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* [PATCH] audit: support for object context filtersDarrel Goeddel2006-07-011-1/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch introduces object audit filters based on the elements of the SELinux context. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> kernel/auditfilter.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] audit: rename AUDIT_SE_* constantsDarrel Goeddel2006-07-011-16/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds additional definitions used by the following patch. The renaming avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> include/linux/audit.h | 15 ++++++++---- kernel/auditfilter.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++---- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 32 +++++++++++++------------- 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bunk/trivialLinus Torvalds2006-07-0110-10/+0
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bunk/trivial: Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h> remove obsolete swsusp_encrypt arch/arm26/Kconfig typos Documentation/IPMI typos Kconfig: Typos in net/sched/Kconfig v9fs: do not include linux/version.h Documentation/DocBook/mtdnand.tmpl: typo fixes typo fixes: specfic -> specific typo fixes in Documentation/networking/pktgen.txt typo fixes: occuring -> occurring typo fixes: infomation -> information typo fixes: disadvantadge -> disadvantage typo fixes: aquire -> acquire typo fixes: mecanism -> mechanism typo fixes: bandwith -> bandwidth fix a typo in the RTC_CLASS help text smb is no longer maintained Manually merged trivial conflict in arch/um/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
| * Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h>Jörn Engel2006-06-3010-10/+0
| | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
* | [PATCH] SELinux: Add security hook definition for getioprio and insert hooksDavid Quigley2006-06-302-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new security hook definition for the sys_ioprio_get operation. At present, the SELinux hook function implementation for this hook is identical to the getscheduler implementation but a separate hook is introduced to allow this check to be specialized in the future if necessary. This patch also creates a helper function get_task_ioprio which handles the access check in addition to retrieving the ioprio value for the task. Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] SELinux: extend task_kill hook to handle signals sent by AIO completionDavid Quigley2006-06-302-5/+21
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch extends the security_task_kill hook to handle signals sent by AIO completion. In this case, the secid of the task responsible for the signal needs to be obtained and saved earlier, so a security_task_getsecid() hook is added, and then this saved value is passed subsequently to the extended task_kill hook for use in checking. Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersecCatherine Zhang2006-06-301-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet. Patch design and implementation: The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NETLINK]: Encapsulate eff_cap usage within security framework.Darrel Goeddel2006-06-303-17/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch encapsulates the usage of eff_cap (in netlink_skb_params) within the security framework by extending security_netlink_recv to include a required capability parameter and converting all direct usage of eff_caps outside of the lsm modules to use the interface. It also updates the SELinux implementation of the security_netlink_send and security_netlink_recv hooks to take advantage of the sid in the netlink_skb_params struct. This also enables SELinux to perform auditing of netlink capability checks. Please apply, for 2.6.18 if possible. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] Keys: Allow in-kernel key requestor to pass auxiliary data to upcallerDavid Howells2006-06-293-11/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The proposed NFS key type uses its own method of passing key requests to userspace (upcalling) rather than invoking /sbin/request-key. This is because the responsible userspace daemon should already be running and will be contacted through rpc_pipefs. This patch permits the NFS filesystem to pass auxiliary data to the upcall operation (struct key_type::request_key) so that the upcaller can use a pre-existing communications channel more easily. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-By: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] poison: add & use more constantsRandy Dunlap2006-06-281-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add more poison values to include/linux/poison.h. It's not clear to me whether some others should be added or not, so I haven't added any of these: ./include/linux/libata.h:#define ATA_TAG_POISON 0xfafbfcfdU ./arch/ppc/8260_io/fcc_enet.c:1918: memset((char *)(&(immap->im_dprambase[(mem_addr+64)])), 0x88, 32); ./drivers/usb/mon/mon_text.c:429: memset(mem, 0xe5, sizeof(struct mon_event_text)); ./drivers/char/ftape/lowlevel/ftape-ctl.c:738: memset(ft_buffer[i]->address, 0xAA, FT_BUFF_SIZE); ./drivers/block/sx8.c:/* 0xf is just arbitrary, non-zero noise; this is sorta like poisoning */ Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: inherit /proc/self/attr/keycreate across forkMichael LeMay2006-06-281-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Update SELinux to cause the keycreate process attribute held in /proc/self/attr/keycreate to be inherited across a fork and reset upon execve. This is consistent with the handling of the other process attributes provided by SELinux and also makes it simpler to adapt logon programs to properly handle the keycreate attribute. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: Add sockcreate node to procattr APIEric Paris2006-06-264-5/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Below is a patch to add a new /proc/self/attr/sockcreate A process may write a context into this interface and all subsequent sockets created will be labeled with that context. This is the same idea as the fscreate interface where a process can specify the label of a file about to be created. At this time one envisioned user of this will be xinetd. It will be able to better label sockets for the actual services. At this time all sockets take the label of the creating process, so all xinitd sockets would just be labeled the same. I tested this by creating a tcp sender and listener. The sender was able to write to this new proc file and then create sockets with the specified label. I am able to be sure the new label was used since the avc denial messages kicked out by the kernel included both the new security permission setsockcreate and all the socket denials were for the new label, not the label of the running process. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keysMichael LeMay2006-06-264-7/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a /proc/<pid>/attr/keycreate entry that stores the appropriate context for newly-created keys. Modify the selinux_key_alloc hook to make use of the new entry. Update the flask headers to include a new "setkeycreate" permission for processes. Update the flask headers to include a new "create" permission for keys. Use the create permission to restrict which SIDs each task can assign to newly-created keys. Add a new parameter to the security hook "security_key_alloc" to indicate whether it is being invoked by the kernel, or from userspace. If it is being invoked by the kernel, the security hook should never fail. Update the documentation to reflect these changes. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: restrict contents of /proc/keys to Viewable keysMichael LeMay2006-06-262-7/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Restrict /proc/keys such that only those keys to which the current task is granted View permission are presented. The documentation is also updated to reflect these changes. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: allocate key serial numbers randomlyMichael LeMay2006-06-261-14/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Cause key_alloc_serial() to generate key serial numbers randomly rather than in linear sequence. Using an linear sequence permits a covert communication channel to be established, in which one process can communicate with another by creating or not creating new keys within a certain timeframe. The second process can probe for the expected next key serial number and judge its existence by the error returned. This is a problem as the serial number namespace is globally shared between all tasks, regardless of their context. For more information on this topic, this old TCSEC guide is recommended: http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/rainbow/NCSC-TG-030.html Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: let keyctl_chown() change a key's ownerFredrik Tolf2006-06-261-8/+48
| | | | | | | | | Let keyctl_chown() change a key's owner, including attempting to transfer the quota burden to the new user. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: discard the contents of a key on revocationDavid Howells2006-06-262-1/+45
| | | | | | | | | | | | Cause the keys linked to a keyring to be unlinked from it when revoked and it causes the data attached to a user-defined key to be discarded when revoked. This frees up most of the quota a key occupied at that point, rather than waiting for the key to actually be destroyed. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: sort out key quota systemDavid Howells2006-06-269-44/+68
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Add the ability for key creation to overrun the user's quota in some circumstances - notably when a session keyring is created and assigned to a process that didn't previously have one. This means it's still possible to log in, should PAM require the creation of a new session keyring, and fix an overburdened key quota. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* Merge branch 'master' of /home/trondmy/kernel/linux-2.6/Trond Myklebust2006-06-2414-45/+216
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: fs/nfs/inode.c fs/super.c Fix conflicts between patch 'NFS: Split fs/nfs/inode.c' and patch 'VFS: Permit filesystem to override root dentry on mount'
| * [PATCH] SELinux: add task_movememory hookDavid Quigley2006-06-232-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds new security hook, task_movememory, to be called when memory owened by a task is to be moved (e.g. when migrating pages to a this hook is identical to the setscheduler implementation, but a separate hook introduced to allow this check to be specialized in the future if necessary. Since the last posting, the hook has been renamed following feedback from Christoph Lameter. Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
| * [PATCH] lsm: add task_setioprio hookJames Morris2006-06-232-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement an LSM hook for setting a task's IO priority, similar to the hook for setting a tasks's nice value. A previous version of this LSM hook was included in an older version of multiadm by Jan Engelhardt, although I don't recall it being submitted upstream. Also included is the corresponding SELinux hook, which re-uses the setsched permission in the proccess class. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@linux01.gwdg.de> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
| * [PATCH] VFS: Permit filesystem to perform statfs with a known root dentryDavid Howells2006-06-232-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Give the statfs superblock operation a dentry pointer rather than a superblock pointer. This complements the get_sb() patch. That reduced the significance of sb->s_root, allowing NFS to place a fake root there. However, NFS does require a dentry to use as a target for the statfs operation. This permits the root in the vfsmount to be used instead. linux/mount.h has been added where necessary to make allyesconfig build successfully. Interest has also been expressed for use with the FUSE and XFS filesystems. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Nathan Scott <nathans@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
| * [PATCH] VFS: Permit filesystem to override root dentry on mountDavid Howells2006-06-232-7/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Extend the get_sb() filesystem operation to take an extra argument that permits the VFS to pass in the target vfsmount that defines the mountpoint. The filesystem is then required to manually set the superblock and root dentry pointers. For most filesystems, this should be done with simple_set_mnt() which will set the superblock pointer and then set the root dentry to the superblock's s_root (as per the old default behaviour). The get_sb() op now returns an integer as there's now no need to return the superblock pointer. This patch permits a superblock to be implicitly shared amongst several mount points, such as can be done with NFS to avoid potential inode aliasing. In such a case, simple_set_mnt() would not be called, and instead the mnt_root and mnt_sb would be set directly. The patch also makes the following changes: (*) the get_sb_*() convenience functions in the core kernel now take a vfsmount pointer argument and return an integer, so most filesystems have to change very little. (*) If one of the convenience function is not used, then get_sb() should normally call simple_set_mnt() to instantiate the vfsmount. This will always return 0, and so can be tail-called from get_sb(). (*) generic_shutdown_super() now calls shrink_dcache_sb() to clean up the dcache upon superblock destruction rather than shrink_dcache_anon(). This is required because the superblock may now have multiple trees that aren't actually bound to s_root, but that still need to be cleaned up. The currently called functions assume that the whole tree is rooted at s_root, and that anonymous dentries are not the roots of trees which results in dentries being left unculled. However, with the way NFS superblock sharing are currently set to be implemented, these assumptions are violated: the root of the filesystem is simply a dummy dentry and inode (the real inode for '/' may well be inaccessible), and all the vfsmounts are rooted on anonymous[*] dentries with child trees. [*] Anonymous until discovered from another tree. (*) The documentation has been adjusted, including the additional bit of changing ext2_* into foo_* in the documentation. [akpm@osdl.org: convert ipath_fs, do other stuff] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Nathan Scott <nathans@sgi.com> Cc: Roland Dreier <rolandd@cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
| * [PATCH] Keys: Fix race between two instantiators of a keyDavid Howells2006-06-233-17/+74
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a revocation notification method to the key type and calls it whilst the key's semaphore is still write-locked after setting the revocation flag. The patch then uses this to maintain a reference on the task_struct of the process that calls request_key() for as long as the authorisation key remains unrevoked. This fixes a potential race between two processes both of which have assumed the authority to instantiate a key (one may have forked the other for example). The problem is that there's no locking around the check for revocation of the auth key and the use of the task_struct it points to, nor does the auth key keep a reference on the task_struct. Access to the "context" pointer in the auth key must thenceforth be done with the auth key semaphore held. The revocation method is called with the target key semaphore held write-locked and the search of the context process's keyrings is done with the auth key semaphore read-locked. The check for the revocation state of the auth key just prior to searching it is done after the auth key is read-locked for the search. This ensures that the auth key can't be revoked between the check and the search. The revocation notification method is added so that the context task_struct can be released as soon as instantiation happens rather than waiting for the auth key to be destroyed, thus avoiding the unnecessary pinning of the requesting process. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
| * [PATCH] selinux: add hooks for key subsystemMichael LeMay2006-06-2312-17/+106
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem within the kernel. Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class representing retained keys. Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key being allocated. Attach security information to root's default keyrings within the SELinux initialization routine. Has passed David's testsuite. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | Merge branch 'master' of /home/trondmy/kernel/linux-2.6/Trond Myklebust2006-06-212-5/+5
|\| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: include/linux/nfs_fs.h Fixed up conflict with kernel header updates.
| * Merge branch 'audit.b21' of ↵Linus Torvalds2006-06-211-1/+1
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current * 'audit.b21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (25 commits) [PATCH] make set_loginuid obey audit_enabled [PATCH] log more info for directory entry change events [PATCH] fix AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND handling [PATCH] validate rule fields' types [PATCH] audit: path-based rules [PATCH] Audit of POSIX Message Queue Syscalls v.2 [PATCH] fix se_sen audit filter [PATCH] deprecate AUDIT_POSSBILE [PATCH] inline more audit helpers [PATCH] proc_loginuid_write() uses simple_strtoul() on non-terminated array [PATCH] update of IPC audit record cleanup [PATCH] minor audit updates [PATCH] fix audit_krule_to_{rule,data} return values [PATCH] add filtering by ppid [PATCH] log ppid [PATCH] collect sid of those who send signals to auditd [PATCH] execve argument logging [PATCH] fix deadlocks in AUDIT_LIST/AUDIT_LIST_RULES [PATCH] audit_panic() is audit-internal [PATCH] inotify (5/5): update kernel documentation ... Manual fixup of conflict in unclude/linux/inotify.h
| | * [PATCH] fix se_sen audit filterDarrel Goeddel2006-06-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a broken comparison that causes the process clearance to be checked for both se_clr and se_sen audit filters. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * | Merge git://git.infradead.org/~dwmw2/rbtree-2.6Linus Torvalds2006-06-201-4/+4
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * git://git.infradead.org/~dwmw2/rbtree-2.6: [RBTREE] Switch rb_colour() et al to en_US spelling of 'color' for consistency Update UML kernel/physmem.c to use rb_parent() accessor macro [RBTREE] Update hrtimers to use rb_parent() accessor macro. [RBTREE] Add explicit alignment to sizeof(long) for struct rb_node. [RBTREE] Merge colour and parent fields of struct rb_node. [RBTREE] Remove dead code in rb_erase() [RBTREE] Update JFFS2 to use rb_parent() accessor macro. [RBTREE] Update eventpoll.c to use rb_parent() accessor macro. [RBTREE] Update key.c to use rb_parent() accessor macro. [RBTREE] Update ext3 to use rb_parent() accessor macro. [RBTREE] Change rbtree off-tree marking in I/O schedulers. [RBTREE] Add accessor macros for colour and parent fields of rb_node
| | * | [RBTREE] Update key.c to use rb_parent() accessor macro.David Woodhouse2006-04-211-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* | | | Merge branch 'master' of /home/trondmy/kernel/linux-2.6/Trond Myklebust2006-06-2012-123/+341
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| * | | [SECMARK]: Add new packet controls to SELinuxJames Morris2006-06-185-119/+232
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add new per-packet access controls to SELinux, replacing the old packet controls. Packets are labeled with the iptables SECMARK and CONNSECMARK targets, then security policy for the packets is enforced with these controls. To allow for a smooth transition to the new controls, the old code is still present, but not active by default. To restore previous behavior, the old controls may be activated at runtime by writing a '1' to /selinux/compat_net, and also via the kernel boot parameter selinux_compat_net. Switching between the network control models requires the security load_policy permission. The old controls will probably eventually be removed and any continued use is discouraged. With this patch, the new secmark controls for SElinux are disabled by default, so existing behavior is entirely preserved, and the user is not affected at all. It also provides a config option to enable the secmark controls by default (which can always be overridden at boot and runtime). It is also noted in the kconfig help that the user will need updated userspace if enabling secmark controls for SELinux and that they'll probably need the SECMARK and CONNMARK targets, and conntrack protocol helpers, although such decisions are beyond the scope of kernel configuration. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | | [SECMARK]: Add SELinux exportsJames Morris2006-06-181-0/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add and export new functions to the in-kernel SELinux API in support of the new secmark-based packet controls. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | | [SECMARK]: Add new flask definitions to SELinuxJames Morris2006-06-184-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Secmark implements a new scheme for adding security markings to packets via iptables, as well as changes to SELinux to use these markings for security policy enforcement. The rationale for this scheme is explained and discussed in detail in the original threads: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/34927/ http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/35244/ Examples of policy and rulesets, as well as a full archive of patches for iptables and SELinux userland, may be found at: http://people.redhat.com/jmorris/selinux/secmark/ The code has been tested with various compilation options and in several scenarios, including with 'complicated' protocols such as FTP and also with the new generic conntrack code with IPv6 connection tracking. This patch: Add support for a new object class ('packet'), and associated permissions ('send', 'recv', 'relabelto'). These are used to enforce security policy for network packets labeled with SECMARK, and for adding labeling rules. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | | [SELINUX]: add security class for appletalk socketsChristopher J. PeBenito2006-06-185-0/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a security class for appletalk sockets so that they can be distinguished in SELinux policy. Please apply. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | | [LSM-IPsec]: SELinux AuthorizeCatherine Zhang2006-06-184-4/+51
| | |/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole, an additional authorization check is added for removing security policies and security associations with security contexts. Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the module. LSM changes: The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM interface. Use: The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy, xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete). SELinux changes: The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* / | VFS: Unexport do_kern_mount() and clean up simple_pin_fs()Trond Myklebust2006-06-091-1/+1
|/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace all module uses with the new vfs_kern_mount() interface, and fix up simple_pin_fs(). Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
* | [PATCH] selinux: fix sb_lock/sb_security_lock nestingStephen Smalley2006-06-051-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Fix unsafe nesting of sb_lock inside sb_security_lock in selinux_complete_init. Detected by the kernel locking validator. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] selinux: endian fixAlexey Dobriyan2006-05-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] selinux: check for failed kmalloc in security_sid_to_context()Serge E. Hallyn2006-05-151-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Check for NULL kmalloc return value before writing to it. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] selinux: Clear selinux_enabled flag upon runtime disable.Stephen Smalley2006-05-032-5/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Clear selinux_enabled flag upon runtime disable of SELinux by userspace, and make sure it is defined even if selinux= boot parameter support is not enabled in configuration. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Tested-by: Jon Smirl <jonsmirl@gmail.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] Reworked patch for labels on user space messagesSteve Grubb2006-05-011-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The below patch should be applied after the inode and ipc sid patches. This patch is a reworking of Tim's patch that has been updated to match the inode and ipc patches since its similar. [updated: > Stephen Smalley also wanted to change a variable from isec to tsec in the > user sid patch. ] Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | [PATCH] change lspp ipc auditingSteve Grubb2006-05-013-14/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Hi, The patch below converts IPC auditing to collect sid's and convert to context string only if it needs to output an audit record. This patch depends on the inode audit change patch already being applied. Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | [PATCH] audit inode patchSteve Grubb2006-05-011-0/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Previously, we were gathering the context instead of the sid. Now in this patch, we gather just the sid and convert to context only if an audit event is being output. This patch brings the performance hit from 146% down to 23% Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | [PATCH] support for context based audit filteringDarrel Goeddel2006-05-016-10/+302
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | The following patch provides selinux interfaces that will allow the audit system to perform filtering based on the process context (user, role, type, sensitivity, and clearance). These interfaces will allow the selinux module to perform efficient matches based on lower level selinux constructs, rather than relying on context retrievals and string comparisons within the audit module. It also allows for dominance checks on the mls portion of the contexts that are impossible with only string comparisons. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] selinux: Fix MLS compatibility off-by-one bugRon Yorston2006-04-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix an off-by-one error in the MLS compatibility code that was causing contexts with a MLS suffix to be rejected, preventing sharing partitions between FC4 and FC5. Bug reported in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=188068 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Improve usage of memory barriers and remove IRQ disablementDavid Howells2006-04-111-21/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove an unnecessary memory barrier (implicit in rcu_dereference()) from install_session_keyring(). install_session_keyring() is also rearranged a little to make it slightly more efficient. As install_*_keyring() may schedule (in synchronize_rcu() or keyring_alloc()), they may not be entered with interrupts disabled - and so there's no point saving the interrupt disablement state over the critical section. exec_keys() will also be invoked with interrupts enabled, and so that doesn't need to save the interrupt state either. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [Security] Keys: Fix oops when adding key to non-keyringDavid Howells2006-04-102-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes the problem of an oops occuring when a user attempts to add a key to a non-keyring key [CVE-2006-1522]. The problem is that __keyring_search_one() doesn't check that the keyring it's been given is actually a keyring. I've fixed this problem by: (1) declaring that caller of __keyring_search_one() must guarantee that the keyring is a keyring; and (2) making key_create_or_update() check that the keyring is a keyring, and return -ENOTDIR if it isn't. This can be tested by: keyctl add user b b `keyctl add user a a @s` Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [SELINUX] Fix build after ipsec decap state changes.Dave Jones2006-04-091-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | security/selinux/xfrm.c: In function 'selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram': security/selinux/xfrm.c:284: error: 'struct sec_path' has no member named 'x' security/selinux/xfrm.c: In function 'selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb': security/selinux/xfrm.c:317: error: 'struct sec_path' has no member named 'x' Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* Merge branch 'audit.b3' of ↵Linus Torvalds2006-03-255-61/+86
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current * 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (22 commits) [PATCH] fix audit_init failure path [PATCH] EXPORT_SYMBOL patch for audit_log, audit_log_start, audit_log_end and audit_format [PATCH] sem2mutex: audit_netlink_sem [PATCH] simplify audit_free() locking [PATCH] Fix audit operators [PATCH] promiscuous mode [PATCH] Add tty to syscall audit records [PATCH] add/remove rule update [PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer [PATCH] SE Linux audit events [PATCH] Minor cosmetic cleanups to the code moved into auditfilter.c [PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL [PATCH] Fix IA64 success/failure indication in syscall auditing. [PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes [PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information. [PATCH] Exclude messages by message type [PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing. [PATCH] Pass dentry, not just name, in fsnotify creation hooks. [PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages. [PATCH] Filter rule comparators ... Fixed trivial conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c
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