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* Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.8' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-08-081-0/+28
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull usercopy protection from Kees Cook: "Tbhis implements HARDENED_USERCOPY verification of copy_to_user and copy_from_user bounds checking for most architectures on SLAB and SLUB" * tag 'usercopy-v4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support s390/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy sparc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy powerpc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy ARM: uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy mm: Hardened usercopy mm: Implement stack frame object validation mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page
| * mm: Hardened usercopyKees Cook2016-07-261-0/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel. This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object being copied to/from: - address range doesn't wrap around - address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size) - if on the slab allocator: - object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches) - otherwise, object must not span page allocations (excepting Reserved and CMA ranges) - if on the stack - object must not extend before/after the current process stack - object must be contained by a valid stack frame (when there is arch/build support for identifying stack frames) - object must not overlap with kernel text Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
* | Merge branch 'work.const-qstr' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-08-062-2/+2
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull qstr constification updates from Al Viro: "Fairly self-contained bunch - surprising lot of places passes struct qstr * as an argument when const struct qstr * would suffice; it complicates analysis for no good reason. I'd prefer to feed that separately from the assorted fixes (those are in #for-linus and with somewhat trickier topology)" * 'work.const-qstr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: qstr: constify instances in adfs qstr: constify instances in lustre qstr: constify instances in f2fs qstr: constify instances in ext2 qstr: constify instances in vfat qstr: constify instances in procfs qstr: constify instances in fuse qstr constify instances in fs/dcache.c qstr: constify instances in nfs qstr: constify instances in ocfs2 qstr: constify instances in autofs4 qstr: constify instances in hfs qstr: constify instances in hfsplus qstr: constify instances in logfs qstr: constify dentry_init_security
| * | qstr: constify dentry_init_securityAl Viro2016-07-212-2/+2
| |/ | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2016-07-3036-195/+345
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - TPM core and driver updates/fixes - IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO) - Lots of Apparmor fixes - Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change syscall #" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits) apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family) tpm: Factor out common startup code tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr() apparmor: do not expose kernel stack apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds ...
| * | apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handlingArnd Bergmann2016-07-273-3/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The newly added Kconfig option could never work and just causes a build error when disabled: security/apparmor/lsm.c:675:25: error: 'CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT' undeclared here (not in a function) bool aa_g_hash_policy = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT; The problem is that the macro undefined in this case, and we need to use the IS_ENABLED() helper to turn it into a boolean constant. Another minor problem with the original patch is that the option is even offered in sysfs when SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH is not enabled, so this also hides the option in that case. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Fixes: 6059f71f1e94 ("apparmor: add parameter to control whether policy hashing is used") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * | apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminatedJohn Johansen2016-07-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()Vegard Nossum2016-07-121-17/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's (interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always a single page was violated. The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write() will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep it in. SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably have a look just in case. Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination. Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * | apparmor: do not expose kernel stackHeinrich Schuchardt2016-07-121-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Do not copy uninitalized fields th.td_hilen, th.td_data. Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is lockedJohn Johansen2016-07-123-13/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | the policy_lock parameter is a one way switch that prevents policy from being further modified. Unfortunately some of the module parameters can effectively modify policy by turning off enforcement. split policy_admin_capable into a view check and a full admin check, and update the admin check to test the policy_lock parameter. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not presentJohn Johansen2016-07-121-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1592547 If unpack_dfa() returns NULL due to the dfa not being present, profile_unpack() is not checking if the dfa is not present (NULL). Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failedJohn Johansen2016-07-121-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verificationJohn Johansen2016-07-122-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another taskJeff Mahoney2016-07-121-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While using AppArmor, SYS_CAP_RESOURCE is insufficient to call prlimit on another task. The only other example of a AppArmor mediating access to another, already running, task (ignoring fork+exec) is ptrace. The AppArmor model for ptrace is that one of the following must be true: 1) The tracer is unconfined 2) The tracer is in complain mode 3) The tracer and tracee are confined by the same profile 4) The tracer is confined but has SYS_CAP_PTRACE 1), 2, and 3) are already true for setrlimit. We can match the ptrace model just by allowing CAP_SYS_RESOURCE. We still test the values of the rlimit since it can always be overridden using a value that means unlimited for a particular resource. Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_nextGeliang Tang2016-07-121-5/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | list_next_entry has been defined in list.h, so I replace list_entry_next with it. Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profileJohn Johansen2016-07-121-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When finding a child profile via an rcu critical section, the profile may be put and scheduled for deletion after the child is found but before its refcount is incremented. Protect against this by repeating the lookup if the profiles refcount is 0 and is one its way to deletion. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is readJohn Johansen2016-07-121-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table boundsJohn Johansen2016-07-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: ensure the target profile name is always auditedJohn Johansen2016-07-121-11/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The target profile name was not being correctly audited in a few cases because the target variable was not being set and gotos passed the code to set it at apply: Since it is always based on new_profile just drop the target var and conditionally report based on new_profile. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix audit full profile hname on successful loadJohn Johansen2016-07-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently logging of a successful profile load only logs the basename of the profile. This can result in confusion when a child profile has the same name as the another profile in the set. Logging the hname will ensure there is no confusion. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix log failures for all profiles in a setJohn Johansen2016-07-121-10/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | currently only the profile that is causing the failure is logged. This makes it more confusing than necessary about which profiles loaded and which didn't. So make sure to log success and failure messages for all profiles in the set being loaded. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix put() parent ref after updating the active refJohn Johansen2016-07-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: add parameter to control whether policy hashing is usedJohn Johansen2016-07-124-6/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: internal paths should be treated as disconnectedJohn Johansen2016-07-121-28/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Internal mounts are not mounted anywhere and as such should be treated as disconnected paths. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix disconnected bind mnts reconnectionJohn Johansen2016-07-121-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Bind mounts can fail to be properly reconnected when PATH_CONNECT is specified. Ensure that when PATH_CONNECT is specified the path has a root. BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1319984 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix update the mtime of the profile file on replacementJohn Johansen2016-07-121-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: exec should not be returning ENOENT when it deniesJohn Johansen2016-07-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current behavior is confusing as it causes exec failures to report the executable is missing instead of identifying that apparmor caused the failure. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix uninitialized lsm_audit memberJohn Johansen2016-07-122-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1268727 The task field in the lsm_audit struct needs to be initialized if a change_hat fails, otherwise the following oops will occur BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000002fbead7d08 IP: [<ffffffff8171153e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x50 PGD 1e3f35067 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: pppox crc_ccitt p8023 p8022 psnap llc ax25 btrfs raid6_pq xor xfs libcrc32c dm_multipath scsi_dh kvm_amd dcdbas kvm microcode amd64_edac_mod joydev edac_core psmouse edac_mce_amd serio_raw k10temp sp5100_tco i2c_piix4 ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter mac_hid lp parport hid_generic usbhid hid pata_acpi mpt2sas ahci raid_class pata_atiixp bnx2 libahci scsi_transport_sas [last unloaded: tipc] CPU: 2 PID: 699 Comm: changehat_twice Tainted: GF O 3.13.0-7-generic #25-Ubuntu Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R415/08WNM9, BIOS 1.8.6 12/06/2011 task: ffff8802135c6000 ti: ffff880212986000 task.ti: ffff880212986000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8171153e>] [<ffffffff8171153e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x50 RSP: 0018:ffff880212987b68 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000000020000 RBX: 0000002fbead7500 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000292 RSI: ffff880212987ba8 RDI: 0000002fbead7d08 RBP: ffff880212987b68 R08: 0000000000000246 R09: ffff880216e572a0 R10: ffffffff815fd677 R11: ffffea0008469580 R12: ffffffff8130966f R13: ffff880212987ba8 R14: 0000002fbead7d08 R15: ffff8800d8c6b830 FS: 00002b5e6c84e7c0(0000) GS:ffff880216e40000(0000) knlGS:0000000055731700 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000002fbead7d08 CR3: 000000021270f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffff880212987b98 ffffffff81075f17 ffffffff8130966f 0000000000000009 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880212987bd0 ffffffff81075f7c 0000000000000292 ffff880212987c08 ffff8800d8c6b800 0000000000000026 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81075f17>] __lock_task_sighand+0x47/0x80 [<ffffffff8130966f>] ? apparmor_cred_prepare+0x2f/0x50 [<ffffffff81075f7c>] do_send_sig_info+0x2c/0x80 [<ffffffff81075fee>] send_sig_info+0x1e/0x30 [<ffffffff8130242d>] aa_audit+0x13d/0x190 [<ffffffff8130c1dc>] aa_audit_file+0xbc/0x130 [<ffffffff8130966f>] ? apparmor_cred_prepare+0x2f/0x50 [<ffffffff81304cc2>] aa_change_hat+0x202/0x530 [<ffffffff81308fc6>] aa_setprocattr_changehat+0x116/0x1d0 [<ffffffff8130a11d>] apparmor_setprocattr+0x25d/0x300 [<ffffffff812cee56>] security_setprocattr+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff8121fc87>] proc_pid_attr_write+0x107/0x130 [<ffffffff811b7604>] vfs_write+0xb4/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811b8039>] SyS_write+0x49/0xa0 [<ffffffff8171a1bf>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix replacement bug that adds new child to old parentJohn Johansen2016-07-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When set atomic replacement is used and the parent is updated before the child, and the child did not exist in the old parent so there is no direct replacement then the new child is incorrectly added to the old parent. This results in the new parent not having the child(ren) that it should and the old parent when being destroyed asserting the following error. AppArmor: policy_destroy: internal error, policy '<profile/name>' still contains profiles Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
| * | apparmor: fix refcount bug in profile replacementJohn Johansen2016-07-121-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
| * | Merge tag 'keys-misc-20160708' of ↵James Morris2016-07-092-2/+2
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next
| | * | KEYS: Strip trailing spacesDavid Howells2016-06-142-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Strip some trailing spaces. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * | | Merge branch 'smack-for-4.8' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next ↵James Morris2016-07-081-0/+3
| |\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | into next
| | * | | Smack: ignore null signal in smack_task_killRafal Krypa2016-06-081-0/+3
| | |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Kill with signal number 0 is commonly used for checking PID existence. Smack treated such cases like any other kills, although no signal is actually delivered when sig == 0. Checking permissions when sig == 0 didn't prevent an unprivileged caller from learning whether PID exists or not. When it existed, kernel returned EPERM, when it didn't - ESRCH. The only effect of policy check in such case is noise in audit logs. This change lets Smack silently ignore kill() invocations with sig == 0. Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | | Merge branch 'stable-4.8' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris2016-07-077-64/+73
| |\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | into next
| | * | | calipso: Add a label cache.Huw Davies2016-06-271-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This works in exactly the same way as the CIPSO label cache. The idea is to allow the lsm to cache the result of a secattr lookup so that it doesn't need to perform the lookup for every skbuff. It introduces two sysctl controls: calipso_cache_enable - enables/disables the cache. calipso_cache_bucket_size - sets the size of a cache bucket. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | netlabel: Pass a family parameter to netlbl_skbuff_err().Huw Davies2016-06-274-8/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This makes it possible to route the error to the appropriate labelling engine. CALIPSO is far less verbose than CIPSO when encountering a bogus packet, so there is no need for a CALIPSO error handler. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | calipso: Allow the lsm to label the skbuff directly.Huw Davies2016-06-271-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In some cases, the lsm needs to add the label to the skbuff directly. A NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT IPv6 hook is added to selinux to match the IPv4 behaviour. This allows selinux to label the skbuffs that it requires. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | calipso: Allow request sockets to be relabelled by the lsm.Huw Davies2016-06-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Request sockets need to have a label that takes into account the incoming connection as well as their parent's label. This is used for the outgoing SYN-ACK and for their child full-socket. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | netlabel: Prevent setsockopt() from changing the hop-by-hop option.Huw Davies2016-06-271-1/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If a socket has a netlabel in place then don't let setsockopt() alter the socket's IPv6 hop-by-hop option. This is in the same spirit as the existing check for IPv4. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | calipso: Set the calipso socket label to match the secattr.Huw Davies2016-06-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CALIPSO is a hop-by-hop IPv6 option. A lot of this patch is based on the equivalent CISPO code. The main difference is due to manipulating the options in the hop-by-hop header. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | selinux: fix type mismatchHeinrich Schuchardt2016-06-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | avc_cache_threshold is of type unsigned int. Do not use a signed new_value in sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value). Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> [PM: subject prefix fix, description cleanup] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | selinux: import NetLabel category bitmaps correctlyPaul Moore2016-06-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The existing ebitmap_netlbl_import() code didn't correctly handle the case where the ebitmap_node was not aligned/sized to a power of two, this patch fixes this (on x86_64 ebitmap_node contains six bitmaps making a range of 0..383). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | selinux: Only apply bounds checking to source typesStephen Smalley2016-05-311-48/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current bounds checking of both source and target types requires allowing any domain that has access to the child domain to also have the same permissions to the parent, which is undesirable. Drop the target bounds checking. KaiGai Kohei originally removed all use of target bounds in commit 7d52a155e38d ("selinux: remove dead code in type_attribute_bounds_av()") but this was reverted in commit 2ae3ba39389b ("selinux: libsepol: remove dead code in check_avtab_hierarchy_callback()") because it would have required explicitly allowing the parent any permissions to the child that the child is allowed to itself. This change in contrast retains the logic for the case where both source and target types are bounded, thereby allowing access if the parent of the source is allowed the corresponding permissions to the parent of the target. Further, this change reworks the logic such that we only perform a single computation for each case and there is no ambiguity as to how to resolve a bounds violation. Under the new logic, if the source type and target types are both bounded, then the parent of the source type must be allowed the same permissions to the parent of the target type. If only the source type is bounded, then the parent of the source type must be allowed the same permissions to the target type. Examples of the new logic and comparisons with the old logic: 1. If we have: typebounds A B; then: allow B self:process <permissions>; will satisfy the bounds constraint iff: allow A self:process <permissions>; is also allowed in policy. Under the old logic, the allow rule on B satisfies the bounds constraint if any of the following three are allowed: allow A B:process <permissions>; or allow B A:process <permissions>; or allow A self:process <permissions>; However, either of the first two ultimately require the third to satisfy the bounds constraint under the old logic, and therefore this degenerates to the same result (but is more efficient - we only need to perform one compute_av call). 2. If we have: typebounds A B; typebounds A_exec B_exec; then: allow B B_exec:file <permissions>; will satisfy the bounds constraint iff: allow A A_exec:file <permissions>; is also allowed in policy. This is essentially the same as #1; it is merely included as an example of dealing with object types related to a bounded domain in a manner that satisfies the bounds relationship. Note that this approach is preferable to leaving B_exec unbounded and having: allow A B_exec:file <permissions>; in policy because that would allow B's entrypoints to be used to enter A. Similarly for _tmp or other related types. 3. If we have: typebounds A B; and an unbounded type T, then: allow B T:file <permissions>; will satisfy the bounds constraint iff: allow A T:file <permissions>; is allowed in policy. The old logic would have been identical for this example. 4. If we have: typebounds A B; and an unbounded domain D, then: allow D B:unix_stream_socket <permissions>; is not subject to any bounds constraints under the new logic because D is not bounded. This is desirable so that we can allow a domain to e.g. connectto a child domain without having to allow it to do the same to its parent. The old logic would have required: allow D A:unix_stream_socket <permissions>; to also be allowed in policy. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: re-wrapped description to appease checkpatch.pl] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | | ima: extend the measurement entry specific pcrEric Richter2016-06-301-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Extend the PCR supplied as a parameter, instead of assuming that the measurement entry uses the default configured PCR. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | | | ima: change integrity cache to store measured pcrEric Richter2016-06-303-3/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IMA avoids re-measuring files by storing the current state as a flag in the integrity cache. It will then skip adding a new measurement log entry if the cache reports the file as already measured. If a policy measures an already measured file to a new PCR, the measurement will not be added to the list. This patch implements a new bitfield for specifying which PCR the file was measured into, rather than if it was measured. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | | | ima: redefine duplicate template entriesEric Richter2016-06-301-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Template entry duplicates are prevented from being added to the measurement list by checking a hash table that contains the template entry digests. However, the PCR value is not included in this comparison, so duplicate template entry digests with differing PCRs may be dropped. This patch redefines duplicate template entries as template entries with the same digest and same PCR values. Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | | | ima: change ima_measurements_show() to display the entry specific pcrEric Richter2016-06-301-5/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IMA assumes that the same default Kconfig PCR is extended for each entry. This patch replaces the default configured PCR with the policy defined PCR. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | | | ima: include pcr for each measurement log entryEric Richter2016-06-304-8/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The IMA measurement list entries include the Kconfig defined PCR value. This patch defines a new ima_template_entry field for including the PCR as specified in the policy rule. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | | | ima: extend ima_get_action() to return the policy pcrEric Richter2016-06-305-7/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Different policy rules may extend different PCRs. This patch retrieves the specific PCR for the matched rule. Subsequent patches will include the rule specific PCR in the measurement list and extend the appropriate PCR. Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-12-20 00:41:22 +0100