From f67cf491175a315ca86c9b349708bfed7b1f40c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mika Westerberg Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2017 15:25:16 +0300 Subject: thunderbolt: Add support for Internal Connection Manager (ICM) Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow connecting devices the user trusts. The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0 (control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add support for the ICM messages to the control channel. The security levels are as follows: none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created. The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able to verify it is actually the approved device. dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those are created automatically. The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and by default it is set to "user" on many systems. In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices that support secure connect. In order to identify the device the user can read identication information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the "authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been stored to the NVM of the device. Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM. This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet. Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c | 195 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 195 insertions(+) (limited to 'drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c') diff --git a/drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c b/drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c index 54bc15f9bf6b..f71b63e90016 100644 --- a/drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c +++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/domain.c @@ -13,11 +13,43 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include "tb.h" static DEFINE_IDA(tb_domain_ida); +static const char * const tb_security_names[] = { + [TB_SECURITY_NONE] = "none", + [TB_SECURITY_USER] = "user", + [TB_SECURITY_SECURE] = "secure", + [TB_SECURITY_DPONLY] = "dponly", +}; + +static ssize_t security_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + struct tb *tb = container_of(dev, struct tb, dev); + + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", tb_security_names[tb->security_level]); +} +static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(security); + +static struct attribute *domain_attrs[] = { + &dev_attr_security.attr, + NULL, +}; + +static struct attribute_group domain_attr_group = { + .attrs = domain_attrs, +}; + +static const struct attribute_group *domain_attr_groups[] = { + &domain_attr_group, + NULL, +}; + struct bus_type tb_bus_type = { .name = "thunderbolt", }; @@ -82,6 +114,7 @@ struct tb *tb_domain_alloc(struct tb_nhi *nhi, size_t privsize) tb->dev.parent = &nhi->pdev->dev; tb->dev.bus = &tb_bus_type; tb->dev.type = &tb_domain_type; + tb->dev.groups = domain_attr_groups; dev_set_name(&tb->dev, "domain%d", tb->index); device_initialize(&tb->dev); @@ -140,6 +173,12 @@ int tb_domain_add(struct tb *tb) */ tb_ctl_start(tb->ctl); + if (tb->cm_ops->driver_ready) { + ret = tb->cm_ops->driver_ready(tb); + if (ret) + goto err_ctl_stop; + } + ret = device_add(&tb->dev); if (ret) goto err_ctl_stop; @@ -231,6 +270,162 @@ int tb_domain_resume_noirq(struct tb *tb) return ret; } +int tb_domain_suspend(struct tb *tb) +{ + int ret; + + mutex_lock(&tb->lock); + if (tb->cm_ops->suspend) { + ret = tb->cm_ops->suspend(tb); + if (ret) { + mutex_unlock(&tb->lock); + return ret; + } + } + mutex_unlock(&tb->lock); + return 0; +} + +void tb_domain_complete(struct tb *tb) +{ + mutex_lock(&tb->lock); + if (tb->cm_ops->complete) + tb->cm_ops->complete(tb); + mutex_unlock(&tb->lock); +} + +/** + * tb_domain_approve_switch() - Approve switch + * @tb: Domain the switch belongs to + * @sw: Switch to approve + * + * This will approve switch by connection manager specific means. In + * case of success the connection manager will create tunnels for all + * supported protocols. + */ +int tb_domain_approve_switch(struct tb *tb, struct tb_switch *sw) +{ + struct tb_switch *parent_sw; + + if (!tb->cm_ops->approve_switch) + return -EPERM; + + /* The parent switch must be authorized before this one */ + parent_sw = tb_to_switch(sw->dev.parent); + if (!parent_sw || !parent_sw->authorized) + return -EINVAL; + + return tb->cm_ops->approve_switch(tb, sw); +} + +/** + * tb_domain_approve_switch_key() - Approve switch and add key + * @tb: Domain the switch belongs to + * @sw: Switch to approve + * + * For switches that support secure connect, this function first adds + * key to the switch NVM using connection manager specific means. If + * adding the key is successful, the switch is approved and connected. + * + * Return: %0 on success and negative errno in case of failure. + */ +int tb_domain_approve_switch_key(struct tb *tb, struct tb_switch *sw) +{ + struct tb_switch *parent_sw; + int ret; + + if (!tb->cm_ops->approve_switch || !tb->cm_ops->add_switch_key) + return -EPERM; + + /* The parent switch must be authorized before this one */ + parent_sw = tb_to_switch(sw->dev.parent); + if (!parent_sw || !parent_sw->authorized) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = tb->cm_ops->add_switch_key(tb, sw); + if (ret) + return ret; + + return tb->cm_ops->approve_switch(tb, sw); +} + +/** + * tb_domain_challenge_switch_key() - Challenge and approve switch + * @tb: Domain the switch belongs to + * @sw: Switch to approve + * + * For switches that support secure connect, this function generates + * random challenge and sends it to the switch. The switch responds to + * this and if the response matches our random challenge, the switch is + * approved and connected. + * + * Return: %0 on success and negative errno in case of failure. + */ +int tb_domain_challenge_switch_key(struct tb *tb, struct tb_switch *sw) +{ + u8 challenge[TB_SWITCH_KEY_SIZE]; + u8 response[TB_SWITCH_KEY_SIZE]; + u8 hmac[TB_SWITCH_KEY_SIZE]; + struct tb_switch *parent_sw; + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct shash_desc *shash; + int ret; + + if (!tb->cm_ops->approve_switch || !tb->cm_ops->challenge_switch_key) + return -EPERM; + + /* The parent switch must be authorized before this one */ + parent_sw = tb_to_switch(sw->dev.parent); + if (!parent_sw || !parent_sw->authorized) + return -EINVAL; + + get_random_bytes(challenge, sizeof(challenge)); + ret = tb->cm_ops->challenge_switch_key(tb, sw, challenge, response); + if (ret) + return ret; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(sha256)", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + + ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, sw->key, TB_SWITCH_KEY_SIZE); + if (ret) + goto err_free_tfm; + + shash = kzalloc(sizeof(*shash) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!shash) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto err_free_tfm; + } + + shash->tfm = tfm; + shash->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + memset(hmac, 0, sizeof(hmac)); + ret = crypto_shash_digest(shash, challenge, sizeof(hmac), hmac); + if (ret) + goto err_free_shash; + + /* The returned HMAC must match the one we calculated */ + if (memcmp(response, hmac, sizeof(hmac))) { + ret = -EKEYREJECTED; + goto err_free_shash; + } + + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + kfree(shash); + + return tb->cm_ops->approve_switch(tb, sw); + +err_free_shash: + kfree(shash); +err_free_tfm: + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + + return ret; +} + int tb_domain_init(void) { return bus_register(&tb_bus_type); -- cgit v1.2.3