From d0485730d2189ffe5d986d4e9e191f1e4d5ffd24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ingo Molnar Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 09:25:36 +0200 Subject: x86/bugs: Rename various 'ia32_cap' variables to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' So we are using the 'ia32_cap' value in a number of places, which got its name from MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR register. But there's very little 'IA32' about it - this isn't 32-bit only code, nor does it originate from there, it's just a historic quirk that many Intel MSR names are prefixed with IA32_. This is already clear from the helper method around the MSR: x86_read_arch_cap_msr(), which doesn't have the IA32 prefix. So rename 'ia32_cap' to 'x86_arch_cap_msr' to be consistent with its role and with the naming of the helper function. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Nikolay Borisov Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Sean Christopherson Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9592a18a814368e75f8f4b9d74d3883aa4fd1eaf.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 30 +++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index ff59fa8bb610..1b0cfc136432 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current); u64 x86_pred_cmd __ro_after_init = PRED_CMD_IBPB; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_pred_cmd); -static u64 __ro_after_init ia32_cap; +static u64 __ro_after_init x86_arch_cap_msr; static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex); @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void) x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK; } - ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); + x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); @@ -343,8 +343,8 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void) * On MDS_NO=1 CPUs if ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR is not set, microcode * update is required. */ - if ( (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && - !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)) + if ( (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && + !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)) taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; /* @@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void) * be propagated to uncore buffers, clearing the Fill buffers on idle * is required irrespective of SMT state. */ - if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) + if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear); /* @@ -444,10 +444,10 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void) * FB_CLEAR or by the presence of both MD_CLEAR and L1D_FLUSH on MDS * affected systems. */ - if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) || + if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) || (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D) && - !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO))) + !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO))) mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW; else mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; @@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static void __init rfds_select_mitigation(void) if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF) return; - if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR) + if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF); else rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; @@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void) * are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability. */ - if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) && + if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) && !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) @@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void) /* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */ /* No microcode */ - if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) { + if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) { if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) { /* * This only needs to be done on the boot CPU so do it @@ -1541,14 +1541,14 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void) /* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */ static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void) { - u64 ia32_cap; + u64 x86_arch_cap_msr; if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL)) return; - ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); + x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); - if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) { + if (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) { x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S; update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base); } @@ -1916,7 +1916,7 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void) if (sched_smt_active()) { static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear); } else if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF || - (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) { + (x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) { static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear); } } @@ -2810,7 +2810,7 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(void) else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP)) return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop"; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && - !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA)) + !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA)) return "; BHI: Retpoline"; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT)) return "; BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop"; -- cgit v1.2.3