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* keys: remove unused key_alloc_semDaniel Walker2008-06-061-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | This semaphore doesn't appear to be used, so remove it. Signed-off-by: Daniel Walker <dwalker@mvista.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* devscgroup: make white list more compact in some casesPavel Emelyanov2008-06-061-2/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Consider you added a 'c foo:bar r' permission to some cgroup and then (a bit later) 'c'foo:bar w' for it. After this you'll see the c foo:bar r c foo:bar w lines in a devices.list file. Another example - consider you added 10 'c foo:bar r' permissions to some cgroup (e.g. by mistake). After this you'll see 10 c foo:bar r lines in a list file. This is weird. This situation also has one more annoying consequence. Having many items in a white list makes permissions checking slower, sine it has to walk a longer list. The proposal is to merge permissions for items, that correspond to the same device. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* devscgroup: relax task to dev_cgroup conversionPavel Emelyanov2008-06-061-6/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Two functions, that need to get a device_cgroup from a task (they are devcgroup_inode_permission and devcgroup_inode_mknod) make it in a strange way: They get a css_set from task, then a subsys_state from css_set, then a cgroup from the state and then a subsys_state again from the cgroup. Besides, the devices_subsys_id is read from memory, whilst there's a enum-ed constant for it. Optimize this part a bit: 1. Get the subsys_stats form the task and be done - no 2 extra dereferences, 2. Use the device_subsys_id constant, not the value from memory (i.e. one less dereference). Found while preparing 2.6.26 OpenVZ port. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* devcgroup: make a helper to convert cgroup_subsys_state to devs_cgroupPavel Emelyanov2008-06-061-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is just picking the container_of out of cgroup_to_devcgroup into a separate function. This new css_to_devcgroup will be used in the 2nd patch. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Smack: fuse mount hang fixCasey Schaufler2008-06-041-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The d_instantiate hook for Smack can hang on the root inode of a filesystem if the file system code has not really done all the set-up. Fuse is known to encounter this problem. This change detects an attempt to instantiate a root inode and addresses it early in the processing, before any attempt is made to do something that might hang. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Tested-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino <lcapitulino@mandriva.com.br> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] split linux/file.hAl Viro2008-05-011-0/+1
| | | | | | Initial splitoff of the low-level stuff; taken to fdtable.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* signals: cleanup security_task_kill() usage/implementationOleg Nesterov2008-04-302-12/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Every implementation of ->task_kill() does nothing when the signal comes from the kernel. This is correct, but means that check_kill_permission() should call security_task_kill() only for SI_FROMUSER() case, and we can remove the same check from ->task_kill() implementations. (sadly, check_kill_permission() is the last user of signal->session/__session but we can't s/task_session_nr/task_session/ here). NOTE: Eric W. Biederman pointed out cap_task_kill() should die, and I think he is very right. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Smack: Integrate Smack with AuditAhmed S. Darwish2008-04-301-0/+155
| | | | | | | | | | Setup the new Audit hooks for Smack. SELinux Audit rule fields are recycled to avoid `auditd' userspace modifications. Currently only equality testing is supported on labels acting as a subject (AUDIT_SUBJ_USER) or as an object (AUDIT_OBJ_USER). Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Security: Make secctx_to_secid() take const secdataDavid Howells2008-04-306-7/+7
| | | | | | | | Make secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'audit.b50' of ↵Linus Torvalds2008-04-292-1/+3
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current * 'audit.b50' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: [PATCH] new predicate - AUDIT_FILETYPE [patch 2/2] Use find_task_by_vpid in audit code [patch 1/2] audit: let userspace fully control TTY input auditing [PATCH 2/2] audit: fix sparse shadowed variable warnings [PATCH 1/2] audit: move extern declarations to audit.h Audit: MAINTAINERS update Audit: increase the maximum length of the key field Audit: standardize string audit interfaces Audit: stop deadlock from signals under load Audit: save audit_backlog_limit audit messages in case auditd comes back Audit: collect sessionid in netlink messages Audit: end printk with newline
| * Audit: standardize string audit interfacesEric Paris2008-04-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch standardized the string auditing interfaces. No userspace changes will be visible and this is all just cleanup and consistancy work. We have the following string audit interfaces to use: void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf, size_t n); void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf); void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string, size_t n); void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string); This may be the first step to possibly fixing some of the issues that people have with the string output from the kernel audit system. But we still don't have an agreed upon solution to that problem. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * Audit: collect sessionid in netlink messagesEric Paris2008-04-281-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Previously I added sessionid output to all audit messages where it was available but we still didn't know the sessionid of the sender of netlink messages. This patch adds that information to netlink messages so we can audit who sent netlink messages. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | keys: explicitly include required slab.h header file.Robert P. J. Day2008-04-292-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since these two source files invoke kmalloc(), they should explicitly include <linux/slab.h>. Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sysDavid Howells2008-04-296-15/+94
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys files: (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes Maximum number of keys that root may have and the maximum total number of bytes of data that root may have stored in those keys. (*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxkeys /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxbytes Maximum number of keys that each non-root user may have and the maximum total number of bytes of data that each of those users may have stored in their keys. Also increase the quotas as a number of people have been complaining that it's not big enough. I'm not sure that it's big enough now either, but on the other hand, it can now be set in /etc/sysctl.conf. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Cc: <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in> Cc: <dwalsh@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessedDavid Howells2008-04-295-126/+92
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't generate the per-UID user and user session keyrings unless they're explicitly accessed. This solves a problem during a login process whereby set*uid() is called before the SELinux PAM module, resulting in the per-UID keyrings having the wrong security labels. This also cures the problem of multiple per-UID keyrings sometimes appearing due to PAM modules (including pam_keyinit) setuiding and causing user_structs to come into and go out of existence whilst the session keyring pins the user keyring. This is achieved by first searching for extant per-UID keyrings before inventing new ones. The serial bound argument is also dropped from find_keyring_by_name() as it's not currently made use of (setting it to 0 disables the feature). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Cc: <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in> Cc: <dwalsh@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | keys: allow clients to set key perms in key_create_or_update()Arun Raghavan2008-04-292-9/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The key_create_or_update() function provided by the keyring code has a default set of permissions that are always applied to the key when created. This might not be desirable to all clients. Here's a patch that adds a "perm" parameter to the function to address this, which can be set to KEY_PERM_UNDEF to revert to the current behaviour. Signed-off-by: Arun Raghavan <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Satyam Sharma <ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | keys: switch to proc_create()Alexey Dobriyan2008-04-291-6/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | keys: add keyctl function to get a security labelDavid Howells2008-04-296-1/+99
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key. The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt: (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context attached to a key in the buffer provided. Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy will take place. A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is sufficiently big. This is included in the returned count. If no LSM is in force then an empty string will be returned. A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be successful. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | keys: allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a stringDavid Howells2008-04-294-29/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string for internal kernel services that call any request_key_*() interface other than request_key(). request_key() itself still takes a NUL-terminated string. The functions that change are: request_key_with_auxdata() request_key_async() request_key_async_with_auxdata() Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | keys: check starting keyring as part of searchKevin Coffman2008-04-291-4/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Check the starting keyring as part of the search to (a) see if that is what we're searching for, and (b) to check it is still valid for searching. The scenario: User in process A does things that cause things to be created in its process session keyring. The user then does an su to another user and starts a new process, B. The two processes now share the same process session keyring. Process B does an NFS access which results in an upcall to gssd. When gssd attempts to instantiate the context key (to be linked into the process session keyring), it is denied access even though it has an authorization key. The order of calls is: keyctl_instantiate_key() lookup_user_key() (the default: case) search_process_keyrings(current) search_process_keyrings(rka->context) (recursive call) keyring_search_aux() keyring_search_aux() verifies the keys and keyrings underneath the top-level keyring it is given, but that top-level keyring is neither fully validated nor checked to see if it is the thing being searched for. This patch changes keyring_search_aux() to: 1) do more validation on the top keyring it is given and 2) check whether that top-level keyring is the thing being searched for Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | keys: increase the payload size when instantiating a keyDavid Howells2008-04-291-8/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Increase the size of a payload that can be used to instantiate a key in add_key() and keyctl_instantiate_key(). This permits huge CIFS SPNEGO blobs to be passed around. The limit is raised to 1MB. If kmalloc() can't allocate a buffer of sufficient size, vmalloc() will be tried instead. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | cgroups: introduce cft->read_seq()Serge E. Hallyn2008-04-291-51/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce a read_seq() helper in cftype, which uses seq_file to print out lists. Use it in the devices cgroup. Also split devices.allow into two files, so now devices.deny and devices.allow are the ones to use to manipulate the whitelist, while devices.list outputs the cgroup's current whitelist. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | cgroups: implement device whitelistSerge E. Hallyn2008-04-292-0/+604
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement a cgroup to track and enforce open and mknod restrictions on device files. A device cgroup associates a device access whitelist with each cgroup. A whitelist entry has 4 fields. 'type' is a (all), c (char), or b (block). 'all' means it applies to all types and all major and minor numbers. Major and minor are either an integer or * for all. Access is a composition of r (read), w (write), and m (mknod). The root device cgroup starts with rwm to 'all'. A child devcg gets a copy of the parent. Admins can then remove devices from the whitelist or add new entries. A child cgroup can never receive a device access which is denied its parent. However when a device access is removed from a parent it will not also be removed from the child(ren). An entry is added using devices.allow, and removed using devices.deny. For instance echo 'c 1:3 mr' > /cgroups/1/devices.allow allows cgroup 1 to read and mknod the device usually known as /dev/null. Doing echo a > /cgroups/1/devices.deny will remove the default 'a *:* mrw' entry. CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to change permissions or move another task to a new cgroup. A cgroup may not be granted more permissions than the cgroup's parent has. Any task can move itself between cgroups. This won't be sufficient, but we can decide the best way to adequately restrict movement later. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix may-be-used-uninitialized warning] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Looks-good-to: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Daniel Hokka Zakrisson <daniel@hozac.com> Cc: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | xattr: add missing consts to function argumentsDavid Howells2008-04-297-30/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add missing consts to xattr function arguments. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2008-04-2812-134/+121
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6: SELinux: Fix a RCU free problem with the netport cache SELinux: Made netnode cache adds faster SELinux: include/security.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups SELinux: policydb.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups SELinux: mls_types.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups SELinux: mls.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups SELinux: hashtab.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups SELinux: context.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups SELinux: ss/conditional.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups SELinux: selinux/include/security.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups SELinux: objsec.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups SELinux: netlabel.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups SELinux: avc_ss.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups Fixed up conflict in include/linux/security.h manually
| * | SELinux: Fix a RCU free problem with the netport cachePaul Moore2008-04-281-22/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The netport cache doesn't free resources in a manner which is safe or orderly. This patch fixes this by adding in a missing call to rcu_dereference() in sel_netport_insert() as well as some general cleanup throughout the file. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: Made netnode cache adds fasterPaul Moore2008-04-281-55/+49
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When adding new entries to the network node cache we would walk the entire hash bucket to make sure we didn't cross a threshold (done to bound the cache size). This isn't a very quick or elegant solution for something which is supposed to be quick-ish so add a counter to each hash bucket to track the size of the bucket and eliminate the need to walk the entire bucket list on each add. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: policydb.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanupsEric Paris2008-04-281-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch changes policydb.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that are fixed may include (does not not have to include) spaces followed by tabs spaces used instead of tabs location of * in pointer declarations Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: mls_types.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanupsEric Paris2008-04-281-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch changes mls_types.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that are fixed may include (does not not have to include) spaces used instead of tabs Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: mls.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanupsEric Paris2008-04-281-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch changes mls.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that are fixed may include (does not not have to include) spaces used instead of tabs Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: hashtab.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanupsEric Paris2008-04-281-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch changes hashtab.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that are fixed may include (does not not have to include) spaces used instead of tabs Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: context.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanupsEric Paris2008-04-281-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch changes context.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that are fixed may include (does not not have to include) include spaces around , in function calls Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: ss/conditional.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanupsEric Paris2008-04-281-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch changes ss/conditional.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that are fixed may include (does not not have to include) location of * in pointer declarations Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: selinux/include/security.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanupsEric Paris2008-04-281-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch changes selinux/include/security.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that are fixed may include (does not not have to include) whitespace at end of lines spaces followed by tabs spaces used instead of tabs spacing around parenthesis location of { around structs and else clauses location of * in pointer declarations removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section useless {} in if statemetns useless checking for NULL before kfree fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements no assignments in if statements and any number of other things I forgot to mention Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: objsec.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanupsEric Paris2008-04-281-30/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch changes objsec.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that are fixed may include (does not not have to include) whitespace at end of lines spaces followed by tabs spaces used instead of tabs spacing around parenthesis location of { around structs and else clauses location of * in pointer declarations removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section useless {} in if statemetns useless checking for NULL before kfree fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements no assignments in if statements and any number of other things I forgot to mention Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: netlabel.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanupsEric Paris2008-04-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch changes netlabel.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that are fixed may include (does not not have to include) spaces used instead of tabs Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | SELinux: avc_ss.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanupsEric Paris2008-04-281-6/+3
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch changes avc_ss.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that are fixed may include (does not not have to include) whitespace at end of lines spaces followed by tabs spaces used instead of tabs spacing around parenthesis location of { around structs and else clauses location of * in pointer declarations removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section useless {} in if statemetns useless checking for NULL before kfree fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements no assignments in if statements and any number of other things I forgot to mention Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | smack: use cap_task_prctlSerge E. Hallyn2008-04-281-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the introduction of per-process securebits, the capabilities-related prctl callbacks were moved into cap_task_prctl(). Have smack use cap_task_prctl() so that PR_SET_KEEPCAPS is defined. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | smack: make smk_cipso_doi() and smk_unlbl_ambient()Casey Schaufler2008-04-281-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The functions smk_cipso_doi and smk_unlbl_ambient are not used outside smackfs.c and should hence be static. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | root_plug: use cap_task_prctlSerge E. Hallyn2008-04-281-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the introduction of per-process securebits, the capabilities-related prctl callbacks were moved into cap_task_prctl(). Have root_plug use cap_task_prctl() so that PR_SET_KEEPCAPS is defined. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | smack: fix integer as NULL pointer warning in smack_lsm.cHarvey Harrison2008-04-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | security/smack/smack_lsm.c:1257:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | capabilities: implement per-process securebitsAndrew G. Morgan2008-04-285-14/+101
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0 based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually) possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain privilege via (set)uid-0. Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs. Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser from the process' tree of children. The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel. With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently fork()'d/exec()'d children with: prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f); This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is enabled at configure time. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning] [serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2008-04-234-21/+21
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: [PATCH] get rid of __exit_files(), __exit_fs() and __put_fs_struct() [PATCH] proc_readfd_common() race fix [PATCH] double-free of inode on alloc_file() failure exit in create_write_pipe() [PATCH] teach seq_file to discard entries [PATCH] umount_tree() will unhash everything itself [PATCH] get rid of more nameidata passing in namespace.c [PATCH] switch a bunch of LSM hooks from nameidata to path [PATCH] lock exclusively in collect_mounts() and drop_collected_mounts() [PATCH] move a bunch of declarations to fs/internal.h
| * [PATCH] switch a bunch of LSM hooks from nameidata to pathAl Viro2008-04-224-21/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | Namely, ones from namespace.c Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | SELinux fixups needed for preemptable RCU from -rtPaul E. McKenney2008-04-222-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The attached patch needs to move from -rt to mainline given preemptable RCU. This patch fixes SELinux code that implicitly assumes that disabling preemption prevents an RCU grace period from completing, an assumption that is valid for Classic RCU, but not necessarily for preemptable RCU. Explicit rcu_read_lock() calls are thus added. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | SELinux: no BUG_ON(!ss_initialized) in selinux_clone_mnt_optsEric Paris2008-04-221-3/+12
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | The Fedora installer actually makes multiple NFS mounts before it loads selinux policy. The code in selinux_clone_mnt_opts() assumed that the init process would always be loading policy before NFS was up and running. It might be possible to hit this in a diskless environment as well, I'm not sure. There is no need to BUG_ON() in this situation since we can safely continue given the circumstances. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2008-04-2217-634/+609
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6: SELinux: one little, two little, three little whitespaces, the avc.c saga. SELinux: cleanup on isle selinuxfs.c changing whitespace for fun and profit: policydb.c SELinux: whitespace and formating fixes for hooks.c SELinux: clean up printks SELinux: sidtab.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: services.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: mls.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: hashtab.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: ebitmap.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: conditional.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: avtab.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: xfrm.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: nlmsgtab.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: netnode.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: netlink.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: netlabel.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups SELinux: netif.c whitespace, syntax, and static declaraction cleanups
| * SELinux: one little, two little, three little whitespaces, the avc.c saga.Eric Paris2008-04-211-28/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | avc.c was bad. It had whitespace and syntax issues which are against our coding style. I have had a little chat with it and the result of that conversation looked like this patch. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * SELinux: cleanup on isle selinuxfs.cEric Paris2008-04-211-55/+57
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Why would anyone just clean up white space all day? Because they were out too late last night and don't want to think for a day. So here is a nice clean selinuxfs.c patch. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * changing whitespace for fun and profit: policydb.cEric Paris2008-04-211-68/+63
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | More formatting changes. Aside from the 80 character line limit even the checkpatch scripts like this file now. Too bad I don't get paid by the lines of code I change. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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