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* [PATCH] Keys: Fix permissions check for update vs addDavid Howells2005-12-021-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Permit add_key() to once again update a matching key rather than adding a new one if a matching key already exists in the target keyring. This bug causes add_key() to always add a new key, displacing the old from the target keyring. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: extend selinuxfs context interfaceStephen Smalley2005-11-091-26/+19
| | | | | | | | | | This patch extends the selinuxfs context interface to allow return the canonical form of the context to userspace. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: disable setxattr on mountpoint labeled filesystemsStephen Smalley2005-11-091-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch disables the setting of SELinux xattrs on files created in filesystems labeled via mountpoint labeling (mounted with the context= option). selinux_inode_setxattr already prevents explicit setxattr from userspace on such filesystems, so this provides consistent behavior for file creation. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: MLS compatibilityStephen Smalley2005-11-091-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | This patch enables files created on a MLS-enabled SELinux system to be accessible on a non-MLS SELinux system, by skipping the MLS component of the security context in the non-MLS case. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] kfree cleanup: securityJesper Juhl2005-11-072-8/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | This is the security/ part of the big kfree cleanup patch. Remove pointless checks for NULL prior to calling kfree() in security/. Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Remove incorrect and obsolete '!' operatorsDavid Howells2005-11-071-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | The attached patch removes a couple of incorrect and obsolete '!' operators left over from the conversion of the key permission functions from true/false returns to zero/error returns. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] cleanup the usage of SEND_SIG_xxx constantsOleg Nesterov2005-10-311-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | This patch simplifies some checks for magic siginfo values. It should not change the behaviour in any way. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] remove hardcoded SEND_SIG_xxx constantsOleg Nesterov2005-10-311-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | This patch replaces hardcoded SEND_SIG_xxx constants with their symbolic names. No changes in affected .o files. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Add LSM hooks for key management [try #3]David Howells2005-10-316-35/+94
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The attached patch adds LSM hooks for key management facilities. The notable changes are: (1) The key struct now supports a security pointer for the use of security modules. This will permit key labelling and restrictions on which programs may access a key. (2) Security modules get a chance to note (or abort) the allocation of a key. (3) The key permission checking can now be enhanced by the security modules; the permissions check consults LSM if all other checks bear out. (4) The key permissions checking functions now return an error code rather than a boolean value. (5) An extra permission has been added to govern the modification of attributes (UID, GID, permissions). Note that there isn't an LSM hook specifically for each keyctl() operation, but rather the permissions hook allows control of individual operations based on the permission request bits. Key management access control through LSM is enabled by automatically if both CONFIG_KEYS and CONFIG_SECURITY are enabled. This should be applied on top of the patch ensubjected: [PATCH] Keys: Possessor permissions should be additive Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Export user-defined keyring operationsDavid Howells2005-10-311-25/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Export user-defined key operations so that those who wish to define their own key type based on the user-defined key operations may do so (as has been requested). The header file created has been placed into include/keys/user-type.h, thus creating a directory where other key types may also be placed. Any objections to doing this? Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] reduce sizeof(struct file)Eric Dumazet2005-10-312-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that RCU applied on 'struct file' seems stable, we can place f_rcuhead in a memory location that is not anymore used at call_rcu(&f->f_rcuhead, file_free_rcu) time, to reduce the size of this critical kernel object. The trick I used is to move f_rcuhead and f_list in an union called f_u The callers are changed so that f_rcuhead becomes f_u.fu_rcuhead and f_list becomes f_u.f_list Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: remove unecessary size_t checks in selinuxfsDavi Arnaut2005-10-311-9/+9
| | | | | | | | | | This patch removes a bunch of unecessary checks for (size_t < 0) in selinuxfs. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux-canonicalize-getxattr-fixAndrew Morton2005-10-311-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | security/selinux/hooks.c: In function `selinux_inode_getxattr': security/selinux/hooks.c:2193: warning: unused variable `sbsec' Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: canonicalize getxattr()James Morris2005-10-312-15/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch allows SELinux to canonicalize the value returned from getxattr() via the security_inode_getsecurity() hook, which is called after the fs level getxattr() function. The purpose of this is to allow the in-core security context for an inode to override the on-disk value. This could happen in cases such as upgrading a system to a different labeling form (e.g. standard SELinux to MLS) without needing to do a full relabel of the filesystem. In such cases, we want getxattr() to return the canonical security context that the kernel is using rather than what is stored on disk. The implementation hooks into the inode_getsecurity(), adding another parameter to indicate the result of the preceding fs-level getxattr() call, so that SELinux knows whether to compare a value obtained from disk with the kernel value. We also now allow getxattr() to work for mountpoint labeled filesystems (i.e. mount with option context=foo_t), as we are able to return the kernel value to the user. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: convert to kzallocJames Morris2005-10-318-97/+49
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch converts SELinux code from kmalloc/memset to the new kazalloc unction. On i386, this results in a text saving of over 1K. Before: text data bss dec hex filename 86319 4642 15236 106197 19ed5 security/selinux/built-in.o After: text data bss dec hex filename 85278 4642 15236 105156 19ac4 security/selinux/built-in.o Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] gfp_t: net/*Al Viro2005-10-282-3/+3
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: handle sel_make_bools() failure in selinuxfsDavi Arnaut2005-10-241-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes error handling in sel_make_bools(), where currently we'd get a memory leak via security_get_bools() and try to kfree() the wrong pointer if called again. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: Fix NULL deref in policydb_destroyStephen Smalley2005-10-241-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes a possible NULL dereference in policydb_destroy, where p->type_attr_map can be NULL if policydb_destroy is called to clean up a partially loaded policy upon an error during policy load. Please apply. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Possessor permissions should be additiveDavid Howells2005-10-081-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | This patch makes the possessor permissions on a key additive with user/group/other permissions on the same key. This permits extra rights to be granted to the possessor of a key without taking away any rights conferred by them owning the key or having common group membership. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Split key permissions checking into a .c fileDavid Howells2005-10-082-0/+71
| | | | | | | | | | | The attached patch splits key permissions checking out of key-ui.h and moves it into a .c file. It's quite large and called quite a lot, and it's about to get bigger with the addition of LSM support for keys... key_any_permission() is also discarded as it's no longer used. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Add request-key process documentationDavid Howells2005-10-082-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | The attached patch adds documentation for the process by which request-key works, including how it permits helper processes to gain access to the requestor's keyrings. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] key: plug request_key_auth memleakDavid Howells2005-10-081-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | Plug request_key_auth memleak. This can be triggered by unprivileged users, so is local DoS. Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux - fix SCTP socket bug and general IP protocol handlingJames Morris2005-09-301-6/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following patch updates the way SELinux classifies and handles IP based protocols. Currently, IP sockets are classified by SELinux as being either TCP, UDP or 'Raw', the latter being a default for IP socket that is not TCP or UDP. The classification code is out of date and uses only the socket type parameter to socket(2) to determine the class of IP socket. So, any socket created with SOCK_STREAM will be classified by SELinux as TCP, and SOCK_DGRAM as UDP. Also, other socket types such as SOCK_SEQPACKET and SOCK_DCCP are currently ignored by SELinux, which classifies them as generic sockets, which means they don't even get basic IP level checking. This patch changes the SELinux IP socket classification logic, so that only an IPPROTO_IP protocol value passed to socket(2) classify the socket as TCP or UDP. The patch also drops the check for SOCK_RAW and converts it into a default, so that socket types like SOCK_DCCP and SOCK_SEQPACKET are classified as SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET (instead of generic sockets). Note that protocol-specific support for SCTP, DCCP etc. is not addressed here, we're just getting these protocols checked at the IP layer. This fixes a reported problem where SCTP sockets were being recognized as generic SELinux sockets yet still being passed in one case to an IP level check, which then fails for generic sockets. It will also fix bugs where any SOCK_STREAM socket is classified as TCP or any SOCK_DGRAM socket is classified as UDP. This patch also unifies the way IP sockets classes are determined in selinux_socket_bind(), so we use the already calculated value instead of trying to recalculate it. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Add possessor permissions to keys [try #3]David Howells2005-09-288-307/+391
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The attached patch adds extra permission grants to keys for the possessor of a key in addition to the owner, group and other permissions bits. This makes SUID binaries easier to support without going as far as labelling keys and key targets using the LSM facilities. This patch adds a second "pointer type" to key structures (struct key_ref *) that can have the bottom bit of the address set to indicate the possession of a key. This is propagated through searches from the keyring to the discovered key. It has been made a separate type so that the compiler can spot attempts to dereference a potentially incorrect pointer. The "possession" attribute can't be attached to a key structure directly as it's not an intrinsic property of a key. Pointers to keys have been replaced with struct key_ref *'s wherever possession information needs to be passed through. This does assume that the bottom bit of the pointer will always be zero on return from kmem_cache_alloc(). The key reference type has been made into a typedef so that at least it can be located in the sources, even though it's basically a pointer to an undefined type. I've also renamed the accessor functions to be more useful, and all reference variables should now end in "_ref". Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] seclvl: use securityfs (fix)Serge Hallyn2005-09-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | That should be -EINVAL for both. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] seclvl-use-securityfs tidyAndrew Morton2005-09-171-10/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | We don't put braces around single statements, thanks. Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* Merge master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chrisw/lsm-2.6 Linus Torvalds2005-09-134-159/+419
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| * [PATCH] SECURITY must depend on SYSFSAdrian Bunk2005-08-221-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CONFIG_SECURITY=y and CONFIG_SYSFS=n results in the following compile error: <-- snip --> ... LD vmlinux security/built-in.o: In function `securityfs_init': inode.c:(.init.text+0x1c2): undefined reference to `kernel_subsys' make: *** [vmlinux] Error 1 <-- snip --> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
| * [PATCH] seclvl securityfsserue@us.ibm.com2005-07-091-158/+70
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Once again, the simple_attr in libfs was actually sufficient - I'd thought the __attribute__(format(printk(1,2))) was more mysterious than it really is. At last, here is the full patch to make seclvl use securityfs. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> -- seclvl.c | 228 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------------------- 1 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 158 deletions(-) Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/seclvl.c ===================================================================
| * [PATCH] add securityfs for all LSMs to useGreg KH2005-07-092-1/+348
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Here's a small patch against 2.6.13-rc2 that adds securityfs, a virtual fs that all LSMs can use instead of creating their own. The fs should be mounted at /sys/kernel/security, and the fs creates that mount point. This will make the LSB people happy that we aren't creating a new /my_lsm_fs directory in the root for every different LSM. It has changed a bit since the last version, thanks to comments from Mike Waychison. Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
* | Merge master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dwmw2/audit-2.6 Linus Torvalds2005-09-133-5/+5
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| * \ Merge with /shiny/git/linux-2.6/.gitDavid Woodhouse2005-08-099-47/+113
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| * \ \ Merge with /shiny/git/linux-2.6/.gitDavid Woodhouse2005-07-131-7/+8
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| * \ \ \ Merge with master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.gitDavid Woodhouse2005-07-0221-451/+1036
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| * | | | AUDIT: Wait for backlog to clear when generating messages.David Woodhouse2005-06-223-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a gfp_mask to audit_log_start() and audit_log(), to reduce the amount of GFP_ATOMIC allocation -- most of it doesn't need to be GFP_ATOMIC. Also if the mask includes __GFP_WAIT, then wait up to 60 seconds for the auditd backlog to clear instead of immediately abandoning the message. The timeout should probably be made configurable, but for now it'll suffice that it only happens if auditd is actually running. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
* | | | | [PATCH] files: lock-free fd look-upDipankar Sarma2005-09-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the use of RCU in files structure, the look-up of files using fds can now be lock-free. The lookup is protected by rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(). This patch changes the readers to use lock-free lookup. Signed-off-by: Maneesh Soni <maneesh@in.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ravikiran Thirumalai <kiran_th@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | | | | [PATCH] files: break up files structDipankar Sarma2005-09-091-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In order for the RCU to work, the file table array, sets and their sizes must be updated atomically. Instead of ensuring this through too many memory barriers, we put the arrays and their sizes in a separate structure. This patch takes the first step of putting the file table elements in a separate structure fdtable that is embedded withing files_struct. It also changes all the users to refer to the file table using files_fdtable() macro. Subsequent applciation of RCU becomes easier after this. Signed-off-by: Dipankar Sarma <dipankar@in.ibm.com> Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | | | | [PATCH] remove the inode_post_link and inode_post_rename LSM hooksStephen Smalley2005-09-092-30/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch removes the inode_post_link and inode_post_rename LSM hooks as they are unused (and likely useless). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | | | | [PATCH] Remove security_inode_post_create/mkdir/symlink/mknod hooksStephen Smalley2005-09-093-140/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch removes the inode_post_create/mkdir/mknod/symlink LSM hooks as they are obsoleted by the new inode_init_security hook that enables atomic inode security labeling. If anyone sees any reason to retain these hooks, please speak now. Also, is anyone using the post_rename/link hooks; if not, those could also be removed. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | | | | [PATCH] tmpfs: Enable atomic inode security labelingStephen Smalley2005-09-091-11/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch modifies tmpfs to call the inode_init_security LSM hook to set up the incore inode security state for new inodes before the inode becomes accessible via the dcache. As there is no underlying storage of security xattrs in this case, it is not necessary for the hook to return the (name, value, len) triple to the tmpfs code, so this patch also modifies the SELinux hook function to correctly handle the case where the (name, value, len) pointers are NULL. The hook call is needed in tmpfs in order to support proper security labeling of tmpfs inodes (e.g. for udev with tmpfs /dev in Fedora). With this change in place, we should then be able to remove the security_inode_post_create/mkdir/... hooks safely. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | | | | [PATCH] security: enable atomic inode security labelingStephen Smalley2005-09-093-0/+67
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following patch set enables atomic security labeling of newly created inodes by altering the fs code to invoke a new LSM hook to obtain the security attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode security state during the inode creation transaction. This parallels the existing processing for setting ACLs on newly created inodes. Otherwise, it is possible for new inodes to be accessed by another thread via the dcache prior to complete security setup (presently handled by the post_create/mkdir/... LSM hooks in the VFS) and a newly created inode may be left unlabeled on the disk in the event of a crash. SELinux presently works around the issue by ensuring that the incore inode security label is initialized to a special SID that is inaccessible to unprivileged processes (in accordance with policy), thereby preventing inappropriate access but potentially causing false denials on legitimate accesses. A simple test program demonstrates such false denials on SELinux, and the patch solves the problem. Similar such false denials have been encountered in real applications. This patch defines a new inode_init_security LSM hook to obtain the security attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode security state for it, and adds a corresponding hook function implementation to SELinux. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | | | | Merge master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6 Linus Torvalds2005-09-051-1/+1
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| * | | | | [CRYPTO]: Use CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP where appropriateHerbert Xu2005-09-021-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch goes through the current users of the crypto layer and sets CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP at crypto_alloc_tfm() where all crypto operations are performed in process context. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | | | | | [PATCH] selinux: endian notationsAlexey Dobriyan2005-09-055-37/+52
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds endian notations to the SELinux code. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | | | | | [PATCH] selinux: Reduce memory use by avtabStephen Smalley2005-09-059-235/+400
|/ / / / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch improves memory use by SELinux by both reducing the avtab node size and reducing the number of avtab nodes. The memory savings are substantial, e.g. on a 64-bit system after boot, James Morris reported the following data for the targeted and strict policies: #objs objsize kernmem Targeted: Before: 237888 40 9.1MB After: 19968 24 468KB Strict: Before: 571680 40 21.81MB After: 221052 24 5.06MB The improvement in memory use comes at a cost in the speed of security server computations of access vectors, but these computations are only required on AVC cache misses, and performance measurements by James Morris using a number of benchmarks have shown that the change does not cause any significant degradation. Note that a rebuilt policy via an updated policy toolchain (libsepol/checkpolicy) is required in order to gain the full benefits of this patch, although some memory savings benefits are immediately applied even to older policies (in particular, the reduction in avtab node size). Sources for the updated toolchain are presently available from the sourceforge CVS tree (http://sourceforge.net/cvs/?group_id=21266), and tarballs are available from http://www.flux.utah.edu/~sds. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | | | | [SELINUX]: Update for tcp_diag rename to inet_diag.James Morris2005-08-302-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Also, support dccp sockets. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | | | | [NETLINK]: Add "groups" argument to netlink_kernel_createPatrick McHardy2005-08-301-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | | | | [NETLINK]: Convert netlink users to use group numbers instead of bitmasksPatrick McHardy2005-08-301-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | | | | [NETLINK]: Fix missing dst_groups initializations in netlink_broadcast usersPatrick McHardy2005-08-301-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | netlink_broadcast users must initialize NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_groups to the destination group mask for netlink_recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | | | | [NETLINK]: Add properly module refcounting for kernel netlink sockets.Harald Welte2005-08-301-1/+1
| |_|_|/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Remove bogus code for compiling netlink as module - Add module refcounting support for modules implementing a netlink protocol - Add support for autoloading modules that implement a netlink protocol as soon as someone opens a socket for that protocol Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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