| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Commit 70b62c25665f636c ("LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM") removed
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_{SELINUX,SMACK,TOMOYO,APPARMOR,DAC} from
security/Kconfig and changed CONFIG_LSM to provide a fixed ordering as a
default value. That commit expected that existing users (upgrading from
Linux 5.0 and earlier) will edit CONFIG_LSM value in accordance with
their CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* choice in their old kernel configs. But
since users might forget to edit CONFIG_LSM value, this patch revives
the choice (only for providing the default value for CONFIG_LSM) in order
to make sure that CONFIG_LSM reflects CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* from their
old kernel configs.
Note that since TOMOYO can be fully stacked against the other legacy
major LSMs, when it is selected, it explicitly disables the other LSMs
to avoid them also initializing since TOMOYO does not expect this
currently.
Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Fixes: 70b62c25665f636c ("LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM")
Co-developed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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sparse complains that Yama defines functions and a variable as non-static
even though they don't exist in any header. Fix it by making them static.
Co-developed-by: Mukesh Ojha <mojha@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Mukesh Ojha <mojha@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
[kees: merged similar static-ness fixes into a single patch]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190326230841.87834-1-jannh@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1553673018-19234-1-git-send-email-mojha@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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The conversion to kvmalloc() forgot to account for the possibility that
p->type_attr_map_array might be null in policydb_destroy().
Fix this by destroying its contents only if it is not NULL.
Also make sure ebitmap_init() is called on all entries before
policydb_destroy() can be called. Right now this is a no-op, because
both kvcalloc() and ebitmap_init() just zero out the whole struct, but
let's rather not rely on a specific implementation.
Reported-by: syzbot+a57b2aff60832666fc28@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: acdf52d97f82 ("selinux: convert to kvmalloc")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two small fixes for SELinux in v5.1: one adds a buffer length check to
the SELinux SCTP code, the other ensures that the SELinux labeling for
a NFS mount is not disabled if the filesystem is mounted twice"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
security/selinux: fix SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS on reused superblock
selinux: add the missing walk_size + len check in selinux_sctp_bind_connect
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In the case when we're reusing a superblock, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts()
fails to set set_kern_flags, with the result that
nfs_clone_sb_security() incorrectly clears NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL.
The result is that if you mount the same NFS filesystem twice, NFS
security labels are turned off, even if they would work fine if you
mounted the filesystem only once.
("fixes" may be not exactly the right tag, it may be more like
"fixed-other-cases-but-missed-this-one".)
Cc: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b4d3452b8b4 "security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts..."
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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As does in __sctp_connect(), when checking addrs in a while loop, after
get the addr len according to sa_family, it's necessary to do the check
walk_size + af->sockaddr_len > addrs_size to make sure it won't access
an out-of-bounds addr.
The same thing is needed in selinux_sctp_bind_connect(), otherwise an
out-of-bounds issue can be triggered:
[14548.772313] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in selinux_sctp_bind_connect+0x1aa/0x1f0
[14548.927083] Call Trace:
[14548.938072] dump_stack+0x9a/0xe9
[14548.953015] print_address_description+0x65/0x22e
[14548.996524] kasan_report.cold.6+0x92/0x1a6
[14549.015335] selinux_sctp_bind_connect+0x1aa/0x1f0
[14549.036947] security_sctp_bind_connect+0x58/0x90
[14549.058142] __sctp_setsockopt_connectx+0x5a/0x150 [sctp]
[14549.081650] sctp_setsockopt.part.24+0x1322/0x3ce0 [sctp]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d452930fd3b9 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
Reported-by: Chunyu Hu <chuhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor fixes from John Johansen:
- fix double when failing to unpack secmark rules in policy
- fix leak of dentry when profile is removed
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2019-03-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: fix double free when unpack of secmark rules fails
apparmor: delete the dentry in aafs_remove() to avoid a leak
apparmor: Fix warning about unused function apparmor_ipv6_postroute
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if secmark rules fail to unpack a double free happens resulting in
the following oops
[ 1295.584074] audit: type=1400 audit(1549970525.256:51): apparmor="STATUS" info="failed to unpack profile secmark rules" error=-71 profile="unconfined" name="/root/test" pid=29882 comm="apparmor_parser" name="/root/test" offset=120
[ 1374.042334] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1374.042336] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:294!
[ 1374.042404] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 1374.042436] CPU: 0 PID: 29921 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 4.20.7-042007-generic #201902061234
[ 1374.042461] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 1374.042489] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x164/0x180
[ 1374.042502] Code: 74 05 41 0f b6 72 51 4c 89 d7 e8 37 cd f8 ff eb 8b 41 b8 01 00 00 00 48 89 d9 48 89 da 4c 89 d6 e8 11 f6 ff ff e9 72 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 49 8b 42 08 a8 01 75 c2 0f 0b 48 8b 3d a9 f4 19 01 e9 c5 fe
[ 1374.042552] RSP: 0018:ffffaf7b812d7b90 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1374.042568] RAX: ffff91e437679200 RBX: ffff91e437679200 RCX: ffff91e437679200
[ 1374.042589] RDX: 00000000000088b6 RSI: ffff91e43da27060 RDI: ffff91e43d401a80
[ 1374.042609] RBP: ffffaf7b812d7ba8 R08: 0000000000027080 R09: ffffffffa6627a6d
[ 1374.042629] R10: ffffd3af41dd9e40 R11: ffff91e43a1740dc R12: ffff91e3f52e8000
[ 1374.042650] R13: ffffffffa6627a6d R14: ffffffffffffffb9 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 1374.042675] FS: 00007f928df77740(0000) GS:ffff91e43da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1374.042697] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1374.042714] CR2: 000055a0c3ab6b50 CR3: 0000000079ed8004 CR4: 0000000000360ef0
[ 1374.042737] Call Trace:
[ 1374.042750] kzfree+0x2d/0x40
[ 1374.042763] aa_free_profile+0x12b/0x270
[ 1374.042776] unpack_profile+0xc1/0xf10
[ 1374.042790] aa_unpack+0x115/0x4e0
[ 1374.042802] aa_replace_profiles+0x8e/0xcc0
[ 1374.042817] ? kvmalloc_node+0x6d/0x80
[ 1374.042831] ? __check_object_size+0x166/0x192
[ 1374.042845] policy_update+0xcf/0x1b0
[ 1374.042858] profile_load+0x7d/0xa0
[ 1374.042871] __vfs_write+0x3a/0x190
[ 1374.042883] ? apparmor_file_permission+0x1a/0x20
[ 1374.042899] ? security_file_permission+0x31/0xc0
[ 1374.042918] ? _cond_resched+0x19/0x30
[ 1374.042931] vfs_write+0xab/0x1b0
[ 1374.042963] ksys_write+0x55/0xc0
[ 1374.043004] __x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20
[ 1374.043046] do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x110
[ 1374.043087] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: 9caafbe2b4cf ("apparmor: Parse secmark policy")
Reported-by: Alex Murray <alex.murray@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Although the apparmorfs dentries are always dropped from the dentry cache
when the usage count drops to zero, there is no guarantee that this will
happen in aafs_remove(), as another thread might still be using it. In
this scenario, this means that the dentry will temporarily continue to
appear in the results of lookups, even after the call to aafs_remove().
In the case of removal of a profile - it also causes simple_rmdir()
on the profile directory to fail, as the directory won't be empty until
the usage counts of all child dentries have decreased to zero. This
results in the dentry for the profile directory leaking and appearing
empty in the file system tree forever.
Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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when compiled without CONFIG_IPV6:
security/apparmor/lsm.c:1601:21: warning: ‘apparmor_ipv6_postroute’ defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
static unsigned int apparmor_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Reported-by: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>
Tested-by: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs mount infrastructure updates from Al Viro:
"The rest of core infrastructure; no new syscalls in that pile, but the
old parts are switched to new infrastructure. At that point
conversions of individual filesystems can happen independently; some
are done here (afs, cgroup, procfs, etc.), there's also a large series
outside of that pile dealing with NFS (quite a bit of option-parsing
stuff is getting used there - it's one of the most convoluted
filesystems in terms of mount-related logics), but NFS bits are the
next cycle fodder.
It got seriously simplified since the last cycle; documentation is
probably the weakest bit at the moment - I considered dropping the
commit introducing Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt (cutting
the size increase by quarter ;-), but decided that it would be better
to fix it up after -rc1 instead.
That pile allows to do followup work in independent branches, which
should make life much easier for the next cycle. fs/super.c size
increase is unpleasant; there's a followup series that allows to
shrink it considerably, but I decided to leave that until the next
cycle"
* 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (41 commits)
afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount
afs: Add fs_context support
vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log
vfs: Implement logging through fs_context
vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API
vfs: Remove kern_mount_data()
hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context
cpuset: Use fs_context
kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context
cgroup: store a reference to cgroup_ns into cgroup_fs_context
cgroup1_get_tree(): separate "get cgroup_root to use" into a separate helper
cgroup_do_mount(): massage calling conventions
cgroup: stash cgroup_root reference into cgroup_fs_context
cgroup2: switch to option-by-option parsing
cgroup1: switch to option-by-option parsing
cgroup: take options parsing into ->parse_monolithic()
cgroup: fold cgroup1_mount() into cgroup1_get_tree()
cgroup: start switching to fs_context
ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context
proc: Add fs_context support to procfs
...
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new primitive: vfs_dup_fs_context(). Comes with fs_context
method (->dup()) for copying the filesystem-specific parts
of fs_context, along with LSM one (->fs_context_dup()) for
doing the same to LSM parts.
[needs better commit message, and change of Author:, anyway]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Implement filesystem context security hooks for the smack LSM.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Implement the new mount API LSM hooks for SELinux. At some point the old
hooks will need to be removed.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Add LSM hooks for use by the new mount API and filesystem context code.
This includes:
(1) Hooks to handle allocation, duplication and freeing of the security
record attached to a filesystem context.
(2) A hook to snoop source specifications. There may be multiple of these
if the filesystem supports it. They will to be local files/devices if
fs_context::source_is_dev is true and will be something else, possibly
remote server specifications, if false.
(3) A hook to snoop superblock configuration options in key[=val] form.
If the LSM decides it wants to handle it, it can suppress the option
being passed to the filesystem. Note that 'val' may include commas
and binary data with the fsopen patch.
(4) A hook to perform validation and allocation after the configuration
has been done but before the superblock is allocated and set up.
(5) A hook to transfer the security from the context to a newly created
superblock.
(6) A hook to rule on whether a path point can be used as a mountpoint.
These are intended to replace:
security_sb_copy_data
security_sb_kern_mount
security_sb_mount
security_sb_set_mnt_opts
security_sb_clone_mnt_opts
security_sb_parse_opts_str
[AV -- some of the methods being replaced are already gone, some of the
methods are not added for the lack of need]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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The flex arrays were being used for constant sized arrays, so there's no
benefit to using flex_arrays over something simpler.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181217131929.11727-4-kent.overstreet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@ovn.org>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull tpm updates from James Morris:
- Clean up the transmission flow
Cleaned up the whole transmission flow. Locking of the chip is now
done in the level of tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops() instead
taking the chip lock inside tpm_transmit(). The nested calls inside
tpm_transmit(), used with the resource manager, have been refactored
out.
Should make easier to perform more complex transactions with the TPM
without making the subsystem a bigger mess (e.g. encrypted channel
patches by James Bottomley).
- PPI 1.3 support
TPM PPI 1.3 introduces an additional optional command parameter that
may be needed for some commands. Display the parameter if the command
requires such a parameter. Only command 23 (SetPCRBanks) needs one.
The PPI request file will show output like this then:
# echo "23 16" > request
# cat request
23 16
# echo "5" > request
# cat request
5
- Extend all PCR banks in IMA
Instead of static PCR banks array, the array of available PCR banks
is now allocated dynamically. The digests sizes are determined
dynamically using a probe PCR read without relying crypto's static
list of hash algorithms.
This should finally make sealing of measurements in IMA safe and
secure.
- TPM 2.0 selftests
Added a test suite to tools/testing/selftests/tpm2 previously outside
of the kernel tree: https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/tpm2-scripts
* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (37 commits)
tpm/ppi: Enable submission of optional command parameter for PPI 1.3
tpm/ppi: Possibly show command parameter if TPM PPI 1.3 is used
tpm/ppi: Display up to 101 operations as define for version 1.3
tpm/ppi: rename TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID to TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID_1
tpm/ppi: pass function revision ID to tpm_eval_dsm()
tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()
KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()
tpm: move tpm_chip definition to include/linux/tpm.h
tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read
tpm: rename and export tpm2_digest and tpm2_algorithms
tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array
tpm: remove @flags from tpm_transmit()
tpm: take TPM chip power gating out of tpm_transmit()
tpm: introduce tpm_chip_start() and tpm_chip_stop()
tpm: remove TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED flag
tpm: use tpm_try_get_ops() in tpm-sysfs.c.
tpm: remove @space from tpm_transmit()
tpm: move TPM space code out of tpm_transmit()
tpm: move tpm_validate_commmand() to tpm2-space.c
tpm: clean up tpm_try_transmit() error handling flow
...
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git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd into next-tpm
tpmdd updates for Linux v5.1
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Clean up the transmission flow
==============================
Cleaned up the whole transmission flow. Locking of the chip is now done in
the level of tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops() instead taking the chip
lock inside tpm_transmit(). The nested calls inside tpm_transmit(), used
with the resource manager, have been refactored out.
Should make easier to perform more complex transactions with the TPM
without making the subsystem a bigger mess (e.g. encrypted channel patches
by James Bottomley).
PPI 1.3 support
===============
TPM PPI 1.3 introduces an additional optional command parameter that may be
needed for some commands. Display the parameter if the command requires
such a parameter. Only command 23 (SetPCRBanks) needs one.
The PPI request file will show output like this then:
# echo "23 16" > request
# cat request
23 16
# echo "5" > request
# cat request
5
Extend all PCR banks in IMA
===========================
Instead of static PCR banks array, the array of available PCR banks is now
allocated dynamically. The digests sizes are determined dynamically using a
probe PCR read without relying crypto's static list of hash algorithms.
This should finally make sealing of measurements in IMA safe and secure.
TPM 2.0 selftests
=================
Added a test suite to tools/testing/selftests/tpm2 previously outside of
the kernel tree: https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/tpm2-scripts.
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Currently, tpm_pcr_extend() accepts as an input only a SHA1 digest.
This patch replaces the hash parameter of tpm_pcr_extend() with an array of
tpm_digest structures, so that the caller can provide a digest for each PCR
bank currently allocated in the TPM.
tpm_pcr_extend() will not extend banks for which no digest was provided,
as it happened before this patch, but instead it requires that callers
provide the full set of digests. Since the number of digests will always be
chip->nr_allocated_banks, the count parameter has been removed.
Due to the API change, ima_pcr_extend() and pcrlock() have been modified.
Since the number of allocated banks is not known in advance, the memory for
the digests must be dynamically allocated. To avoid performance degradation
and to avoid that a PCR extend is not done due to lack of memory, the array
of tpm_digest structures is allocated by the users of the TPM driver at
initialization time.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (on x86 for TPM 1.2 & PTT TPM 2.0)
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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When crypto agility support will be added to the TPM driver, users of the
driver have to retrieve the allocated banks from chip->allocated_banks and
use this information to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures to be
passed to tpm_pcr_extend().
This patch retrieves a tpm_chip pointer from tpm_default_chip() so that the
pointer can be used to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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Currently, the TPM driver retrieves the digest size from a table mapping
TPM algorithms identifiers to identifiers defined by the crypto subsystem.
If the algorithm is not defined by the latter, the digest size can be
retrieved from the output of the PCR read command.
The patch modifies the definition of tpm_pcr_read() and tpm2_pcr_read() to
pass the desired hash algorithm and obtain the digest size at TPM startup.
Algorithms and corresponding digest sizes are stored in the new structure
tpm_bank_info, member of tpm_chip, so that the information can be used by
other kernel subsystems.
tpm_bank_info contains: the TPM algorithm identifier, necessary to generate
the event log as defined by Trusted Computing Group (TCG); the digest size,
to pad/truncate a digest calculated with a different algorithm; the crypto
subsystem identifier, to calculate the digest of event data.
This patch also protects against data corruption that could happen in the
bus, by checking that the digest size returned by the TPM during a PCR read
matches the size of the algorithm passed to tpm2_pcr_read().
For the initial PCR read, when digest sizes are not yet available, this
patch ensures that the amount of data copied from the output returned by
the TPM does not exceed the size of the array data are copied to.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"Mimi Zohar says:
'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA
kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull
request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for
verifying the PE kernel image signature.
Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp
files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated.
The remaining patches are cleanup'"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation
ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call
evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr'
encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1
kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next-integrity
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA
kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull
request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for
verifying the PE kernel image signature.*
Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp
files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated.
The remaining patches are cleanup.
*Upstream commit "993a110319a4 (x86/kexec: Fix a kexec_file_load()
failure)" is required for testing.
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Instead of sizeof use pre-defined constant for UUID representation.
While here, drop the implementation details of uuid_t type.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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If tmpfiles can be made persistent, then newly created tmpfiles need to
be treated like any other new files in policy.
This patch indicates which newly created tmpfiles are in policy, causing
the file hash to be calculated on __fput().
Reported-by: Ignaz Forster <ignaz.forster@gmx.de>
[rgoldwyn@suse.com: Call ima_post_create_tmpfile() in vfs_tmpfile() as
opposed to do_tmpfile(). This will help the case for overlayfs where
copy_up is denied while overwriting a file.]
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c: In function 'init_evm':
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:566:21: warning:
variable 'xattr' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Commit 21af76631476 ("EVM: turn evm_config_xattrnames into a list")
defined and set "xattr", but never used it.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: tweaked the patch description explanation]
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Properly start the enumeration associated with match_table_t at zero,
making Opt_err/Opt_error the last enumeration value.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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commit 9dc92c45177a ("integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring")
introduced a .platform keyring for storing preboot keys, used for
verifying kernel image signatures. Currently only IMA-appraisal is able
to use the keyring to verify kernel images that have their signature
stored in xattr.
This patch exposes the .platform keyring, making it accessible for
verifying PE signed kernel images as well.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: fixed checkpatch errors, squashed with patch fix]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"A fairly routine cycle for docs - lots of typo fixes, some new
documents, and more translations. There's also some LICENSES
adjustments from Thomas"
* tag 'docs-5.1' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (74 commits)
docs: Bring some order to filesystem documentation
Documentation/locking/lockdep: Drop last two chars of sample states
doc: rcu: Suspicious RCU usage is a warning
docs: driver-api: iio: fix errors in documentation
Documentation/process/howto: Update for 4.x -> 5.x versioning
docs: Explicitly state that the 'Fixes:' tag shouldn't split lines
doc: security: Add kern-doc for lsm_hooks.h
doc: sctp: Merge and clean up rst files
Docs: Correct /proc/stat path
scripts/spdxcheck.py: fix C++ comment style detection
doc: fix typos in license-rules.rst
Documentation: fix admin-guide/README.rst minimum gcc version requirement
doc: process: complete removal of info about -git patches
doc: translations: sync translations 'remove info about -git patches'
perf-security: wrap paragraphs on 72 columns
perf-security: elaborate on perf_events/Perf privileged users
perf-security: document collected perf_events/Perf data categories
perf-security: document perf_events/Perf resource control
sysfs.txt: add note on available attribute macros
docs: kernel-doc: typo "if ... if" -> "if ... is"
...
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The SCTP sections were ending up at the top-level table of contents
under the security section when they should have be sections with the
SCTP chapters. In addition to correcting the section and subsection
headings, this merges the SCTP documents into a single file to organize
the chapters more clearly, internally linkifies them, and adds the
missing SPDX header.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1.
Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two
bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another.
Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups
and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't
all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file
capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on
filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems.
All changes pass the audit-testsuite. Please merge for v5.1"
* tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: mark expected switch fall-through
audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes
audit: join tty records to their syscall
audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL
audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match
audit: ignore fcaps on umount
audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs
audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
audit: add support for fcaps v3
audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT
audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records
audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging
audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
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The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used
by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack).
The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be
accessed by audit accessor functions.
It was part of commit 03d37d25e0f9 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic
Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used.
Remove it.
Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: fixed the referenced commit title]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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V3 namespaced file capabilities were introduced in
commit 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Add support for these by adding the "frootid" field to the existing
fcaps fields in the NAME and BPRM_FCAPS records.
Please see github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/103
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
[PM: comment tweak to fit an 80 char line width]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Nine SELinux patches for v5.1, all bug fixes.
As far as I'm concerned, nothing really jumps out as risky or special
to me, but each commit has a decent description so you can judge for
yourself. As usual, everything passes the selinux-testsuite; please
merge for v5.1"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix avc audit messages
selinux: replace BUG_ONs with WARN_ONs in avc.c
selinux: log invalid contexts in AVCs
selinux: replace some BUG_ON()s with a WARN_ON()
selinux: inline some AVC functions used only once
selinux: do not override context on context mounts
selinux: never allow relabeling on context mounts
selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link
selinux: avoid silent denials in permissive mode under RCU walk
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commit a2c513835bb6c6 ("selinux: inline some AVC functions used only once")
introduced usage of audit_log_string() in place of audit_log_format()
for fixed strings. However, audit_log_string() quotes the string.
This breaks the avc audit message format and userspace audit parsers.
Switch back to using audit_log_format().
Fixes: a2c513835bb6c6 ("selinux: inline some AVC functions used only once")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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These checks are only guarding against programming errors that could
silently grant too many permissions. These cases are better handled with
WARN_ON(), since it doesn't really help much to crash the machine in
this case.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In case a file has an invalid context set, in an AVC record generated
upon access to such file, the target context is always reported as
unlabeled. This patch adds new optional fields to the AVC record
(srawcon and trawcon) that report the actual context string if it
differs from the one reported in scontext/tcontext. This is useful for
diagnosing SELinux denials involving invalid contexts.
To trigger an AVC that illustrates this situation:
# setenforce 0
# touch /tmp/testfile
# setfattr -n security.selinux -v system_u:object_r:banana_t:s0 /tmp/testfile
# runcon system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 cat /tmp/testfile
AVC before:
type=AVC msg=audit(1547801083.248:11): avc: denied { open } for pid=1149 comm="cat" path="/tmp/testfile" dev="tmpfs" ino=6608 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023 tclass=file permissive=1
AVC after:
type=AVC msg=audit(1547801083.248:11): avc: denied { open } for pid=1149 comm="cat" path="/tmp/testfile" dev="tmpfs" ino=6608 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023 tclass=file permissive=1 trawcon=system_u:object_r:banana_t:s0
Note that it is also possible to encounter this situation with the
'scontext' field - e.g. when a new policy is loaded while a process is
running, whose context is not valid in the new policy.
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1135683
Cc: Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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We don't need to crash the machine in these cases. Let's just detect the
buggy state early and error out with a warning.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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avc_dump_av() and avc_dump_query() are each used only in one place. Get
rid of them and open code their contents in the call sites.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Ignore all selinux_inode_notifysecctx() calls on mounts with SBLABEL_MNT
flag unset. This is achived by returning -EOPNOTSUPP for this case in
selinux_inode_setsecurtity() (because that function should not be called
in such case anyway) and translating this error to 0 in
selinux_inode_notifysecctx().
This fixes behavior of kernfs-based filesystems when mounted with the
'context=' option. Before this patch, if a node's context had been
explicitly set to a non-default value and later the filesystem has been
remounted with the 'context=' option, then this node would show up as
having the manually-set context and not the mount-specified one.
Steps to reproduce:
# mount -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
# chcon unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/cgroup.stat
# ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
-r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
# umount /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
# mount -o context=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
Result before:
# ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
-r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
Result after:
# ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In the SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT case we never want to allow relabeling
files/directories, so we should never set the SBLABEL_MNT flag. The
'special handling' in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() is only intended for when
the behavior is set to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS.
While there, make the logic in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() more explicit
and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to make sure that introducing a new
SECURITY_FS_USE_* forces a review of the logic.
Fixes: d5f3a5f6e7e7 ("selinux: add security in-core xattr support for pstore and debugfs")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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commit bda0be7ad9948 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
switched selinux_inode_follow_link() to use avc_has_perm_flags() and
pass down the MAY_NOT_BLOCK flag if called during RCU walk. However,
the only test of MAY_NOT_BLOCK occurs during slow_avc_audit()
and only if passing an inode as audit data (LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE). Since
selinux_inode_follow_link() passes a dentry directly, passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK
here serves no purpose. Switch selinux_inode_follow_link() to use
avc_has_perm() and drop avc_has_perm_flags() since there are no other
users.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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commit 0dc1ba24f7fff6 ("SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe")
results in no audit messages at all if in permissive mode because the
cache is updated during the rcu walk and thus no denial occurs on
the subsequent ref walk. Fix this by not updating the cache when
performing a non-blocking permission check. This only affects search
and symlink read checks during rcu walk.
Fixes: 0dc1ba24f7fff6 ("SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe")
Reported-by: BMK <bmktuwien@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- Extend LSM stacking to allow sharing of cred, file, ipc, inode, and
task blobs. This paves the way for more full-featured LSMs to be
merged, and is specifically aimed at LandLock and SARA LSMs. This
work is from Casey and Kees.
- There's a new LSM from Micah Morton: "SafeSetID gates the setid
family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given
UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist." This
feature is currently shipping in ChromeOS.
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (62 commits)
keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY
LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in Kconfig
LSM: Ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is specified
LSM: Update function documentation for cap_capable
security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing break
tomoyo: Bump version.
LSM: fix return value check in safesetid_init_securityfs()
LSM: SafeSetID: add selftest
LSM: SafeSetID: remove unused include
LSM: SafeSetID: 'depend' on CONFIG_SECURITY
LSM: Add 'name' field for SafeSetID in DEFINE_LSM
LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
tomoyo: Allow multiple use_group lines.
tomoyo: Coding style fix.
tomoyo: Swicth from cred->security to task_struct->security.
security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs
security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs
security: keys: annotate implicit fall through
capabilities:: annotate implicit fall through
...
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The arg5 of KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY should have a __user pointer tag on
it as it is a user pointer. This clears the following sparse warning
for this:
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: warning: incorrect type in argument 3 (different address spaces)
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: expected struct keyctl_pkey_query [noderef] <asn:1>*<noident>
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: got struct keyctl_pkey_query *<noident>
Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Remove modules not using it (SELinux and SMACK aren't
the only ones not using it).
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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To avoid potential confusion, explicitly ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is
used on the command line, and report that it is happening.
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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This should have gone in with commit
c1a85a00ea66cb6f0bd0f14e47c28c2b0999799f.
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
cases where we are expecting to fall through.
This patch fixes the following warnings:
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c:85:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:940:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:943:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:972:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:974:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3391:9: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
Also, add a missing break statement to fix the following warning:
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:116:26: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Update URLs and profile version.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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