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Now that %z is standartised in C99 there is no reason to support %Z.
Unlike %L it doesn't even make format strings smaller.
Use BUILD_BUG_ON in a couple ATM drivers.
In case anyone didn't notice lib/vsprintf.o is about half of SLUB which
is in my opinion is quite an achievement. Hopefully this patch inspires
someone else to trim vsprintf.c more.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103230126.GA30170@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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->fault(), ->page_mkwrite(), and ->pfn_mkwrite() calls do not need to
take a vma and vmf parameter when the vma already resides in vmf.
Remove the vma parameter to simplify things.
[arnd@arndb.de: fix ARM build]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170125223558.1451224-1-arnd@arndb.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/148521301778.19116.10840599906674778980.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user
visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will
care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show
up.
From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs
ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes
prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem,
but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops.
Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long
standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only
children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not
children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl
systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace
regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same
rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough
to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature.
There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify
instances inside a user namespace.
Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate
namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the
hierachy and properties of namespaces.
Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a
network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As
in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory.
Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions
on the wrong inode were being checked.
I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to
be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough
credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID
in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable
executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their
mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work
better.
A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now
fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates
as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget
to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission
check happened when the original filesystem was mounted.
Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing
unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics
simpler which benefits CRIU.
The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us
ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the
fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing
how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem
fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem
uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock.
vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid()
proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering
mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.
prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
introduce the walk_process_tree() helper
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns
fs: Better permission checking for submounts
exit: fix the setns() && PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction
vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type
proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces
exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps
exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID
inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits
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With previous changes every location that tests for
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP also tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE making the
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP redundant, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Now that we have user namespaces and non-global capabilities verify
the tracer has capabilities in the relevant user namespace instead
of in the current_user_ns().
As the test for setting LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP is currently
ptracer_capable(p, current_user_ns()) and the new task credentials are
in current_user_ns() this change does not have any user visible change
and simply moves the test to where it is used, making the code easier
to read.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID in
it's user namespace. I punted on relaxing this permission check
long ago but now that I have read this code closely it is clear
it is safe to test against CAP_SETUID in the user namespace.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull driver core updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the "small" driver core patches for 4.11-rc1.
Not much here, some firmware documentation and self-test updates, a
debugfs code formatting issue, and a new feature for call_usermodehelper
to make it more robust on systems that want to lock it down in a more
secure way.
All of these have been linux-next for a while now with no reported
issues"
* tag 'driver-core-4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
kernfs: handle null pointers while printing node name and path
Introduce STATIC_USERMODEHELPER to mediate call_usermodehelper()
Make static usermode helper binaries constant
kmod: make usermodehelper path a const string
firmware: revamp firmware documentation
selftests: firmware: send expected errors to /dev/null
selftests: firmware: only modprobe if driver is missing
platform: Print the resource range if device failed to claim
kref: prefer atomic_inc_not_zero to atomic_add_unless
debugfs: improve formatting of debugfs_real_fops()
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Some usermode helper applications are defined at kernel build time, while
others can be changed at runtime. To provide a sane way to filter these, add a
new kernel option "STATIC_USERMODEHELPER". This option routes all
call_usermodehelper() calls through this binary, no matter what the caller
wishes to have called.
The new binary (by default set to /sbin/usermode-helper, but can be changed
through the STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH option) can properly filter the
requested programs to be run by the kernel by looking at the first argument
that is passed to it. All other options should then be passed onto the proper
program if so desired.
To disable all call_usermodehelper() calls by the kernel, set
STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
Thanks to Neil Brown for the idea of this feature.
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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There are a number of usermode helper binaries that are "hard coded" in
the kernel today, so mark them as "const" to make it harder for someone
to change where the variables point to.
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Thomas Sailer <t.sailer@alumni.ethz.ch>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Cc: Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights:
1) Support TX_RING in AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 mode, from Sowmini
Varadhan.
2) Simplify classifier state on sk_buff in order to shrink it a bit.
From Willem de Bruijn.
3) Introduce SIPHASH and it's usage for secure sequence numbers and
syncookies. From Jason A. Donenfeld.
4) Reduce CPU usage for ICMP replies we are going to limit or
suppress, from Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
5) Introduce Shared Memory Communications socket layer, from Ursula
Braun.
6) Add RACK loss detection and allow it to actually trigger fast
recovery instead of just assisting after other algorithms have
triggered it. From Yuchung Cheng.
7) Add xmit_more and BQL support to mvneta driver, from Simon Guinot.
8) skb_cow_data avoidance in esp4 and esp6, from Steffen Klassert.
9) Export MPLS packet stats via netlink, from Robert Shearman.
10) Significantly improve inet port bind conflict handling, especially
when an application is restarted and changes it's setting of
reuseport. From Josef Bacik.
11) Implement TX batching in vhost_net, from Jason Wang.
12) Extend the dummy device so that VF (virtual function) features,
such as configuration, can be more easily tested. From Phil
Sutter.
13) Avoid two atomic ops per page on x86 in bnx2x driver, from Eric
Dumazet.
14) Add new bpf MAP, implementing a longest prefix match trie. From
Daniel Mack.
15) Packet sample offloading support in mlxsw driver, from Yotam Gigi.
16) Add new aquantia driver, from David VomLehn.
17) Add bpf tracepoints, from Daniel Borkmann.
18) Add support for port mirroring to b53 and bcm_sf2 drivers, from
Florian Fainelli.
19) Remove custom busy polling in many drivers, it is done in the core
networking since 4.5 times. From Eric Dumazet.
20) Support XDP adjust_head in virtio_net, from John Fastabend.
21) Fix several major holes in neighbour entry confirmation, from
Julian Anastasov.
22) Add XDP support to bnxt_en driver, from Michael Chan.
23) VXLAN offloads for enic driver, from Govindarajulu Varadarajan.
24) Add IPVTAP driver (IP-VLAN based tap driver) from Sainath Grandhi.
25) Support GRO in IPSEC protocols, from Steffen Klassert"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1764 commits)
Revert "ath10k: Search SMBIOS for OEM board file extension"
net: socket: fix recvmmsg not returning error from sock_error
bnxt_en: use eth_hw_addr_random()
bpf: fix unlocking of jited image when module ronx not set
arch: add ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY config
net: napi_watchdog() can use napi_schedule_irqoff()
tcp: Revert "tcp: tcp_probe: use spin_lock_bh()"
net/hsr: use eth_hw_addr_random()
net: mvpp2: enable building on 64-bit platforms
net: mvpp2: switch to build_skb() in the RX path
net: mvpp2: simplify MVPP2_PRS_RI_* definitions
net: mvpp2: fix indentation of MVPP2_EXT_GLOBAL_CTRL_DEFAULT
net: mvpp2: remove unused register definitions
net: mvpp2: simplify mvpp2_bm_bufs_add()
net: mvpp2: drop useless fields in mvpp2_bm_pool and related code
net: mvpp2: remove unused 'tx_skb' field of 'struct mvpp2_tx_queue'
net: mvpp2: release reference to txq_cpu[] entry after unmapping
net: mvpp2: handle too large value in mvpp2_rx_time_coal_set()
net: mvpp2: handle too large value handling in mvpp2_rx_pkts_coal_set()
net: mvpp2: remove useless arguments in mvpp2_rx_{pkts, time}_coal_set
...
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Add net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start, which is a per namespace sysctl
that denotes the first unprivileged inet port in the namespace. To
disable all privileged ports set this to zero. It also checks for
overlap with the local port range. The privileged and local range may
not overlap.
The use case for this change is to allow containerized processes to bind
to priviliged ports, but prevent them from ever being allowed to modify
their container's network configuration. The latter is accomplished by
ensuring that the network namespace is not a child of the user
namespace. This modification was needed to allow the container manager
to disable a namespace's priviliged port restrictions without exposing
control of the network namespace to processes in the user namespace.
Signed-off-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- major AppArmor update: policy namespaces & lots of fixes
- add /sys/kernel/security/lsm node for easy detection of loaded LSMs
- SELinux cgroupfs labeling support
- SELinux context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts within user
namespaces
- improved TPM 2.0 support"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (117 commits)
tpm: declare tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() as static
tpm: Fix expected number of response bytes of TPM1.2 PCR Extend
tpm xen: drop unneeded chip variable
tpm: fix misspelled "facilitate" in module parameter description
tpm_tis: fix the error handling of init_tis()
KEYS: Use memzero_explicit() for secret data
KEYS: Fix an error code in request_master_key()
sign-file: fix build error in sign-file.c with libressl
selinux: allow changing labels for cgroupfs
selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattr
tpm: silence an array overflow warning
tpm: fix the type of owned field in cap_t
tpm: add securityfs support for TPM 2.0 firmware event log
tpm: enhance read_log_of() to support Physical TPM event log
tpm: enhance TPM 2.0 PCR extend to support multiple banks
tpm: implement TPM 2.0 capability to get active PCR banks
tpm: fix RC value check in tpm2_seal_trusted
tpm_tis: fix iTPM probe via probe_itpm() function
tpm: Begin the process to deprecate user_read_timer
tpm: remove tpm_read_index and tpm_write_index from tpm.h
...
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I don't think GCC has figured out how to optimize the memset() away, but
they might eventually so let's future proof this code a bit.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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This function has two callers and neither are able to handle a NULL
return. Really, -EINVAL is the correct thing return here anyway. This
fixes some static checker warnings like:
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c:709 encrypted_key_decrypt()
error: uninitialized symbol 'master_key'.
Fixes: 7e70cb497850 ("keys: add new key-type encrypted")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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into next
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This patch allows changing labels for cgroup mounts. Previously, running
chcon on cgroupfs would throw an "Operation not supported". This patch
specifically whitelist cgroupfs.
The patch could also allow containers to write only to the systemd cgroup
for instance, while the other cgroups are kept with cgroup_t label.
Signed-off-by: Antonio Murdaca <runcom@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait()
can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects
sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can
in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically
reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful. Remove
the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack. Smack
already removed its check from its hook.
Reported-by: yangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Several of the extended socket classes introduced by
commit da69a5306ab92e07 ("selinux: support distinctions
among all network address families") are never used because
sockets can never be created with the associated address family.
Remove these unused socket security classes. The removed classes
are bridge_socket for PF_BRIDGE, ib_socket for PF_IB, and mpls_socket
for PF_MPLS.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Use SECINITSID_SECURITY as the default SID for booleans which don't have
a matching SID returned from security_genfs_sid(), also update the
error message to a warning which matches this.
This prevents the policy failing to load (and consequently the system
failing to boot) when there is no default genfscon statement matched for
the selinuxfs in the new policy.
Signed-off-by: Gary Tierney <gary.tierney@gmx.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Adds error logging to the code paths which can fail when loading a new
policy in sel_write_load(). If the policy fails to be loaded from
userspace then a warning message is printed, whereas if a failure occurs
after loading policy from userspace an error message will be printed
with details on where policy loading failed (recreating one of /classes/,
/policy_capabilities/, /booleans/ in the SELinux fs).
Also, if sel_make_bools() fails to obtain an SID for an entry in
/booleans/* an error will be printed indicating the path of the
boolean.
Signed-off-by: Gary Tierney <gary.tierney@gmx.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Processes can only alter their own security attributes via
/proc/pid/attr nodes. This is presently enforced by each individual
security module and is also imposed by the Linux credentials
implementation, which only allows a task to alter its own credentials.
Move the check enforcing this restriction from the individual
security modules to proc_pid_attr_write() before calling the security hook,
and drop the unnecessary task argument to the security hook since it can
only ever be the current task.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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SELinux was sometimes using the task "objective" credentials when
it could/should use the "subjective" credentials. This was sometimes
hidden by the fact that we were unnecessarily passing around pointers
to the current task, making it appear as if the task could be something
other than current, so eliminate all such passing of current. Inline
various permission checking helper functions that can be reduced to a
single avc_has_perm() call.
Since the credentials infrastructure only allows a task to alter
its own credentials, we can always assume that current must be the same
as the target task in selinux_setprocattr after the check. We likely
should move this check from selinux_setprocattr() to proc_pid_attr_write()
and drop the task argument to the security hook altogether; it can only
serve to confuse things.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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commit aad82892af261b9903cc11c55be3ecf5f0b0b4f8 ("selinux: Add support for
unprivileged mounts from user namespaces") prohibited any use of context
mount options within non-init user namespaces. However, this breaks
use of context mount options for tmpfs mounts within user namespaces,
which are being used by Docker/runc. There is no reason to block such
usage for tmpfs, ramfs or devpts. Exempt these filesystem types
from this restriction.
Before:
sh$ userns_child_exec -p -m -U -M '0 1000 1' -G '0 1000 1' bash
sh# mount -t tmpfs -o context=system_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0:c13 none /tmp
mount: tmpfs is write-protected, mounting read-only
mount: cannot mount tmpfs read-only
After:
sh$ userns_child_exec -p -m -U -M '0 1000 1' -G '0 1000 1' bash
sh# mount -t tmpfs -o context=system_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0:c13 none /tmp
sh# ls -Zd /tmp
unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0:c13 /tmp
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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commit 79c8b348f215 ("selinux: support distinctions among all network
address families") mapped datagram ICMP sockets to the new icmp_socket
security class, but left ICMPv6 sockets unchanged. This change fixes
that oversight to handle both kinds of sockets consistently.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Since kernel 4.1 ftrace is supported as a new separate filesystem. It
gets automatically mounted by the kernel under the old path
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing. Because it lives now on a separate filesystem
SELinux needs to be updated to also support setting SELinux labels
on tracefs inodes. This is required for compatibility in Android
when moving to Linux 4.1 or newer.
Signed-off-by: Yongqin Liu <yongqin.liu@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Extend SELinux to support distinctions among all network address families
implemented by the kernel by defining new socket security classes
and mapping to them. Otherwise, many sockets are mapped to the generic
socket class and are indistinguishable in policy. This has come up
previously with regard to selectively allowing access to bluetooth sockets,
and more recently with regard to selectively allowing access to AF_ALG
sockets. Guido Trentalancia submitted a patch that took a similar approach
to add only support for distinguishing AF_ALG sockets, but this generalizes
his approach to handle all address families implemented by the kernel.
Socket security classes are also added for ICMP and SCTP sockets.
Socket security classes were not defined for AF_* values that are reserved
but unimplemented in the kernel, e.g. AF_NETBEUI, AF_SECURITY, AF_ASH,
AF_ECONET, AF_SNA, AF_WANPIPE.
Backward compatibility is provided by only enabling the finer-grained
socket classes if a new policy capability is set in the policy; older
policies will behave as before. The legacy redhat1 policy capability
that was only ever used in testing within Fedora for ptrace_child
is reclaimed for this purpose; as far as I can tell, this policy
capability is not enabled in any supported distro policy.
Add a pair of conditional compilation guards to detect when new AF_* values
are added so that we can update SELinux accordingly rather than having to
belatedly update it long after new address families are introduced.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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SELinux tries to support setting/clearing of /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell by ignoring terminating newlines and treating an
attribute value that begins with a NUL or newline as an attempt to
clear the attribute. However, the test for clearing attributes has
always been wrong; it has an off-by-one error, and this could further
lead to reading past the end of the allocated buffer since commit
bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a ("proc_pid_attr_write():
switch to memdup_user()"). Fix the off-by-one error.
Even with this fix, setting and clearing /proc/pid/attr attributes
from the shell is not straightforward since the interface does not
support multiple write() calls (so shells that write the value and
newline separately will set and then immediately clear the attribute,
requiring use of echo -n to set the attribute), whereas trying to use
echo -n "" to clear the attribute causes the shell to skip the
write() call altogether since POSIX says that a zero-length write
causes no side effects. Thus, one must use echo -n to set and echo
without -n to clear, as in the following example:
$ echo -n unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0
$ echo "" > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
$ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate
Note the use of /proc/$$ rather than /proc/self, as otherwise
the cat command will read its own attribute value, not that of the shell.
There are no users of this facility to my knowledge; possibly we
should just get rid of it.
UPDATE: Upon further investigation it appears that a local process
with the process:setfscreate permission can cause a kernel panic as a
result of this bug. This patch fixes CVE-2017-2618.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: added the update about CVE-2017-2618 to the commit description]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5: d6ea83ec6864e
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Otherwise some mask and inmask tokens with MAY_APPEND flag may not work
as expected.
Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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On failure to return a pathname from ima_d_path(), a pointer to
dname is returned, which is subsequently used in the IMA measurement
list, the IMA audit records, and other audit logging. Saving the
pointer to dname for later use has the potential to race with rename.
Intead of returning a pointer to dname on failure, this patch returns
a pointer to a copy of the filename.
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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The access to fd from anon_inode is always failed because there is
no set xattr operations. So this patch fixes to ignore private
inode including anon_inode for file functions.
It was only ignored for smack_file_receive() to share dma-buf fd,
but dma-buf has other functions like ioctl and mmap.
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/4/17/16
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Since 4b936885a (v2.6.32) all inodes on sockfs and pipefs are disconnected.
It caused filesystem specific code in smack_d_instantiate to be skipped,
because all inodes on those pseudo filesystems were treated as root inodes.
As a result all sockfs inodes had the Smack label set to floor.
In most cases access checks for sockets use socket_smack data so the inode
label is not important. But there are special cases that were broken.
One example would be calling fcntl with F_SETOWN command on a socket fd.
Now smack_d_instantiate expects all pipefs and sockfs inodes to be
disconnected and has the logic in appropriate place.
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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smack_file_open() is first checking the capability of calling subject,
this check will skip the SMACK logging for success case. Use smk_tskacc()
for proper logging and SMACK access check.
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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In smack_from_secattr function,"smack_known_list" is being traversed
using list_for_each_entry macro, although it is a rcu protected
structure. So it should be traversed using "list_for_each_entry_rcu"
macro to fetch the rcu protected entry.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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There is race condition issue while freeing the i_security blob in SMACK
module. There is existing condition where i_security can be freed while
inode_permission is called from path lookup on second CPU. There has been
observed the page fault with such condition. VFS code and Selinux module
takes care of this condition by freeing the inode and i_security field
using RCU via call_rcu(). But in SMACK directly the i_secuirty blob is
being freed. Use call_rcu() to fix this race condition issue.
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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smk_copy_rules() and smk_copy_relabel() are initializing list_head though
they have been initialized already in new_task_smack() function. Delete
repeated initialization.
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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"smk_set_access()" function adds a new rule entry in subject label specific
list(rule_list) and in global rule list(smack_rule_list) both. Mutex lock
(rule_lock) is used to avoid simultaneous updates. But this lock is subject
label specific lock. If 2 processes tries to add different rules(i.e with
different subject labels) simultaneously, then both the processes can take
the "rule_lock" respectively. So it will cause a problem while adding
entries in master rule list.
Now a new mutex lock(smack_master_list_lock) has been taken to add entry in
smack_rule_list to avoid simultaneous updates of different rules.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Fix the issue of wrong SMACK label (SMACK64IPIN) update when a second bind
call is made to same IP address & port, but with different SMACK label
(SMACK64IPIN) by second instance of server. In this case server returns
with "Bind:Address already in use" error but before returning, SMACK label
is updated in SMACK port-label mapping list inside smack_socket_bind() hook
To fix this issue a new check has been added in smk_ipv6_port_label()
function before updating the existing port entry. It checks whether the
socket for matching port entry is closed or not. If it is closed then it
means port is not bound and it is safe to update the existing port entry
else return if port is still getting used. For checking whether socket is
closed or not, one more field "smk_can_reuse" has been added in the
"smk_port_label" structure. This field will be set to '1' in
"smack_sk_free_security()" function which is called to free the socket
security blob when the socket is being closed. In this function, port entry
is searched in the SMACK port-label mapping list for the closing socket.
If entry is found then "smk_can_reuse" field is set to '1'.Initially
"smk_can_reuse" field is set to '0' in smk_ipv6_port_label() function after
creating a new entry in the list which indicates that socket is in use.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Permission denied error comes when 2 IPv6 servers are running and client
tries to connect one of them. Scenario is that both servers are using same
IP and port but different protocols(Udp and tcp). They are using different
SMACK64IPIN labels.Tcp server is using "test" and udp server is using
"test-in". When we try to run tcp client with SMACK64IPOUT label as "test",
then connection denied error comes. It should not happen since both tcp
server and client labels are same.This happens because there is no check
for protocol in smk_ipv6_port_label() function while searching for the
earlier port entry. It checks whether there is an existing port entry on
the basis of port only. So it updates the earlier port entry in the list.
Due to which smack label gets changed for earlier entry in the
"smk_ipv6_port_list" list and permission denied error comes.
Now a check is added for socket type also.Now if 2 processes use same
port but different protocols (tcp or udp), then 2 different port entries
will be added in the list. Similarly while checking smack access in
smk_ipv6_port_check() function, port entry is searched on the basis of
both port and protocol.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <Himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Add the rcu synchronization mechanism for accessing smk_ipv6_port_list
in smack IPv6 hooks. Access to the port list is vulnerable to a race
condition issue,it does not apply proper synchronization methods while
working on critical section. It is possible that when one thread is
reading the list, at the same time another thread is modifying the
same port list, which can cause the major problems.
To ensure proper synchronization between two threads, rcu mechanism
has been applied while accessing and modifying the port list. RCU will
also not affect the performance, as there are more accesses than
modification where RCU is most effective synchronization mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.
Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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The kernel build bot turned up a bad config combination when
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR is y and CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH is n,
resulting in the build error
security/built-in.o: In function `aa_unpack':
(.text+0x841e2): undefined reference to `aa_g_hash_policy'
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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AA_BUG() uses WARN and won't break the kernel like BUG_ON().
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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If this sysctl is set to non-zero and a process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN in
the root namespace has created an AppArmor policy namespace,
unprivileged processes will be able to change to a profile in the
newly created AppArmor policy namespace and, if the profile allows
CAP_MAC_ADMIN and appropriate file permissions, will be able to load
policy in the respective policy namespace.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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