From cd3bafc73d11eb51cb2d3691629718431e1768ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hajime Tazaki Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2015 23:31:10 +0900 Subject: xfrm6: Fix a offset value for network header in _decode_session6 When a network-layer header has multiple IPv6 extension headers, then offset for mobility header goes wrong. This regression breaks an xfrm policy lookup for a particular receive packet. Binding update packets of Mobile IPv6 are all discarded without this fix. Fixes: de3b7a06dfe1 ("xfrm6: Fix transport header offset in _decode_session6.") Signed-off-by: Hajime Tazaki Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c index 48bf5a06847b..8d2d01b4800a 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c +++ b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c @@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ _decode_session6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, int reverse) #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6_MIP6) case IPPROTO_MH: + offset += ipv6_optlen(exthdr); if (!onlyproto && pskb_may_pull(skb, nh + offset + 3 - skb->data)) { struct ip6_mh *mh; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 044a832a7779c0638bea2d0fea901c055b995f4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steffen Klassert Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2015 13:38:49 +0100 Subject: xfrm: Fix local error reporting crash with interfamily tunnels We set the outer mode protocol too early. As a result, the local error handler might dispatch to the wrong address family and report the error to a wrong socket type. We fix this by setting the outer protocol to the skb after we accessed the inner mode for the last time, right before we do the atcual encapsulation where we switch finally to the outer mode. Reported-by: Chris Ruehl Tested-by: Chris Ruehl Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/ipv4/xfrm4_output.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/xfrm6_output.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_output.c b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_output.c index d5f6bd9a210a..dab73813cb92 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_output.c @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ int xfrm4_prepare_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) return err; IPCB(skb)->flags |= IPSKB_XFRM_TUNNEL_SIZE; + skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP); return x->outer_mode->output2(x, skb); } @@ -71,7 +72,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm4_prepare_output); int xfrm4_output_finish(struct sk_buff *skb) { memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb))); - skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP); #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER IPCB(skb)->flags |= IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED; diff --git a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_output.c b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_output.c index ca3f29b98ae5..010f8bd2d577 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_output.c +++ b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_output.c @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ int xfrm6_prepare_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) return err; skb->ignore_df = 1; + skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6); return x->outer_mode->output2(x, skb); } @@ -122,7 +123,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm6_prepare_output); int xfrm6_output_finish(struct sk_buff *skb) { memset(IP6CB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IP6CB(skb))); - skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6); #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER IP6CB(skb)->flags |= IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED; -- cgit v1.2.3 From ac37e2515c1a89c477459a2020b6bfdedabdb91b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: huaibin Wang Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2015 18:10:36 +0100 Subject: xfrm: release dst_orig in case of error in xfrm_lookup() dst_orig should be released on error. Function like __xfrm_route_forward() expects that behavior. Since a recent commit, xfrm_lookup() may also be called by xfrm_lookup_route(), which expects the opposite. Let's introduce a new flag (XFRM_LOOKUP_KEEP_DST_REF) to tell what should be done in case of error. Fixes: f92ee61982d("xfrm: Generate blackhole routes only from route lookup functions") Signed-off-by: huaibin Wang Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- include/net/dst.h | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 12 ++++++------ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/dst.h b/include/net/dst.h index a8ae4e760778..0fb99a26e973 100644 --- a/include/net/dst.h +++ b/include/net/dst.h @@ -481,6 +481,7 @@ void dst_init(void); enum { XFRM_LOOKUP_ICMP = 1 << 0, XFRM_LOOKUP_QUEUE = 1 << 1, + XFRM_LOOKUP_KEEP_DST_REF = 1 << 2, }; struct flowi; diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c index cee479bc655c..638af0655aaf 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c @@ -2269,11 +2269,9 @@ struct dst_entry *xfrm_lookup(struct net *net, struct dst_entry *dst_orig, * have the xfrm_state's. We need to wait for KM to * negotiate new SA's or bail out with error.*/ if (net->xfrm.sysctl_larval_drop) { - dst_release(dst); - xfrm_pols_put(pols, drop_pols); XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTNOSTATES); - - return ERR_PTR(-EREMOTE); + err = -EREMOTE; + goto error; } err = -EAGAIN; @@ -2324,7 +2322,8 @@ nopol: error: dst_release(dst); dropdst: - dst_release(dst_orig); + if (!(flags & XFRM_LOOKUP_KEEP_DST_REF)) + dst_release(dst_orig); xfrm_pols_put(pols, drop_pols); return ERR_PTR(err); } @@ -2338,7 +2337,8 @@ struct dst_entry *xfrm_lookup_route(struct net *net, struct dst_entry *dst_orig, struct sock *sk, int flags) { struct dst_entry *dst = xfrm_lookup(net, dst_orig, fl, sk, - flags | XFRM_LOOKUP_QUEUE); + flags | XFRM_LOOKUP_QUEUE | + XFRM_LOOKUP_KEEP_DST_REF); if (IS_ERR(dst) && PTR_ERR(dst) == -EREMOTE) return make_blackhole(net, dst_orig->ops->family, dst_orig); -- cgit v1.2.3 From d0c22119f574b851e63360c6b8660fe9593bbc3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bob Copeland Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2015 14:28:52 -0500 Subject: mac80211: drop unencrypted frames in mesh fwding The mesh forwarding path was not checking that data frames were protected when running an encrypted network; add the necessary check. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Bob Copeland Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/rx.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 1101563357ea..944bdc04e913 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2214,6 +2214,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_mesh_fwding(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; mesh_hdr = (struct ieee80211s_hdr *) (skb->data + hdrlen); + if (ieee80211_drop_unencrypted(rx, hdr->frame_control)) + return RX_DROP_MONITOR; + /* frame is in RMC, don't forward */ if (ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) && is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && -- cgit v1.2.3 From aa75ebc275b2a91b193654a177daf900ad6703f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Kazior Date: Tue, 10 Feb 2015 12:48:44 +0100 Subject: mac80211: disable u-APSD queues by default Some APs experience problems when working with U-APSD. Decreasing the probability of that happening by using legacy mode for all ACs but VO isn't enough. Cisco 4410N originally forced us to enable VO by default only because it treated non-VO ACs as legacy. However some APs (notably Netgear R7000) silently reclassify packets to different ACs. Since u-APSD ACs require trigger frames for frame retrieval clients would never see some frames (e.g. ARP responses) or would fetch them accidentally after a long time. It makes little sense to enable u-APSD queues by default because it needs userspace applications to be aware of it to actually take advantage of the possible additional powersavings. Implicitly depending on driver autotrigger frame support doesn't make much sense. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index 3afe36824703..c0e089c194f1 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -58,13 +58,24 @@ struct ieee80211_local; #define IEEE80211_UNSET_POWER_LEVEL INT_MIN /* - * Some APs experience problems when working with U-APSD. Decrease the - * probability of that happening by using legacy mode for all ACs but VO. - * The AP that caused us trouble was a Cisco 4410N. It ignores our - * setting, and always treats non-VO ACs as legacy. + * Some APs experience problems when working with U-APSD. Decreasing the + * probability of that happening by using legacy mode for all ACs but VO isn't + * enough. + * + * Cisco 4410N originally forced us to enable VO by default only because it + * treated non-VO ACs as legacy. + * + * However some APs (notably Netgear R7000) silently reclassify packets to + * different ACs. Since u-APSD ACs require trigger frames for frame retrieval + * clients would never see some frames (e.g. ARP responses) or would fetch them + * accidentally after a long time. + * + * It makes little sense to enable u-APSD queues by default because it needs + * userspace applications to be aware of it to actually take advantage of the + * possible additional powersavings. Implicitly depending on driver autotrigger + * frame support doesn't make much sense. */ -#define IEEE80211_DEFAULT_UAPSD_QUEUES \ - IEEE80211_WMM_IE_STA_QOSINFO_AC_VO +#define IEEE80211_DEFAULT_UAPSD_QUEUES 0 #define IEEE80211_DEFAULT_MAX_SP_LEN \ IEEE80211_WMM_IE_STA_QOSINFO_SP_ALL -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5778d39d070b4ac5f889928175b7f2d53ae7504e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: WANG Cong Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2015 17:03:40 -0700 Subject: net_sched: fix struct tc_u_hnode layout in u32 We dynamically allocate divisor+1 entries for ->ht[] in tc_u_hnode: ht = kzalloc(sizeof(*ht) + divisor*sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL); So ->ht is supposed to be the last field of this struct, however this is broken, since an rcu head is appended after it. Fixes: 1ce87720d456 ("net: sched: make cls_u32 lockless") Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim Cc: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Acked-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/cls_u32.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c index 09487afbfd51..95fdf4e40051 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c @@ -78,8 +78,11 @@ struct tc_u_hnode { struct tc_u_common *tp_c; int refcnt; unsigned int divisor; - struct tc_u_knode __rcu *ht[1]; struct rcu_head rcu; + /* The 'ht' field MUST be the last field in structure to allow for + * more entries allocated at end of structure. + */ + struct tc_u_knode __rcu *ht[1]; }; struct tc_u_common { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7768eed8bf1d2e5eefa38c573f15f737a9824052 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 19:03:46 +0100 Subject: net: add comment for sock_efree() usage Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Acked-by: Alexander Duyck Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sock.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 93c8b20c91e4..78e89eb7eb70 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -1655,6 +1655,10 @@ void sock_rfree(struct sk_buff *skb) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_rfree); +/* + * Buffer destructor for skbs that are not used directly in read or write + * path, e.g. for error handler skbs. Automatically called from kfree_skb. + */ void sock_efree(struct sk_buff *skb) { sock_put(skb->sk); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4363890079674db7b00cf1bb0e6fa430e846e86b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 21:58:32 -0400 Subject: net: Handle unregister properly when netdev namespace change fails. If rtnl_newlink() fails on it's call to dev_change_net_namespace(), we have to make use of the ->dellink() method, if present, just like we do when rtnl_configure_link() fails. Fixes: 317f4810e45e ("rtnl: allow to create device with IFLA_LINK_NETNSID set") Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/rtnetlink.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c index 25b4b5d23485..ee0608bb3bc0 100644 --- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c +++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c @@ -2166,28 +2166,28 @@ replay: } } err = rtnl_configure_link(dev, ifm); - if (err < 0) { - if (ops->newlink) { - LIST_HEAD(list_kill); - - ops->dellink(dev, &list_kill); - unregister_netdevice_many(&list_kill); - } else { - unregister_netdevice(dev); - } - goto out; - } - + if (err < 0) + goto out_unregister; if (link_net) { err = dev_change_net_namespace(dev, dest_net, ifname); if (err < 0) - unregister_netdevice(dev); + goto out_unregister; } out: if (link_net) put_net(link_net); put_net(dest_net); return err; +out_unregister: + if (ops->newlink) { + LIST_HEAD(list_kill); + + ops->dellink(dev, &list_kill); + unregister_netdevice_many(&list_kill); + } else { + unregister_netdevice(dev); + } + goto out; } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9949afa42be0b76f5832db112ce51bb6b35b2abb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Neal Cardwell Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 17:17:03 -0400 Subject: tcp: fix tcp_cong_avoid_ai() credit accumulation bug with decreases in w The recent change to tcp_cong_avoid_ai() to handle stretch ACKs introduced a bug where snd_cwnd_cnt could accumulate a very large value while w was large, and then if w was reduced snd_cwnd could be incremented by a large delta, leading to a large burst and high packet loss. This was tickled when CUBIC's bictcp_update() sets "ca->cnt = 100 * cwnd". This bug crept in while preparing the upstream version of 814d488c6126. Testing: This patch has been tested in datacenter netperf transfers and live youtube.com and google.com servers. Fixes: 814d488c6126 ("tcp: fix the timid additive increase on stretch ACKs") Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c index d694088214cd..62856e185a93 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c @@ -378,6 +378,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_slow_start); */ void tcp_cong_avoid_ai(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 w, u32 acked) { + /* If credits accumulated at a higher w, apply them gently now. */ + if (tp->snd_cwnd_cnt >= w) { + tp->snd_cwnd_cnt = 0; + tp->snd_cwnd++; + } + tp->snd_cwnd_cnt += acked; if (tp->snd_cwnd_cnt >= w) { u32 delta = tp->snd_cwnd_cnt / w; -- cgit v1.2.3 From d578e18ce93f5d33a7120fd57c453e22a4c0fc37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Neal Cardwell Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 17:17:04 -0400 Subject: tcp: restore 1.5x per RTT limit to CUBIC cwnd growth in congestion avoidance Commit 814d488c6126 ("tcp: fix the timid additive increase on stretch ACKs") fixed a bug where tcp_cong_avoid_ai() would either credit a connection with an increase of snd_cwnd_cnt, or increase snd_cwnd, but not both, resulting in cwnd increasing by 1 packet on at most every alternate invocation of tcp_cong_avoid_ai(). Although the commit correctly implemented the CUBIC algorithm, which can increase cwnd by as much as 1 packet per 1 packet ACKed (2x per RTT), in practice that could be too aggressive: in tests on network paths with small buffers, YouTube server retransmission rates nearly doubled. This commit restores CUBIC to a maximum cwnd growth rate of 1 packet per 2 packets ACKed (1.5x per RTT). In YouTube tests this restored retransmit rates to low levels. Testing: This patch has been tested in datacenter netperf transfers and live youtube.com and google.com servers. Fixes: 9cd981dcf174 ("tcp: fix stretch ACK bugs in CUBIC") Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_cubic.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_cubic.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_cubic.c index 4b276d1ed980..06d3d665a9fd 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_cubic.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_cubic.c @@ -306,8 +306,10 @@ tcp_friendliness: } } - if (ca->cnt == 0) /* cannot be zero */ - ca->cnt = 1; + /* The maximum rate of cwnd increase CUBIC allows is 1 packet per + * 2 packets ACKed, meaning cwnd grows at 1.5x per RTT. + */ + ca->cnt = max(ca->cnt, 2U); } static void bictcp_cong_avoid(struct sock *sk, u32 ack, u32 acked) -- cgit v1.2.3 From b1cb59cf2efe7971d3d72a7b963d09a512d994c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexey Kodanev Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 14:29:17 +0300 Subject: net: sysctl_net_core: check SNDBUF and RCVBUF for min length sysctl has sysctl.net.core.rmem_*/wmem_* parameters which can be set to incorrect values. Given that 'struct sk_buff' allocates from rcvbuf, incorrectly set buffer length could result to memory allocation failures. For example, set them as follows: # sysctl net.core.rmem_default=64 net.core.wmem_default = 64 # sysctl net.core.wmem_default=64 net.core.wmem_default = 64 # ping localhost -s 1024 -i 0 > /dev/null This could result to the following failure: skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff81628db4 len:-32 put:-32 head:ffff88003a1cc200 data:ffff88003a1cc200 tail:0xffffffe0 end:0xc0 dev: kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:102! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP ... task: ffff88003b7f5550 ti: ffff88003ae88000 task.ti: ffff88003ae88000 RIP: 0010:[] [] skb_put+0xa1/0xb0 RSP: 0018:ffff88003ae8bc68 EFLAGS: 00010296 RAX: 000000000000008d RBX: 00000000ffffffe0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88003fdcf598 RSI: ffff88003fdcd9c8 RDI: ffff88003fdcd9c8 RBP: ffff88003ae8bc88 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000000002b2 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003d3f7300 R15: ffff88000012a900 FS: 00007fa0e2b4a840(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000d0f7e0 CR3: 000000003b8fb000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Stack: ffff88003a1cc200 00000000ffffffe0 00000000000000c0 ffffffff818cab1d ffff88003ae8bd68 ffffffff81628db4 ffff88003ae8bd48 ffff88003b7f5550 ffff880031a09408 ffff88003b7f5550 ffff88000012aa48 ffff88000012ab00 Call Trace: [] unix_stream_sendmsg+0x2c4/0x470 [] sock_write_iter+0x146/0x160 [] new_sync_write+0x92/0xd0 [] vfs_write+0xd6/0x180 [] SyS_write+0x59/0xd0 [] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 c8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 30 db 91 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 4f a8 0e 00 <0f> 0b eb fe 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 RIP [] skb_put+0xa1/0xb0 RSP Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Moreover, the possible minimum is 1, so we can get another kernel panic: ... BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88013caee5c0 IP: [] __alloc_skb+0x12f/0x1f0 ... Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c index 433424804284..8ce351ffceb1 100644 --- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c +++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ static int zero = 0; static int one = 1; static int ushort_max = USHRT_MAX; +static int min_sndbuf = SOCK_MIN_SNDBUF; +static int min_rcvbuf = SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF; static int net_msg_warn; /* Unused, but still a sysctl */ @@ -237,7 +239,7 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = { .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, - .extra1 = &one, + .extra1 = &min_sndbuf, }, { .procname = "rmem_max", @@ -245,7 +247,7 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = { .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, - .extra1 = &one, + .extra1 = &min_rcvbuf, }, { .procname = "wmem_default", @@ -253,7 +255,7 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = { .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, - .extra1 = &one, + .extra1 = &min_sndbuf, }, { .procname = "rmem_default", @@ -261,7 +263,7 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = { .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, - .extra1 = &one, + .extra1 = &min_rcvbuf, }, { .procname = "dev_weight", -- cgit v1.2.3 From c29390c6dfeee0944ac6b5610ebbe403944378fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 18:42:02 -0700 Subject: xps: must clear sender_cpu before forwarding John reported that my previous commit added a regression on his router. This is because sender_cpu & napi_id share a common location, so get_xps_queue() can see garbage and perform an out of bound access. We need to make sure sender_cpu is cleared before doing the transmit, otherwise any NIC busy poll enabled (skb_mark_napi_id()) can trigger this bug. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: John Bisected-by: John Fixes: 2bd82484bb4c ("xps: fix xps for stacked devices") Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/linux/skbuff.h | 7 +++++++ net/core/skbuff.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/ip_forward.c | 1 + net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h index 30007afe70b3..f54d6659713a 100644 --- a/include/linux/skbuff.h +++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h @@ -948,6 +948,13 @@ static inline void skb_copy_hash(struct sk_buff *to, const struct sk_buff *from) to->l4_hash = from->l4_hash; }; +static inline void skb_sender_cpu_clear(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_XPS + skb->sender_cpu = 0; +#endif +} + #ifdef NET_SKBUFF_DATA_USES_OFFSET static inline unsigned char *skb_end_pointer(const struct sk_buff *skb) { diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c index f80507823531..434e78e5254d 100644 --- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -4173,7 +4173,7 @@ void skb_scrub_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, bool xnet) skb->ignore_df = 0; skb_dst_drop(skb); skb->mark = 0; - skb->sender_cpu = 0; + skb_sender_cpu_clear(skb); skb_init_secmark(skb); secpath_reset(skb); nf_reset(skb); diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_forward.c b/net/ipv4/ip_forward.c index 787b3c294ce6..d9bc28ac5d1b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_forward.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_forward.c @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ip_forward_finish(struct sk_buff *skb) if (unlikely(opt->optlen)) ip_forward_options(skb); + skb_sender_cpu_clear(skb); return dst_output(skb); } diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c index 0a04a37305d5..7e80b61b51ff 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c @@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ static int ip6_forward_proxy_check(struct sk_buff *skb) static inline int ip6_forward_finish(struct sk_buff *skb) { + skb_sender_cpu_clear(skb); return dst_output(skb); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3a8dd9711e0792f64394edafadd66c2d1f1904df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Willem de Bruijn Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 15:43:55 -0400 Subject: sock: fix possible NULL sk dereference in __skb_tstamp_tx Test that sk != NULL before reading sk->sk_tsflags. Fixes: 49ca0d8bfaf3 ("net-timestamp: no-payload option") Reported-by: One Thousand Gnomes Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/skbuff.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c index 434e78e5254d..8e4ac97c8477 100644 --- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -3733,9 +3733,13 @@ void __skb_tstamp_tx(struct sk_buff *orig_skb, struct sock *sk, int tstype) { struct sk_buff *skb; - bool tsonly = sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_TSONLY; + bool tsonly; - if (!sk || !skb_may_tx_timestamp(sk, tsonly)) + if (!sk) + return; + + tsonly = sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_TSONLY; + if (!skb_may_tx_timestamp(sk, tsonly)) return; if (tsonly) -- cgit v1.2.3 From f862e07cf95d5b62a5fc5e981dd7d0dbaf33a501 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 22:46:59 +0100 Subject: rds: avoid potential stack overflow The rds_iw_update_cm_id function stores a large 'struct rds_sock' object on the stack in order to pass a pair of addresses. This happens to just fit withint the 1024 byte stack size warning limit on x86, but just exceed that limit on ARM, which gives us this warning: net/rds/iw_rdma.c:200:1: warning: the frame size of 1056 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=] As the use of this large variable is basically bogus, we can rearrange the code to not do that. Instead of passing an rds socket into rds_iw_get_device, we now just pass the two addresses that we have available in rds_iw_update_cm_id, and we change rds_iw_get_mr accordingly, to create two address structures on the stack there. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Acked-by: Sowmini Varadhan Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/rds/iw_rdma.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/rds/iw_rdma.c b/net/rds/iw_rdma.c index a817705ce2d0..dba8d0864f18 100644 --- a/net/rds/iw_rdma.c +++ b/net/rds/iw_rdma.c @@ -88,7 +88,9 @@ static unsigned int rds_iw_unmap_fastreg_list(struct rds_iw_mr_pool *pool, int *unpinned); static void rds_iw_destroy_fastreg(struct rds_iw_mr_pool *pool, struct rds_iw_mr *ibmr); -static int rds_iw_get_device(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_iw_device **rds_iwdev, struct rdma_cm_id **cm_id) +static int rds_iw_get_device(struct sockaddr_in *src, struct sockaddr_in *dst, + struct rds_iw_device **rds_iwdev, + struct rdma_cm_id **cm_id) { struct rds_iw_device *iwdev; struct rds_iw_cm_id *i_cm_id; @@ -112,15 +114,15 @@ static int rds_iw_get_device(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_iw_device **rds_iwd src_addr->sin_port, dst_addr->sin_addr.s_addr, dst_addr->sin_port, - rs->rs_bound_addr, - rs->rs_bound_port, - rs->rs_conn_addr, - rs->rs_conn_port); + src->sin_addr.s_addr, + src->sin_port, + dst->sin_addr.s_addr, + dst->sin_port); #ifdef WORKING_TUPLE_DETECTION - if (src_addr->sin_addr.s_addr == rs->rs_bound_addr && - src_addr->sin_port == rs->rs_bound_port && - dst_addr->sin_addr.s_addr == rs->rs_conn_addr && - dst_addr->sin_port == rs->rs_conn_port) { + if (src_addr->sin_addr.s_addr == src->sin_addr.s_addr && + src_addr->sin_port == src->sin_port && + dst_addr->sin_addr.s_addr == dst->sin_addr.s_addr && + dst_addr->sin_port == dst->sin_port) { #else /* FIXME - needs to compare the local and remote * ipaddr/port tuple, but the ipaddr is the only @@ -128,7 +130,7 @@ static int rds_iw_get_device(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_iw_device **rds_iwd * zero'ed. It doesn't appear to be properly populated * during connection setup... */ - if (src_addr->sin_addr.s_addr == rs->rs_bound_addr) { + if (src_addr->sin_addr.s_addr == src->sin_addr.s_addr) { #endif spin_unlock_irq(&iwdev->spinlock); *rds_iwdev = iwdev; @@ -180,19 +182,13 @@ int rds_iw_update_cm_id(struct rds_iw_device *rds_iwdev, struct rdma_cm_id *cm_i { struct sockaddr_in *src_addr, *dst_addr; struct rds_iw_device *rds_iwdev_old; - struct rds_sock rs; struct rdma_cm_id *pcm_id; int rc; src_addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&cm_id->route.addr.src_addr; dst_addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&cm_id->route.addr.dst_addr; - rs.rs_bound_addr = src_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; - rs.rs_bound_port = src_addr->sin_port; - rs.rs_conn_addr = dst_addr->sin_addr.s_addr; - rs.rs_conn_port = dst_addr->sin_port; - - rc = rds_iw_get_device(&rs, &rds_iwdev_old, &pcm_id); + rc = rds_iw_get_device(src_addr, dst_addr, &rds_iwdev_old, &pcm_id); if (rc) rds_iw_remove_cm_id(rds_iwdev, cm_id); @@ -598,9 +594,17 @@ void *rds_iw_get_mr(struct scatterlist *sg, unsigned long nents, struct rds_iw_device *rds_iwdev; struct rds_iw_mr *ibmr = NULL; struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id; + struct sockaddr_in src = { + .sin_addr.s_addr = rs->rs_bound_addr, + .sin_port = rs->rs_bound_port, + }; + struct sockaddr_in dst = { + .sin_addr.s_addr = rs->rs_conn_addr, + .sin_port = rs->rs_conn_port, + }; int ret; - ret = rds_iw_get_device(rs, &rds_iwdev, &cm_id); + ret = rds_iw_get_device(&src, &dst, &rds_iwdev, &cm_id); if (ret || !cm_id) { ret = -ENODEV; goto out; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8051a2a518fcf3827a143470083ad6008697ff17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 11:53:41 +1030 Subject: 9p/trans_virtio: fix hot-unplug On device hot-unplug, 9p/virtio currently will kfree channel while it might still be in use. Of course, it might stay used forever, so it's an extremely ugly hack, but it seems better than use-after-free that we have now. [ Unused variable removed, whitespace cleanup, msg single-lined --RR ] Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell --- net/9p/trans_virtio.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/9p/trans_virtio.c b/net/9p/trans_virtio.c index d8e376a5f0f1..36a1a739ad68 100644 --- a/net/9p/trans_virtio.c +++ b/net/9p/trans_virtio.c @@ -658,14 +658,30 @@ p9_virtio_create(struct p9_client *client, const char *devname, char *args) static void p9_virtio_remove(struct virtio_device *vdev) { struct virtio_chan *chan = vdev->priv; - - if (chan->inuse) - p9_virtio_close(chan->client); - vdev->config->del_vqs(vdev); + unsigned long warning_time; mutex_lock(&virtio_9p_lock); + + /* Remove self from list so we don't get new users. */ list_del(&chan->chan_list); + warning_time = jiffies; + + /* Wait for existing users to close. */ + while (chan->inuse) { + mutex_unlock(&virtio_9p_lock); + msleep(250); + if (time_after(jiffies, warning_time + 10 * HZ)) { + dev_emerg(&vdev->dev, + "p9_virtio_remove: waiting for device in use.\n"); + warning_time = jiffies; + } + mutex_lock(&virtio_9p_lock); + } + mutex_unlock(&virtio_9p_lock); + + vdev->config->del_vqs(vdev); + sysfs_remove_file(&(vdev->dev.kobj), &dev_attr_mount_tag.attr); kobject_uevent(&(vdev->dev.kobj), KOBJ_CHANGE); kfree(chan->tag); -- cgit v1.2.3 From c8e2c80d7ec00d020320f905822bf49c5ad85250 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 09:49:59 -0700 Subject: inet_diag: fix possible overflow in inet_diag_dump_one_icsk() inet_diag_dump_one_icsk() allocates too small skb. Add inet_sk_attr_size() helper right before inet_sk_diag_fill() so that it can be updated if/when new attributes are added. iproute2/ss currently does not use this dump_one() interface, this might explain nobody noticed this problem yet. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/inet_diag.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_diag.c b/net/ipv4/inet_diag.c index 81751f12645f..592aff37366b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_diag.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_diag.c @@ -71,6 +71,20 @@ static inline void inet_diag_unlock_handler( mutex_unlock(&inet_diag_table_mutex); } +static size_t inet_sk_attr_size(void) +{ + return nla_total_size(sizeof(struct tcp_info)) + + nla_total_size(1) /* INET_DIAG_SHUTDOWN */ + + nla_total_size(1) /* INET_DIAG_TOS */ + + nla_total_size(1) /* INET_DIAG_TCLASS */ + + nla_total_size(sizeof(struct inet_diag_meminfo)) + + nla_total_size(sizeof(struct inet_diag_msg)) + + nla_total_size(SK_MEMINFO_VARS * sizeof(u32)) + + nla_total_size(TCP_CA_NAME_MAX) + + nla_total_size(sizeof(struct tcpvegas_info)) + + 64; +} + int inet_sk_diag_fill(struct sock *sk, struct inet_connection_sock *icsk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet_diag_req_v2 *req, struct user_namespace *user_ns, @@ -326,9 +340,7 @@ int inet_diag_dump_one_icsk(struct inet_hashinfo *hashinfo, struct sk_buff *in_s if (err) goto out; - rep = nlmsg_new(sizeof(struct inet_diag_msg) + - sizeof(struct inet_diag_meminfo) + - sizeof(struct tcp_info) + 64, GFP_KERNEL); + rep = nlmsg_new(inet_sk_attr_size(), GFP_KERNEL); if (!rep) { err = -ENOMEM; goto out; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4c906c279886550d2aaac6facf71d709158e4e3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Venkat Venkatsubra Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 07:08:22 -0700 Subject: bridge: reset bridge mtu after deleting an interface On adding an interface br_add_if() sets the MTU to the min of all the interfaces. Do the same thing on removing an interface too in br_del_if. Signed-off-by: Venkat Venkatsubra Acked-by: Roopa Prabhu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/bridge/br_if.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bridge/br_if.c b/net/bridge/br_if.c index b087d278c679..1849d96b3c91 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_if.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_if.c @@ -563,6 +563,8 @@ int br_del_if(struct net_bridge *br, struct net_device *dev) */ del_nbp(p); + dev_set_mtu(br->dev, br_min_mtu(br)); + spin_lock_bh(&br->lock); changed_addr = br_stp_recalculate_bridge_id(br); spin_unlock_bh(&br->lock); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3eeff778e00c956875c70b145c52638c313dfb23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2015 05:22:21 +0000 Subject: caif: fix MSG_OOB test in caif_seqpkt_recvmsg() It should be checking flags, not msg->msg_flags. It's ->sendmsg() instances that need to look for that in ->msg_flags, ->recvmsg() ones (including the other ->recvmsg() instance in that file, as well as unix_dgram_recvmsg() this one claims to be imitating) check in flags. Braino had been introduced in commit dcda13 ("caif: Bugfix - use MSG_TRUNC in receive") back in 2010, so it goes quite a while back. Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/caif/caif_socket.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/caif/caif_socket.c b/net/caif/caif_socket.c index 769b185fefbd..a6e2da0bc718 100644 --- a/net/caif/caif_socket.c +++ b/net/caif/caif_socket.c @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int caif_seqpkt_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, int copylen; ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (m->msg_flags&MSG_OOB) + if (flags & MSG_OOB) goto read_error; skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, 0 , &ret); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7d985ed1dca5c90535d67ce92ef6ca520302340a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2015 05:34:56 +0000 Subject: rxrpc: bogus MSG_PEEK test in rxrpc_recvmsg() [I would really like an ACK on that one from dhowells; it appears to be quite straightforward, but...] MSG_PEEK isn't passed to ->recvmsg() via msg->msg_flags; as the matter of fact, neither the kernel users of rxrpc, nor the syscalls ever set that bit in there. It gets passed via flags; in fact, another such check in the same function is done correctly - as flags & MSG_PEEK. It had been that way (effectively disabled) for 8 years, though, so the patch needs beating up - that case had never been tested. If it is correct, it's -stable fodder. Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/rxrpc/ar-recvmsg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-recvmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-recvmsg.c index 4575485ad1b4..19a560626dc4 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-recvmsg.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-recvmsg.c @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int rxrpc_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, if (!skb) { /* nothing remains on the queue */ if (copied && - (msg->msg_flags & MSG_PEEK || timeo == 0)) + (flags & MSG_PEEK || timeo == 0)) goto out; /* wait for a message to turn up */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0f611d28fc2e13cfec64e1c544c16a086886805a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrei Otcheretianski Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 08:53:30 +0200 Subject: mac80211: count interfaces correctly for combination checks Since moving the interface combination checks to mac80211, it's broken because it now only considers interfaces with an assigned channel context, so for example any interface that isn't active can still be up, which is clearly an issue; also, in particular P2P-Device wdevs are an issue since they never have a chanctx. Fix this by counting running interfaces instead the ones with a channel context assigned. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [3.16+] Fixes: 73de86a38962b ("cfg80211/mac80211: move interface counting for combination check to mac80211") Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach [rewrite commit message, dig out the commit it fixes] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/util.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/util.c b/net/mac80211/util.c index 8428f4a95479..747bdcf72e92 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/util.c +++ b/net/mac80211/util.c @@ -3178,7 +3178,7 @@ int ieee80211_check_combinations(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, wdev_iter = &sdata_iter->wdev; if (sdata_iter == sdata || - rcu_access_pointer(sdata_iter->vif.chanctx_conf) == NULL || + !ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata_iter) || local->hw.wiphy->software_iftypes & BIT(wdev_iter->iftype)) continue; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 70a3fd6c61c46c07c63cab935dca9a17d8de1709 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 08:53:29 +0200 Subject: mac80211: ask for ECSA IE to be considered for beacon parse CRC When a beacon from the AP contains only the ECSA IE, and not a CSA IE as well, this ECSA IE is not considered for calculating the CRC and the beacon might be dropped as not being interesting. This is clearly wrong, it should be handled and the channel switch should be executed. Fix this by including the ECSA IE ID in the bitmap of interesting IEs. Reported-by: Gil Tribush Reviewed-by: Luciano Coelho Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/mlme.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c index 10ac6324c1d0..cde8cd3d6595 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c @@ -3204,7 +3204,8 @@ static const u64 care_about_ies = (1ULL << WLAN_EID_CHANNEL_SWITCH) | (1ULL << WLAN_EID_PWR_CONSTRAINT) | (1ULL << WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY) | - (1ULL << WLAN_EID_HT_OPERATION); + (1ULL << WLAN_EID_HT_OPERATION) | + (1ULL << WLAN_EID_EXT_CHANSWITCH_ANN); static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_beacon(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt, size_t len, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 496fcc294daab18799e190c0264863d653588d1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 08:53:27 +0200 Subject: nl80211: ignore HT/VHT capabilities without QoS/WMM As HT/VHT depend heavily on QoS/WMM, it's not a good idea to let userspace add clients that have HT/VHT but not QoS/WMM. Since it does so in certain cases we've observed (client is using HT IEs but not QoS/WMM) just ignore the HT/VHT info at this point and don't pass it down to the drivers which might unconditionally use it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index be2501538011..b6f84f6a2a09 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -4400,6 +4400,16 @@ static int nl80211_new_station(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) if (parse_station_flags(info, dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype, ¶ms)) return -EINVAL; + /* HT/VHT requires QoS, but if we don't have that just ignore HT/VHT + * as userspace might just pass through the capabilities from the IEs + * directly, rather than enforcing this restriction and returning an + * error in this case. + */ + if (!(params.sta_flags_set & BIT(NL80211_STA_FLAG_WME))) { + params.ht_capa = NULL; + params.vht_capa = NULL; + } + /* When you run into this, adjust the code below for the new flag */ BUILD_BUG_ON(NL80211_STA_FLAG_MAX != 7); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f84eaa1068315409ffbef57e6fea312180787db3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 08:53:26 +0200 Subject: mac80211: ignore CSA to same channel If the AP is confused and starts doing a CSA to the same channel, just ignore that request instead of trying to act it out since it was likely sent in error anyway. In the case of the bug I was investigating the GO was misbehaving and sending out a beacon with CSA IEs still included after having actually done the channel switch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 1 + net/mac80211/mlme.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index c0e089c194f1..8d53d65bd2ab 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -464,6 +464,7 @@ struct ieee80211_if_managed { unsigned int flags; bool csa_waiting_bcn; + bool csa_ignored_same_chan; bool beacon_crc_valid; u32 beacon_crc; diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c index cde8cd3d6595..142f66aece18 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c @@ -1150,6 +1150,17 @@ ieee80211_sta_process_chanswitch(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, return; } + if (cfg80211_chandef_identical(&csa_ie.chandef, + &sdata->vif.bss_conf.chandef)) { + if (ifmgd->csa_ignored_same_chan) + return; + sdata_info(sdata, + "AP %pM tries to chanswitch to same channel, ignore\n", + ifmgd->associated->bssid); + ifmgd->csa_ignored_same_chan = true; + return; + } + mutex_lock(&local->mtx); mutex_lock(&local->chanctx_mtx); conf = rcu_dereference_protected(sdata->vif.chanctx_conf, @@ -1210,6 +1221,7 @@ ieee80211_sta_process_chanswitch(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, sdata->vif.csa_active = true; sdata->csa_chandef = csa_ie.chandef; sdata->csa_block_tx = csa_ie.mode; + ifmgd->csa_ignored_same_chan = false; if (sdata->csa_block_tx) ieee80211_stop_vif_queues(local, sdata, @@ -2090,6 +2102,7 @@ static void ieee80211_set_disassoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, sdata->vif.csa_active = false; ifmgd->csa_waiting_bcn = false; + ifmgd->csa_ignored_same_chan = false; if (sdata->csa_block_tx) { ieee80211_wake_vif_queues(local, sdata, IEEE80211_QUEUE_STOP_REASON_CSA); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 37355565ba57fd45f78f0934305be2761b641f8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Dichtel Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2015 15:56:05 +0100 Subject: ip6_tunnel: fix error code when tunnel exists After commit 2b0bb01b6edb, the kernel returns -ENOBUFS when user tries to add an existing tunnel with ioctl API: $ ip -6 tunnel add ip6tnl1 mode ip6ip6 dev eth1 add tunnel "ip6tnl0" failed: No buffer space available It's confusing, the right error is EEXIST. This patch also change a bit the code returned: - ENOBUFS -> ENOMEM - ENOENT -> ENODEV Fixes: 2b0bb01b6edb ("ip6_tunnel: Return an error when adding an existing tunnel.") CC: Steffen Klassert Reported-by: Pierre Cheynier Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c index 266a264ec212..ddd94eca19b3 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c @@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ out: * Create tunnel matching given parameters. * * Return: - * created tunnel or NULL + * created tunnel or error pointer **/ static struct ip6_tnl *ip6_tnl_create(struct net *net, struct __ip6_tnl_parm *p) @@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static struct ip6_tnl *ip6_tnl_create(struct net *net, struct __ip6_tnl_parm *p) struct net_device *dev; struct ip6_tnl *t; char name[IFNAMSIZ]; - int err; + int err = -ENOMEM; if (p->name[0]) strlcpy(name, p->name, IFNAMSIZ); @@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static struct ip6_tnl *ip6_tnl_create(struct net *net, struct __ip6_tnl_parm *p) failed_free: ip6_dev_free(dev); failed: - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(err); } /** @@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ failed: * tunnel device is created and registered for use. * * Return: - * matching tunnel or NULL + * matching tunnel or error pointer **/ static struct ip6_tnl *ip6_tnl_locate(struct net *net, @@ -380,13 +380,13 @@ static struct ip6_tnl *ip6_tnl_locate(struct net *net, if (ipv6_addr_equal(local, &t->parms.laddr) && ipv6_addr_equal(remote, &t->parms.raddr)) { if (create) - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST); return t; } } if (!create) - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); return ip6_tnl_create(net, p); } @@ -1420,7 +1420,7 @@ ip6_tnl_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd) } ip6_tnl_parm_from_user(&p1, &p); t = ip6_tnl_locate(net, &p1, 0); - if (t == NULL) + if (IS_ERR(t)) t = netdev_priv(dev); } else { memset(&p, 0, sizeof(p)); @@ -1445,7 +1445,7 @@ ip6_tnl_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd) ip6_tnl_parm_from_user(&p1, &p); t = ip6_tnl_locate(net, &p1, cmd == SIOCADDTUNNEL); if (cmd == SIOCCHGTUNNEL) { - if (t != NULL) { + if (!IS_ERR(t)) { if (t->dev != dev) { err = -EEXIST; break; @@ -1457,14 +1457,15 @@ ip6_tnl_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd) else err = ip6_tnl_update(t, &p1); } - if (t) { + if (!IS_ERR(t)) { err = 0; ip6_tnl_parm_to_user(&p, &t->parms); if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_ifru.ifru_data, &p, sizeof(p))) err = -EFAULT; - } else - err = (cmd == SIOCADDTUNNEL ? -ENOBUFS : -ENOENT); + } else { + err = PTR_ERR(t); + } break; case SIOCDELTUNNEL: err = -EPERM; @@ -1478,7 +1479,7 @@ ip6_tnl_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd) err = -ENOENT; ip6_tnl_parm_from_user(&p1, &p); t = ip6_tnl_locate(net, &p1, 0); - if (t == NULL) + if (IS_ERR(t)) break; err = -EPERM; if (t->dev == ip6n->fb_tnl_dev) @@ -1672,12 +1673,13 @@ static int ip6_tnl_newlink(struct net *src_net, struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[]) { struct net *net = dev_net(dev); - struct ip6_tnl *nt; + struct ip6_tnl *nt, *t; nt = netdev_priv(dev); ip6_tnl_netlink_parms(data, &nt->parms); - if (ip6_tnl_locate(net, &nt->parms, 0)) + t = ip6_tnl_locate(net, &nt->parms, 0); + if (!IS_ERR(t)) return -EEXIST; return ip6_tnl_create2(dev); @@ -1697,8 +1699,7 @@ static int ip6_tnl_changelink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr *tb[], ip6_tnl_netlink_parms(data, &p); t = ip6_tnl_locate(net, &p, 0); - - if (t) { + if (!IS_ERR(t)) { if (t->dev != dev) return -EEXIST; } else -- cgit v1.2.3 From cb7cf8a33ff73cf638481d1edf883d8968f934f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2015 12:19:24 -0700 Subject: inet: Clean up inet_csk_wait_for_connect() vs. might_sleep() I got the following trace with current net-next kernel : [14723.885290] WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 22658 at kernel/sched/core.c:7285 __might_sleep+0x89/0xa0() [14723.885325] do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [] prepare_to_wait_exclusive+0x34/0xa0 [14723.885355] CPU: 26 PID: 22658 Comm: netserver Not tainted 4.0.0-dbg-DEV #1379 [14723.885359] ffffffff81a223a8 ffff881fae9e7ca8 ffffffff81650b5d 0000000000000001 [14723.885364] ffff881fae9e7cf8 ffff881fae9e7ce8 ffffffff810a72e7 0000000000000000 [14723.885367] ffffffff81a57620 000000000000093a 0000000000000000 ffff881fae9e7e64 [14723.885371] Call Trace: [14723.885377] [] dump_stack+0x4c/0x65 [14723.885382] [] warn_slowpath_common+0x97/0xe0 [14723.885386] [] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x50 [14723.885390] [] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10d/0x1d0 [14723.885393] [] ? prepare_to_wait_exclusive+0x34/0xa0 [14723.885396] [] ? prepare_to_wait_exclusive+0x34/0xa0 [14723.885399] [] __might_sleep+0x89/0xa0 [14723.885403] [] lock_sock_nested+0x36/0xb0 [14723.885406] [] ? release_sock+0x173/0x1c0 [14723.885411] [] inet_csk_accept+0x157/0x2a0 [14723.885415] [] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0xc0/0xc0 [14723.885419] [] inet_accept+0x2d/0x150 [14723.885424] [] SYSC_accept4+0xff/0x210 [14723.885428] [] ? retint_swapgs+0xe/0x44 [14723.885431] [] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10d/0x1d0 [14723.885437] [] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [14723.885441] [] SyS_accept+0x10/0x20 [14723.885444] [] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17 [14723.885447] ---[ end trace ff74cd83355b1873 ]--- In commit 26cabd31259ba43f68026ce3f62b78094124333f Peter added a sched_annotate_sleep() in sk_wait_event() Is the following patch needed as well ? Alternative would be to use sk_wait_event() from inet_csk_wait_for_connect() Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c index 14d02ea905b6..3e44b9b0b78e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c @@ -268,6 +268,7 @@ static int inet_csk_wait_for_connect(struct sock *sk, long timeo) release_sock(sk); if (reqsk_queue_empty(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue)) timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo); + sched_annotate_sleep(); lock_sock(sk); err = 0; if (!reqsk_queue_empty(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue)) -- cgit v1.2.3 From ced585c83b27deca427c606a34dd3eaa6b96d82b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2015 20:25:57 +0100 Subject: act_bpf: allow non-default TC_ACT opcodes as BPF exec outcome Revisiting commit d23b8ad8ab23 ("tc: add BPF based action") with regards to eBPF support, I was thinking that it might be better to improve return semantics from a BPF program invoked through BPF_PROG_RUN(). Currently, in case filter_res is 0, we overwrite the default action opcode with TC_ACT_SHOT. A default action opcode configured through tc's m_bpf can be: TC_ACT_RECLASSIFY, TC_ACT_PIPE, TC_ACT_SHOT, TC_ACT_UNSPEC, TC_ACT_OK. In cls_bpf, we have the possibility to overwrite the default class associated with the classifier in case filter_res is _not_ 0xffffffff (-1). That allows us to fold multiple [e]BPF programs into a single one, where they would otherwise need to be defined as a separate classifier with its own classid, needlessly redoing parsing work, etc. Similarly, we could do better in act_bpf: Since above TC_ACT* opcodes are exported to UAPI anyway, we reuse them for return-code-to-tc-opcode mapping, where we would allow above possibilities. Thus, like in cls_bpf, a filter_res of 0xffffffff (-1) means that the configured _default_ action is used. Any unkown return code from the BPF program would fail in tcf_bpf() with TC_ACT_UNSPEC. Should we one day want to make use of TC_ACT_STOLEN or TC_ACT_QUEUED, which both have the same semantics, we have the option to either use that as a default action (filter_res of 0xffffffff) or non-default BPF return code. All that will allow us to transparently use tcf_bpf() for both BPF flavours. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Cc: Jiri Pirko Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim Acked-by: Jiri Pirko Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/act_bpf.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/act_bpf.c b/net/sched/act_bpf.c index 82c5d7fc1988..5f6288fa3f12 100644 --- a/net/sched/act_bpf.c +++ b/net/sched/act_bpf.c @@ -25,21 +25,41 @@ static int tcf_bpf(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a, struct tcf_result *res) { struct tcf_bpf *b = a->priv; - int action; - int filter_res; + int action, filter_res; spin_lock(&b->tcf_lock); + b->tcf_tm.lastuse = jiffies; bstats_update(&b->tcf_bstats, skb); - action = b->tcf_action; filter_res = BPF_PROG_RUN(b->filter, skb); - if (filter_res == 0) { - /* Return code 0 from the BPF program - * is being interpreted as a drop here. - */ - action = TC_ACT_SHOT; + + /* A BPF program may overwrite the default action opcode. + * Similarly as in cls_bpf, if filter_res == -1 we use the + * default action specified from tc. + * + * In case a different well-known TC_ACT opcode has been + * returned, it will overwrite the default one. + * + * For everything else that is unkown, TC_ACT_UNSPEC is + * returned. + */ + switch (filter_res) { + case TC_ACT_PIPE: + case TC_ACT_RECLASSIFY: + case TC_ACT_OK: + action = filter_res; + break; + case TC_ACT_SHOT: + action = filter_res; b->tcf_qstats.drops++; + break; + case TC_ACT_UNSPEC: + action = b->tcf_action; + break; + default: + action = TC_ACT_UNSPEC; + break; } spin_unlock(&b->tcf_lock); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8e199dfd82ee097b522b00344af6448715d8ee0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sabrina Dubroca Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 11:22:32 +0100 Subject: ipv6: call ipv6_proxy_select_ident instead of ipv6_select_ident in udp6_ufo_fragment Matt Grant reported frequent crashes in ipv6_select_ident when udp6_ufo_fragment is called from openvswitch on a skb that doesn't have a dst_entry set. ipv6_proxy_select_ident generates the frag_id without using the dst associated with the skb. This approach was suggested by Vladislav Yasevich. Fixes: 0508c07f5e0c ("ipv6: Select fragment id during UFO segmentation if not set.") Cc: Vladislav Yasevich Reported-by: Matt Grant Tested-by: Matt Grant Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca Acked-by: Vladislav Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/udp_offload.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c index ab889bb16b3c..be2c0ba82c85 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv6/udp_offload.c @@ -112,11 +112,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, fptr = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + unfrag_ip6hlen); fptr->nexthdr = nexthdr; fptr->reserved = 0; - if (skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id) - fptr->identification = skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id; - else - ipv6_select_ident(fptr, - (struct rt6_info *)skb_dst(skb)); + if (!skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id) + ipv6_proxy_select_ident(skb); + fptr->identification = skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id; /* Fragment the skb. ipv6 header and the remaining fields of the * fragment header are updated in ipv6_gso_segment() -- cgit v1.2.3 From 73ba57bfae4a1914f6a6dac71e3168dd900e00af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Barth Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 16:16:04 +0100 Subject: ipv6: fix backtracking for throw routes for throw routes to trigger evaluation of other policy rules EAGAIN needs to be propagated up to fib_rules_lookup similar to how its done for IPv4 A simple testcase for verification is: ip -6 rule add lookup 33333 priority 33333 ip -6 route add throw 2001:db8::1 ip -6 route add 2001:db8::1 via fe80::1 dev wlan0 table 33333 ip route get 2001:db8::1 Signed-off-by: Steven Barth Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c b/net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c index b4d5e1d97c1b..27ca79682efb 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c +++ b/net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ static int fib6_rule_action(struct fib_rule *rule, struct flowi *flp, goto again; flp6->saddr = saddr; } + err = rt->dst.error; goto out; } again: -- cgit v1.2.3 From d22e1537181188e5dc8cbc51451832625035bdc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Hunt Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 19:19:30 -0400 Subject: tcp: fix tcp fin memory accounting tcp_send_fin() does not account for the memory it allocates properly, so sk_forward_alloc can be negative in cases where we've sent a FIN: ss example output (ss -amn | grep -B1 f4294): tcp FIN-WAIT-1 0 1 192.168.0.1:45520 192.0.2.1:8080 skmem:(r0,rb87380,t0,tb87380,f4294966016,w1280,o0,bl0) Acked-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index a2a796c5536b..1db253e36045 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -2773,15 +2773,11 @@ void tcp_send_fin(struct sock *sk) } else { /* Socket is locked, keep trying until memory is available. */ for (;;) { - skb = alloc_skb_fclone(MAX_TCP_HEADER, - sk->sk_allocation); + skb = sk_stream_alloc_skb(sk, 0, sk->sk_allocation); if (skb) break; yield(); } - - /* Reserve space for headers and prepare control bits. */ - skb_reserve(skb, MAX_TCP_HEADER); /* FIN eats a sequence byte, write_seq advanced by tcp_queue_skb(). */ tcp_init_nondata_skb(skb, tp->write_seq, TCPHDR_ACK | TCPHDR_FIN); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 91edd096e224941131f896b86838b1e59553696a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Catalin Marinas Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2015 16:48:13 +0000 Subject: net: compat: Update get_compat_msghdr() to match copy_msghdr_from_user() behaviour Commit db31c55a6fb2 (net: clamp ->msg_namelen instead of returning an error) introduced the clamping of msg_namelen when the unsigned value was larger than sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage). This caused a msg_namelen of -1 to be valid. The native code was subsequently fixed by commit dbb490b96584 (net: socket: error on a negative msg_namelen). In addition, the native code sets msg_namelen to 0 when msg_name is NULL. This was done in commit (6a2a2b3ae075 net:socket: set msg_namelen to 0 if msg_name is passed as NULL in msghdr struct from userland) and subsequently updated by 08adb7dabd48 (fold verify_iovec() into copy_msghdr_from_user()). This patch brings the get_compat_msghdr() in line with copy_msghdr_from_user(). Fixes: db31c55a6fb2 (net: clamp ->msg_namelen instead of returning an error) Cc: David S. Miller Cc: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/compat.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/compat.c b/net/compat.c index 94d3d5e97883..f7bd286a8280 100644 --- a/net/compat.c +++ b/net/compat.c @@ -49,6 +49,13 @@ ssize_t get_compat_msghdr(struct msghdr *kmsg, __get_user(kmsg->msg_controllen, &umsg->msg_controllen) || __get_user(kmsg->msg_flags, &umsg->msg_flags)) return -EFAULT; + + if (!uaddr) + kmsg->msg_namelen = 0; + + if (kmsg->msg_namelen < 0) + return -EINVAL; + if (kmsg->msg_namelen > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)) kmsg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage); kmsg->msg_control = compat_ptr(tmp3); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4de930efc23b92ddf88ce91c405ee645fe6e27ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2015 17:41:43 +0000 Subject: net: validate the range we feed to iov_iter_init() in sys_sendto/sys_recvfrom Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19 Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/socket.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c index bbedbfcb42c2..245330ca0015 100644 --- a/net/socket.c +++ b/net/socket.c @@ -1702,6 +1702,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(sendto, int, fd, void __user *, buff, size_t, len, if (len > INT_MAX) len = INT_MAX; + if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buff, len))) + return -EFAULT; sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed); if (!sock) goto out; @@ -1760,6 +1762,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(recvfrom, int, fd, void __user *, ubuf, size_t, size, if (size > INT_MAX) size = INT_MAX; + if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ubuf, size))) + return -EFAULT; sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed); if (!sock) goto out; -- cgit v1.2.3