinux_state pointers and their offspringStephen Smalley2023-03-1418-995/+651
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Linus observed that the pervasive passing of selinux_state pointers introduced by me in commit aa8e712cee93 ("selinux: wrap global selinux state") adds overhead and complexity without providing any benefit. The original idea was to pave the way for SELinux namespaces but those have not yet been implemented and there isn't currently a concrete plan to do so. Remove the passing of the selinux_state pointers, reverting to direct use of the single global selinux_state, and likewise remove passing of child pointers like the selinux_avc. The selinux_policy pointer remains as it is needed for atomic switching of policies. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202303101057.mZ3Gv5fK-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* selinux: uninline unlikely parts of avc_has_perm_noaudit()Paul Moore2023-03-081-28/+57
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is based on earlier patch posted to the list by Linus, his commit description read: "avc_has_perm_noaudit()is one of those hot functions that end up being used by almost all filesystem operations (through "avc_has_perm()") and it's intended to be cheap enough to inline. However, it turns out that the unlikely parts of it (where it doesn't find an existing avc node) need a fair amount of stack space for the automatic replacement node, so if it were to be inlined (at least clang does not) it would just use stack space unnecessarily. So split the unlikely part out of it, and mark that part noinline. That improves the actual likely part." The basic idea behind the patch was reasonable, but there were minor nits (double indenting, etc.) and the RCU read lock unlock/re-lock in avc_compute_av() began to look even more ugly. This patch builds on Linus' first effort by cleaning things up a bit and removing the RCU unlock/lock dance in avc_compute_av(). Removing the RCU lock dance in avc_compute_av() is safe as there are currently two callers of avc_compute_av(): avc_has_perm_noaudit() and avc_has_extended_perms(). The first caller in avc_has_perm_noaudit() does not require a RCU lock as there is no avc_node to protect so the RCU lock can be dropped before calling avc_compute_av(). The second caller, avc_has_extended_perms(), is similar in that there is no avc_node that requires RCU protection, but the code is simplified by holding the RCU look around the avc_compute_av() call, and given that we enter a RCU critical section in security_compute_av() (called from av_compute_av()) the impact will likely be unnoticeable. It is also worth noting that avc_has_extended_perms() is only called from the SELinux ioctl() access control hook at the moment. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Merge tag 'mm-stable-2023-02-20-13-37' of ↵Linus Torvalds2023-02-241-3/+3
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton: - Daniel Verkamp has contributed a memfd series ("mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_EXEC") which permits the setting of the memfd execute bit at memfd creation time, with the option of sealing the state of the X bit. - Peter Xu adds a patch series ("mm/hugetlb: Make huge_pte_offset() thread-safe for pmd unshare") which addresses a rare race condition related to PMD unsharing. - Several folioification patch serieses from Matthew Wilcox, Vishal Moola, Sidhartha Kumar and Lorenzo Stoakes - Johannes Weiner has a series ("mm: push down lock_page_memcg()") which does perform some memcg maintenance and cleanup work. - SeongJae Park has added DAMOS filtering to DAMON, with the series "mm/damon/core: implement damos filter". These filters provide users with finer-grained control over DAMOS's actions. SeongJae has also done some DAMON cleanup work. - Kairui Song adds a series ("Clean up and fixes for swap"). - Vernon Yang contributed the series "Clean up and refinement for maple tree". - Yu Zhao has contributed the "mm: multi-gen LRU: memcg LRU" series. It adds to MGLRU an LRU of memcgs, to improve the scalability of global reclaim. - David Hildenbrand has added some userfaultfd cleanup work in the series "mm: uffd-wp + change_protection() cleanups". - Christoph Hellwig has removed the generic_writepages() library function in the series "remove generic_writepages". - Baolin Wang has performed some maintenance on the compaction code in his series "Some small improvements for compaction". - Sidhartha Kumar is doing some maintenance work on struct page in his series "Get rid of tail page fields". - David Hildenbrand contributed some cleanup, bugfixing and generalization of pte management and of pte debugging in his series "mm: support __HAVE_ARCH_PTE_SWP_EXCLUSIVE on all architectures with swap PTEs". - Mel Gorman and Neil Brown have removed the __GFP_ATOMIC allocation flag in the series "Discard __GFP_ATOMIC". - Sergey Senozhatsky has improved zsmalloc's memory utilization with his series "zsmalloc: make zspage chain size configurable". - Joey Gouly has added prctl() support for prohibiting the creation of writeable+executable mappings. The previous BPF-based approach had shortcomings. See "mm: In-kernel support for memory-deny-write-execute (MDWE)". - Waiman Long did some kmemleak cleanup and bugfixing in the series "mm/kmemleak: Simplify kmemleak_cond_resched() & fix UAF". - T.J. Alumbaugh has contributed some MGLRU cleanup work in his series "mm: multi-gen LRU: improve". - Jiaqi Yan has provided some enhancements to our memory error statistics reporting, mainly by presenting the statistics on a per-node basis. See the series "Introduce per NUMA node memory error statistics". - Mel Gorman has a second and hopefully final shot at fixing a CPU-hog regression in compaction via his series "Fix excessive CPU usage during compaction". - Christoph Hellwig does some vmalloc maintenance work in the series "cleanup vfree and vunmap". - Christoph Hellwig has removed block_device_operations.rw_page() in ths series "remove ->rw_page". - We get some maple_tree improvements and cleanups in Liam Howlett's series "VMA tree type safety and remove __vma_adjust()". - Suren Baghdasaryan has done some work on the maintainability of our vm_flags handling in the series "introduce vm_flags modifier functions". - Some pagemap cleanup and generalization work in Mike Rapoport's series "mm, arch: add generic implementation of pfn_valid() for FLATMEM" and "fixups for generic implementation of pfn_valid()" - Baoquan He has done some work to make /proc/vmallocinfo and /proc/kcore better represent the real state of things in his series "mm/vmalloc.c: allow vread() to read out vm_map_ram areas". - Jason Gunthorpe rationalized the GUP system's interface to the rest of the kernel in the series "Simplify the external interface for GUP". - SeongJae Park wishes to migrate people from DAMON's debugfs interface over to its sysfs interface. To support this, we'll temporarily be printing warnings when people use the debugfs interface. See the series "mm/damon: deprecate DAMON debugfs interface". - Andrey Konovalov provided the accurately named "lib/stackdepot: fixes and clean-ups" series. - Huang Ying has provided a dramatic reduction in migration's TLB flush IPI rates with the series "migrate_pages(): batch TLB flushing". - Arnd Bergmann has some objtool fixups in "objtool warning fixes". * tag 'mm-stable-2023-02-20-13-37' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (505 commits) include/linux/migrate.h: remove unneeded externs mm/memory_hotplug: cleanup return value handing in do_migrate_range() mm/uffd: fix comment in handling pte markers mm: change to return bool for isolate_movable_page() mm: hugetlb: change to return bool for isolate_hugetlb() mm: change to return bool for isolate_lru_page() mm: change to return bool for folio_isolate_lru() objtool: add UACCESS exceptions for __tsan_volatile_read/write kmsan: disable ftrace in kmsan core code kasan: mark addr_has_metadata __always_inline mm: memcontrol: rename memcg_kmem_enabled() sh: initialize max_mapnr m68k/nommu: add missing definition of ARCH_PFN_OFFSET mm: percpu: fix incorrect size in pcpu_obj_full_size() maple_tree: reduce stack usage with gcc-9 and earlier mm: page_alloc: call panic() when memoryless node allocation fails mm: multi-gen LRU: avoid futile retries migrate_pages: move THP/hugetlb migration support check to simplify code migrate_pages: batch flushing TLB migrate_pages: share more code between _unmap and _move ...
| * mm: replace vma->vm_flags direct modifications with modifier callsSuren Baghdasaryan2023-02-101-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace direct modifications to vma->vm_flags with calls to modifier functions to be able to track flag changes and to keep vma locking correctness. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix drivers/misc/open-dice.c, per Hyeonggon Yoo] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230126193752.297968-5-surenb@google.com Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Acked-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arjun Roy <arjunroy@google.com> Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev> Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@google.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Oskolkov <posk@google.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@bytedance.com> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
* | fs: port inode_owner_or_capable() to mnt_idmapChristian Brauner2023-01-191-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
* | fs: port acl to mnt_idmapChristian Brauner2023-01-191-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
* | fs: port xattr to mnt_idmapChristian Brauner2023-01-191-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
* | fs: port ->permission() to pass mnt_idmapChristian Brauner2023-01-191-2/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
* Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20221212' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-12-131-7/+6
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: - Improve the error handling in the device cgroup such that memory allocation failures when updating the access policy do not potentially alter the policy. - Some minor fixes to reiserfs to ensure that it properly releases LSM-related xattr values. - Update the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook to take sockptr_t values. Previously the net/BPF folks updated the getsockopt code in the network stack to leverage the sockptr_t type to make it easier to pass both kernel and __user pointers, but unfortunately when they did so they didn't convert the LSM hook. While there was/is no immediate risk by not converting the LSM hook, it seems like this is a mistake waiting to happen so this patch proactively does the LSM hook conversion. - Convert vfs_getxattr_alloc() to return an int instead of a ssize_t and cleanup the callers. Internally the function was never going to return anything larger than an int and the callers were doing some very odd things casting the return value; this patch fixes all that and helps bring a bit of sanity to vfs_getxattr_alloc() and its callers. - More verbose, and helpful, LSM debug output when the system is booted with "lsm.debug" on the command line. There are examples in the commit description, but the quick summary is that this patch provides better information about which LSMs are enabled and the ordering in which they are processed. - General comment and kernel-doc fixes and cleanups. * tag 'lsm-pr-20221212' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: lsm: Fix description of fs_context_parse_param lsm: Add/fix return values in lsm_hooks.h and fix formatting lsm: Clarify documentation of vm_enough_memory hook reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free() lsm,fs: fix vfs_getxattr_alloc() return type and caller error paths device_cgroup: Roll back to original exceptions after copy failure LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe audit: Fix some kernel-doc warnings lsm: remove obsoleted comments for security hooks fs: edit a comment made in bad taste
| * lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safePaul Moore2022-11-051-7/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 4ff09db1b79b ("bpf: net: Change sk_getsockopt() to take the sockptr_t argument") made it possible to call sk_getsockopt() with both user and kernel address space buffers through the use of the sockptr_t type. Unfortunately at the time of conversion the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook was written to only accept userspace buffers, and in a desire to avoid having to change the LSM hook the commit author simply passed the sockptr_t's userspace buffer pointer. Since the only sk_getsockopt() callers at the time of conversion which used kernel sockptr_t buffers did not allow SO_PEERSEC, and hence the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() hook, this was acceptable but also very fragile as future changes presented the possibility of silently passing kernel space pointers to the LSM hook. There are several ways to protect against this, including careful code review of future commits, but since relying on code review to catch bugs is a recipe for disaster and the upstream eBPF maintainer is "strongly against defensive programming", this patch updates the LSM hook, and all of the implementations to support sockptr_t and safely handle both user and kernel space buffers. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20221212' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-12-135-47/+52
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: "Two SELinux patches: one increases the sleep time on deprecated functionality, and one removes the indirect calls in the sidtab context conversion code" * tag 'selinux-pr-20221212' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: remove the sidtab context conversion indirect calls selinux: increase the deprecation sleep for checkreqprot and runtime disable
| * | selinux: remove the sidtab context conversion indirect callsPaul Moore2022-11-094-44/+45
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The sidtab conversion code has support for multiple context conversion routines through the use of function pointers and indirect calls. However, the reality is that all current users rely on the same conversion routine: convert_context(). This patch does away with this extra complexity and replaces the indirect calls with direct function calls; allowing us to remove a layer of obfuscation and create cleaner, more maintainable code. Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | selinux: increase the deprecation sleep for checkreqprot and runtime disablePaul Moore2022-10-171-2/+2
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Further the checkreqprot and runtime disable deprecation efforts by increasing the sleep time from 5 to 15 seconds to help make this more noticeable for any users who are still using these knobs. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | Merge tag 'fs.acl.rework.v6.2' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-12-131-0/+22
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping Pull VFS acl updates from Christian Brauner: "This contains the work that builds a dedicated vfs posix acl api. The origins of this work trace back to v5.19 but it took quite a while to understand the various filesystem specific implementations in sufficient detail and also come up with an acceptable solution. As we discussed and seen multiple times the current state of how posix acls are handled isn't nice and comes with a lot of problems: The current way of handling posix acls via the generic xattr api is error prone, hard to maintain, and type unsafe for the vfs until we call into the filesystem's dedicated get and set inode operations. It is already the case that posix acls are special-cased to death all the way through the vfs. There are an uncounted number of hacks that operate on the uapi posix acl struct instead of the dedicated vfs struct posix_acl. And the vfs must be involved in order to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing them to the backing store, caching them, reporting them to userspace, or for permission checking. Currently a range of hacks and duct tape exist to make this work. As with most things this is really no ones fault it's just something that happened over time. But the code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain and one is constantly at risk of introducing bugs and regressions when having to touch it. Instead of continuing to hack posix acls through the xattr handlers this series builds a dedicated posix acl api solely around the get and set inode operations. Going forward, the vfs_get_acl(), vfs_remove_acl(), and vfs_set_acl() helpers must be used in order to interact with posix acls. They operate directly on the vfs internal struct posix_acl instead of abusing the uapi posix acl struct as we currently do. In the end this removes all of the hackiness, makes the codepaths easier to maintain, and gets us type safety. This series passes the LTP and xfstests suites without any regressions. For xfstests the following combinations were tested: - xfs - ext4 - btrfs - overlayfs - overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts - orangefs - (limited) cifs There's more simplifications for posix acls that we can make in the future if the basic api has made it. A few implementation details: - The series makes sure to retain exactly the same security and integrity module permission checks. Especially for the integrity modules this api is a win because right now they convert the uapi posix acl struct passed to them via a void pointer into the vfs struct posix_acl format to perform permission checking on the mode. There's a new dedicated security hook for setting posix acls which passes the vfs struct posix_acl not a void pointer. Basing checking on the posix acl stored in the uapi format is really unreliable. The vfs currently hacks around directly in the uapi struct storing values that frankly the security and integrity modules can't correctly interpret as evidenced by bugs we reported and fixed in this area. It's not necessarily even their fault it's just that the format we provide to them is sub optimal. - Some filesystems like 9p and cifs need access to the dentry in order to get and set posix acls which is why they either only partially or not even at all implement get and set inode operations. For example, cifs allows setxattr() and getxattr() operations but doesn't allow permission checking based on posix acls because it can't implement a get acl inode operation. Thus, this patch series updates the set acl inode operation to take a dentry instead of an inode argument. However, for the get acl inode operation we can't do this as the old get acl method is called in e.g., generic_permission() and inode_permission(). These helpers in turn are called in various filesystem's permission inode operation. So passing a dentry argument to the old get acl inode operation would amount to passing a dentry to the permission inode operation which we shouldn't and probably can't do. So instead of extending the existing inode operation Christoph suggested to add a new one. He also requested to ensure that the get and set acl inode operation taking a dentry are consistently named. So for this version the old get acl operation is renamed to ->get_inode_acl() and a new ->get_acl() inode operation taking a dentry is added. With this we can give both 9p and cifs get and set acl inode operations and in turn remove their complex custom posix xattr handlers. In the future I hope to get rid of the inode method duplication but it isn't like we have never had this situation. Readdir is just one example. And frankly, the overall gain in type safety and the more pleasant api wise are simply too big of a benefit to not accept this duplication for a while. - We've done a full audit of every codepaths using variant of the current generic xattr api to get and set posix acls and surprisingly it isn't that many places. There's of course always a chance that we might have missed some and if so I'm sure we'll find them soon enough. The crucial codepaths to be converted are obviously stacking filesystems such as ecryptfs and overlayfs. For a list of all callers currently using generic xattr api helpers see [2] including comments whether they support posix acls or not. - The old vfs generic posix acl infrastructure doesn't obey the create and replace semantics promised on the setxattr(2) manpage. This patch series doesn't address this. It really is something we should revisit later though. The patches are roughly organized as follows: (1) Change existing set acl inode operation to take a dentry argument (Intended to be a non-functional change) (2) Rename existing get acl method (Intended to be a non-functional change) (3) Implement get and set acl inode operations for filesystems that couldn't implement one before because of the missing dentry. That's mostly 9p and cifs (Intended to be a non-functional change) (4) Build posix acl api, i.e., add vfs_get_acl(), vfs_remove_acl(), and vfs_set_acl() including security and integrity hooks (Intended to be a non-functional change) (5) Implement get and set acl inode operations for stacking filesystems (Intended to be a non-functional change) (6) Switch posix acl handling in stacking filesystems to new posix acl api now that all filesystems it can stack upon support it. (7) Switch vfs to new posix acl api (semantical change) (8) Remove all now unused helpers (9) Additional regression fixes reported after we merged this into linux-next Thanks to Seth for a lot of good discussion around this and encouragement and input from Christoph" * tag 'fs.acl.rework.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping: (36 commits) posix_acl: Fix the type of sentinel in get_acl orangefs: fix mode handling ovl: call posix_acl_release() after error checking evm: remove dead code in evm_inode_set_acl() cifs: check whether acl is valid early acl: make vfs_posix_acl_to_xattr() static acl: remove a slew of now unused helpers 9p: use stub posix acl handlers cifs: use stub posix acl handlers ovl: use stub posix acl handlers ecryptfs: use stub posix acl handlers evm: remove evm_xattr_acl_change() xattr: use posix acl api ovl: use posix acl api ovl: implement set acl method ovl: implement get acl method ecryptfs: implement set acl method ecryptfs: implement get acl method ksmbd: use vfs_remove_acl() acl: add vfs_remove_acl() ...
| * | selinux: implement get, set and remove acl hookChristian Brauner2022-10-201-0/+22
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void pointer stored in the uapi format. I spent considerate time in the security module infrastructure and audited all codepaths. SELinux has no restrictions based on the posix acl values passed through it. The capability hook doesn't need to be called either because it only has restrictions on security.* xattrs. So these are all fairly simply hooks for SELinux. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
* / selinux: enable use of both GFP_KERNEL and GFP_ATOMIC in convert_context()GONG, Ruiqi2022-10-193-5/+6
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following warning was triggered on a hardware environment: SELinux: Converting 162 SID table entries... BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at __might_sleep+0x60/0x74 0x0 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 5943, name: tar CPU: 7 PID: 5943 Comm: tar Tainted: P O 5.10.0 #1 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1c8 show_stack+0x18/0x28 dump_stack+0xe8/0x15c ___might_sleep+0x168/0x17c __might_sleep+0x60/0x74 __kmalloc_track_caller+0xa0/0x7dc kstrdup+0x54/0xac convert_context+0x48/0x2e4 sidtab_context_to_sid+0x1c4/0x36c security_context_to_sid_core+0x168/0x238 security_context_to_sid_default+0x14/0x24 inode_doinit_use_xattr+0x164/0x1e4 inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x1c0/0x488 selinux_d_instantiate+0x20/0x34 security_d_instantiate+0x70/0xbc d_splice_alias+0x4c/0x3c0 ext4_lookup+0x1d8/0x200 [ext4] __lookup_slow+0x12c/0x1e4 walk_component+0x100/0x200 path_lookupat+0x88/0x118 filename_lookup+0x98/0x130 user_path_at_empty+0x48/0x60 vfs_statx+0x84/0x140 vfs_fstatat+0x20/0x30 __se_sys_newfstatat+0x30/0x74 __arm64_sys_newfstatat+0x1c/0x2c el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x100/0x184 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x2c el0_svc+0x20/0x34 el0_sync_handler+0x80/0x17c el0_sync+0x13c/0x140 SELinux: Context system_u:object_r:pssp_rsyslog_log_t:s0:c0 is not valid (left unmapped). It was found that within a critical section of spin_lock_irqsave in sidtab_context_to_sid(), convert_context() (hooked by sidtab_convert_params.func) might cause the process to sleep via allocating memory with GFP_KERNEL, which is problematic. As Ondrej pointed out [1], convert_context()/sidtab_convert_params.func has another caller sidtab_convert_tree(), which is okay with GFP_KERNEL. Therefore, fix this problem by adding a gfp_t argument for convert_context()/sidtab_convert_params.func and pass GFP_KERNEL/_ATOMIC properly in individual callers. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221018120111.1474581-1-gongruiqi1@huawei.com/ [1] Reported-by: Tan Ninghao <tanninghao1@huawei.com> Fixes: ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance") Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> [PM: wrap long BUG() output lines, tweak subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Merge tag 'pull-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfsLinus Torvalds2022-10-071-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull vfs constification updates from Al Viro: "whack-a-mole: constifying struct path *" * tag 'pull-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: ecryptfs: constify path spufs: constify path nd_jump_link(): constify path audit_init_parent(): constify path __io_setxattr(): constify path do_proc_readlink(): constify path overlayfs: constify path fs/notify: constify path may_linkat(): constify path do_sys_name_to_handle(): constify path ->getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM...
| * ->getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM...Al Viro2022-09-011-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | cast of ->d_name.name to char * is completely wrong - nothing is allowed to modify its contents. Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20221003' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-10-042-0/+11
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore: "Seven patches for the LSM layer and we've got a mix of trivial and significant patches. Highlights below, starting with the smaller bits first so they don't get lost in the discussion of the larger items: - Remove some redundant NULL pointer checks in the common LSM audit code. - Ratelimit the lockdown LSM's access denial messages. With this change there is a chance that the last visible lockdown message on the console is outdated/old, but it does help preserve the initial series of lockdown denials that started the denial message flood and my gut feeling is that these might be the more valuable messages. - Open userfaultfds as readonly instead of read/write. While this code obviously lives outside the LSM, it does have a noticeable impact on the LSMs with Ondrej explaining the situation in the commit description. It is worth noting that this patch languished on the VFS list for over a year without any comments (objections or otherwise) so I took the liberty of pulling it into the LSM tree after giving fair notice. It has been in linux-next since the end of August without any noticeable problems. - Add a LSM hook for user namespace creation, with implementations for both the BPF LSM and SELinux. Even though the changes are fairly small, this is the bulk of the diffstat as we are also including BPF LSM selftests for the new hook. It's also the most contentious of the changes in this pull request with Eric Biederman NACK'ing the LSM hook multiple times during its development and discussion upstream. While I've never taken NACK's lightly, I'm sending these patches to you because it is my belief that they are of good quality, satisfy a long-standing need of users and distros, and are in keeping with the existing nature of the LSM layer and the Linux Kernel as a whole. The patches in implement a LSM hook for user namespace creation that allows for a granular approach, configurable at runtime, which enables both monitoring and control of user namespaces. The general consensus has been that this is far preferable to the other solutions that have been adopted downstream including outright removal from the kernel, disabling via system wide sysctls, or various other out-of-tree mechanisms that users have been forced to adopt since we haven't been able to provide them an upstream solution for their requests. Eric has been steadfast in his objections to this LSM hook, explaining that any restrictions on the user namespace could have significant impact on userspace. While there is the possibility of impacting userspace, it is important to note that this solution only impacts userspace when it is requested based on the runtime configuration supplied by the distro/admin/user. Frederick (the pathset author), the LSM/security community, and myself have tried to work with Eric during development of this patchset to find a mutually acceptable solution, but Eric's approach and unwillingness to engage in a meaningful way have made this impossible. I have CC'd Eric directly on this pull request so he has a chance to provide his side of the story; there have been no objections outside of Eric's" * tag 'lsm-pr-20221003' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: lockdown: ratelimit denial messages userfaultfd: open userfaultfds with O_RDONLY selinux: Implement userns_create hook selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm userns_create hook bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_userns_create() sleepable security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns() lsm: clean up redundant NULL pointer check
| * | selinux: Implement userns_create hookFrederick Lawler2022-08-162-0/+11
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Unprivileged user namespace creation is an intended feature to enable sandboxing, however this feature is often used to as an initial step to perform a privilege escalation attack. This patch implements a new user_namespace { create } access control permission to restrict which domains allow or deny user namespace creation. This is necessary for system administrators to quickly protect their systems while waiting for vulnerability patches to be applied. This permission can be used in the following way: allow domA_t domA_t : user_namespace { create }; Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20221003' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-10-046-53/+46
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore: "Six SELinux patches, all are simple and easily understood, but a list of the highlights is below: - Use 'grep -E' instead of 'egrep' in the SELinux policy install script. Fun fact, this seems to be GregKH's *second* dedicated SELinux patch since we transitioned to git (ignoring merges, the SPDX stuff, and a trivial fs reference removal when lustre was yanked); the first was back in 2011 when selinuxfs was placed in /sys/fs/selinux. Oh, the memories ... - Convert the SELinux policy boolean values to use signed integer types throughout the SELinux kernel code. Prior to this we were using a mix of signed and unsigned integers which was probably okay in this particular case, but it is definitely not a good idea in general. - Remove a reference to the SELinux runtime disable functionality in /etc/selinux/config as we are in the process of deprecating that. See [1] for more background on this if you missed the previous notes on the deprecation. - Minor cleanups: remove unneeded variables and function parameter constification" Link: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/wiki/DEPRECATE-runtime-disable [1] * tag 'selinux-pr-20221003' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: remove runtime disable message in the install_policy.sh script selinux: use "grep -E" instead of "egrep" selinux: remove the unneeded result variable selinux: declare read-only parameters const selinux: use int arrays for boolean values selinux: remove an unneeded variable in sel_make_class_dir_entries()
| * | selinux: remove the unneeded result variableXu Panda2022-09-141-15/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Return the value avc_has_perm() directly instead of storing it in another redundant variable. Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Xu Panda <xu.panda@zte.com.cn> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | selinux: declare read-only parameters constChristian Göttsche2022-08-304-29/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Declare ebitmap, mls_level and mls_context parameters const where they are only read from. This allows callers to supply pointers to const as arguments and increases readability. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | selinux: use int arrays for boolean valuesChristian Göttsche2022-08-301-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Do not cast pointers of signed integers to pointers of unsigned integers and vice versa. It should currently not be an issue since they hold SELinux boolean values which should only contain either 0's or 1's, which should have the same representation. Reported by sparse: .../selinuxfs.c:1485:30: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different signedness) .../selinuxfs.c:1485:30: expected unsigned int * .../selinuxfs.c:1485:30: got int *[addressable] values .../selinuxfs.c:1402:48: warning: incorrect type in argument 3 (different signedness) .../selinuxfs.c:1402:48: expected int *values .../selinuxfs.c:1402:48: got unsigned int *bool_pending_values Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: minor whitespace fixes, sparse output cleanup] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | selinux: remove an unneeded variable in sel_make_class_dir_entries()ye xingchen2022-08-301-4/+1
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Return the value sel_make_perm_files() directly instead of storing it in another redundant variable. Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: ye xingchen <ye.xingchen@zte.com.cn> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* / selinux: implement the security_uring_cmd() LSM hookPaul Moore2022-08-262-1/+25
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a SELinux access control for the iouring IORING_OP_URING_CMD command. This includes the addition of a new permission in the existing "io_uring" object class: "cmd". The subject of the new permission check is the domain of the process requesting access, the object is the open file which points to the device/file that is the target of the IORING_OP_URING_CMD operation. A sample policy rule is shown below: allow <domain> <file>:io_uring { cmd }; Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd") Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20220801' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-08-025-13/+19
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: "A relatively small set of patches for SELinux this time, eight patches in total with really only one significant change. The highlights are: - Add support for proper labeling of memfd_secret anonymous inodes. This will allow LSMs that implement the anonymous inode hooks to apply security policy to memfd_secret() fds. - Various small improvements to memory management: fixed leaks, freed memory when needed, boundary checks. - Hardened the selinux_audit_data struct with __randomize_layout. - A minor documentation tweak to fix a formatting/style issue" * tag 'selinux-pr-20220801' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: selinux_add_opt() callers free memory selinux: Add boundary check in put_entry() selinux: fix memleak in security_read_state_kernel() docs: selinux: add '=' signs to kernel boot options mm: create security context for memfd_secret inodes selinux: fix typos in comments selinux: drop unnecessary NULL check selinux: add __randomize_layout to selinux_audit_data
| * selinux: selinux_add_opt() callers free memoryXiu Jianfeng2022-06-211-7/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The selinux_add_opt() function may need to allocate memory for the mount options if none has already been allocated, but there is no need to free that memory on error as the callers handle that. Drop the existing kfree() on error to help increase consistency in the selinux_add_opt() error handling. This patch also changes selinux_add_opt() to return -EINVAL when the mount option value, @s, is NULL. It currently return -ENOMEM. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220611090550.135674-1-xiujianfeng@huawei.com/T/ Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> [PM: fix subject, rework commit description language] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: Add boundary check in put_entry()Xiu Jianfeng2022-06-151-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Just like next_entry(), boundary check is necessary to prevent memory out-of-bound access. Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: fix memleak in security_read_state_kernel()Xiu Jianfeng2022-06-141-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In this function, it directly returns the result of __security_read_policy without freeing the allocated memory in *data, cause memory leak issue, so free the memory if __security_read_policy failed. Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: fix typos in commentsJonas Lindner2022-06-102-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Jonas Lindner <jolindner@gmx.de> [PM: fixed duplicated subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: drop unnecessary NULL checkChristian Göttsche2022-06-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit e3489f8974e1 ("selinux: kill selinux_sb_get_mnt_opts()") introduced a NULL check on the context after a successful call to security_sid_to_context(). This is on the one hand redundant after checking for success and on the other hand insufficient on an actual NULL pointer, since the context is passed to seq_escape() leading to a call of strlen() on it. Reported by Clang analyzer: In file included from security/selinux/hooks.c:28: In file included from ./include/linux/tracehook.h:50: In file included from ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:13: In file included from ./include/linux/cgroup.h:18: ./include/linux/seq_file.h:136:25: warning: Null pointer passed as 1st argument to string length function [unix.cstring.NullArg] seq_escape_mem(m, src, strlen(src), flags, esc); ^~~~~~~~~~~ Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: add __randomize_layout to selinux_audit_dataGONG, Ruiqi2022-06-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Randomize the layout of struct selinux_audit_data as suggested in [1], since it contains a pointer to struct selinux_state, an already randomized strucure. [1]: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/188 Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | selinux: free contexts previously transferred in selinux_add_opt()Christian Göttsche2022-06-161-7/+4
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | `selinux_add_opt()` stopped taking ownership of the passed context since commit 70f4169ab421 ("selinux: parse contexts for mount options early"). unreferenced object 0xffff888114dfd140 (size 64): comm "mount", pid 15182, jiffies 4295687028 (age 796.340s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 73 79 73 74 65 6d 5f 75 3a 6f 62 6a 65 63 74 5f system_u:object_ 72 3a 74 65 73 74 5f 66 69 6c 65 73 79 73 74 65 r:test_filesyste backtrace: [<ffffffffa07dbef4>] kmemdup_nul+0x24/0x80 [<ffffffffa0d34253>] selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts+0x293/0x560 [<ffffffffa0d13f08>] security_sb_eat_lsm_opts+0x58/0x80 [<ffffffffa0af1eb2>] generic_parse_monolithic+0x82/0x180 [<ffffffffa0a9c1a5>] do_new_mount+0x1f5/0x550 [<ffffffffa0a9eccb>] path_mount+0x2ab/0x1570 [<ffffffffa0aa019e>] __x64_sys_mount+0x20e/0x280 [<ffffffffa1f47124>] do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 [<ffffffffa200007e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 unreferenced object 0xffff888108e71640 (size 64): comm "fsmount", pid 7607, jiffies 4295044974 (age 1601.016s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 73 79 73 74 65 6d 5f 75 3a 6f 62 6a 65 63 74 5f system_u:object_ 72 3a 74 65 73 74 5f 66 69 6c 65 73 79 73 74 65 r:test_filesyste backtrace: [<ffffffff861dc2b1>] memdup_user+0x21/0x90 [<ffffffff861dc367>] strndup_user+0x47/0xa0 [<ffffffff864f6965>] __do_sys_fsconfig+0x485/0x9f0 [<ffffffff87940124>] do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 [<ffffffff87a0007e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 70f4169ab421 ("selinux: parse contexts for mount options early") Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20220523' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-05-2419-80/+89
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: "We've got twelve patches queued for v5.19, with most being fairly minor. The highlights are below: - The checkreqprot and runtime disable knobs have been deprecated for some time with no active users that we can find. In an effort to move things along we are adding a pause when the knobs are used to help make the deprecation more noticeable in case anyone is still using these hacks in the shadows. - We've added the anonymous inode class name to the AVC audit records when anonymous inodes are involved. This should make writing policy easier when anonymous inodes are involved. - More constification work. This is fairly straightforward and the source of most of the diffstat. - The usual minor cleanups: remove unnecessary assignments, assorted style/checkpatch fixes, kdoc fixes, macro while-loop encapsulations, #include tweaks, etc" * tag 'selinux-pr-20220523' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: security: declare member holding string literal const selinux: log anon inode class name selinux: declare data arrays const selinux: fix indentation level of mls_ops block selinux: include necessary headers in headers selinux: avoid extra semicolon selinux: update parameter documentation selinux: resolve checkpatch errors selinux: don't sleep when CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE is true selinux: checkreqprot is deprecated, add some ssleep() discomfort selinux: runtime disable is deprecated, add some ssleep() discomfort selinux: Remove redundant assignments
| * selinux: log anon inode class nameChristian Göttsche2022-05-031-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Log the anonymous inode class name in the security hook inode_init_security_anon. This name is the key for name based type transitions on the anon_inode security class on creation. Example: type=AVC msg=audit(02/16/22 22:02:50.585:216) : avc: granted \ { create } for pid=2136 comm=mariadbd anonclass=[io_uring] \ scontext=system_u:system_r:mysqld_t:s0 \ tcontext=system_u:system_r:mysqld_iouring_t:s0 tclass=anon_inode Add a new LSM audit data type holding the inode and the class name. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: adjusted 'anonclass' to be a trusted string, cgzones approved] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: declare data arrays constChristian Göttsche2022-05-039-26/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The arrays for the policy capability names, the initial sid identifiers and the class and permission names are not changed at runtime. Declare them const to avoid accidental modification. Do not override the classmap and the initial sid list in the build time script genheaders. Check flose(3) is successful in genheaders.c, otherwise the written data might be corrupted or incomplete. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: manual merge due to fuzz, minor style tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: fix indentation level of mls_ops blockChristian Göttsche2022-05-031-21/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add one level of indentation to the code block of the label mls_ops in constraint_expr_eval(), to adjust the trailing break; to the parent case: branch. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: include necessary headers in headersChristian Göttsche2022-05-036-1/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Include header files required for struct or typedef declarations in header files. This is for example helpful when working with an IDE, which needs to resolve those symbols. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: avoid extra semicolonChristian Göttsche2022-05-031-9/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Wrap macro into `do { } while (0)` to avoid Clang emitting warnings about extra semicolons. Similar to userspace commit https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/commit/9d85aa60d12e468e7fd510c2b5475b5299b71622 Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: whitespace/indenting tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: update parameter documentationChristian Göttsche2022-05-032-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | security/selinux/include/audit.h:54: warning: Function parameter or member 'krule' not described in 'selinux_audit_rule_known' security/selinux/include/audit.h:54: warning: Excess function parameter 'rule' description in 'selinux_audit_rule_known' security/selinux/include/avc.h:130: warning: Function parameter or member 'state' not described in 'avc_audit' This also bring the parameter name of selinux_audit_rule_known() in sync between declaration and definition. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: resolve checkpatch errorsChristian Göttsche2022-05-033-18/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Reported by checkpatch: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c --------------------------- ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #29: FILE: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:29: +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #97: FILE: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:97: +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #105: FILE: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:105: +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #134: FILE: security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:134: +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] = +{ security/selinux/ss/policydb.c ------------------------------ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #318: FILE: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:318: +static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #674: FILE: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:674: +static int (*index_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #1643: FILE: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:1643: +static int (*read_f[SYM_NUM]) (struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp) = +{ ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line #3246: FILE: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:3246: + void *datap) = +{ Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: don't sleep when CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE is truePaul Moore2022-04-142-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Unfortunately commit 81200b0265b1 ("selinux: checkreqprot is deprecated, add some ssleep() discomfort") added a five second sleep during early kernel boot, e.g. start_kernel(), which could cause a "scheduling while atomic" panic. This patch fixes this problem by moving the sleep out of checkreqprot_set() and into sel_write_checkreqprot() so that we only sleep when the checkreqprot setting is set during runtime, after the kernel has booted. The error message remains the same in both cases. Fixes: 81200b0265b1 ("selinux: checkreqprot is deprecated, add some ssleep() discomfort") Reported-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: checkreqprot is deprecated, add some ssleep() discomfortPaul Moore2022-04-043-3/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The checkreqprot functionality was disabled by default back in Linux v4.4 (2015) with commit 2a35d196c160e3 ("selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default") and it was officially marked as deprecated in Linux v5.7. It was always a bit of a hack to workaround very old userspace and to the best of our knowledge, the checkreqprot functionality has been disabled by Linux distributions for quite some time. This patch moves the deprecation messages from KERN_WARNING to KERN_ERR and adds a five second sleep to anyone using it to help draw their attention to the deprecation and provide a URL which helps explain things in more detail. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: runtime disable is deprecated, add some ssleep() discomfortPaul Moore2022-04-041-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We deprecated the SELinux runtime disable functionality in Linux v5.6, and it is time to get a bit more serious about removing it. Add a five second sleep to anyone using it to help draw their attention to the deprecation and provide a URL which helps explain things in more detail, including how to add kernel command line parameters to some of the more popular Linux distributions. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>