summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security (follow)
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* [PATCH] selinux: fix tty lockingStephen Smalley2006-09-261-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Take tty_mutex when accessing ->signal->tty in selinux code. Noted by Alan Cox. Longer term, we are looking at refactoring the code to provide better encapsulation of the tty layer, but this is a simple fix that addresses the immediate bug. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: convert sbsec semaphore to a mutexEric Paris2006-09-262-5/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | This patch converts the semaphore in the superblock security struct to a mutex. No locking changes or other code changes are done. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: change isec semaphore to a mutexEric Paris2006-09-263-19/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch converts the remaining isec->sem into a mutex. Very similar locking is provided as before only in the faster smaller mutex rather than a semaphore. An out_unlock path is introduced rather than the conditional unlocking found in the original code. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: eliminate inode_security_set_securityEric Paris2006-09-261-20/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | inode_security_set_sid is only called by security_inode_init_security, which is called when a new file is being created and needs to have its incore security state initialized and its security xattr set. This helper used to be called in other places in the past, but now only has the one. So this patch rolls inode_security_set_sid directly back into security_inode_init_security. There also is no need to hold the isec->sem while doing this, as the inode is not available to other threads at this point in time. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: add support for range transitions on object classesDarrel Goeddel2006-09-265-23/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduces support for policy version 21. This version of the binary kernel policy allows for defining range transitions on security classes other than the process security class. As always, backwards compatibility for older formats is retained. The security class is read in as specified when using the new format, while the "process" security class is assumed when using an older policy format. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: enable configuration of max policy versionStephen Smalley2006-09-262-1/+42
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Enable configuration of SELinux maximum supported policy version to support legacy userland (init) that does not gracefully handle kernels that support newer policy versions two or more beyond the installed policy, as in FC3 and FC4. [bunk@stusta.de: improve Kconfig help text] Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: replace ctxid with sid in selinux_audit_rule_match interfaceStephen Smalley2006-09-261-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | Replace ctxid with sid in selinux_audit_rule_match interface for consistency with other interfaces. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: rename selinux_ctxid_to_stringStephen Smalley2006-09-261-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Rename selinux_ctxid_to_string to selinux_sid_to_string to be consistent with other interfaces. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: eliminate selinux_task_ctxidStephen Smalley2006-09-261-9/+0
| | | | | | | | | Eliminate selinux_task_ctxid since it duplicates selinux_task_get_sid. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [NetLabel]: change the SELinux permissionsPaul Moore2006-09-261-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | Change NetLabel to use the 'recvfrom' socket permission and the SECINITSID_NETMSG SELinux SID as the NetLabel base SID for incoming packets. This patch effectively makes the old, and currently unused, SELinux NETMSG permissions NetLabel permissions. Signed-of-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NetLabel]: correct improper handling of non-NetLabel peer contextsPaul Moore2006-09-261-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a problem where NetLabel would always set the value of sk_security_struct->peer_sid in selinux_netlbl_sock_graft() to the context of the socket, causing problems when users would query the context of the connection. This patch fixes this so that the value in sk_security_struct->peer_sid is only set when the connection is NetLabel based, otherwise the value is untouched. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [SELINUX]: Fix bug in security_sid_mls_copyVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | The following fixes a bug where random mem is being tampered with in the non-mls case; encountered by Jashua Brindle on a gentoo box. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* [NetLabel]: add some missing #includes to various header filesPaul Moore2006-09-231-0/+9
| | | | | | | Add some missing include files to the NetLabel related header files. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NetLabel]: uninline selinux_netlbl_inode_permission()Paul Moore2006-09-232-43/+25
| | | | | | | | Uninline the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() at the request of Andrew Morton. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NetLabel]: Cleanup ebitmap_import()Paul Moore2006-09-231-20/+16
| | | | | | | Rewrite ebitmap_import() so it is a bit cleaner and easier to read. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NetLabel]: Comment corrections.Paul Moore2006-09-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | Fix some incorrect comments. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NetLabel]: Correctly initialize the NetLabel fields.Paul Moore2006-09-233-2/+67
| | | | | | | | Fix a problem where the NetLabel specific fields of the sk_security_struct structure were not being initialized early enough in some cases. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [SELINUX]: security/selinux/hooks.c: Make 4 functions static.Adrian Bunk2006-09-221-5/+7
| | | | | | | | | This patch makes four needlessly global functions static. Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NetLabel]: SELinux supportVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-229-14/+996
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add NetLabel support to the SELinux LSM and modify the socket_post_create() LSM hook to return an error code. The most significant part of this patch is the addition of NetLabel hooks into the following SELinux LSM hooks: * selinux_file_permission() * selinux_socket_sendmsg() * selinux_socket_post_create() * selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb() * selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream() * selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram() * selinux_sock_graft() * selinux_inet_conn_request() The basic reasoning behind this patch is that outgoing packets are "NetLabel'd" by labeling their socket and the NetLabel security attributes are checked via the additional hook in selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(). NetLabel itself is only a labeling mechanism, similar to filesystem extended attributes, it is up to the SELinux enforcement mechanism to perform the actual access checks. In addition to the changes outlined above this patch also includes some changes to the extended bitmap (ebitmap) and multi-level security (mls) code to import and export SELinux TE/MLS attributes into and out of NetLabel. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Fix build with SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM disabled.Venkat Yekkirala2006-09-222-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following patch will fix the build problem (encountered by Andrew Morton) when SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM is not enabled. As compared to git-net-selinux_xfrm_decode_session-build-fix.patch in -mm, this patch sets the return parameter sid to SECSID_NULL in selinux_xfrm_decode_session() and handles this value in the caller selinux_inet_conn_request() appropriately. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Auto-labeling of child socketsVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-223-45/+117
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This automatically labels the TCP, Unix stream, and dccp child sockets as well as openreqs to be at the same MLS level as the peer. This will result in the selection of appropriately labeled IPSec Security Associations. This also uses the sock's sid (as opposed to the isec sid) in SELinux enforcement of secmark in rcv_skb and postroute_last hooks. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Default labeling of socket specific IPSec policiesVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-223-13/+26
| | | | | | | | This defaults the label of socket-specific IPSec policies to be the same as the socket they are set on. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Add flow labelingVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-224-25/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This labels the flows that could utilize IPSec xfrms at the points the flows are defined so that IPSec policy and SAs at the right label can be used. The following protos are currently not handled, but they should continue to be able to use single-labeled IPSec like they currently do. ipmr ip_gre ipip igmp sit sctp ip6_tunnel (IPv6 over IPv6 tunnel device) decnet Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Flow based matching of xfrm policy and stateVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-224-42/+210
| | | | | | | | | This implements a seemless mechanism for xfrm policy selection and state matching based on the flow sid. This also includes the necessary SELinux enforcement pieces. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Add security sid to sockVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-223-17/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This adds security for IP sockets at the sock level. Security at the sock level is needed to enforce the SELinux security policy for security associations even when a sock is orphaned (such as in the TCP LAST_ACK state). This will also be used to enforce SELinux controls over data arriving at or leaving a child socket while it's still waiting to be accepted. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Define new SELinux service routineVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-224-20/+91
| | | | | | | | | | | This defines a routine that combines the Type Enforcement portion of one sid with the MLS portion from the other sid to arrive at a new sid. This would be used to define a sid for a security association that is to be negotiated by IKE as well as for determing the sid for open requests and connection-oriented child sockets. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [MLSXFRM]: Granular IPSec associations for use in MLS environmentsVenkat Yekkirala2006-09-222-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current approach to labeling Security Associations for SELinux purposes uses a one-to-one mapping between xfrm policy rules and security associations. This doesn't address the needs of real world MLS (Multi-level System, traditional Bell-LaPadula) environments where a single xfrm policy rule (pertaining to a range, classified to secret for example) might need to map to multiple Security Associations (one each for classified, secret, top secret and all the compartments applicable to these security levels). This patch set addresses the above problem by allowing for the mapping of a single xfrm policy rule to multiple security associations, with each association used in the security context it is defined for. It also includes the security context to be used in IKE negotiation in the acquire messages sent to the IKE daemon so that a unique SA can be negotiated for each unique security context. A couple of bug fixes are also included; checks to make sure the SAs used by a packet match policy (security context-wise) on the inbound and also that the bundle used for the outbound matches the security context of the flow. This patch set also makes the use of the SELinux sid in flow cache lookups seemless by including the sid in the flow key itself. Also, open requests as well as connection-oriented child sockets are labeled automatically to be at the same level as the peer to allow for use of appropriately labeled IPSec associations. Description of changes: A "sid" member has been added to the flow cache key resulting in the sid being available at all needed locations and the flow cache lookups automatically using the sid. The flow sid is derived from the socket on the outbound and the SAs (unlabeled where an SA was not used) on the inbound. Outbound case: 1. Find policy for the socket. 2. OLD: Find an SA that matches the policy. NEW: Find an SA that matches BOTH the policy and the flow/socket. This is necessary since not every SA that matches the policy can be used for the flow/socket. Consider policy range Secret-TS, and SAs each for Secret and TS. We don't want a TS socket to use the Secret SA. Hence the additional check for the SA Vs. flow/socket. 3. NEW: When looking thru bundles for a policy, make sure the flow/socket can use the bundle. If a bundle is not found, create one, calling for IKE if necessary. If using IKE, include the security context in the acquire message to the IKE daemon. Inbound case: 1. OLD: Find policy for the socket. NEW: Find policy for the incoming packet based on the sid of the SA(s) it used or the unlabeled sid if no SAs were used. (Consider a case where a socket is "authorized" for two policies (unclassified-confidential, secret-top_secret). If the packet has come in using a secret SA, we really ought to be using the latter policy (secret-top_secret).) 2. OLD: BUG: No check to see if the SAs used by the packet agree with the policy sec_ctx-wise. (It was indicated in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() that this was being accomplished by (x->id.spi == tmpl->id.spi || !tmpl->id.spi) in xfrm_state_ok, but it turns out tmpl->id.spi would normally be zero (unless xfrm policy rules specify one at the template level, which they usually don't). NEW: The socket is checked for access to the SAs used (based on the sid of the SAs) in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(). Forward case: This would be Step 1 from the Inbound case, followed by Steps 2 and 3 from the Outbound case. Outstanding items/issues: - Timewait acknowledgements and such are generated in the current/upstream implementation using a NULL socket resulting in the any_socket sid (SYSTEM_HIGH) to be used. This problem is not addressed by this patch set. This patch: Add new flask definitions to SELinux Adds a new avperm "polmatch" to arbitrate flow/state access to a xfrm policy rule. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [CRYPTO] users: Use crypto_hash interface instead of crypto_digestHerbert Xu2006-09-211-8/+10
| | | | | | | This patch converts all remaining crypto_digest users to use the new crypto_hash interface. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [AF_UNIX]: Kernel memory leak fix for af_unix datagram getpeersec patchCatherine Zhang2006-08-022-16/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | From: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> This patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the original unix datagram getpeersec patch. Instead of creating a security context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the security context when the receiver requests it. This new design requires modification of the current unix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely, secid_to_secctx and release_secctx. The former retrieves the security context and the latter releases it. A hook is required for releasing the security context because it is up to the security module to decide how that's done. In the case of Selinux, it's a simple kfree operation. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] selinux: fix bug in security_compute_sidVenkat Yekkirala2006-07-311-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Initializes newcontext sooner to allow for its destruction in all cases. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: fix memory leakDarrel Goeddel2006-07-311-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes a memory leak when a policydb structure is destroyed. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Fix security check for joint context= and fscontext= mount optionsEric Paris2006-07-151-5/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After some discussion on the actual meaning of the filesystem class security check in try context mount it was determined that the checks for the context= mount options were not correct if fscontext mount option had already been used. When labeling the superblock we should be checking relabel_from and relabel_to. But if the superblock has already been labeled (with fscontext) then context= is actually labeling the inodes, and so we should be checking relabel_from and associate. This patch fixes which checks are called depending on the mount options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: add rootcontext= option to label root inode when mountingEric Paris2006-07-101-9/+57
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce a new rootcontext= option to FS mounting. This option will allow you to explicitly label the root inode of an FS being mounted before that FS or inode because visible to userspace. This was found to be useful for things like stateless linux, see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=190001 Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: decouple fscontext/context mount optionsEric Paris2006-07-102-16/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the conflict between fscontext and context mount options. If context= is specified without fscontext it will operate just as before, if both are specified we will use mount point labeling and all inodes will get the label specified by context=. The superblock will be labeled with the label of fscontext=, thus affecting operations which check the superblock security context, such as associate permissions. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] audit: support for object context filtersDarrel Goeddel2006-07-011-1/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch introduces object audit filters based on the elements of the SELinux context. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> kernel/auditfilter.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] audit: rename AUDIT_SE_* constantsDarrel Goeddel2006-07-011-16/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds additional definitions used by the following patch. The renaming avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> include/linux/audit.h | 15 ++++++++---- kernel/auditfilter.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++---- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 32 +++++++++++++------------- 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bunk/trivialLinus Torvalds2006-07-0110-10/+0
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bunk/trivial: Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h> remove obsolete swsusp_encrypt arch/arm26/Kconfig typos Documentation/IPMI typos Kconfig: Typos in net/sched/Kconfig v9fs: do not include linux/version.h Documentation/DocBook/mtdnand.tmpl: typo fixes typo fixes: specfic -> specific typo fixes in Documentation/networking/pktgen.txt typo fixes: occuring -> occurring typo fixes: infomation -> information typo fixes: disadvantadge -> disadvantage typo fixes: aquire -> acquire typo fixes: mecanism -> mechanism typo fixes: bandwith -> bandwidth fix a typo in the RTC_CLASS help text smb is no longer maintained Manually merged trivial conflict in arch/um/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
| * Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h>Jörn Engel2006-06-3010-10/+0
| | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
* | [PATCH] SELinux: Add security hook definition for getioprio and insert hooksDavid Quigley2006-06-302-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new security hook definition for the sys_ioprio_get operation. At present, the SELinux hook function implementation for this hook is identical to the getscheduler implementation but a separate hook is introduced to allow this check to be specialized in the future if necessary. This patch also creates a helper function get_task_ioprio which handles the access check in addition to retrieving the ioprio value for the task. Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* | [PATCH] SELinux: extend task_kill hook to handle signals sent by AIO completionDavid Quigley2006-06-302-5/+21
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch extends the security_task_kill hook to handle signals sent by AIO completion. In this case, the secid of the task responsible for the signal needs to be obtained and saved earlier, so a security_task_getsecid() hook is added, and then this saved value is passed subsequently to the extended task_kill hook for use in checking. Signed-off-by: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersecCatherine Zhang2006-06-301-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet. Patch design and implementation: The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NETLINK]: Encapsulate eff_cap usage within security framework.Darrel Goeddel2006-06-303-17/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch encapsulates the usage of eff_cap (in netlink_skb_params) within the security framework by extending security_netlink_recv to include a required capability parameter and converting all direct usage of eff_caps outside of the lsm modules to use the interface. It also updates the SELinux implementation of the security_netlink_send and security_netlink_recv hooks to take advantage of the sid in the netlink_skb_params struct. This also enables SELinux to perform auditing of netlink capability checks. Please apply, for 2.6.18 if possible. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] Keys: Allow in-kernel key requestor to pass auxiliary data to upcallerDavid Howells2006-06-293-11/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The proposed NFS key type uses its own method of passing key requests to userspace (upcalling) rather than invoking /sbin/request-key. This is because the responsible userspace daemon should already be running and will be contacted through rpc_pipefs. This patch permits the NFS filesystem to pass auxiliary data to the upcall operation (struct key_type::request_key) so that the upcaller can use a pre-existing communications channel more easily. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-By: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] poison: add & use more constantsRandy Dunlap2006-06-281-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add more poison values to include/linux/poison.h. It's not clear to me whether some others should be added or not, so I haven't added any of these: ./include/linux/libata.h:#define ATA_TAG_POISON 0xfafbfcfdU ./arch/ppc/8260_io/fcc_enet.c:1918: memset((char *)(&(immap->im_dprambase[(mem_addr+64)])), 0x88, 32); ./drivers/usb/mon/mon_text.c:429: memset(mem, 0xe5, sizeof(struct mon_event_text)); ./drivers/char/ftape/lowlevel/ftape-ctl.c:738: memset(ft_buffer[i]->address, 0xAA, FT_BUFF_SIZE); ./drivers/block/sx8.c:/* 0xf is just arbitrary, non-zero noise; this is sorta like poisoning */ Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: inherit /proc/self/attr/keycreate across forkMichael LeMay2006-06-281-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Update SELinux to cause the keycreate process attribute held in /proc/self/attr/keycreate to be inherited across a fork and reset upon execve. This is consistent with the handling of the other process attributes provided by SELinux and also makes it simpler to adapt logon programs to properly handle the keycreate attribute. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] SELinux: Add sockcreate node to procattr APIEric Paris2006-06-264-5/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Below is a patch to add a new /proc/self/attr/sockcreate A process may write a context into this interface and all subsequent sockets created will be labeled with that context. This is the same idea as the fscreate interface where a process can specify the label of a file about to be created. At this time one envisioned user of this will be xinetd. It will be able to better label sockets for the actual services. At this time all sockets take the label of the creating process, so all xinitd sockets would just be labeled the same. I tested this by creating a tcp sender and listener. The sender was able to write to this new proc file and then create sockets with the specified label. I am able to be sure the new label was used since the avc denial messages kicked out by the kernel included both the new security permission setsockcreate and all the socket denials were for the new label, not the label of the running process. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keysMichael LeMay2006-06-264-7/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a /proc/<pid>/attr/keycreate entry that stores the appropriate context for newly-created keys. Modify the selinux_key_alloc hook to make use of the new entry. Update the flask headers to include a new "setkeycreate" permission for processes. Update the flask headers to include a new "create" permission for keys. Use the create permission to restrict which SIDs each task can assign to newly-created keys. Add a new parameter to the security hook "security_key_alloc" to indicate whether it is being invoked by the kernel, or from userspace. If it is being invoked by the kernel, the security hook should never fail. Update the documentation to reflect these changes. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: restrict contents of /proc/keys to Viewable keysMichael LeMay2006-06-262-7/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Restrict /proc/keys such that only those keys to which the current task is granted View permission are presented. The documentation is also updated to reflect these changes. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: allocate key serial numbers randomlyMichael LeMay2006-06-261-14/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Cause key_alloc_serial() to generate key serial numbers randomly rather than in linear sequence. Using an linear sequence permits a covert communication channel to be established, in which one process can communicate with another by creating or not creating new keys within a certain timeframe. The second process can probe for the expected next key serial number and judge its existence by the error returned. This is a problem as the serial number namespace is globally shared between all tasks, regardless of their context. For more information on this topic, this old TCSEC guide is recommended: http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/rainbow/NCSC-TG-030.html Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: let keyctl_chown() change a key's ownerFredrik Tolf2006-06-261-8/+48
| | | | | | | | | Let keyctl_chown() change a key's owner, including attempting to transfer the quota burden to the new user. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-12-14 18:21:58 +0100