From 573f45a9f9a47fed4c7957609689b772121b33d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Laight Date: Sun, 24 Nov 2024 15:39:00 +0000 Subject: x86: fix off-by-one in access_ok() When the size isn't a small constant, __access_ok() will call valid_user_address() with the address after the last byte of the user buffer. It is valid for a buffer to end with the last valid user address so valid_user_address() must allow accesses to the base of the guard page. [ This introduces an off-by-one in the other direction for the plain non-sized accesses, but since we have that guard region that is a whole page, those checks "allowing" accesses to that guard region don't really matter. The access will fault anyway, whether to the guard page or if the address has been masked to all ones - Linus ] Fixes: 86e6b1547b3d0 ("x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue") Signed-off-by: David Laight Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 06a516f6795b..ca327cfa42ae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -2389,12 +2389,12 @@ void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) alternative_instructions(); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) { - unsigned long USER_PTR_MAX = TASK_SIZE_MAX-1; + unsigned long USER_PTR_MAX = TASK_SIZE_MAX; /* * Enable this when LAM is gated on LASS support if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LAM)) - USER_PTR_MAX = (1ul << 63) - PAGE_SIZE - 1; + USER_PTR_MAX = (1ul << 63) - PAGE_SIZE; */ runtime_const_init(ptr, USER_PTR_MAX); -- cgit v1.2.3