From 2e1809208a4a52e883527c288b4fca61a90100b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: luo penghao Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2021 06:26:21 +0000 Subject: xfrm: Remove duplicate assignment The statement in the switch is repeated with the statement at the beginning of the while loop, so this statement is meaningless. The clang_analyzer complains as follows: net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3392:2 warning: Value stored to 'exthdr' is never read Reported-by: Zeal Robot Signed-off-by: luo penghao Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/xfrm') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c index 1a06585022ab..edc673e78114 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c @@ -3392,7 +3392,6 @@ decode_session6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, bool reverse) case NEXTHDR_DEST: offset += ipv6_optlen(exthdr); nexthdr = exthdr->nexthdr; - exthdr = (struct ipv6_opt_hdr *)(nh + offset); break; case IPPROTO_UDP: case IPPROTO_UDPLITE: -- cgit v1.2.3 From ac1077e92825bb0ffeee8550a41771df772214ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jean Sacren Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2021 00:03:12 -0700 Subject: net: xfrm: drop check of pols[0] for the second time !pols[0] is checked earlier. If we don't return, pols[0] is always true. We should drop the check of pols[0] for the second time and the binary is also smaller. Before: text data bss dec hex filename 48395 957 240 49592 c1b8 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.o After: text data bss dec hex filename 48379 957 240 49576 c1a8 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.o Signed-off-by: Jean Sacren Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/xfrm') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c index edc673e78114..9341298b2a70 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c @@ -2680,7 +2680,7 @@ static int xfrm_expand_policies(const struct flowi *fl, u16 family, *num_xfrms = pols[0]->xfrm_nr; #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY - if (pols[0] && pols[0]->action == XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW && + if (pols[0]->action == XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW && pols[0]->type != XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN) { pols[1] = xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype(xp_net(pols[0]), XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN, -- cgit v1.2.3 From af734a26a1a95a9fda51f2abb0c22a7efcafd5ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antony Antony Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2021 18:02:09 +0100 Subject: xfrm: update SA curlft.use_time SA use_time was only updated once, for the first packet. with this fix update the use_time for every packet. Signed-off-by: Antony Antony Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/xfrm') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c index 70a8c36f0ba6..144238a50f3d 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c @@ -669,6 +669,7 @@ resume: x->curlft.bytes += skb->len; x->curlft.packets++; + x->curlft.use_time = ktime_get_real_seconds(); spin_unlock(&x->lock); diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c index 229544bc70c2..3585bfc302f9 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c @@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ static int xfrm_output_one(struct sk_buff *skb, int err) x->curlft.bytes += skb->len; x->curlft.packets++; + x->curlft.use_time = ktime_get_real_seconds(); spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock); -- cgit v1.2.3 From e6911affa416dc4e0c0b3f04cbe6b02ce13277f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xu Jia Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2021 17:06:58 +0800 Subject: xfrm: Add support for SM3 secure hash This patch allows IPsec to use SM3 HMAC authentication algorithm. Signed-off-by: Xu Jia Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- include/uapi/linux/pfkeyv2.h | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/xfrm') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/pfkeyv2.h b/include/uapi/linux/pfkeyv2.h index d65b11785260..798ba9ffd48c 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/pfkeyv2.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/pfkeyv2.h @@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ struct sadb_x_filter { #define SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512HMAC 7 #define SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC 8 #define SADB_X_AALG_AES_XCBC_MAC 9 +#define SADB_X_AALG_SM3_256HMAC 10 #define SADB_X_AALG_NULL 251 /* kame */ #define SADB_AALG_MAX 251 diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c index 4dae3ab8d030..00b5444a4d86 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c @@ -341,6 +341,26 @@ static struct xfrm_algo_desc aalg_list[] = { .pfkey_supported = 0, }, +{ + .name = "hmac(sm3)", + .compat = "sm3", + + .uinfo = { + .auth = { + .icv_truncbits = 256, + .icv_fullbits = 256, + } + }, + + .pfkey_supported = 1, + + .desc = { + .sadb_alg_id = SADB_X_AALG_SM3_256HMAC, + .sadb_alg_ivlen = 0, + .sadb_alg_minbits = 256, + .sadb_alg_maxbits = 256 + } +}, }; static struct xfrm_algo_desc ealg_list[] = { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 23b6a6df94c6ce434e7947cfad14b1640fb9f794 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xu Jia Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2021 17:06:59 +0800 Subject: xfrm: Add support for SM4 symmetric cipher algorithm This patch adds SM4 encryption algorithm entry to ealg_list. Signed-off-by: Xu Jia Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- include/uapi/linux/pfkeyv2.h | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/xfrm') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/pfkeyv2.h b/include/uapi/linux/pfkeyv2.h index 798ba9ffd48c..8abae1f6749c 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/pfkeyv2.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/pfkeyv2.h @@ -330,6 +330,7 @@ struct sadb_x_filter { #define SADB_X_EALG_AES_GCM_ICV16 20 #define SADB_X_EALG_CAMELLIACBC 22 #define SADB_X_EALG_NULL_AES_GMAC 23 +#define SADB_X_EALG_SM4CBC 24 #define SADB_EALG_MAX 253 /* last EALG */ /* private allocations should use 249-255 (RFC2407) */ #define SADB_X_EALG_SERPENTCBC 252 /* draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-aes-cbc-00 */ diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c index 00b5444a4d86..094734fbec96 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c @@ -572,6 +572,27 @@ static struct xfrm_algo_desc ealg_list[] = { .sadb_alg_maxbits = 288 } }, +{ + .name = "cbc(sm4)", + .compat = "sm4", + + .uinfo = { + .encr = { + .geniv = "echainiv", + .blockbits = 128, + .defkeybits = 128, + } + }, + + .pfkey_supported = 1, + + .desc = { + .sadb_alg_id = SADB_X_EALG_SM4CBC, + .sadb_alg_ivlen = 16, + .sadb_alg_minbits = 128, + .sadb_alg_maxbits = 256 + } +}, }; static struct xfrm_algo_desc calg_list[] = { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4e484b3e969b52effd95c17f7a86f39208b2ccf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antony Antony Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2021 14:11:18 +0100 Subject: xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change message to user space Kernel generates mapping change message, XFRM_MSG_MAPPING, when a source port chage is detected on a input state with UDP encapsulation set. Kernel generates a message for each IPsec packet with new source port. For a high speed flow per packet mapping change message can be excessive, and can overload the user space listener. Introduce rate limiting for XFRM_MSG_MAPPING message to the user space. The rate limiting is configurable via netlink, when adding a new SA or updating it. Use the new attribute XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH in seconds. v1->v2 change: update xfrm_sa_len() v2->v3 changes: use u32 insted unsigned long to reduce size of struct xfrm_state fix xfrm_ompat size Reported-by: kernel test robot accept XFRM_MSG_MAPPING only when XFRMA_ENCAP is present Co-developed-by: Thomas Egerer Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer Signed-off-by: Antony Antony Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- include/net/xfrm.h | 5 +++++ include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c | 6 ++++-- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/xfrm') diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h index 2308210793a0..2589e4c0501b 100644 --- a/include/net/xfrm.h +++ b/include/net/xfrm.h @@ -200,6 +200,11 @@ struct xfrm_state { struct xfrm_algo_aead *aead; const char *geniv; + /* mapping change rate limiting */ + __be16 new_mapping_sport; + u32 new_mapping; /* seconds */ + u32 mapping_maxage; /* seconds for input SA */ + /* Data for encapsulator */ struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap; struct sock __rcu *encap_sk; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h b/include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h index eda0426ec4c2..4e29d7851890 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h @@ -313,6 +313,7 @@ enum xfrm_attr_type_t { XFRMA_SET_MARK, /* __u32 */ XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK, /* __u32 */ XFRMA_IF_ID, /* __u32 */ + XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH, /* __u32 in seconds for input SA */ __XFRMA_MAX #define XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK XFRMA_SET_MARK /* Compatibility */ diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c index 2bf269390163..a0f62fa02e06 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c @@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy compat_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = { [XFRMA_SET_MARK] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [XFRMA_IF_ID] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, }; static struct nlmsghdr *xfrm_nlmsg_put_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, @@ -274,9 +275,10 @@ static int xfrm_xlate64_attr(struct sk_buff *dst, const struct nlattr *src) case XFRMA_SET_MARK: case XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK: case XFRMA_IF_ID: + case XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH: return xfrm_nla_cpy(dst, src, nla_len(src)); default: - BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRMA_MAX != XFRMA_IF_ID); + BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRMA_MAX != XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH); pr_warn_once("unsupported nla_type %d\n", src->nla_type); return -EOPNOTSUPP; } @@ -431,7 +433,7 @@ static int xfrm_xlate32_attr(void *dst, const struct nlattr *nla, int err; if (type > XFRMA_MAX) { - BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRMA_MAX != XFRMA_IF_ID); + BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRMA_MAX != XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH); NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Bad attribute"); return -EOPNOTSUPP; } diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c index a2f4001221d1..78d51399a0f4 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c @@ -1593,6 +1593,9 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_clone(struct xfrm_state *orig, x->km.seq = orig->km.seq; x->replay = orig->replay; x->preplay = orig->preplay; + x->mapping_maxage = orig->mapping_maxage; + x->new_mapping = 0; + x->new_mapping_sport = 0; return x; @@ -2242,7 +2245,7 @@ int km_query(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_tmpl *t, struct xfrm_policy *pol) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(km_query); -int km_new_mapping(struct xfrm_state *x, xfrm_address_t *ipaddr, __be16 sport) +static int __km_new_mapping(struct xfrm_state *x, xfrm_address_t *ipaddr, __be16 sport) { int err = -EINVAL; struct xfrm_mgr *km; @@ -2257,6 +2260,24 @@ int km_new_mapping(struct xfrm_state *x, xfrm_address_t *ipaddr, __be16 sport) rcu_read_unlock(); return err; } + +int km_new_mapping(struct xfrm_state *x, xfrm_address_t *ipaddr, __be16 sport) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (x->mapping_maxage) { + if ((jiffies / HZ - x->new_mapping) > x->mapping_maxage || + x->new_mapping_sport != sport) { + x->new_mapping_sport = sport; + x->new_mapping = jiffies / HZ; + ret = __km_new_mapping(x, ipaddr, sport); + } + } else { + ret = __km_new_mapping(x, ipaddr, sport); + } + + return ret; +} EXPORT_SYMBOL(km_new_mapping); void km_policy_expired(struct xfrm_policy *pol, int dir, int hard, u32 portid) diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 7c36cc1f3d79..130240680655 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -282,6 +282,10 @@ static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p, err = 0; + if (attrs[XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH]) + if (!attrs[XFRMA_ENCAP]) + err = -EINVAL; + out: return err; } @@ -521,6 +525,7 @@ static void xfrm_update_ae_params(struct xfrm_state *x, struct nlattr **attrs, struct nlattr *lt = attrs[XFRMA_LTIME_VAL]; struct nlattr *et = attrs[XFRMA_ETIMER_THRESH]; struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH]; + struct nlattr *mt = attrs[XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH]; if (re) { struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn; @@ -552,6 +557,9 @@ static void xfrm_update_ae_params(struct xfrm_state *x, struct nlattr **attrs, if (rt) x->replay_maxdiff = nla_get_u32(rt); + + if (mt) + x->mapping_maxage = nla_get_u32(mt); } static void xfrm_smark_init(struct nlattr **attrs, struct xfrm_mark *m) @@ -1024,8 +1032,13 @@ static int copy_to_user_state_extra(struct xfrm_state *x, if (ret) goto out; } - if (x->security) + if (x->security) { ret = copy_sec_ctx(x->security, skb); + if (ret) + goto out; + } + if (x->mapping_maxage) + ret = nla_put_u32(skb, XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH, x->mapping_maxage); out: return ret; } @@ -3069,6 +3082,9 @@ static inline unsigned int xfrm_sa_len(struct xfrm_state *x) /* Must count x->lastused as it may become non-zero behind our back. */ l += nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(u64)); + if (x->mapping_maxage) + l += nla_total_size(sizeof(x->mapping_maxage)); + return l; } -- cgit v1.2.3