From b3897f567100d18e0597f638b911d23aa5e0dd23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 09:48:27 -0400
Subject: Audit: fix handling of 'strings' with NULL characters

currently audit_log_n_untrustedstring() uses audit_string_contains_control()
to check if the 'string' has any control characters.  If the 'string' has an
embedded NULL audit_string_contains_control() will return that the data has
no control characters and will then pass the string to audit_log_n_string
with the total length, not the length up to the first NULL.
audit_log_n_string() does a memcpy of the entire length and so the actual
audit record emitted may then contain a NULL and then whatever random memory
is after the NULL.

Since we want to log the entire octet stream (if we can't trust the data
to be a string we can't trust that a NULL isn't actually a part of it)
we should just consider NULL as a control character.  If the caller is
certain they want to stop at the first NULL they should be using
audit_log_untrustedstring.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 kernel/audit.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'kernel/audit.c')

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index ce6d8ea3131e..fa3805516dff 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1382,7 +1382,7 @@ void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string,
 int audit_string_contains_control(const char *string, size_t len)
 {
 	const unsigned char *p;
-	for (p = string; p < (const unsigned char *)string + len && *p; p++) {
+	for (p = string; p < (const unsigned char *)string + len; p++) {
 		if (*p == '"' || *p < 0x21 || *p > 0x7e)
 			return 1;
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 55ad2f8d340678397de5916b9cd960f17ebd7150 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2009 09:52:47 -0400
Subject: audit: ignore terminating NUL in AUDIT_USER_TTY messages

AUDIT_USER_TTY, like all other messages sent from user-space, is sent
NUL-terminated.  Unlike other user-space audit messages, which come only
from trusted sources, AUDIT_USER_TTY messages are processed using
audit_log_n_untrustedstring().

This patch modifies AUDIT_USER_TTY handling to ignore the trailing NUL
and use the "quoted_string" representation of the message if possible.

Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac <mitr@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 kernel/audit.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

(limited to 'kernel/audit.c')

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index fa3805516dff..5560390cb0f5 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -766,6 +766,9 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 
 				audit_log_format(ab, " msg=");
 				size = nlmsg_len(nlh);
+				if (size > 0 &&
+				    ((unsigned char *)data)[size - 1] == '\0')
+					size--;
 				audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, data, size);
 			}
 			audit_set_pid(ab, pid);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From def57543418a5f47debae28a0a9dea2effc11692 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2009 18:00:14 -0400
Subject: Audit: remove spaces from audit_log_d_path

audit_log_d_path had spaces in the strings which would be emitted on the
error paths.  This patch simply replaces those spaces with an _ or removes
the needless spaces entirely.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 kernel/audit.c   | 4 ++--
 kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'kernel/audit.c')

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 5560390cb0f5..9442c3533ba9 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1440,13 +1440,13 @@ void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *prefix,
 	/* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
 	pathname = kmalloc(PATH_MAX+11, ab->gfp_mask);
 	if (!pathname) {
-		audit_log_format(ab, "<no memory>");
+		audit_log_string(ab, "<no_memory>");
 		return;
 	}
 	p = d_path(path, pathname, PATH_MAX+11);
 	if (IS_ERR(p)) { /* Should never happen since we send PATH_MAX */
 		/* FIXME: can we save some information here? */
-		audit_log_format(ab, "<too long>");
+		audit_log_string(ab, "<too_long>");
 	} else
 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
 	kfree(pathname);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index aa0428e08367..7d6ac7c1f414 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1478,7 +1478,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
 			case 0:
 				/* name was specified as a relative path and the
 				 * directory component is the cwd */
-				audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
+				audit_log_d_path(ab, "name=", &context->pwd);
 				break;
 			default:
 				/* log the name's directory component */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3