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* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-12-161-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs updates from Al Viro: - more ->d_init() stuff (work.dcache) - pathname resolution cleanups (work.namei) - a few missing iov_iter primitives - copy_from_iter_full() and friends. Either copy the full requested amount, advance the iterator and return true, or fail, return false and do _not_ advance the iterator. Quite a few open-coded callers converted (and became more readable and harder to fuck up that way) (work.iov_iter) - several assorted patches, the big one being logfs removal * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: logfs: remove from tree vfs: fix put_compat_statfs64() does not handle errors namei: fold should_follow_link() with the step into not-followed link namei: pass both WALK_GET and WALK_MORE to should_follow_link() namei: invert WALK_PUT logics namei: shift interpretation of LOOKUP_FOLLOW inside should_follow_link() namei: saner calling conventions for mountpoint_last() namei.c: get rid of user_path_parent() switch getfrag callbacks to ..._full() primitives make skb_add_data,{_nocache}() and skb_copy_to_page_nocache() advance only on success [iov_iter] new primitives - copy_from_iter_full() and friends don't open-code file_inode() ceph: switch to use of ->d_init() ceph: unify dentry_operations instances lustre: switch to use of ->d_init()
| * don't open-code file_inode()Al Viro2016-12-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Smack: Remove unnecessary smack_known_invalidCasey Schaufler2016-11-154-36/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The invalid Smack label ("") and the Huh ("?") Smack label serve the same purpose and having both is unnecessary. While pulling out the invalid label it became clear that the use of smack_from_secid() was inconsistent, so that is repaired. The setting of inode labels to the invalid label could never happen in a functional system, has never been observed in the wild and is not what you'd really want for a failure behavior in any case. That is removed. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smack_parse_opts_str().Tetsuo Handa2016-11-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since smack_parse_opts_str() is calling match_strdup() which uses GFP_KERNEL, it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from kcalloc() which is called by smack_parse_opts_str(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | Smack: ipv6 label match fixCasey Schaufler2016-11-101-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The check for a deleted entry in the list of IPv6 host addresses was being performed in the wrong place, leading to most peculiar results in some cases. This puts the check into the right place. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | SMACK: Fix the memory leak in smack_cred_prepare() hookHimanshu Shukla2016-11-101-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Memory leak in smack_cred_prepare()function. smack_cred_prepare() hook returns error if there is error in allocating memory in smk_copy_rules() or smk_copy_relabel() function. If smack_cred_prepare() function returns error then the calling function should call smack_cred_free() function for cleanup. In smack_cred_free() function first credential is extracted and then all rules are deleted. In smack_cred_prepare() function security field is assigned in the end when all function return success. But this function may return before and memory will not be freed. Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | SMACK: Do not apply star label in smack_setprocattr hookHimanshu Shukla2016-11-101-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Smack prohibits processes from using the star ("*") and web ("@") labels. Checks have been added in other functions. In smack_setprocattr() hook, only check for web ("@") label has been added and restricted from applying web ("@") label. Check for star ("*") label should also be added in smack_setprocattr() hook. Return error should be "-EINVAL" not "-EPERM" as permission is there for setting label but not the label value as star ("*") or web ("@"). Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | smack: parse mnt opts after privileges checkHimanshu Shukla2016-11-101-25/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In smack_set_mnt_opts()first the SMACK mount options are being parsed and later it is being checked whether the user calling mount has CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability. This sequence of operationis will allow unauthorized user to add SMACK labels in label list and may cause denial of security attack by adding many labels by allocating kernel memory by unauthorized user. Superblock smack flag is also being set as initialized though function may return with EPERM error. First check the capability of calling user then set the SMACK attributes and smk_flags. Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | Smack: Assign smack_known_web label for kernel thread'sjooseong lee2016-11-051-2/+10
|/ | | | | | | | | | | Assign smack_known_web label for kernel thread's socket Creating struct sock by sk_alloc function in various kernel subsystems like bluetooth doesn't call smack_socket_post_create(). In such case, received sock label is the floor('_') label and makes access deny. Signed-off-by: jooseong lee <jooseong.lee@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Merge branch 'work.xattr' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-10-111-6/+6
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs xattr updates from Al Viro: "xattr stuff from Andreas This completes the switch to xattr_handler ->get()/->set() from ->getxattr/->setxattr/->removexattr" * 'work.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: vfs: Remove {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations xattr: Stop calling {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations vfs: Check for the IOP_XATTR flag in listxattr xattr: Add __vfs_{get,set,remove}xattr helpers libfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for empty directory handling vfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for bad-inode handling vfs: Add IOP_XATTR inode operations flag vfs: Move xattr_resolve_name to the front of fs/xattr.c ecryptfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers sockfs: Get rid of getxattr iop sockfs: getxattr: Fail with -EOPNOTSUPP for invalid attribute names kernfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers hfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers jffs2: Remove jffs2_{get,set,remove}xattr macros xattr: Remove unnecessary NULL attribute name check
| * xattr: Add __vfs_{get,set,remove}xattr helpersAndreas Gruenbacher2016-10-081-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now, various places in the kernel check for the existence of getxattr, setxattr, and removexattr inode operations and directly call those operations. Switch to helper functions and test for the IOP_XATTR flag instead. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge branch 'stable-4.9' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris2016-09-191-2/+2
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | into next
| * | security: Use IS_ENABLED() instead of checking for built-in or moduleJavier Martinez Canillas2016-08-081-2/+2
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The IS_ENABLED() macro checks if a Kconfig symbol has been enabled either built-in or as a module, use that macro instead of open coding the same. Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier@osg.samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | Smack: Signal delivery as an append operationCasey Schaufler2016-09-083-7/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Under a strict subject/object security policy delivering a signal or delivering network IPC could be considered either a write or an append operation. The original choice to make both write operations leads to an issue where IPC delivery is desired under policy, but delivery of signals is not. This patch provides the option of making signal delivery an append operation, allowing Smack rules that deny signal delivery while allowing IPC. This was requested for Tizen. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | Smack: Use memdup_user() rather than duplicating its implementationMarkus Elfring2016-08-231-8/+3
|/ | | | | | | | | | Reuse existing functionality from memdup_user() instead of keeping duplicate source code. This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-07-301-1/+4
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - TPM core and driver updates/fixes - IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO) - Lots of Apparmor fixes - Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change syscall #" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits) apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family) tpm: Factor out common startup code tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr() apparmor: do not expose kernel stack apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds ...
| * Merge branch 'smack-for-4.8' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next ↵James Morris2016-07-081-0/+3
| |\ | | | | | | | | | into next
| | * Smack: ignore null signal in smack_task_killRafal Krypa2016-06-081-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Kill with signal number 0 is commonly used for checking PID existence. Smack treated such cases like any other kills, although no signal is actually delivered when sig == 0. Checking permissions when sig == 0 didn't prevent an unprivileged caller from learning whether PID exists or not. When it existed, kernel returned EPERM, when it didn't - ESRCH. The only effect of policy check in such case is noise in audit logs. This change lets Smack silently ignore kill() invocations with sig == 0. Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | Merge branch 'stable-4.8' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris2016-07-071-1/+1
| |\ \ | | |/ | |/| | | | into next
| | * netlabel: Pass a family parameter to netlbl_skbuff_err().Huw Davies2016-06-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This makes it possible to route the error to the appropriate labelling engine. CALIPSO is far less verbose than CIPSO when encountering a bogus packet, so there is no need for a CALIPSO error handler. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-07-302-4/+38
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull userns vfs updates from Eric Biederman: "This tree contains some very long awaited work on generalizing the user namespace support for mounting filesystems to include filesystems with a backing store. The real world target is fuse but the goal is to update the vfs to allow any filesystem to be supported. This patchset is based on a lot of code review and testing to approach that goal. While looking at what is needed to support the fuse filesystem it became clear that there were things like xattrs for security modules that needed special treatment. That the resolution of those concerns would not be fuse specific. That sorting out these general issues made most sense at the generic level, where the right people could be drawn into the conversation, and the issues could be solved for everyone. At a high level what this patchset does a couple of simple things: - Add a user namespace owner (s_user_ns) to struct super_block. - Teach the vfs to handle filesystem uids and gids not mapping into to kuids and kgids and being reported as INVALID_UID and INVALID_GID in vfs data structures. By assigning a user namespace owner filesystems that are mounted with only user namespace privilege can be detected. This allows security modules and the like to know which mounts may not be trusted. This also allows the set of uids and gids that are communicated to the filesystem to be capped at the set of kuids and kgids that are in the owning user namespace of the filesystem. One of the crazier corner casees this handles is the case of inodes whose i_uid or i_gid are not mapped into the vfs. Most of the code simply doesn't care but it is easy to confuse the inode writeback path so no operation that could cause an inode write-back is permitted for such inodes (aka only reads are allowed). This set of changes starts out by cleaning up the code paths involved in user namespace permirted mounts. Then when things are clean enough adds code that cleanly sets s_user_ns. Then additional restrictions are added that are possible now that the filesystem superblock contains owner information. These changes should not affect anyone in practice, but there are some parts of these restrictions that are changes in behavior. - Andy's restriction on suid executables that does not honor the suid bit when the path is from another mount namespace (think /proc/[pid]/fd/) or when the filesystem was mounted by a less privileged user. - The replacement of the user namespace implicit setting of MNT_NODEV with implicitly setting SB_I_NODEV on the filesystem superblock instead. Using SB_I_NODEV is a stronger form that happens to make this state user invisible. The user visibility can be managed but it caused problems when it was introduced from applications reasonably expecting mount flags to be what they were set to. There is a little bit of work remaining before it is safe to support mounting filesystems with backing store in user namespaces, beyond what is in this set of changes. - Verifying the mounter has permission to read/write the block device during mount. - Teaching the integrity modules IMA and EVM to handle filesystems mounted with only user namespace root and to reduce trust in their security xattrs accordingly. - Capturing the mounters credentials and using that for permission checks in d_automount and the like. (Given that overlayfs already does this, and we need the work in d_automount it make sense to generalize this case). Furthermore there are a few changes that are on the wishlist: - Get all filesystems supporting posix acls using the generic posix acls so that posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user may be removed. [Maintainability] - Reducing the permission checks in places such as remount to allow the superblock owner to perform them. - Allowing the superblock owner to chown files with unmapped uids and gids to something that is mapped so the files may be treated normally. I am not considering even obvious relaxations of permission checks until it is clear there are no more corner cases that need to be locked down and handled generically. Many thanks to Seth Forshee who kept this code alive, and putting up with me rewriting substantial portions of what he did to handle more corner cases, and for his diligent testing and reviewing of my changes" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (30 commits) fs: Call d_automount with the filesystems creds fs: Update i_[ug]id_(read|write) to translate relative to s_user_ns evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC dquot: For now explicitly don't support filesystems outside of init_user_ns quota: Handle quota data stored in s_user_ns in quota_setxquota quota: Ensure qids map to the filesystem vfs: Don't create inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs vfs: Don't modify inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as() fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() vfs: Verify acls are valid within superblock's s_user_ns. userns: Handle -1 in k[ug]id_has_mapping when !CONFIG_USER_NS fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid fs: Limit file caps to the user namespace of the super block userns: Remove the now unnecessary FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT flag userns: Remove implicit MNT_NODEV fragility. ...
| * | | Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mountsSeth Forshee2016-06-241-10/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64 and SMACK64MMAP access is denied if the label does not match smk_root. To be consistent with suid, a SMACK64EXEC label which does not match smk_root will still allow execution of the file but will not run with the label supplied in the xattr. Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * | | Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespacesSeth Forshee2016-06-242-12/+37
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Security labels from unprivileged mounts cannot be trusted. Ideally for these mounts we would assign the objects in the filesystem the same label as the inode for the backing device passed to mount. Unfortunately it's currently impossible to determine which inode this is from the LSM mount hooks, so we settle for the label of the process doing the mount. This label is assigned to s_root, and also to smk_default to ensure that new inodes receive this label. The transmute property is also set on s_root to make this behavior more explicit, even though it is technically not necessary. If a filesystem has existing security labels, access to inodes is permitted if the label is the same as smk_root, otherwise access is denied. The SMACK64EXEC xattr is completely ignored. Explicit setting of security labels continues to require CAP_MAC_ADMIN in init_user_ns. Altogether, this ensures that filesystem objects are not accessible to subjects which cannot already access the backing store, that MAC is not violated for any objects in the fileystem which are already labeled, and that a user cannot use an unprivileged mount to gain elevated MAC privileges. sysfs, tmpfs, and ramfs are already mountable from user namespaces and support security labels. We can't rule out the possibility that these filesystems may already be used in mounts from user namespaces with security lables set from the init namespace, so failing to trust lables in these filesystems may introduce regressions. It is safe to trust labels from these filesystems, since the unprivileged user does not control the backing store and thus cannot supply security labels, so an explicit exception is made to trust labels from these filesystems. Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* / / vfs: make the string hashes salt the hashLinus Torvalds2016-06-111-2/+2
|/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We always mixed in the parent pointer into the dentry name hash, but we did it late at lookup time. It turns out that we can simplify that lookup-time action by salting the hash with the parent pointer early instead of late. A few other users of our string hashes also wanted to mix in their own pointers into the hash, and those are updated to use the same mechanism. Hash users that don't have any particular initial salt can just use the NULL pointer as a no-salt. Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: George Spelvin <linux@sciencehorizons.net> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | switch ->setxattr() to passing dentry and inode separatelyAl Viro2016-05-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | smack ->d_instantiate() uses ->setxattr(), so to be able to call it before we'd hashed the new dentry and attached it to inode, we need ->setxattr() instances getting the inode as an explicit argument rather than obtaining it from dentry. Similar change for ->getxattr() had been done in commit ce23e64. Unlike ->getxattr() (which is used by both selinux and smack instances of ->d_instantiate()) ->setxattr() is used only by smack one and unfortunately it got missed back then. Reported-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com> Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | ->getxattr(): pass dentry and inode as separate argumentsAl Viro2016-04-111-2/+2
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | don't bother with ->d_inode->i_sb - it's always equal to ->d_sbAl Viro2016-04-101-1/+1
|/ | | | | | ... and neither can ever be NULL Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* smack: fix cache of access labelsJosé Bollo2016-02-161-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | Before this commit, removing the access property of a file, aka, the extended attribute security.SMACK64 was not effictive until the cache had been cleaned. This patch fixes that problem. Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Smack: Remove pointless hooksCasey Schaufler2016-02-111-30/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | Prior to the 4.2 kernel there no no harm in providing a security module hook that does nothing, as the default hook would get called if the module did not supply one. With the list based infrastructure an empty hook adds overhead. This patch removes the three Smack hooks that don't actually do anything. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* security: let security modules use PTRACE_MODE_* with bitmasksJann Horn2016-01-211-5/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch, all modes have flags ORed into them. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-01-181-3/+25
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: - EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel (EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring. - Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks. - Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2. - Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA. * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits) selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix KEYS: refcount bug fix ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking IMA: policy can be updated zero times selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm() selinux: export validatetrans decisions gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code ...
| * Merge branch 'smack-for-4.5' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next ↵James Morris2015-12-261-1/+23
| |\ | | | | | | | | | into next
| | * Smack: type confusion in smak sendmsg() handlerRoman Kubiak2015-12-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Smack security handler for sendmsg() syscall is vulnerable to type confusion issue what can allow to privilege escalation into root or cause denial of service. A malicious attacker can create socket of one type for example AF_UNIX and pass is into sendmsg() function ensuring that this is AF_INET socket. Remedy Do not trust user supplied data. Proposed fix below. Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mateusz Fruba <m.fruba@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * Smack: File receive for socketsCasey Schaufler2015-12-101-0/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The existing file receive hook checks for access on the file inode even for UDS. This is not right, as the inode is not used by Smack to make access checks for sockets. This change checks for an appropriate access relationship between the receiving (current) process and the socket. If the process can't write to the socket's send label or the socket's receive label can't write to the process fail. This will allow the legitimate cases, where the socket sender and socket receiver can freely communicate. Only strangly set socket labels should cause a problem. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-constAndreas Gruenbacher2015-12-241-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecid hook non-const so that we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * | security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-constAndreas Gruenbacher2015-12-241-1/+1
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecurity hook non-const so that we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
* | Merge branch 'work.misc' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-01-131-82/+32
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro: "All kinds of stuff. That probably should've been 5 or 6 separate branches, but by the time I'd realized how large and mixed that bag had become it had been too close to -final to play with rebasing. Some fs/namei.c cleanups there, memdup_user_nul() introduction and switching open-coded instances, burying long-dead code, whack-a-mole of various kinds, several new helpers for ->llseek(), assorted cleanups and fixes from various people, etc. One piece probably deserves special mention - Neil's lookup_one_len_unlocked(). Similar to lookup_one_len(), but gets called without ->i_mutex and tries to avoid ever taking it. That, of course, means that it's not useful for any directory modifications, but things like getting inode attributes in nfds readdirplus are fine with that. I really should've asked for moratorium on lookup-related changes this cycle, but since I hadn't done that early enough... I *am* asking for that for the coming cycle, though - I'm going to try and get conversion of i_mutex to rwsem with ->lookup() done under lock taken shared. There will be a patch closer to the end of the window, along the lines of the one Linus had posted last May - mechanical conversion of ->i_mutex accesses to inode_lock()/inode_unlock()/inode_trylock()/ inode_is_locked()/inode_lock_nested(). To quote Linus back then: ----- | This is an automated patch using | | sed 's/mutex_lock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_lock(\1)/' | sed 's/mutex_unlock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_unlock(\1)/' | sed 's/mutex_lock_nested(&\(.*\)->i_mutex,[ ]*I_MUTEX_\([A-Z0-9_]*\))/inode_lock_nested(\1, I_MUTEX_\2)/' | sed 's/mutex_is_locked(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_is_locked(\1)/' | sed 's/mutex_trylock(&\(.*\)->i_mutex)/inode_trylock(\1)/' | | with a very few manual fixups ----- I'm going to send that once the ->i_mutex-affecting stuff in -next gets mostly merged (or when Linus says he's about to stop taking merges)" * 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits) nfsd: don't hold i_mutex over userspace upcalls fs:affs:Replace time_t with time64_t fs/9p: use fscache mutex rather than spinlock proc: add a reschedule point in proc_readfd_common() logfs: constify logfs_block_ops structures fcntl: allow to set O_DIRECT flag on pipe fs: __generic_file_splice_read retry lookup on AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE fs: xattr: Use kvfree() [s390] page_to_phys() always returns a multiple of PAGE_SIZE nbd: use ->compat_ioctl() fs: use block_device name vsprintf helper lib/vsprintf: add %*pg format specifier fs: use gendisk->disk_name where possible poll: plug an unused argument to do_poll amdkfd: don't open-code memdup_user() cdrom: don't open-code memdup_user() rsxx: don't open-code memdup_user() mtip32xx: don't open-code memdup_user() [um] mconsole: don't open-code memdup_user_nul() [um] hostaudio: don't open-code memdup_user() ...
| * | convert a bunch of open-coded instances of memdup_user_nul()Al Viro2016-01-041-82/+32
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | A _lot_ of ->write() instances were open-coding it; some are converted to memdup_user_nul(), a lot more remain... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* / nfs: Move call to security_inode_listsecurity into nfs_listxattrAndreas Gruenbacher2015-12-141-2/+0
|/ | | | | | | | | | | Add a nfs_listxattr operation. Move the call to security_inode_listsecurity from list operation of the "security.*" xattr handler to nfs_listxattr. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com> Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netLinus Torvalds2015-11-111-4/+7
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull networking fixes from David Miller: 1) Fix null deref in xt_TEE netfilter module, from Eric Dumazet. 2) Several spots need to get to the original listner for SYN-ACK packets, most spots got this ok but some were not. Whilst covering the remaining cases, create a helper to do this. From Eric Dumazet. 3) Missiing check of return value from alloc_netdev() in CAIF SPI code, from Rasmus Villemoes. 4) Don't sleep while != TASK_RUNNING in macvtap, from Vlad Yasevich. 5) Use after free in mvneta driver, from Justin Maggard. 6) Fix race on dst->flags access in dst_release(), from Eric Dumazet. 7) Add missing ZLIB_INFLATE dependency for new qed driver. From Arnd Bergmann. 8) Fix multicast getsockopt deadlock, from WANG Cong. 9) Fix deadlock in btusb, from Kuba Pawlak. 10) Some ipv6_add_dev() failure paths were not cleaning up the SNMP6 counter state. From Sabrina Dubroca. 11) Fix packet_bind() race, which can cause lost notifications, from Francesco Ruggeri. 12) Fix MAC restoration in qlcnic driver during bonding mode changes, from Jarod Wilson. 13) Revert bridging forward delay change which broke libvirt and other userspace things, from Vlad Yasevich. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (65 commits) Revert "bridge: Allow forward delay to be cfgd when STP enabled" bpf_trace: Make dependent on PERF_EVENTS qed: select ZLIB_INFLATE net: fix a race in dst_release() net: mvneta: Fix memory use after free. net: Documentation: Fix default value tcp_limit_output_bytes macvtap: Resolve possible __might_sleep warning in macvtap_do_read() mvneta: add FIXED_PHY dependency net: caif: check return value of alloc_netdev net: hisilicon: NET_VENDOR_HISILICON should depend on HAS_DMA drivers: net: xgene: fix RGMII 10/100Mb mode netfilter: nft_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper net_sched: em_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper sched: cls_flow: use skb_to_full_sk() helper netfilter: xt_owner: use skb_to_full_sk() helper smack: use skb_to_full_sk() helper net: add skb_to_full_sk() helper and use it in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid() bpf: doc: correct arch list for supported eBPF JIT dwc_eth_qos: Delete an unnecessary check before the function call "of_node_put" bonding: fix panic on non-ARPHRD_ETHER enslave failure ...
| * smack: use skb_to_full_sk() helperEric Dumazet2015-11-091-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This module wants to access sk->sk_security, which is not available for request sockets. Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-11-064-47/+238
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem update from James Morris: "This is mostly maintenance updates across the subsystem, with a notable update for TPM 2.0, and addition of Jarkko Sakkinen as a maintainer of that" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (40 commits) apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependency selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_struct selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be static selinux: use sprintf return value selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools() selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core() selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity() selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate call selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data KEYS: Provide a script to extract a module signature KEYS: Provide a script to extract the sys cert list from a vmlinux file keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members used certs: add .gitignore to stop git nagging about x509_certificate_list KEYS: use kvfree() in add_key Smack: limited capability for changing process label TPM: remove unnecessary little endian conversion vTPM: support little endian guests char: Drop owner assignment from i2c_driver ...
| * Smack: limited capability for changing process labelZbigniew Jasinski2015-10-194-41/+229
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This feature introduces new kernel interface: - <smack_fs>/relabel-self - for setting transition labels list This list is used to control smack label transition mechanism. List is set by, and per process. Process can transit to new label only if label is on the list. Only process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability can add labels to this list. With this list, process can change it's label without CAP_MAC_ADMIN but only once. After label changing, list is unset. Changes in v2: * use list_for_each_entry instead of _rcu during label write * added missing description in security/Smack.txt Changes in v3: * squashed into one commit Changes in v4: * switch from global list to per-task list * since the per-task list is accessed only by the task itself there is no need to use synchronization mechanisms on it Changes in v5: * change smackfs interface of relabel-self to the one used for onlycap multiple labels are accepted, separated by space, which replace the previous list upon write Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * Smack: pipefs fix in smack_d_instantiateRoman Kubiak2015-10-101-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fix writes the task label when smack_d_instantiate is called, before the label of the superblock was written on the pipe's inode. Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * Smack: Minor initialisation improvementJosé Bollo2015-10-102-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This change has two goals: - delay the setting of 'smack_enabled' until it will be really effective - ensure that smackfs is valid only if 'smack_enabled' is set (it is already the case in smack_netfilter.c) Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * smack: smk_ipv6_port_list should be staticGeliang Tang2015-10-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fixes the following sparse warning: security/smack/smack_lsm.c:55:1: warning: symbol 'smk_ipv6_port_list' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * Smack: fix a NULL dereference in wrong smack_import_entry() usageLukasz Pawelczyk2015-10-101-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 'commit e774ad683f42 ("smack: pass error code through pointers")' made this function return proper error codes instead of NULL. Reflect that. This is a fix for a NULL dereference introduced in 'commit 21abb1ec414c ("Smack: IPv6 host labeling")' echo "$SOME_IPV6_ADDR \"test" > /smack/ipv6host (this should return EINVAL, it doesn't) cat /smack/ipv6host (derefences 0x000a) Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | netfilter: remove hook owner refcountingFlorian Westphal2015-10-161-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | since commit 8405a8fff3f8 ("netfilter: nf_qeueue: Drop queue entries on nf_unregister_hook") all pending queued entries are discarded. So we can simply remove all of the owner handling -- when module is removed it also needs to unregister all its hooks. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
* | netfilter: Pass priv instead of nf_hook_ops to netfilter hooksEric W. Biederman2015-09-181-2/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | Only pass the void *priv parameter out of the nf_hook_ops. That is all any of the functions are interested now, and by limiting what is passed it becomes simpler to change implementation details. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
* Smack - Fix build error with bringup unconfiguredCasey Schaufler2015-08-131-14/+18
| | | | | | | | | | The changes for mounting binary filesystems was allied improperly, with the list of tokens being in an ifdef that it shouldn't have been. Fix that, and a couple style issues that were bothering me. Reported-by: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>