From 4185392da4b4b494e51934c51b999b4df424afba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jesse Gross Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2012 15:49:47 -0700 Subject: openvswitch: Relax set header validation. When installing a flow with an action to set a particular field we need to validate that the packets that are part of the flow actually contain that header. With IP we use zeroed addresses and with TCP/UDP the check is for zeroed ports. This check is overly broad and can catch packets like DHCP requests that have a zero source address in a legitimate header. This changes the check to look for a zeroed protocol number for IP or for both ports be zero for TCP/UDP before considering the header to not exist. Reported-by: Ethan Jackson Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross --- net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c index d8277d29e710..cf58cedad083 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c @@ -425,10 +425,10 @@ static int validate_sample(const struct nlattr *attr, static int validate_tp_port(const struct sw_flow_key *flow_key) { if (flow_key->eth.type == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { - if (flow_key->ipv4.tp.src && flow_key->ipv4.tp.dst) + if (flow_key->ipv4.tp.src || flow_key->ipv4.tp.dst) return 0; } else if (flow_key->eth.type == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { - if (flow_key->ipv6.tp.src && flow_key->ipv6.tp.dst) + if (flow_key->ipv6.tp.src || flow_key->ipv6.tp.dst) return 0; } @@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static int validate_set(const struct nlattr *a, if (flow_key->eth.type != htons(ETH_P_IP)) return -EINVAL; - if (!flow_key->ipv4.addr.src || !flow_key->ipv4.addr.dst) + if (!flow_key->ip.proto) return -EINVAL; ipv4_key = nla_data(ovs_key); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 61a0cfb008f57ecf7eb28ee762952fb42dc15d15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andre Guedes Date: Wed, 1 Aug 2012 20:34:15 -0300 Subject: Bluetooth: Fix use-after-free bug in SMP If SMP fails, we should always cancel security_timer delayed work. Otherwise, security_timer function may run after l2cap_conn object has been freed. This patch fixes the following warning reported by ODEBUG: WARNING: at lib/debugobjects.c:261 debug_print_object+0x7c/0x8d() Hardware name: Bochs ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x27 Modules linked in: btusb bluetooth Pid: 440, comm: kworker/u:2 Not tainted 3.5.0-rc1+ #4 Call Trace: [] ? free_obj_work+0x4a/0x7f [] warn_slowpath_common+0x7e/0x97 [] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x41/0x43 [] debug_print_object+0x7c/0x8d [] ? __queue_work+0x241/0x241 [] debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x92/0x159 [] slab_free_hook+0x6f/0x77 [] ? l2cap_conn_del+0x148/0x157 [bluetooth] [] kfree+0x59/0xac [] l2cap_conn_del+0x148/0x157 [bluetooth] [] l2cap_recv_frame+0xa77/0xfa4 [bluetooth] [] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x112/0x1ad [] l2cap_recv_acldata+0xe2/0x264 [bluetooth] [] hci_rx_work+0x235/0x33c [bluetooth] [] ? process_one_work+0x126/0x2fe [] process_one_work+0x185/0x2fe [] ? process_one_work+0x126/0x2fe [] ? lock_acquired+0x1b5/0x1cf [] ? le_scan_work+0x11d/0x11d [bluetooth] [] ? spin_lock_irq+0x9/0xb [] worker_thread+0xcf/0x175 [] ? rescuer_thread+0x175/0x175 [] kthread+0x95/0x9d [] kernel_threadi_helper+0x4/0x10 [] ? retint_restore_args+0x13/0x13 [] ? flush_kthread_worker+0xdb/0xdb [] ? gs_change+0x13/0x13 This bug can be reproduced using hctool lecc or l2test tools and bluetoothd not running. Signed-off-by: Andre Guedes Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan --- net/bluetooth/smp.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index 901a616c8083..98ffc1b6a6fa 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -267,10 +267,10 @@ static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason, u8 send) mgmt_auth_failed(conn->hcon->hdev, conn->dst, hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, reason); - if (test_and_clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags)) { - cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer); + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer); + + if (test_and_clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags)) smp_chan_destroy(conn); - } } #define JUST_WORKS 0x00 -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2dba62c30ec3040ef1b647a8976fd7e6854cc7a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick McHardy Date: Sun, 19 Aug 2012 10:16:08 +0000 Subject: netfilter: nfnetlink_log: fix NLA_PUT macro removal bug Commit 1db20a52 (nfnetlink_log: Stop using NLA_PUT*().) incorrectly converted a NLA_PUT_BE16 macro to nla_put_be32() in nfnetlink_log: - NLA_PUT_BE16(inst->skb, NFULA_HWTYPE, htons(skb->dev->type)); + if (nla_put_be32(inst->skb, NFULA_HWTYPE, htons(skb->dev->type)) Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c index 169ab59ed9d4..592091c1260b 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c @@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ __build_packet_message(struct nfulnl_instance *inst, } if (indev && skb_mac_header_was_set(skb)) { - if (nla_put_be32(inst->skb, NFULA_HWTYPE, htons(skb->dev->type)) || + if (nla_put_be16(inst->skb, NFULA_HWTYPE, htons(skb->dev->type)) || nla_put_be16(inst->skb, NFULA_HWLEN, htons(skb->dev->hard_header_len)) || nla_put(inst->skb, NFULA_HWHEADER, skb->dev->hard_header_len, -- cgit v1.2.3 From be1e44441a560c43c136a562d49a1c9623c91197 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "J. Bruce Fields" Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2012 18:12:28 -0400 Subject: svcrpc: fix BUG() in svc_tcp_clear_pages Examination of svc_tcp_clear_pages shows that it assumes sk_tcplen is consistent with sk_pages[] (in particular, sk_pages[n] can't be NULL if sk_tcplen would lead us to expect n pages of data). svc_tcp_restore_pages zeroes out sk_pages[] while leaving sk_tcplen. This is OK, since both functions are serialized by XPT_BUSY. However, that means the inconsistency must be repaired before dropping XPT_BUSY. Therefore we should be ensuring that svc_tcp_save_pages repairs the problem before exiting svc_tcp_recv_record on error. Symptoms were a BUG() in svc_tcp_clear_pages. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields --- net/sunrpc/svcsock.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c index 18bc130255a7..998aa8c1807c 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c @@ -1129,9 +1129,9 @@ static int svc_tcp_recvfrom(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) if (len >= 0) svsk->sk_tcplen += len; if (len != want) { + svc_tcp_save_pages(svsk, rqstp); if (len < 0 && len != -EAGAIN) goto err_other; - svc_tcp_save_pages(svsk, rqstp); dprintk("svc: incomplete TCP record (%d of %d)\n", svsk->sk_tcplen, svsk->sk_reclen); goto err_noclose; -- cgit v1.2.3 From f06f00a24d76e168ecb38d352126fd203937b601 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "J. Bruce Fields" Date: Mon, 20 Aug 2012 16:04:40 -0400 Subject: svcrpc: sends on closed socket should stop immediately svc_tcp_sendto sets XPT_CLOSE if we fail to transmit the entire reply. However, the XPT_CLOSE won't be acted on immediately. Meanwhile other threads could send further replies before the socket is really shut down. This can manifest as data corruption: for example, if a truncated read reply is followed by another rpc reply, that second reply will look to the client like further read data. Symptoms were data corruption preceded by svc_tcp_sendto logging something like kernel: rpc-srv/tcp: nfsd: sent only 963696 when sending 1048708 bytes - shutting down socket Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Malahal Naineni Tested-by: Malahal Naineni Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields --- net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c b/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c index 88f2bf671960..0d693a89434f 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c @@ -794,7 +794,8 @@ int svc_send(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) /* Grab mutex to serialize outgoing data. */ mutex_lock(&xprt->xpt_mutex); - if (test_bit(XPT_DEAD, &xprt->xpt_flags)) + if (test_bit(XPT_DEAD, &xprt->xpt_flags) + || test_bit(XPT_CLOSE, &xprt->xpt_flags)) len = -ENOTCONN; else len = xprt->xpt_ops->xpo_sendto(rqstp); -- cgit v1.2.3 From d10f27a750312ed5638c876e4bd6aa83664cccd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "J. Bruce Fields" Date: Fri, 17 Aug 2012 17:31:53 -0400 Subject: svcrpc: fix svc_xprt_enqueue/svc_recv busy-looping The rpc server tries to ensure that there will be room to send a reply before it receives a request. It does this by tracking, in xpt_reserved, an upper bound on the total size of the replies that is has already committed to for the socket. Currently it is adding in the estimate for a new reply *before* it checks whether there is space available. If it finds that there is not space, it then subtracts the estimate back out. This may lead the subsequent svc_xprt_enqueue to decide that there is space after all. The results is a svc_recv() that will repeatedly return -EAGAIN, causing server threads to loop without doing any actual work. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Michael Tokarev Tested-by: Michael Tokarev Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields --- net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c b/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c index 0d693a89434f..bac973a31367 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c @@ -316,7 +316,6 @@ static bool svc_xprt_has_something_to_do(struct svc_xprt *xprt) */ void svc_xprt_enqueue(struct svc_xprt *xprt) { - struct svc_serv *serv = xprt->xpt_server; struct svc_pool *pool; struct svc_rqst *rqstp; int cpu; @@ -362,8 +361,6 @@ void svc_xprt_enqueue(struct svc_xprt *xprt) rqstp, rqstp->rq_xprt); rqstp->rq_xprt = xprt; svc_xprt_get(xprt); - rqstp->rq_reserved = serv->sv_max_mesg; - atomic_add(rqstp->rq_reserved, &xprt->xpt_reserved); pool->sp_stats.threads_woken++; wake_up(&rqstp->rq_wait); } else { @@ -640,8 +637,6 @@ int svc_recv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, long timeout) if (xprt) { rqstp->rq_xprt = xprt; svc_xprt_get(xprt); - rqstp->rq_reserved = serv->sv_max_mesg; - atomic_add(rqstp->rq_reserved, &xprt->xpt_reserved); /* As there is a shortage of threads and this request * had to be queued, don't allow the thread to wait so @@ -738,6 +733,8 @@ int svc_recv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, long timeout) else len = xprt->xpt_ops->xpo_recvfrom(rqstp); dprintk("svc: got len=%d\n", len); + rqstp->rq_reserved = serv->sv_max_mesg; + atomic_add(rqstp->rq_reserved, &xprt->xpt_reserved); } svc_xprt_received(xprt); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 27f011243a6e4e8b81078df1d83608dae31e3d38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Pedersen Date: Mon, 20 Aug 2012 11:28:25 -0700 Subject: mac80211: fix DS to MBSS address translation The destination address of unicast frames forwarded through a mesh gate was being replaced with the broadcast address. Instead leave the original destination address as the mesh DA. If the nexthop address is not in the mpath table it will be resolved. If that fails, the frame will be forwarded to known mesh gates. Reported-by: Cedric Voncken Signed-off-by: Thomas Pedersen Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/tx.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c index acf712ffb5e6..c5e8c9c31f76 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/tx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c @@ -1811,37 +1811,31 @@ netdev_tx_t ieee80211_subif_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, meshhdrlen = ieee80211_new_mesh_header(&mesh_hdr, sdata, NULL, NULL); } else { - int is_mesh_mcast = 1; - const u8 *mesh_da; + /* DS -> MBSS (802.11-2012 13.11.3.3). + * For unicast with unknown forwarding information, + * destination might be in the MBSS or if that fails + * forwarded to another mesh gate. In either case + * resolution will be handled in ieee80211_xmit(), so + * leave the original DA. This also works for mcast */ + const u8 *mesh_da = skb->data; + + if (mppath) + mesh_da = mppath->mpp; + else if (mpath) + mesh_da = mpath->dst; + rcu_read_unlock(); - if (is_multicast_ether_addr(skb->data)) - /* DA TA mSA AE:SA */ - mesh_da = skb->data; - else { - static const u8 bcast[ETH_ALEN] = - { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff }; - if (mppath) { - /* RA TA mDA mSA AE:DA SA */ - mesh_da = mppath->mpp; - is_mesh_mcast = 0; - } else if (mpath) { - mesh_da = mpath->dst; - is_mesh_mcast = 0; - } else { - /* DA TA mSA AE:SA */ - mesh_da = bcast; - } - } hdrlen = ieee80211_fill_mesh_addresses(&hdr, &fc, mesh_da, sdata->vif.addr); - rcu_read_unlock(); - if (is_mesh_mcast) + if (is_multicast_ether_addr(mesh_da)) + /* DA TA mSA AE:SA */ meshhdrlen = ieee80211_new_mesh_header(&mesh_hdr, sdata, skb->data + ETH_ALEN, NULL); else + /* RA TA mDA mSA AE:DA SA */ meshhdrlen = ieee80211_new_mesh_header(&mesh_hdr, sdata, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9b04f350057863d1fad1ba071e09362a1da3503e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2012 20:48:29 +0000 Subject: ipv4: properly update pmtu Sylvain Munault reported following info : - TCP connection get "stuck" with data in send queue when doing "large" transfers ( like typing 'ps ax' on a ssh connection ) - Only happens on path where the PMTU is lower than the MTU of the interface - Is not present right after boot, it only appears 10-20min after boot or so. (and that's inside the _same_ TCP connection, it works fine at first and then in the same ssh session, it'll get stuck) - Definitely seems related to fragments somehow since I see a router sending ICMP message saying fragmentation is needed. - Exact same setup works fine with kernel 3.5.1 Problem happens when the 10 minutes (ip_rt_mtu_expires) expiration period is over. ip_rt_update_pmtu() calls dst_set_expires() to rearm a new expiration, but dst_set_expires() does nothing because dst.expires is already set. It seems we want to set the expires field to a new value, regardless of prior one. With help from Julian Anastasov. Reported-by: Sylvain Munaut Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet CC: Julian Anastasov Tested-by: Sylvain Munaut Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/route.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c index fd9ecb52c66b..8c8c748ebb28 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c @@ -956,7 +956,7 @@ static void ip_rt_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk, dst->obsolete = DST_OBSOLETE_KILL; } else { rt->rt_pmtu = mtu; - dst_set_expires(&rt->dst, ip_rt_mtu_expires); + rt->dst.expires = max(1UL, jiffies + ip_rt_mtu_expires); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From a0dfb2634e5671770f598cda08002d8cda66ac77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fengguang Wu Date: Thu, 23 Aug 2012 19:51:21 +0800 Subject: af_packet: match_fanout_group() can be static cc: Eric Leblond Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index aee7196aac36..c5c9e2a54218 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@ static void __fanout_unlink(struct sock *sk, struct packet_sock *po) spin_unlock(&f->lock); } -bool match_fanout_group(struct packet_type *ptype, struct sock * sk) +static bool match_fanout_group(struct packet_type *ptype, struct sock * sk) { if (ptype->af_packet_priv == (void*)((struct packet_sock *)sk)->fanout) return true; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 78df76a065ae3b5dbcb9a29912adc02f697de498 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 05:40:47 +0000 Subject: ipv4: take rt_uncached_lock only if needed Multicast traffic allocates dst with DST_NOCACHE, but dst is not inserted into rt_uncached_list. This slowdown multicast workloads on SMP because rt_uncached_lock is contended. Change the test before taking the lock to actually check the dst was inserted into rt_uncached_list. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/route.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c index 8c8c748ebb28..24fd4c596643 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c @@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ static void ipv4_dst_destroy(struct dst_entry *dst) { struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *) dst; - if (dst->flags & DST_NOCACHE) { + if (!list_empty(&rt->rt_uncached)) { spin_lock_bh(&rt_uncached_lock); list_del(&rt->rt_uncached); spin_unlock_bh(&rt_uncached_lock); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 20e1db19db5d6b9e4e83021595eab0dc8f107bef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Thu, 23 Aug 2012 02:09:11 +0000 Subject: netlink: fix possible spoofing from non-root processes Non-root user-space processes can send Netlink messages to other processes that are well-known for being subscribed to Netlink asynchronous notifications. This allows ilegitimate non-root process to send forged messages to Netlink subscribers. The userspace process usually verifies the legitimate origin in two ways: a) Socket credentials. If UID != 0, then the message comes from some ilegitimate process and the message needs to be dropped. b) Netlink portID. In general, portID == 0 means that the origin of the messages comes from the kernel. Thus, discarding any message not coming from the kernel. However, ctnetlink sets the portID in event messages that has been triggered by some user-space process, eg. conntrack utility. So other processes subscribed to ctnetlink events, eg. conntrackd, know that the event was triggered by some user-space action. Neither of the two ways to discard ilegitimate messages coming from non-root processes can help for ctnetlink. This patch adds capability validation in case that dst_pid is set in netlink_sendmsg(). This approach is aggressive since existing applications using any Netlink bus to deliver messages between two user-space processes will break. Note that the exception is NETLINK_USERSOCK, since it is reserved for netlink-to-netlink userspace communication. Still, if anyone wants that his Netlink bus allows netlink-to-netlink userspace, then they can set NL_NONROOT_SEND. However, by default, I don't think it makes sense to allow to use NETLINK_ROUTE to communicate two processes that are sending no matter what information that is not related to link/neighbouring/routing. They should be using NETLINK_USERSOCK instead for that. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c index 1445d73533ed..527023823b5c 100644 --- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c +++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c @@ -1373,7 +1373,8 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock, dst_pid = addr->nl_pid; dst_group = ffs(addr->nl_groups); err = -EPERM; - if (dst_group && !netlink_capable(sock, NL_NONROOT_SEND)) + if ((dst_group || dst_pid) && + !netlink_capable(sock, NL_NONROOT_SEND)) goto out; } else { dst_pid = nlk->dst_pid; @@ -2147,6 +2148,7 @@ static void __init netlink_add_usersock_entry(void) rcu_assign_pointer(nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].listeners, listeners); nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].module = THIS_MODULE; nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].registered = 1; + nl_table[NETLINK_USERSOCK].nl_nonroot = NL_NONROOT_SEND; netlink_table_ungrab(); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7c4a56fec379ac0d7754e0d4da6a7361f1a4fe64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yuchung Cheng Date: Thu, 23 Aug 2012 07:05:17 +0000 Subject: tcp: fix cwnd reduction for non-sack recovery The cwnd reduction in fast recovery is based on the number of packets newly delivered per ACK. For non-sack connections every DUPACK signifies a packet has been delivered, but the sender mistakenly skips counting them for cwnd reduction. The fix is to compute newly_acked_sacked after DUPACKs are accounted in sacked_out for non-sack connections. Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng Acked-by: Nandita Dukkipati Acked-by: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 15 +++++++-------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 85308b90df80..6e38c6c23caa 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -2926,13 +2926,14 @@ static void tcp_enter_recovery(struct sock *sk, bool ece_ack) * tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue(). */ static void tcp_fastretrans_alert(struct sock *sk, int pkts_acked, - int newly_acked_sacked, bool is_dupack, + int prior_sacked, bool is_dupack, int flag) { struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); int do_lost = is_dupack || ((flag & FLAG_DATA_SACKED) && (tcp_fackets_out(tp) > tp->reordering)); + int newly_acked_sacked = 0; int fast_rexmit = 0; if (WARN_ON(!tp->packets_out && tp->sacked_out)) @@ -2992,6 +2993,7 @@ static void tcp_fastretrans_alert(struct sock *sk, int pkts_acked, tcp_add_reno_sack(sk); } else do_lost = tcp_try_undo_partial(sk, pkts_acked); + newly_acked_sacked = pkts_acked + tp->sacked_out - prior_sacked; break; case TCP_CA_Loss: if (flag & FLAG_DATA_ACKED) @@ -3013,6 +3015,7 @@ static void tcp_fastretrans_alert(struct sock *sk, int pkts_acked, if (is_dupack) tcp_add_reno_sack(sk); } + newly_acked_sacked = pkts_acked + tp->sacked_out - prior_sacked; if (icsk->icsk_ca_state <= TCP_CA_Disorder) tcp_try_undo_dsack(sk); @@ -3590,7 +3593,6 @@ static int tcp_ack(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, int flag) int prior_packets; int prior_sacked = tp->sacked_out; int pkts_acked = 0; - int newly_acked_sacked = 0; bool frto_cwnd = false; /* If the ack is older than previous acks @@ -3666,8 +3668,6 @@ static int tcp_ack(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, int flag) flag |= tcp_clean_rtx_queue(sk, prior_fackets, prior_snd_una); pkts_acked = prior_packets - tp->packets_out; - newly_acked_sacked = (prior_packets - prior_sacked) - - (tp->packets_out - tp->sacked_out); if (tp->frto_counter) frto_cwnd = tcp_process_frto(sk, flag); @@ -3681,7 +3681,7 @@ static int tcp_ack(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, int flag) tcp_may_raise_cwnd(sk, flag)) tcp_cong_avoid(sk, ack, prior_in_flight); is_dupack = !(flag & (FLAG_SND_UNA_ADVANCED | FLAG_NOT_DUP)); - tcp_fastretrans_alert(sk, pkts_acked, newly_acked_sacked, + tcp_fastretrans_alert(sk, pkts_acked, prior_sacked, is_dupack, flag); } else { if ((flag & FLAG_DATA_ACKED) && !frto_cwnd) @@ -3698,7 +3698,7 @@ static int tcp_ack(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, int flag) no_queue: /* If data was DSACKed, see if we can undo a cwnd reduction. */ if (flag & FLAG_DSACKING_ACK) - tcp_fastretrans_alert(sk, pkts_acked, newly_acked_sacked, + tcp_fastretrans_alert(sk, pkts_acked, prior_sacked, is_dupack, flag); /* If this ack opens up a zero window, clear backoff. It was * being used to time the probes, and is probably far higher than @@ -3718,8 +3718,7 @@ old_ack: */ if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked) { flag |= tcp_sacktag_write_queue(sk, skb, prior_snd_una); - newly_acked_sacked = tp->sacked_out - prior_sacked; - tcp_fastretrans_alert(sk, pkts_acked, newly_acked_sacked, + tcp_fastretrans_alert(sk, pkts_acked, prior_sacked, is_dupack, flag); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From cc110922da7e902b62d18641a370fec01a9fa794 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vinicius Costa Gomes Date: Thu, 23 Aug 2012 21:32:43 -0300 Subject: Bluetooth: Change signature of smp_conn_security() To make it clear that it may be called from contexts that may not have any knowledge of L2CAP, we change the connection parameter, to receive a hci_conn. This also makes it clear that it is checking the security of the link. Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan --- include/net/bluetooth/smp.h | 2 +- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 11 ++++++----- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 2 +- net/bluetooth/smp.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h index ca356a734920..8b27927b2a55 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ struct smp_chan { }; /* SMP Commands */ -int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level); +int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level); int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb); int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force); int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index daa149b7003c..4ea1710a4783 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -1199,14 +1199,15 @@ clean: static void l2cap_conn_ready(struct l2cap_conn *conn) { struct l2cap_chan *chan; + struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); - if (!conn->hcon->out && conn->hcon->type == LE_LINK) + if (!hcon->out && hcon->type == LE_LINK) l2cap_le_conn_ready(conn); - if (conn->hcon->out && conn->hcon->type == LE_LINK) - smp_conn_security(conn, conn->hcon->pending_sec_level); + if (hcon->out && hcon->type == LE_LINK) + smp_conn_security(hcon, hcon->pending_sec_level); mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock); @@ -1219,8 +1220,8 @@ static void l2cap_conn_ready(struct l2cap_conn *conn) continue; } - if (conn->hcon->type == LE_LINK) { - if (smp_conn_security(conn, chan->sec_level)) + if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) { + if (smp_conn_security(hcon, chan->sec_level)) l2cap_chan_ready(chan); } else if (chan->chan_type != L2CAP_CHAN_CONN_ORIENTED) { diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c index b94abd30e6f9..45cb0b0dd2c7 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c @@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, ch break; } - if (smp_conn_security(conn, sec.level)) + if (smp_conn_security(conn->hcon, sec.level)) break; sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG; chan->state = BT_CONFIG; diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index 98ffc1b6a6fa..8c225ef349cd 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -760,9 +760,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) return 0; } -int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level) +int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) { - struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; + struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data; struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan; __u8 authreq; -- cgit v1.2.3 From d8343f125710fb596f7a88cd756679f14f4e77b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vinicius Costa Gomes Date: Thu, 23 Aug 2012 21:32:44 -0300 Subject: Bluetooth: Fix sending a HCI Authorization Request over LE links MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In the case that the link is already in the connected state and a Pairing request arrives from the mgmt interface, hci_conn_security() would be called but it was not considering LE links. Reported-by: João Paulo Rechi Vita Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan --- net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c index 5ad7da217474..3c094e78dde9 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include static void hci_le_connect(struct hci_conn *conn) { @@ -619,6 +620,9 @@ int hci_conn_security(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level, __u8 auth_type) { BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn); + if (conn->type == LE_LINK) + return smp_conn_security(conn, sec_level); + /* For sdp we don't need the link key. */ if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP) return 1; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 072a9c48600409d72aeb0d5b29fbb75861a06631 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amerigo Wang Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 21:41:11 +0000 Subject: netpoll: revert 6bdb7fe3104 and fix be_poll() instead Against -net. In the patch "netpoll: re-enable irq in poll_napi()", I tried to fix the following warning: [100718.051041] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [100718.051048] WARNING: at kernel/softirq.c:159 local_bh_enable_ip+0x7d/0xb0() (Not tainted) [100718.051049] Hardware name: ProLiant BL460c G7 ... [100718.051068] Call Trace: [100718.051073] [] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x87/0xc0 [100718.051075] [] ? warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20 [100718.051077] [] ? local_bh_enable_ip+0x7d/0xb0 [100718.051080] [] ? _spin_unlock_bh+0x1b/0x20 [100718.051085] [] ? be_process_mcc+0x74/0x230 [be2net] [100718.051088] [] ? be_poll_tx_mcc+0x16c/0x290 [be2net] [100718.051090] [] ? netpoll_poll_dev+0xd6/0x490 [100718.051095] [] ? bond_poll_controller+0x75/0x80 [bonding] [100718.051097] [] ? netpoll_poll_dev+0x45/0x490 [100718.051100] [] ? ksize+0x19/0x80 [100718.051102] [] ? netpoll_send_skb_on_dev+0x157/0x240 by reenabling IRQ before calling ->poll, but it seems more problems are introduced after that patch: http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/stuff/IMG_20120824_122054.jpg http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=134563282530588&w=2 So it is safe to fix be2net driver code directly. This patch reverts the offending commit and fixes be_poll() by avoid disabling BH there, this is okay because be_poll() can be called either by poll_napi() which already disables IRQ, or by net_rx_action() which already disables BH. Reported-by: Andrew Morton Reported-by: Sylvain Munaut Cc: Sylvain Munaut Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: David Miller Cc: Sathya Perla Cc: Subbu Seetharaman Cc: Ajit Khaparde Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Tested-by: Sylvain Munaut Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c | 6 ++++-- drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c | 2 ++ net/core/netpoll.c | 10 +--------- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c index 7fac97b4bb59..8c63d06ab12b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_cmds.c @@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ int be_process_mcc(struct be_adapter *adapter) int num = 0, status = 0; struct be_mcc_obj *mcc_obj = &adapter->mcc_obj; - spin_lock_bh(&adapter->mcc_cq_lock); + spin_lock(&adapter->mcc_cq_lock); while ((compl = be_mcc_compl_get(adapter))) { if (compl->flags & CQE_FLAGS_ASYNC_MASK) { /* Interpret flags as an async trailer */ @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ int be_process_mcc(struct be_adapter *adapter) if (num) be_cq_notify(adapter, mcc_obj->cq.id, mcc_obj->rearm_cq, num); - spin_unlock_bh(&adapter->mcc_cq_lock); + spin_unlock(&adapter->mcc_cq_lock); return status; } @@ -295,7 +295,9 @@ static int be_mcc_wait_compl(struct be_adapter *adapter) if (be_error(adapter)) return -EIO; + local_bh_disable(); status = be_process_mcc(adapter); + local_bh_enable(); if (atomic_read(&mcc_obj->q.used) == 0) break; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c index 90a903d83d87..78b8aa8069f0 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c @@ -3763,7 +3763,9 @@ static void be_worker(struct work_struct *work) /* when interrupts are not yet enabled, just reap any pending * mcc completions */ if (!netif_running(adapter->netdev)) { + local_bh_disable(); be_process_mcc(adapter); + local_bh_enable(); goto reschedule; } diff --git a/net/core/netpoll.c b/net/core/netpoll.c index 346b1eb83a1f..e4ba3e70c174 100644 --- a/net/core/netpoll.c +++ b/net/core/netpoll.c @@ -168,24 +168,16 @@ static void poll_napi(struct net_device *dev) struct napi_struct *napi; int budget = 16; - WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled()); - list_for_each_entry(napi, &dev->napi_list, dev_list) { - local_irq_enable(); if (napi->poll_owner != smp_processor_id() && spin_trylock(&napi->poll_lock)) { - rcu_read_lock_bh(); budget = poll_one_napi(rcu_dereference_bh(dev->npinfo), napi, budget); - rcu_read_unlock_bh(); spin_unlock(&napi->poll_lock); - if (!budget) { - local_irq_disable(); + if (!budget) break; - } } - local_irq_disable(); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0a54e939d8c2647c711ef2369c3e73c3b7f3028c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julia Lawall Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2012 06:49:11 +0000 Subject: ipvs: fix error return code Initialize return variable before exiting on an error path. A simplified version of the semantic match that finds this problem is as follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/) // ( if@p1 (\(ret < 0\|ret != 0\)) { ... return ret; } | ret@p1 = 0 ) ... when != ret = e1 when != &ret *if(...) { ... when != ret = e2 when forall return ret; } // Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall Acked-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c index 72bf32a84874..f51013c07b9f 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c @@ -1171,8 +1171,10 @@ ip_vs_add_service(struct net *net, struct ip_vs_service_user_kern *u, goto out_err; } svc->stats.cpustats = alloc_percpu(struct ip_vs_cpu_stats); - if (!svc->stats.cpustats) + if (!svc->stats.cpustats) { + ret = -ENOMEM; goto out_err; + } /* I'm the first user of the service */ atomic_set(&svc->usecnt, 0); -- cgit v1.2.3 From ef6acf68c259d907517dcc0ffefcd4e30276ae29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julia Lawall Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2012 06:49:16 +0000 Subject: netfilter: ctnetlink: fix error return code in init path Initialize return variable before exiting on an error path. A simplified version of the semantic match that finds this problem is as follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/) // ( if@p1 (\(ret < 0\|ret != 0\)) { ... return ret; } | ret@p1 = 0 ) ... when != ret = e1 when != &ret *if(...) { ... when != ret = e2 when forall return ret; } // Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c index da4fc37a8578..9807f3278fcb 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c @@ -2790,7 +2790,8 @@ static int __init ctnetlink_init(void) goto err_unreg_subsys; } - if (register_pernet_subsys(&ctnetlink_net_ops)) { + ret = register_pernet_subsys(&ctnetlink_net_ops); + if (ret < 0) { pr_err("ctnetlink_init: cannot register pernet operations\n"); goto err_unreg_exp_subsys; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6fc09f10f12477bdaa54e94f9cb428bef6d81315 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julia Lawall Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2012 06:49:17 +0000 Subject: netfilter: nfnetlink_log: fix error return code in init path Initialize return variable before exiting on an error path. A simplified version of the semantic match that finds this problem is as follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/) // ( if@p1 (\(ret < 0\|ret != 0\)) { ... return ret; } | ret@p1 = 0 ) ... when != ret = e1 when != &ret *if(...) { ... when != ret = e2 when forall return ret; } // Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c index 592091c1260b..14e2f3903142 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c @@ -996,8 +996,10 @@ static int __init nfnetlink_log_init(void) #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS if (!proc_create("nfnetlink_log", 0440, - proc_net_netfilter, &nful_file_ops)) + proc_net_netfilter, &nful_file_ops)) { + status = -ENOMEM; goto cleanup_logger; + } #endif return status; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3f509c689a07a4aa989b426893d8491a7ffcc410 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2012 15:24:09 +0000 Subject: netfilter: nf_nat_sip: fix incorrect handling of EBUSY for RTCP expectation We're hitting bug while trying to reinsert an already existing expectation: kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:895! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [...] Call Trace: [] nf_ct_expect_related_report+0x4a0/0x57a [nf_conntrack] [] ? in4_pton+0x72/0x131 [] ip_nat_sdp_media+0xeb/0x185 [nf_nat_sip] [] set_expected_rtp_rtcp+0x32d/0x39b [nf_conntrack_sip] [] process_sdp+0x30c/0x3ec [nf_conntrack_sip] [] ? irq_exit+0x9a/0x9c [] ? ip_nat_sdp_media+0x185/0x185 [nf_nat_sip] We have to remove the RTP expectation if the RTCP expectation hits EBUSY since we keep trying with other ports until we succeed. Reported-by: Rafal Fitt Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c index 4ad9cf173992..9c87cde28ff8 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c @@ -502,7 +502,10 @@ static unsigned int ip_nat_sdp_media(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int dataoff, ret = nf_ct_expect_related(rtcp_exp); if (ret == 0) break; - else if (ret != -EBUSY) { + else if (ret == -EBUSY) { + nf_ct_unexpect_related(rtp_exp); + continue; + } else if (ret < 0) { nf_ct_unexpect_related(rtp_exp); port = 0; break; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 99469c32f79a32d8481f87be0d3c66dad286f4ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "xeb@mail.ru" Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 01:07:38 +0000 Subject: l2tp: avoid to use synchronize_rcu in tunnel free function Avoid to use synchronize_rcu in l2tp_tunnel_free because context may be atomic. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kozlov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 3 +-- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c index 393355d37b47..513cab08a986 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c @@ -1347,11 +1347,10 @@ static void l2tp_tunnel_free(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel) /* Remove from tunnel list */ spin_lock_bh(&pn->l2tp_tunnel_list_lock); list_del_rcu(&tunnel->list); + kfree_rcu(tunnel, rcu); spin_unlock_bh(&pn->l2tp_tunnel_list_lock); - synchronize_rcu(); atomic_dec(&l2tp_tunnel_count); - kfree(tunnel); } /* Create a socket for the tunnel, if one isn't set up by diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h index a38ec6cdeee1..56d583e083a7 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h @@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ struct l2tp_tunnel_cfg { struct l2tp_tunnel { int magic; /* Should be L2TP_TUNNEL_MAGIC */ + struct rcu_head rcu; rwlock_t hlist_lock; /* protect session_hlist */ struct hlist_head session_hlist[L2TP_HASH_SIZE]; /* hashed list of sessions, -- cgit v1.2.3 From acbb219d5f53821b2d0080d047800410c0420ea1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Francesco Ruggeri Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 07:38:35 +0000 Subject: net: ipv4: ipmr_expire_timer causes crash when removing net namespace When tearing down a net namespace, ipv4 mr_table structures are freed without first deactivating their timers. This can result in a crash in run_timer_softirq. This patch mimics the corresponding behaviour in ipv6. Locking and synchronization seem to be adequate. We are about to kfree mrt, so existing code should already make sure that no other references to mrt are pending or can be created by incoming traffic. The functions invoked here do not cause new references to mrt or other race conditions to be created. Invoking del_timer_sync guarantees that ipmr_expire_timer is inactive. Both ipmr_expire_process (whose completion we may have to wait in del_timer_sync) and mroute_clean_tables internally use mfc_unres_lock or other synchronizations when needed, and they both only modify mrt. Tested in Linux 3.4.8. Signed-off-by: Francesco Ruggeri Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c index 8eec8f4a0536..ebdf06f938bf 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c @@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(mfc_unres_lock); static struct kmem_cache *mrt_cachep __read_mostly; static struct mr_table *ipmr_new_table(struct net *net, u32 id); +static void ipmr_free_table(struct mr_table *mrt); + static int ip_mr_forward(struct net *net, struct mr_table *mrt, struct sk_buff *skb, struct mfc_cache *cache, int local); @@ -131,6 +133,7 @@ static int ipmr_cache_report(struct mr_table *mrt, struct sk_buff *pkt, vifi_t vifi, int assert); static int __ipmr_fill_mroute(struct mr_table *mrt, struct sk_buff *skb, struct mfc_cache *c, struct rtmsg *rtm); +static void mroute_clean_tables(struct mr_table *mrt); static void ipmr_expire_process(unsigned long arg); #ifdef CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES @@ -271,7 +274,7 @@ static void __net_exit ipmr_rules_exit(struct net *net) list_for_each_entry_safe(mrt, next, &net->ipv4.mr_tables, list) { list_del(&mrt->list); - kfree(mrt); + ipmr_free_table(mrt); } fib_rules_unregister(net->ipv4.mr_rules_ops); } @@ -299,7 +302,7 @@ static int __net_init ipmr_rules_init(struct net *net) static void __net_exit ipmr_rules_exit(struct net *net) { - kfree(net->ipv4.mrt); + ipmr_free_table(net->ipv4.mrt); } #endif @@ -336,6 +339,13 @@ static struct mr_table *ipmr_new_table(struct net *net, u32 id) return mrt; } +static void ipmr_free_table(struct mr_table *mrt) +{ + del_timer_sync(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer); + mroute_clean_tables(mrt); + kfree(mrt); +} + /* Service routines creating virtual interfaces: DVMRP tunnels and PIMREG */ static void ipmr_del_tunnel(struct net_device *dev, struct vifctl *v) -- cgit v1.2.3 From c5ae7d41927dbd208c885d4794e30617ad6cdf12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 28 Aug 2012 12:33:07 +0000 Subject: ipv4: must use rcu protection while calling fib_lookup Following lockdep splat was reported by Pavel Roskin : [ 1570.586223] =============================== [ 1570.586225] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] [ 1570.586228] 3.6.0-rc3-wl-main #98 Not tainted [ 1570.586229] ------------------------------- [ 1570.586231] /home/proski/src/linux/net/ipv4/route.c:645 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 1570.586233] [ 1570.586233] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1570.586233] [ 1570.586236] [ 1570.586236] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 [ 1570.586238] 2 locks held by Chrome_IOThread/4467: [ 1570.586240] #0: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [] release_sock+0x2c/0xa0 [ 1570.586253] #1: (fnhe_lock){+.-...}, at: [] update_or_create_fnhe+0x2c/0x270 [ 1570.586260] [ 1570.586260] stack backtrace: [ 1570.586263] Pid: 4467, comm: Chrome_IOThread Not tainted 3.6.0-rc3-wl-main #98 [ 1570.586265] Call Trace: [ 1570.586271] [] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfd/0x130 [ 1570.586275] [] update_or_create_fnhe+0x15c/0x270 [ 1570.586278] [] __ip_rt_update_pmtu+0x73/0xb0 [ 1570.586282] [] ip_rt_update_pmtu+0x29/0x90 [ 1570.586285] [] inet_csk_update_pmtu+0x2c/0x80 [ 1570.586290] [] tcp_v4_mtu_reduced+0x2e/0xc0 [ 1570.586293] [] tcp_release_cb+0xa4/0xb0 [ 1570.586296] [] release_sock+0x55/0xa0 [ 1570.586300] [] tcp_sendmsg+0x4af/0xf50 [ 1570.586305] [] inet_sendmsg+0x120/0x230 [ 1570.586308] [] ? inet_sk_rebuild_header+0x40/0x40 [ 1570.586312] [] ? sock_update_classid+0xbd/0x3b0 [ 1570.586315] [] ? sock_update_classid+0x130/0x3b0 [ 1570.586320] [] do_sock_write+0xc5/0xe0 [ 1570.586323] [] sock_aio_write+0x53/0x80 [ 1570.586328] [] do_sync_write+0xa3/0xe0 [ 1570.586332] [] vfs_write+0x165/0x180 [ 1570.586335] [] sys_write+0x45/0x90 [ 1570.586340] [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Pavel Roskin Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/route.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c index 24fd4c596643..82cf2a722b23 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c @@ -934,12 +934,14 @@ static u32 __ip_rt_update_pmtu(struct rtable *rt, struct flowi4 *fl4, u32 mtu) if (mtu < ip_rt_min_pmtu) mtu = ip_rt_min_pmtu; + rcu_read_lock(); if (fib_lookup(dev_net(rt->dst.dev), fl4, &res) == 0) { struct fib_nh *nh = &FIB_RES_NH(res); update_or_create_fnhe(nh, fl4->daddr, 0, mtu, jiffies + ip_rt_mtu_expires); } + rcu_read_unlock(); return mtu; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5b423f6a40a0327f9d40bc8b97ce9be266f74368 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2012 16:25:49 +0000 Subject: netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix racy timer handling with reliable events Existing code assumes that del_timer returns true for alive conntrack entries. However, this is not true if reliable events are enabled. In that case, del_timer may return true for entries that were just inserted in the dying list. Note that packets / ctnetlink may hold references to conntrack entries that were just inserted to such list. This patch fixes the issue by adding an independent timer for event delivery. This increases the size of the ecache extension. Still we can revisit this later and use variable size extensions to allocate this area on demand. Tested-by: Oliver Smith Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.h | 1 + net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.h index e1ce1048fe5f..4a045cda9c60 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.h @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct nf_conntrack_ecache { u16 ctmask; /* bitmask of ct events to be delivered */ u16 expmask; /* bitmask of expect events to be delivered */ u32 pid; /* netlink pid of destroyer */ + struct timer_list timeout; }; static inline struct nf_conntrack_ecache * diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index cf4875565d67..2ceec64b19f9 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -249,12 +249,15 @@ static void death_by_event(unsigned long ul_conntrack) { struct nf_conn *ct = (void *)ul_conntrack; struct net *net = nf_ct_net(ct); + struct nf_conntrack_ecache *ecache = nf_ct_ecache_find(ct); + + BUG_ON(ecache == NULL); if (nf_conntrack_event(IPCT_DESTROY, ct) < 0) { /* bad luck, let's retry again */ - ct->timeout.expires = jiffies + + ecache->timeout.expires = jiffies + (random32() % net->ct.sysctl_events_retry_timeout); - add_timer(&ct->timeout); + add_timer(&ecache->timeout); return; } /* we've got the event delivered, now it's dying */ @@ -268,6 +271,9 @@ static void death_by_event(unsigned long ul_conntrack) void nf_ct_insert_dying_list(struct nf_conn *ct) { struct net *net = nf_ct_net(ct); + struct nf_conntrack_ecache *ecache = nf_ct_ecache_find(ct); + + BUG_ON(ecache == NULL); /* add this conntrack to the dying list */ spin_lock_bh(&nf_conntrack_lock); @@ -275,10 +281,10 @@ void nf_ct_insert_dying_list(struct nf_conn *ct) &net->ct.dying); spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_lock); /* set a new timer to retry event delivery */ - setup_timer(&ct->timeout, death_by_event, (unsigned long)ct); - ct->timeout.expires = jiffies + + setup_timer(&ecache->timeout, death_by_event, (unsigned long)ct); + ecache->timeout.expires = jiffies + (random32() % net->ct.sysctl_events_retry_timeout); - add_timer(&ct->timeout); + add_timer(&ecache->timeout); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_ct_insert_dying_list); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 48f125ce1cc3ff275f9587b5bf56bf0f90766c7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julia Lawall Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2012 06:49:12 +0000 Subject: net: ipv6: fix error return code Initialize return variable before exiting on an error path. The initial initialization of the return variable is also dropped, because that value is never used. A simplified version of the semantic match that finds this problem is as follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/) // ( if@p1 (\(ret < 0\|ret != 0\)) { ... return ret; } | ret@p1 = 0 ) ... when != ret = e1 when != &ret *if(...) { ... when != ret = e2 when forall return ret; } // Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/esp6.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6.c b/net/ipv6/esp6.c index 6dc7fd353ef5..282f3723ee19 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/esp6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/esp6.c @@ -167,8 +167,6 @@ static int esp6_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) struct esp_data *esp = x->data; /* skb is pure payload to encrypt */ - err = -ENOMEM; - aead = esp->aead; alen = crypto_aead_authsize(aead); @@ -203,8 +201,10 @@ static int esp6_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) } tmp = esp_alloc_tmp(aead, nfrags + sglists, seqhilen); - if (!tmp) + if (!tmp) { + err = -ENOMEM; goto error; + } seqhi = esp_tmp_seqhi(tmp); iv = esp_tmp_iv(aead, tmp, seqhilen); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 599901c3e4204e9d9c5a24df5402cd91617a2a26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julia Lawall Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2012 06:49:15 +0000 Subject: net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c: fix error return code Initialize return variable before exiting on an error path. A simplified version of the semantic match that finds this problem is as follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/) // ( if@p1 (\(ret < 0\|ret != 0\)) { ... return ret; } | ret@p1 = 0 ) ... when != ret = e1 when != &ret *if(...) { ... when != ret = e2 when forall return ret; } // Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c index 87cd0e4d4282..210be48d8ae3 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c @@ -1994,8 +1994,10 @@ int __xfrm_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x, bool init_replay) goto error; x->outer_mode = xfrm_get_mode(x->props.mode, family); - if (x->outer_mode == NULL) + if (x->outer_mode == NULL) { + err = -EPROTONOSUPPORT; goto error; + } if (init_replay) { err = xfrm_init_replay(x); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 39855b5ba9a72a80de96009011b7f8b2fb01612b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Stringer Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2012 15:28:28 -0700 Subject: openvswitch: Fix typo Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross --- net/openvswitch/actions.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/openvswitch/actions.c b/net/openvswitch/actions.c index f3f96badf5aa..954405ceae9e 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/actions.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/actions.c @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static int make_writable(struct sk_buff *skb, int write_len) return pskb_expand_head(skb, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC); } -/* remove VLAN header from packet and update csum accrodingly. */ +/* remove VLAN header from packet and update csum accordingly. */ static int __pop_vlan_tci(struct sk_buff *skb, __be16 *current_tci) { struct vlan_hdr *vhdr; -- cgit v1.2.3 From e812347ccf9e8ce073b0ba0c49d03b124707b2b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Sun, 2 Sep 2012 23:57:18 +0000 Subject: net: sock_edemux() should take care of timewait sockets sock_edemux() can handle either a regular socket or a timewait socket Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sock.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 8f67ced8d6a8..7f64467535d1 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -1523,7 +1523,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_rfree); void sock_edemux(struct sk_buff *skb) { - sock_put(skb->sk); + struct sock *sk = skb->sk; + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) + inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk)); + else + sock_put(sk); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_edemux); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4c3a5bdae293f75cdf729c6c00124e8489af2276 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Graf Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2012 04:27:42 +0000 Subject: sctp: Don't charge for data in sndbuf again when transmitting packet SCTP charges wmem_alloc via sctp_set_owner_w() in sctp_sendmsg() and via skb_set_owner_w() in sctp_packet_transmit(). If a sender runs out of sndbuf it will sleep in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() and expects to be waken up by __sctp_write_space(). Buffer space charged via sctp_set_owner_w() is released in sctp_wfree() which calls __sctp_write_space() directly. Buffer space charged via skb_set_owner_w() is released via sock_wfree() which calls sk->sk_write_space() _if_ SOCK_USE_WRITE_QUEUE is not set. sctp_endpoint_init() sets SOCK_USE_WRITE_QUEUE on all sockets. Therefore if sctp_packet_transmit() manages to queue up more than sndbuf bytes, sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() will never be woken up again unless it is interrupted by a signal. This could be fixed by clearing the SOCK_USE_WRITE_QUEUE flag but ... Charging for the data twice does not make sense in the first place, it leads to overcharging sndbuf by a factor 2. Therefore this patch only charges a single byte in wmem_alloc when transmitting an SCTP packet to ensure that the socket stays alive until the packet has been released. This means that control chunks are no longer accounted for in wmem_alloc which I believe is not a problem as skb->truesize will typically lead to overcharging anyway and thus compensates for any control overhead. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf CC: Vlad Yasevich CC: Neil Horman CC: David Miller Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sctp/output.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sctp/output.c b/net/sctp/output.c index 838e18b4d7ea..be50aa234dcd 100644 --- a/net/sctp/output.c +++ b/net/sctp/output.c @@ -364,6 +364,25 @@ finish: return retval; } +static void sctp_packet_release_owner(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + sk_free(skb->sk); +} + +static void sctp_packet_set_owner_w(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk) +{ + skb_orphan(skb); + skb->sk = sk; + skb->destructor = sctp_packet_release_owner; + + /* + * The data chunks have already been accounted for in sctp_sendmsg(), + * therefore only reserve a single byte to keep socket around until + * the packet has been transmitted. + */ + atomic_inc(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc); +} + /* All packets are sent to the network through this function from * sctp_outq_tail(). * @@ -405,7 +424,7 @@ int sctp_packet_transmit(struct sctp_packet *packet) /* Set the owning socket so that we know where to get the * destination IP address. */ - skb_set_owner_w(nskb, sk); + sctp_packet_set_owner_w(nskb, sk); if (!sctp_transport_dst_check(tp)) { sctp_transport_route(tp, NULL, sctp_sk(sk)); -- cgit v1.2.3 From b379135c40163ae79ba7a54e6928b53983e74ee8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Sat, 1 Sep 2012 03:19:57 +0000 Subject: fq_codel: dont reinit flow state When fq_codel builds a new flow, it should not reset codel state. Codel algo needs to get previous values (lastcount, drop_next) to get proper behavior. Signed-off-by: Dave Taht Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: Dave Taht Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c b/net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c index 9fc1c62ec80e..4e606fcb2534 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c @@ -191,7 +191,6 @@ static int fq_codel_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch) if (list_empty(&flow->flowchain)) { list_add_tail(&flow->flowchain, &q->new_flows); - codel_vars_init(&flow->cvars); q->new_flow_count++; flow->deficit = q->quantum; flow->dropped = 0; @@ -418,6 +417,7 @@ static int fq_codel_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt) struct fq_codel_flow *flow = q->flows + i; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&flow->flowchain); + codel_vars_init(&flow->cvars); } } if (sch->limit >= 1) -- cgit v1.2.3 From c303aa94cdae483a7577230e61720e126e600a52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jesse Gross Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2012 19:06:27 -0700 Subject: openvswitch: Fix FLOW_BUFSIZE definition. The vlan encapsulation fields in the maximum flow defintion were never updated when the representation changed before upstreaming. In theory this could cause a kernel panic when a maximum length flow is used. In practice this has never happened (to my knowledge) because skb allocations are padded out to a cache line so you would need the right combination of flow and packet being sent to userspace. Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross --- net/openvswitch/flow.h | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/openvswitch/flow.h b/net/openvswitch/flow.h index 9b75617ca4e0..c30df1a10c67 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/flow.h +++ b/net/openvswitch/flow.h @@ -145,15 +145,17 @@ u64 ovs_flow_used_time(unsigned long flow_jiffies); * OVS_KEY_ATTR_PRIORITY 4 -- 4 8 * OVS_KEY_ATTR_IN_PORT 4 -- 4 8 * OVS_KEY_ATTR_ETHERNET 12 -- 4 16 + * OVS_KEY_ATTR_ETHERTYPE 2 2 4 8 (outer VLAN ethertype) * OVS_KEY_ATTR_8021Q 4 -- 4 8 - * OVS_KEY_ATTR_ETHERTYPE 2 2 4 8 + * OVS_KEY_ATTR_ENCAP 0 -- 4 4 (VLAN encapsulation) + * OVS_KEY_ATTR_ETHERTYPE 2 2 4 8 (inner VLAN ethertype) * OVS_KEY_ATTR_IPV6 40 -- 4 44 * OVS_KEY_ATTR_ICMPV6 2 2 4 8 * OVS_KEY_ATTR_ND 28 -- 4 32 * ------------------------------------------------- - * total 132 + * total 144 */ -#define FLOW_BUFSIZE 132 +#define FLOW_BUFSIZE 144 int ovs_flow_to_nlattrs(const struct sw_flow_key *, struct sk_buff *); int ovs_flow_from_nlattrs(struct sw_flow_key *swkey, int *key_lenp, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3d2abdfdf14f4d6decc2023708211e19b096f4ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eliad Peller Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 17:44:45 +0300 Subject: mac80211: clear bssid on auth/assoc failure ifmgd->bssid wasn't cleared properly in some auth/assoc failure cases, causing mac80211 and the low-level driver to go out of sync. Clear ifmgd->bssid on failure, and notify the driver. Cc: stable@kernel.org # 3.4+ Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/mlme.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c index a4a5acdbaa4d..f76b83341cf9 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c @@ -3248,6 +3248,8 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_auth(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, goto out_unlock; err_clear: + memset(ifmgd->bssid, 0, ETH_ALEN); + ieee80211_bss_info_change_notify(sdata, BSS_CHANGED_BSSID); ifmgd->auth_data = NULL; err_free: kfree(auth_data); @@ -3439,6 +3441,8 @@ int ieee80211_mgd_assoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, err = 0; goto out; err_clear: + memset(ifmgd->bssid, 0, ETH_ALEN); + ieee80211_bss_info_change_notify(sdata, BSS_CHANGED_BSSID); ifmgd->assoc_data = NULL; err_free: kfree(assoc_data); -- cgit v1.2.3 From b4e4f47e940bc93c5b1125a4429ff53956754800 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wei Yongjun Date: Sun, 2 Sep 2012 21:41:04 +0800 Subject: nl80211: fix possible memory leak nl80211_connect() connkeys is malloced in nl80211_parse_connkeys() and should be freed in the error handling case, otherwise it will cause memory leak. spatch with a semantic match is used to found this problem. (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/) Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index 97026f3b215a..1e37dbf00cb3 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -5633,8 +5633,10 @@ static int nl80211_connect(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) sizeof(connect.ht_capa_mask)); if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_HT_CAPABILITY]) { - if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_HT_CAPABILITY_MASK]) + if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_HT_CAPABILITY_MASK]) { + kfree(connkeys); return -EINVAL; + } memcpy(&connect.ht_capa, nla_data(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_HT_CAPABILITY]), sizeof(connect.ht_capa)); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6cf5c951175abcec4da470c50565cc0afe6cd11d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alan Cox Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 04:13:18 +0000 Subject: netrom: copy_datagram_iovec can fail Check for an error from this and if so bail properly. Signed-off-by: Alan Cox Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c index 06592d8b4a2b..1b9024ee963c 100644 --- a/net/netrom/af_netrom.c +++ b/net/netrom/af_netrom.c @@ -1169,7 +1169,12 @@ static int nr_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC; } - skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied); + er = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied); + if (er < 0) { + skb_free_datagram(sk, skb); + release_sock(sk); + return er; + } if (sax != NULL) { sax->sax25_family = AF_NETROM; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 37159ef2c1ae1e696b24b260b241209a19f92c60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 07:18:57 +0000 Subject: l2tp: fix a lockdep splat Fixes following lockdep splat : [ 1614.734896] ============================================= [ 1614.734898] [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] [ 1614.734901] 3.6.0-rc3+ #782 Not tainted [ 1614.734903] --------------------------------------------- [ 1614.734905] swapper/11/0 is trying to acquire lock: [ 1614.734907] (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.734920] [ 1614.734920] but task is already holding lock: [ 1614.734922] (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [] tcp_v4_err+0x163/0x6b0 [ 1614.734932] [ 1614.734932] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1614.734935] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 1614.734935] [ 1614.734937] CPU0 [ 1614.734938] ---- [ 1614.734940] lock(slock-AF_INET); [ 1614.734943] lock(slock-AF_INET); [ 1614.734946] [ 1614.734946] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 1614.734946] [ 1614.734949] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 1614.734949] [ 1614.734952] 7 locks held by swapper/11/0: [ 1614.734954] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [] __netif_receive_skb+0x251/0xd00 [ 1614.734964] #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4e0 [ 1614.734972] #2: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [] icmp_socket_deliver+0x46/0x230 [ 1614.734982] #3: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [] tcp_v4_err+0x163/0x6b0 [ 1614.734989] #4: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [] ip_queue_xmit+0x0/0x680 [ 1614.734997] #5: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [] ip_finish_output+0x135/0x890 [ 1614.735004] #6: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [] dev_queue_xmit+0x0/0xe00 [ 1614.735012] [ 1614.735012] stack backtrace: [ 1614.735016] Pid: 0, comm: swapper/11 Not tainted 3.6.0-rc3+ #782 [ 1614.735018] Call Trace: [ 1614.735020] [] __lock_acquire+0x144c/0x1b10 [ 1614.735033] [] ? check_usage+0x9b/0x4d0 [ 1614.735037] [] ? mark_held_locks+0x82/0x130 [ 1614.735042] [] lock_acquire+0x90/0x200 [ 1614.735047] [] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.735051] [] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 1614.735060] [] _raw_spin_lock+0x41/0x50 [ 1614.735065] [] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.735069] [] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.735075] [] l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x32/0x60 [l2tp_eth] [ 1614.735079] [] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x502/0xa70 [ 1614.735083] [] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5e/0xa70 [ 1614.735087] [] ? dev_queue_xmit+0x141/0xe00 [ 1614.735093] [] sch_direct_xmit+0xfe/0x290 [ 1614.735098] [] dev_queue_xmit+0x1e5/0xe00 [ 1614.735102] [] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa70/0xa70 [ 1614.735106] [] ? eth_header+0x3a/0xf0 [ 1614.735111] [] ? fib_get_table+0x2e/0x280 [ 1614.735117] [] arp_xmit+0x22/0x60 [ 1614.735121] [] arp_send+0x43/0x50 [ 1614.735125] [] arp_solicit+0x18f/0x450 [ 1614.735132] [] neigh_probe+0x4a/0x70 [ 1614.735137] [] __neigh_event_send+0xea/0x300 [ 1614.735141] [] neigh_resolve_output+0x163/0x260 [ 1614.735146] [] ip_finish_output+0x505/0x890 [ 1614.735150] [] ? ip_finish_output+0x135/0x890 [ 1614.735154] [] ip_output+0x59/0xf0 [ 1614.735158] [] ip_local_out+0x2d/0xa0 [ 1614.735162] [] ip_queue_xmit+0x1c3/0x680 [ 1614.735165] [] ? ip_local_out+0xa0/0xa0 [ 1614.735172] [] tcp_transmit_skb+0x402/0xa60 [ 1614.735177] [] tcp_retransmit_skb+0x1a1/0x620 [ 1614.735181] [] tcp_retransmit_timer+0x393/0x960 [ 1614.735185] [] ? tcp_v4_err+0x163/0x6b0 [ 1614.735189] [] tcp_v4_err+0x657/0x6b0 [ 1614.735194] [] ? icmp_socket_deliver+0x46/0x230 [ 1614.735199] [] icmp_socket_deliver+0xce/0x230 [ 1614.735203] [] ? icmp_socket_deliver+0x46/0x230 [ 1614.735208] [] icmp_unreach+0xe4/0x2c0 [ 1614.735213] [] icmp_rcv+0x350/0x4a0 [ 1614.735217] [] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x135/0x4e0 [ 1614.735221] [] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4e0 [ 1614.735225] [] ip_local_deliver+0x4a/0x90 [ 1614.735229] [] ip_rcv_finish+0x187/0x730 [ 1614.735233] [] ip_rcv+0x21d/0x300 [ 1614.735237] [] __netif_receive_skb+0x46b/0xd00 [ 1614.735241] [] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x251/0xd00 [ 1614.735245] [] process_backlog+0xb8/0x180 [ 1614.735249] [] net_rx_action+0x159/0x330 [ 1614.735257] [] __do_softirq+0xd0/0x3e0 [ 1614.735264] [] ? tick_program_event+0x24/0x30 [ 1614.735270] [] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30 [ 1614.735278] [] do_softirq+0x8d/0xc0 [ 1614.735282] [] irq_exit+0xae/0xe0 [ 1614.735287] [] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x99 [ 1614.735291] [] apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80 [ 1614.735293] [] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10 [ 1614.735306] [] ? intel_idle+0xf5/0x150 [ 1614.735310] [] ? intel_idle+0xee/0x150 [ 1614.735317] [] cpuidle_enter+0x19/0x20 [ 1614.735321] [] cpuidle_idle_call+0xa8/0x630 [ 1614.735327] [] cpu_idle+0x8a/0xe0 [ 1614.735333] [] start_secondary+0x220/0x222 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c index 513cab08a986..1a9f3723c13c 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c @@ -1501,6 +1501,8 @@ out: return err; } +static struct lock_class_key l2tp_socket_class; + int l2tp_tunnel_create(struct net *net, int fd, int version, u32 tunnel_id, u32 peer_tunnel_id, struct l2tp_tunnel_cfg *cfg, struct l2tp_tunnel **tunnelp) { struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = NULL; @@ -1605,6 +1607,8 @@ int l2tp_tunnel_create(struct net *net, int fd, int version, u32 tunnel_id, u32 tunnel->old_sk_destruct = sk->sk_destruct; sk->sk_destruct = &l2tp_tunnel_destruct; tunnel->sock = sk; + lockdep_set_class_and_name(&sk->sk_lock.slock, &l2tp_socket_class, "l2tp_sock"); + sk->sk_allocation = GFP_ATOMIC; /* Add tunnel to our list */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3b59df46a449ec9975146d71318c4777ad086744 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steffen Klassert Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 00:03:29 +0000 Subject: xfrm: Workaround incompatibility of ESN and async crypto ESN for esp is defined in RFC 4303. This RFC assumes that the sequence number counters are always up to date. However, this is not true if an async crypto algorithm is employed. If the sequence number counters are not up to date on sequence number check, we may incorrectly update the upper 32 bit of the sequence number. This leads to a DOS. We workaround this by comparing the upper sequence number, (used for authentication) with the upper sequence number computed after the async processing. We drop the packet if these numbers are different. To do this, we introduce a recheck function that does this check in the ESN case. Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Acked-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/xfrm.h | 3 +++ net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h index 976a81abe1a2..639dd1316d37 100644 --- a/include/net/xfrm.h +++ b/include/net/xfrm.h @@ -273,6 +273,9 @@ struct xfrm_replay { int (*check)(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 net_seq); + int (*recheck)(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct sk_buff *skb, + __be32 net_seq); void (*notify)(struct xfrm_state *x, int event); int (*overflow)(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb); }; diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c index 54a0dc2e2f8d..ab2bb42fe094 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ resume: /* only the first xfrm gets the encap type */ encap_type = 0; - if (async && x->repl->check(x, skb, seq)) { + if (async && x->repl->recheck(x, skb, seq)) { XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATESEQERROR); goto drop_unlock; } diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c index 2f6d11d04a2b..3efb07d3eb27 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c @@ -420,6 +420,18 @@ err: return -EINVAL; } +static int xfrm_replay_recheck_esn(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 net_seq) +{ + if (unlikely(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.input.hi != + htonl(xfrm_replay_seqhi(x, net_seq)))) { + x->stats.replay_window++; + return -EINVAL; + } + + return xfrm_replay_check_esn(x, skb, net_seq); +} + static void xfrm_replay_advance_esn(struct xfrm_state *x, __be32 net_seq) { unsigned int bitnr, nr, i; @@ -479,6 +491,7 @@ static void xfrm_replay_advance_esn(struct xfrm_state *x, __be32 net_seq) static struct xfrm_replay xfrm_replay_legacy = { .advance = xfrm_replay_advance, .check = xfrm_replay_check, + .recheck = xfrm_replay_check, .notify = xfrm_replay_notify, .overflow = xfrm_replay_overflow, }; @@ -486,6 +499,7 @@ static struct xfrm_replay xfrm_replay_legacy = { static struct xfrm_replay xfrm_replay_bmp = { .advance = xfrm_replay_advance_bmp, .check = xfrm_replay_check_bmp, + .recheck = xfrm_replay_check_bmp, .notify = xfrm_replay_notify_bmp, .overflow = xfrm_replay_overflow_bmp, }; @@ -493,6 +507,7 @@ static struct xfrm_replay xfrm_replay_bmp = { static struct xfrm_replay xfrm_replay_esn = { .advance = xfrm_replay_advance_esn, .check = xfrm_replay_check_esn, + .recheck = xfrm_replay_recheck_esn, .notify = xfrm_replay_notify_bmp, .overflow = xfrm_replay_overflow_esn, }; -- cgit v1.2.3 From c0cc88a7627c333de50b07b7c60b1d49d9d2e6cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 15:54:55 -0400 Subject: l2tp: fix a typo in l2tp_eth_dev_recv() While investigating l2tp bug, I hit a bug in eth_type_trans(), because not enough bytes were pulled in skb head. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/l2tp/l2tp_eth.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_eth.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_eth.c index f9ee74deeac2..3bfb34aaee29 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_eth.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_eth.c @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static void l2tp_eth_dev_recv(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb, print_hex_dump_bytes("", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, skb->data, length); } - if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(ETH_HLEN))) + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, ETH_HLEN)) goto error; secpath_reset(skb); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7ce8c7a3433c6d6f4adfec0611d250782f0b4b0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: LEO Airwarosu Yoichi Shinoda Date: Mon, 27 Aug 2012 22:28:16 +0900 Subject: mac80211: Various small fixes for cfg.c: mpath_set_pinfo() Various small fixes for net/mac80211/cfg.c:mpath_set_pinfo(): Initialize *pinfo before filling members in, handle MESH_PATH_RESOLVED correctly, and remove bogus assignment; result in correct display of FLAGS values and meaningful EXPTIME for expired paths in iw utility. Signed-off-by: Yoichi Shinoda Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/cfg.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/cfg.c b/net/mac80211/cfg.c index d41974aacf51..a58c0b649ba1 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c +++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c @@ -1378,6 +1378,8 @@ static void mpath_set_pinfo(struct mesh_path *mpath, u8 *next_hop, else memset(next_hop, 0, ETH_ALEN); + memset(pinfo, 0, sizeof(*pinfo)); + pinfo->generation = mesh_paths_generation; pinfo->filled = MPATH_INFO_FRAME_QLEN | @@ -1396,7 +1398,6 @@ static void mpath_set_pinfo(struct mesh_path *mpath, u8 *next_hop, pinfo->discovery_timeout = jiffies_to_msecs(mpath->discovery_timeout); pinfo->discovery_retries = mpath->discovery_retries; - pinfo->flags = 0; if (mpath->flags & MESH_PATH_ACTIVE) pinfo->flags |= NL80211_MPATH_FLAG_ACTIVE; if (mpath->flags & MESH_PATH_RESOLVING) @@ -1405,10 +1406,8 @@ static void mpath_set_pinfo(struct mesh_path *mpath, u8 *next_hop, pinfo->flags |= NL80211_MPATH_FLAG_SN_VALID; if (mpath->flags & MESH_PATH_FIXED) pinfo->flags |= NL80211_MPATH_FLAG_FIXED; - if (mpath->flags & MESH_PATH_RESOLVING) - pinfo->flags |= NL80211_MPATH_FLAG_RESOLVING; - - pinfo->flags = mpath->flags; + if (mpath->flags & MESH_PATH_RESOLVED) + pinfo->flags |= NL80211_MPATH_FLAG_RESOLVED; } static int ieee80211_get_mpath(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *dev, -- cgit v1.2.3 From d013ef2aba8fe765ca683598e404203215632373 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian Anastasov Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2012 10:53:18 +0000 Subject: tcp: fix possible socket refcount problem for ipv6 commit 144d56e91044181ec0ef67aeca91e9a8b5718348 ("tcp: fix possible socket refcount problem") is missing the IPv6 part. As tcp_release_cb is shared by both protocols we should hold sock reference for the TCP_MTU_REDUCED_DEFERRED bit. Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov Acked-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index a3e60cc04a8a..acd32e3f1b68 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -403,8 +403,9 @@ static void tcp_v6_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt, tp->mtu_info = ntohl(info); if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) tcp_v6_mtu_reduced(sk); - else - set_bit(TCP_MTU_REDUCED_DEFERRED, &tp->tsq_flags); + else if (!test_and_set_bit(TCP_MTU_REDUCED_DEFERRED, + &tp->tsq_flags)) + sock_hold(sk); goto out; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From ed6fe9d614fc1bca95eb8c0ccd0e92db00ef9d5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikulas Patocka Date: Sat, 1 Sep 2012 12:34:07 -0400 Subject: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val] Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice versa). Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit processes with a 64-bit kernel. On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address spaces), it can be used read kernel memory. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- net/socket.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c index a5471f804d99..edc3c4af9085 100644 --- a/net/socket.c +++ b/net/socket.c @@ -2604,7 +2604,7 @@ static int do_siocgstamp(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, err = sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, (unsigned long)&ktv); set_fs(old_fs); if (!err) - err = compat_put_timeval(up, &ktv); + err = compat_put_timeval(&ktv, up); return err; } @@ -2620,7 +2620,7 @@ static int do_siocgstampns(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, err = sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, (unsigned long)&kts); set_fs(old_fs); if (!err) - err = compat_put_timespec(up, &kts); + err = compat_put_timespec(&kts, up); return err; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0626af3139572610b56376580d11eb65d45d9dd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 07:49:03 +0000 Subject: netfilter: take care of timewait sockets Sami Farin reported crashes in xt_LOG because it assumes skb->sk is a full blown socket. Since (41063e9 ipv4: Early TCP socket demux), we can have skb->sk pointing to a timewait socket. Same fix is needed in nfnetlink_log. Diagnosed-by: Florian Westphal Reported-by: Sami Farin Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c | 14 ++++++++------ net/netfilter/xt_LOG.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++---------------- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c index 14e2f3903142..5cfb5bedb2b8 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c @@ -381,6 +381,7 @@ __build_packet_message(struct nfulnl_instance *inst, struct nlmsghdr *nlh; struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg; sk_buff_data_t old_tail = inst->skb->tail; + struct sock *sk; nlh = nlmsg_put(inst->skb, 0, 0, NFNL_SUBSYS_ULOG << 8 | NFULNL_MSG_PACKET, @@ -499,18 +500,19 @@ __build_packet_message(struct nfulnl_instance *inst, } /* UID */ - if (skb->sk) { - read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); - if (skb->sk->sk_socket && skb->sk->sk_socket->file) { - struct file *file = skb->sk->sk_socket->file; + sk = skb->sk; + if (sk && sk->sk_state != TCP_TIME_WAIT) { + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + if (sk->sk_socket && sk->sk_socket->file) { + struct file *file = sk->sk_socket->file; __be32 uid = htonl(file->f_cred->fsuid); __be32 gid = htonl(file->f_cred->fsgid); - read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); if (nla_put_be32(inst->skb, NFULA_UID, uid) || nla_put_be32(inst->skb, NFULA_GID, gid)) goto nla_put_failure; } else - read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); } /* local sequence number */ diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_LOG.c b/net/netfilter/xt_LOG.c index ff5f75fddb15..2a4f9693e799 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_LOG.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_LOG.c @@ -145,6 +145,19 @@ static int dump_tcp_header(struct sbuff *m, const struct sk_buff *skb, return 0; } +static void dump_sk_uid_gid(struct sbuff *m, struct sock *sk) +{ + if (!sk || sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) + return; + + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + if (sk->sk_socket && sk->sk_socket->file) + sb_add(m, "UID=%u GID=%u ", + sk->sk_socket->file->f_cred->fsuid, + sk->sk_socket->file->f_cred->fsgid); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); +} + /* One level of recursion won't kill us */ static void dump_ipv4_packet(struct sbuff *m, const struct nf_loginfo *info, @@ -361,14 +374,8 @@ static void dump_ipv4_packet(struct sbuff *m, } /* Max length: 15 "UID=4294967295 " */ - if ((logflags & XT_LOG_UID) && !iphoff && skb->sk) { - read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); - if (skb->sk->sk_socket && skb->sk->sk_socket->file) - sb_add(m, "UID=%u GID=%u ", - skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_cred->fsuid, - skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_cred->fsgid); - read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); - } + if ((logflags & XT_LOG_UID) && !iphoff) + dump_sk_uid_gid(m, skb->sk); /* Max length: 16 "MARK=0xFFFFFFFF " */ if (!iphoff && skb->mark) @@ -717,14 +724,8 @@ static void dump_ipv6_packet(struct sbuff *m, } /* Max length: 15 "UID=4294967295 " */ - if ((logflags & XT_LOG_UID) && recurse && skb->sk) { - read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); - if (skb->sk->sk_socket && skb->sk->sk_socket->file) - sb_add(m, "UID=%u GID=%u ", - skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_cred->fsuid, - skb->sk->sk_socket->file->f_cred->fsgid); - read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); - } + if ((logflags & XT_LOG_UID) && recurse) + dump_sk_uid_gid(m, skb->sk); /* Max length: 16 "MARK=0xFFFFFFFF " */ if (!recurse && skb->mark) -- cgit v1.2.3 From f39c1bfb5a03e2d255451bff05be0d7255298fa4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trond Myklebust Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2012 11:08:50 -0400 Subject: SUNRPC: Fix a UDP transport regression Commit 43cedbf0e8dfb9c5610eb7985d5f21263e313802 (SUNRPC: Ensure that we grab the XPRT_LOCK before calling xprt_alloc_slot) is causing hangs in the case of NFS over UDP mounts. Since neither the UDP or the RDMA transport mechanism use dynamic slot allocation, we can skip grabbing the socket lock for those transports. Add a new rpc_xprt_op to allow switching between the TCP and UDP/RDMA case. Note that the NFSv4.1 back channel assigns the slot directly through rpc_run_bc_task, so we can ignore that case. Reported-by: Dick Streefland Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [>= 3.1] --- include/linux/sunrpc/xprt.h | 3 +++ net/sunrpc/xprt.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/transport.c | 1 + net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/xprt.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/xprt.h index cff40aa7db62..bf8c49ff7530 100644 --- a/include/linux/sunrpc/xprt.h +++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/xprt.h @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ struct rpc_xprt_ops { void (*set_buffer_size)(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, size_t sndsize, size_t rcvsize); int (*reserve_xprt)(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct rpc_task *task); void (*release_xprt)(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct rpc_task *task); + void (*alloc_slot)(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct rpc_task *task); void (*rpcbind)(struct rpc_task *task); void (*set_port)(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, unsigned short port); void (*connect)(struct rpc_task *task); @@ -281,6 +282,8 @@ void xprt_connect(struct rpc_task *task); void xprt_reserve(struct rpc_task *task); int xprt_reserve_xprt(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct rpc_task *task); int xprt_reserve_xprt_cong(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct rpc_task *task); +void xprt_alloc_slot(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct rpc_task *task); +void xprt_lock_and_alloc_slot(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct rpc_task *task); int xprt_prepare_transmit(struct rpc_task *task); void xprt_transmit(struct rpc_task *task); void xprt_end_transmit(struct rpc_task *task); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprt.c b/net/sunrpc/xprt.c index a5a402a7d21f..5d7f61d7559c 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprt.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprt.c @@ -969,11 +969,11 @@ static bool xprt_dynamic_free_slot(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct rpc_rqst *req) return false; } -static void xprt_alloc_slot(struct rpc_task *task) +void xprt_alloc_slot(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct rpc_task *task) { - struct rpc_xprt *xprt = task->tk_xprt; struct rpc_rqst *req; + spin_lock(&xprt->reserve_lock); if (!list_empty(&xprt->free)) { req = list_entry(xprt->free.next, struct rpc_rqst, rq_list); list_del(&req->rq_list); @@ -994,12 +994,29 @@ static void xprt_alloc_slot(struct rpc_task *task) default: task->tk_status = -EAGAIN; } + spin_unlock(&xprt->reserve_lock); return; out_init_req: task->tk_status = 0; task->tk_rqstp = req; xprt_request_init(task, xprt); + spin_unlock(&xprt->reserve_lock); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xprt_alloc_slot); + +void xprt_lock_and_alloc_slot(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct rpc_task *task) +{ + /* Note: grabbing the xprt_lock_write() ensures that we throttle + * new slot allocation if the transport is congested (i.e. when + * reconnecting a stream transport or when out of socket write + * buffer space). + */ + if (xprt_lock_write(xprt, task)) { + xprt_alloc_slot(xprt, task); + xprt_release_write(xprt, task); + } } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xprt_lock_and_alloc_slot); static void xprt_free_slot(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct rpc_rqst *req) { @@ -1083,20 +1100,9 @@ void xprt_reserve(struct rpc_task *task) if (task->tk_rqstp != NULL) return; - /* Note: grabbing the xprt_lock_write() here is not strictly needed, - * but ensures that we throttle new slot allocation if the transport - * is congested (e.g. if reconnecting or if we're out of socket - * write buffer space). - */ task->tk_timeout = 0; task->tk_status = -EAGAIN; - if (!xprt_lock_write(xprt, task)) - return; - - spin_lock(&xprt->reserve_lock); - xprt_alloc_slot(task); - spin_unlock(&xprt->reserve_lock); - xprt_release_write(xprt, task); + xprt->ops->alloc_slot(xprt, task); } static inline __be32 xprt_alloc_xid(struct rpc_xprt *xprt) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/transport.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/transport.c index 06cdbff79e4a..5d9202dc7cb1 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/transport.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/transport.c @@ -713,6 +713,7 @@ static void xprt_rdma_print_stats(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct seq_file *seq) static struct rpc_xprt_ops xprt_rdma_procs = { .reserve_xprt = xprt_rdma_reserve_xprt, .release_xprt = xprt_release_xprt_cong, /* sunrpc/xprt.c */ + .alloc_slot = xprt_alloc_slot, .release_request = xprt_release_rqst_cong, /* ditto */ .set_retrans_timeout = xprt_set_retrans_timeout_def, /* ditto */ .rpcbind = rpcb_getport_async, /* sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c */ diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c index 400567243f84..a35b8e52e551 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c @@ -2473,6 +2473,7 @@ static void bc_destroy(struct rpc_xprt *xprt) static struct rpc_xprt_ops xs_local_ops = { .reserve_xprt = xprt_reserve_xprt, .release_xprt = xs_tcp_release_xprt, + .alloc_slot = xprt_alloc_slot, .rpcbind = xs_local_rpcbind, .set_port = xs_local_set_port, .connect = xs_connect, @@ -2489,6 +2490,7 @@ static struct rpc_xprt_ops xs_udp_ops = { .set_buffer_size = xs_udp_set_buffer_size, .reserve_xprt = xprt_reserve_xprt_cong, .release_xprt = xprt_release_xprt_cong, + .alloc_slot = xprt_alloc_slot, .rpcbind = rpcb_getport_async, .set_port = xs_set_port, .connect = xs_connect, @@ -2506,6 +2508,7 @@ static struct rpc_xprt_ops xs_udp_ops = { static struct rpc_xprt_ops xs_tcp_ops = { .reserve_xprt = xprt_reserve_xprt, .release_xprt = xs_tcp_release_xprt, + .alloc_slot = xprt_lock_and_alloc_slot, .rpcbind = rpcb_getport_async, .set_port = xs_set_port, .connect = xs_connect, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 979402b16cde048ced4839e21cc49e0779352b80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2012 23:34:44 +0000 Subject: udp: increment UDP_MIB_INERRORS if copy failed In UDP recvmsg(), we miss an increase of UDP_MIB_INERRORS if the copy of skb to userspace failed for whatever reason. Reported-by: Shawn Bohrer Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/udp.c | 5 +++++ net/ipv6/udp.c | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c index 6f6d1aca3c3d..2814f66dac64 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c @@ -1226,6 +1226,11 @@ try_again: if (unlikely(err)) { trace_kfree_skb(skb, udp_recvmsg); + if (!peeked) { + atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops); + UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), + UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite); + } goto out_free; } diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c index 99d0077b56b8..07e2bfef6845 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c @@ -394,6 +394,17 @@ try_again: } if (unlikely(err)) { trace_kfree_skb(skb, udpv6_recvmsg); + if (!peeked) { + atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops); + if (is_udp4) + UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), + UDP_MIB_INERRORS, + is_udplite); + else + UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk), + UDP_MIB_INERRORS, + is_udplite); + } goto out_free; } if (!peeked) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6862234238e84648c305526af2edd98badcad1e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chema Gonzalez Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2012 13:40:50 +0000 Subject: net: small bug on rxhash calculation In the current rxhash calculation function, while the sorting of the ports/addrs is coherent (you get the same rxhash for packets sharing the same 4-tuple, in both directions), ports and addrs are sorted independently. This implies packets from a connection between the same addresses but crossed ports hash to the same rxhash. For example, traffic between A=S:l and B=L:s is hashed (in both directions) from {L, S, {s, l}}. The same rxhash is obtained for packets between C=S:s and D=L:l. This patch ensures that you either swap both addrs and ports, or you swap none. Traffic between A and B, and traffic between C and D, get their rxhash from different sources ({L, S, {l, s}} for A<->B, and {L, S, {s, l}} for C<->D) The patch is co-written with Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Chema Gonzalez Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/dev.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 83988362805e..d7fe32c946c1 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -2647,15 +2647,16 @@ void __skb_get_rxhash(struct sk_buff *skb) if (!skb_flow_dissect(skb, &keys)) return; - if (keys.ports) { - if ((__force u16)keys.port16[1] < (__force u16)keys.port16[0]) - swap(keys.port16[0], keys.port16[1]); + if (keys.ports) skb->l4_rxhash = 1; - } /* get a consistent hash (same value on both flow directions) */ - if ((__force u32)keys.dst < (__force u32)keys.src) + if (((__force u32)keys.dst < (__force u32)keys.src) || + (((__force u32)keys.dst == (__force u32)keys.src) && + ((__force u16)keys.port16[1] < (__force u16)keys.port16[0]))) { swap(keys.dst, keys.src); + swap(keys.port16[0], keys.port16[1]); + } hash = jhash_3words((__force u32)keys.dst, (__force u32)keys.src, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 64f509ce71b08d037998e93dd51180c19b2f464c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jozsef Kadlecsik Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2012 09:55:53 +0000 Subject: netfilter: Mark SYN/ACK packets as invalid from original direction Clients should not send such packets. By accepting them, we open up a hole by wich ephemeral ports can be discovered in an off-path attack. See: "Reflection scan: an Off-Path Attack on TCP" by Jan Wrobel, http://arxiv.org/abs/1201.2074 Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c | 19 ++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c index a5ac11ebef33..aba98f942979 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c @@ -158,21 +158,18 @@ static const u8 tcp_conntracks[2][6][TCP_CONNTRACK_MAX] = { * sCL -> sSS */ /* sNO, sSS, sSR, sES, sFW, sCW, sLA, sTW, sCL, sS2 */ -/*synack*/ { sIV, sIV, sIG, sIG, sIG, sIG, sIG, sIG, sIG, sSR }, +/*synack*/ { sIV, sIV, sSR, sIV, sIV, sIV, sIV, sIV, sIV, sSR }, /* * sNO -> sIV Too late and no reason to do anything * sSS -> sIV Client can't send SYN and then SYN/ACK * sS2 -> sSR SYN/ACK sent to SYN2 in simultaneous open - * sSR -> sIG - * sES -> sIG Error: SYNs in window outside the SYN_SENT state - * are errors. Receiver will reply with RST - * and close the connection. - * Or we are not in sync and hold a dead connection. - * sFW -> sIG - * sCW -> sIG - * sLA -> sIG - * sTW -> sIG - * sCL -> sIG + * sSR -> sSR Late retransmitted SYN/ACK in simultaneous open + * sES -> sIV Invalid SYN/ACK packets sent by the client + * sFW -> sIV + * sCW -> sIV + * sLA -> sIV + * sTW -> sIV + * sCL -> sIV */ /* sNO, sSS, sSR, sES, sFW, sCW, sLA, sTW, sCL, sS2 */ /*fin*/ { sIV, sIV, sFW, sFW, sLA, sLA, sLA, sTW, sCL, sIV }, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4a70bbfaef0361d27272629d1a250a937edcafe4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jozsef Kadlecsik Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2012 09:55:54 +0000 Subject: netfilter: Validate the sequence number of dataless ACK packets as well We spare nothing by not validating the sequence number of dataless ACK packets and enabling it makes harder off-path attacks. See: "Reflection scan: an Off-Path Attack on TCP" by Jan Wrobel, http://arxiv.org/abs/1201.2074 Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c | 10 ++-------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c index aba98f942979..e046b3756aab 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c @@ -630,15 +630,9 @@ static bool tcp_in_window(const struct nf_conn *ct, ack = sack = receiver->td_end; } - if (seq == end - && (!tcph->rst - || (seq == 0 && state->state == TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT))) + if (tcph->rst && seq == 0 && state->state == TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT) /* - * Packets contains no data: we assume it is valid - * and check the ack value only. - * However RST segments are always validated by their - * SEQ number, except when seq == 0 (reset sent answering - * SYN. + * RST sent answering SYN. */ seq = end = sender->td_end; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 566f26aa705609d05940289036ab914c8a3be707 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wei Yongjun Date: Sun, 9 Sep 2012 18:38:27 +0000 Subject: caif: move the dereference below the NULL test The dereference should be moved below the NULL test. spatch with a semantic match is used to found this. (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/) Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/caif/cfsrvl.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/caif/cfsrvl.c b/net/caif/cfsrvl.c index dd485f6128e8..ba217e90765e 100644 --- a/net/caif/cfsrvl.c +++ b/net/caif/cfsrvl.c @@ -211,9 +211,10 @@ void caif_client_register_refcnt(struct cflayer *adapt_layer, void (*put)(struct cflayer *lyr)) { struct cfsrvl *service; - service = container_of(adapt_layer->dn, struct cfsrvl, layer); - WARN_ON(adapt_layer == NULL || adapt_layer->dn == NULL); + if (WARN_ON(adapt_layer == NULL || adapt_layer->dn == NULL)) + return; + service = container_of(adapt_layer->dn, struct cfsrvl, layer); service->hold = hold; service->put = put; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1c463e57b32e3b6a3250fe75d1d56cb598d664e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2012 09:13:07 -0700 Subject: net: fix net/core/sock.c build error Fix net/core/sock.c build error when CONFIG_INET is not enabled: net/built-in.o: In function `sock_edemux': (.text+0xd396): undefined reference to `inet_twsk_put' Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sock.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 7f64467535d1..305792076121 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -1525,9 +1525,11 @@ void sock_edemux(struct sk_buff *skb) { struct sock *sk = skb->sk; +#ifdef CONFIG_INET if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT) inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk)); else +#endif sock_put(sk); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_edemux); -- cgit v1.2.3 From bdfc87f7d1e253e0a61e2fc6a75ea9d76f7fc03a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 11 Sep 2012 13:11:12 +0000 Subject: net-sched: sch_cbq: avoid infinite loop Its possible to setup a bad cbq configuration leading to an infinite loop in cbq_classify() DEV_OUT=eth0 ICMP="match ip protocol 1 0xff" U32="protocol ip u32" DST="match ip dst" tc qdisc add dev $DEV_OUT root handle 1: cbq avpkt 1000 \ bandwidth 100mbit tc class add dev $DEV_OUT parent 1: classid 1:1 cbq \ rate 512kbit allot 1500 prio 5 bounded isolated tc filter add dev $DEV_OUT parent 1: prio 3 $U32 \ $ICMP $DST 192.168.3.234 flowid 1: Reported-by: Denys Fedoryschenko Tested-by: Denys Fedoryschenko Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/sch_cbq.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_cbq.c b/net/sched/sch_cbq.c index 6aabd77d1cfd..564b9fc8efd3 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_cbq.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_cbq.c @@ -250,10 +250,11 @@ cbq_classify(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, int *qerr) else if ((cl = defmap[res.classid & TC_PRIO_MAX]) == NULL) cl = defmap[TC_PRIO_BESTEFFORT]; - if (cl == NULL || cl->level >= head->level) + if (cl == NULL) goto fallback; } - + if (cl->level >= head->level) + goto fallback; #ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT switch (result) { case TC_ACT_QUEUED: -- cgit v1.2.3 From 16af511a666827eaf5802144f09e2fb7b0942c99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Perches Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2012 02:04:53 +0000 Subject: netfilter: log: Fix log-level processing auto75914331@hushmail.com reports that iptables does not correctly output the KERN_. $IPTABLES -A RULE_0_in -j LOG --log-level notice --log-prefix "DENY in: " result with linux 3.6-rc5 Sep 12 06:37:29 xxxxx kernel: <5>DENY in: IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=....... result with linux 3.5.3 and older: Sep 9 10:43:01 xxxxx kernel: DENY in: IN=eth0 OUT= MAC...... commit 04d2c8c83d0 ("printk: convert the format for KERN_ to a 2 byte pattern") updated the syslog header style but did not update netfilter uses. Do so. Use KERN_SOH and string concatenation instead of "%c" KERN_SOH_ASCII as suggested by Eric Dumazet. Signed-off-by: Joe Perches cc: auto75914331@hushmail.com Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_log.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/xt_LOG.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_log.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_log.c index f88ee537fb2b..92de5e5f9db2 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_log.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_log.c @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ ebt_log_packet(u_int8_t pf, unsigned int hooknum, unsigned int bitmask; spin_lock_bh(&ebt_log_lock); - printk("<%c>%s IN=%s OUT=%s MAC source = %pM MAC dest = %pM proto = 0x%04x", + printk(KERN_SOH "%c%s IN=%s OUT=%s MAC source = %pM MAC dest = %pM proto = 0x%04x", '0' + loginfo->u.log.level, prefix, in ? in->name : "", out ? out->name : "", eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest, diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_LOG.c b/net/netfilter/xt_LOG.c index 2a4f9693e799..91e9af4d1f42 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_LOG.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_LOG.c @@ -443,8 +443,8 @@ log_packet_common(struct sbuff *m, const struct nf_loginfo *loginfo, const char *prefix) { - sb_add(m, "<%d>%sIN=%s OUT=%s ", loginfo->u.log.level, - prefix, + sb_add(m, KERN_SOH "%c%sIN=%s OUT=%s ", + '0' + loginfo->u.log.level, prefix, in ? in->name : "", out ? out->name : ""); #ifdef CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER -- cgit v1.2.3 From e29fe837bfa3ca0a9f4ef1d4a90e6e0a74b6b8a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Ward Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2012 05:22:32 +0000 Subject: net_sched: gred: correct comment about qavg calculation in RIO mode Signed-off-by: David Ward Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/sch_gred.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_gred.c b/net/sched/sch_gred.c index e901583e4ea5..fca73cdf44d9 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_gred.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_gred.c @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static int gred_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch) skb->tc_index = (skb->tc_index & ~GRED_VQ_MASK) | dp; } - /* sum up all the qaves of prios <= to ours to get the new qave */ + /* sum up all the qaves of prios < ours to get the new qave */ if (!gred_wred_mode(t) && gred_rio_mode(t)) { int i; -- cgit v1.2.3 From c22e464022f935b0cbd8724b1d99d800d49518a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Ward Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2012 05:22:33 +0000 Subject: net_sched: gred: eliminate redundant DP prio comparisons Each pair of DPs only needs to be compared once when searching for a non-unique prio value. Signed-off-by: David Ward Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/sch_gred.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_gred.c b/net/sched/sch_gred.c index fca73cdf44d9..e19d4ebfea1c 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_gred.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_gred.c @@ -102,9 +102,8 @@ static inline int gred_wred_mode_check(struct Qdisc *sch) if (q == NULL) continue; - for (n = 0; n < table->DPs; n++) - if (table->tab[n] && table->tab[n] != q && - table->tab[n]->prio == q->prio) + for (n = i + 1; n < table->DPs; n++) + if (table->tab[n] && table->tab[n]->prio == q->prio) return 1; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1fe37b106b039d9358fd1211c39b1fa199e547a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Ward Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2012 05:22:34 +0000 Subject: net_sched: gred: fix qave reporting via netlink q->vars.qavg is a Wlog scaled value, but q->backlog is not. In order to pass q->vars.qavg as the backlog value, we need to un-scale it. Additionally, the qave value returned via netlink should not be Wlog scaled, so we need to un-scale the result of red_calc_qavg(). This caused artificially high values for "Average Queue" to be shown by 'tc -s -d qdisc', but did not affect the actual operation of GRED. Signed-off-by: David Ward Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/sch_gred.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_gred.c b/net/sched/sch_gred.c index e19d4ebfea1c..b2570b59d85e 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_gred.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_gred.c @@ -534,6 +534,7 @@ static int gred_dump(struct Qdisc *sch, struct sk_buff *skb) for (i = 0; i < MAX_DPs; i++) { struct gred_sched_data *q = table->tab[i]; struct tc_gred_qopt opt; + unsigned long qavg; memset(&opt, 0, sizeof(opt)); @@ -565,7 +566,9 @@ static int gred_dump(struct Qdisc *sch, struct sk_buff *skb) if (gred_wred_mode(table)) gred_load_wred_set(table, q); - opt.qave = red_calc_qavg(&q->parms, &q->vars, q->vars.qavg); + qavg = red_calc_qavg(&q->parms, &q->vars, + q->vars.qavg >> q->parms.Wlog); + opt.qave = qavg >> q->parms.Wlog; append_opt: if (nla_append(skb, sizeof(opt), &opt) < 0) -- cgit v1.2.3 From ba1bf474eae07a128fae6252bf7d68eaef0eacf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Ward Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2012 05:22:35 +0000 Subject: net_sched: gred: actually perform idling in WRED mode gred_dequeue() and gred_drop() do not seem to get called when the queue is empty, meaning that we never start idling while in WRED mode. And since qidlestart is not stored by gred_store_wred_set(), we would never stop idling while in WRED mode if we ever started. This messes up the average queue size calculation that influences packet marking/dropping behavior. Now, we start WRED mode idling as we are removing the last packet from the queue. Also we now actually stop WRED mode idling when we are enqueuing a packet. Cc: Bruce Osler Signed-off-by: David Ward Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/sch_gred.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_gred.c b/net/sched/sch_gred.c index b2570b59d85e..d42234c0f13b 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_gred.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_gred.c @@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ static inline void gred_store_wred_set(struct gred_sched *table, struct gred_sched_data *q) { table->wred_set.qavg = q->vars.qavg; + table->wred_set.qidlestart = q->vars.qidlestart; } static inline int gred_use_ecn(struct gred_sched *t) @@ -259,16 +260,18 @@ static struct sk_buff *gred_dequeue(struct Qdisc *sch) } else { q->backlog -= qdisc_pkt_len(skb); - if (!q->backlog && !gred_wred_mode(t)) - red_start_of_idle_period(&q->vars); + if (gred_wred_mode(t)) { + if (!sch->qstats.backlog) + red_start_of_idle_period(&t->wred_set); + } else { + if (!q->backlog) + red_start_of_idle_period(&q->vars); + } } return skb; } - if (gred_wred_mode(t) && !red_is_idling(&t->wred_set)) - red_start_of_idle_period(&t->wred_set); - return NULL; } @@ -290,19 +293,20 @@ static unsigned int gred_drop(struct Qdisc *sch) q->backlog -= len; q->stats.other++; - if (!q->backlog && !gred_wred_mode(t)) - red_start_of_idle_period(&q->vars); + if (gred_wred_mode(t)) { + if (!sch->qstats.backlog) + red_start_of_idle_period(&t->wred_set); + } else { + if (!q->backlog) + red_start_of_idle_period(&q->vars); + } } qdisc_drop(skb, sch); return len; } - if (gred_wred_mode(t) && !red_is_idling(&t->wred_set)) - red_start_of_idle_period(&t->wred_set); - return 0; - } static void gred_reset(struct Qdisc *sch) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6af773e786ad617b0264ebe06ba60675c01f3e51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nishank Trivedi Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2012 13:32:49 +0000 Subject: pktgen: fix crash with vlan and packet size less than 46 If vlan option is being specified in the pktgen and packet size being requested is less than 46 bytes, despite being illogical request, pktgen should not crash the kernel. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88021fb82000 Process kpktgend_0 (pid: 1184, threadinfo ffff880215f1a000, task ffff880218544530) Call Trace: [] ? pktgen_finalize_skb+0x222/0x300 [pktgen] [] ? build_skb+0x34/0x1c0 [] pktgen_thread_worker+0x5d1/0x1790 [pktgen] [] ? igb_xmit_frame_ring+0xa30/0xa30 [igb] [] ? wake_up_bit+0x40/0x40 [] ? wake_up_bit+0x40/0x40 [] ? spin+0x240/0x240 [pktgen] [] kthread+0x93/0xa0 [] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 [] ? flush_kthread_worker+0x80/0x80 [] ? gs_change+0x13/0x13 The root cause of why pktgen is not able to handle this case is due to comparison of signed (datalen) and unsigned data (sizeof), which eventually passes a huge number to skb_put(). Signed-off-by: Nishank Trivedi Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/pktgen.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/pktgen.c b/net/core/pktgen.c index cce9e53528b1..148e73d2c451 100644 --- a/net/core/pktgen.c +++ b/net/core/pktgen.c @@ -2721,7 +2721,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *fill_packet_ipv4(struct net_device *odev, /* Eth + IPh + UDPh + mpls */ datalen = pkt_dev->cur_pkt_size - 14 - 20 - 8 - pkt_dev->pkt_overhead; - if (datalen < sizeof(struct pktgen_hdr)) + if (datalen < 0 || datalen < sizeof(struct pktgen_hdr)) datalen = sizeof(struct pktgen_hdr); udph->source = htons(pkt_dev->cur_udp_src); -- cgit v1.2.3