From 4334ec8518cec3f7a4feeb3dacb46acfb24904d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2011 16:58:06 +0100 Subject: mac80211: fix TX status cookie in HW offload case When the off-channel TX is done with remain-on-channel offloaded to hardware, the reported cookie is wrong as in that case we shouldn't use the SKB as the cookie but need to instead use the corresponding r-o-c cookie (XOR'ed with 2 to prevent API mismatches). Fix this by keeping track of the hw_roc_skb pointer just for the status processing and use the correct cookie to report in this case. We can't use the hw_roc_skb pointer itself because it is NULL'ed when the frame is transmitted to prevent it being used twice. This fixes a bug where the P2P state machine in the supplicant gets stuck because it never gets a correct result for its transmitted frame. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: John W. Linville --- net/mac80211/cfg.c | 2 ++ net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 2 +- net/mac80211/status.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/cfg.c b/net/mac80211/cfg.c index 4bc8a9250cfd..9cd73b11506e 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c +++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c @@ -1822,6 +1822,7 @@ static int ieee80211_mgmt_tx(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *dev, *cookie ^= 2; IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb)->flags |= IEEE80211_TX_CTL_TX_OFFCHAN; local->hw_roc_skb = skb; + local->hw_roc_skb_for_status = skb; mutex_unlock(&local->mtx); return 0; @@ -1875,6 +1876,7 @@ static int ieee80211_mgmt_tx_cancel_wait(struct wiphy *wiphy, if (ret == 0) { kfree_skb(local->hw_roc_skb); local->hw_roc_skb = NULL; + local->hw_roc_skb_for_status = NULL; } mutex_unlock(&local->mtx); diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index c47d7c0e48a4..533fd32f49ff 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ struct ieee80211_local { struct ieee80211_channel *hw_roc_channel; struct net_device *hw_roc_dev; - struct sk_buff *hw_roc_skb; + struct sk_buff *hw_roc_skb, *hw_roc_skb_for_status; struct work_struct hw_roc_start, hw_roc_done; enum nl80211_channel_type hw_roc_channel_type; unsigned int hw_roc_duration; diff --git a/net/mac80211/status.c b/net/mac80211/status.c index 38a797217a91..071ac95c4aa0 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/status.c +++ b/net/mac80211/status.c @@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ void ieee80211_tx_status(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, struct sk_buff *skb) if (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_NL80211_FRAME_TX) { struct ieee80211_work *wk; + u64 cookie = (unsigned long)skb; rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(wk, &local->work_list, list) { @@ -334,8 +335,12 @@ void ieee80211_tx_status(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, struct sk_buff *skb) break; } rcu_read_unlock(); + if (local->hw_roc_skb_for_status == skb) { + cookie = local->hw_roc_cookie ^ 2; + local->hw_roc_skb_for_status = NULL; + } cfg80211_mgmt_tx_status( - skb->dev, (unsigned long) skb, skb->data, skb->len, + skb->dev, cookie, skb->data, skb->len, !!(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_STAT_ACK), GFP_ATOMIC); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From fc7c976dc7a565213393ce700d4a6105f037bf20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Felix Fietkau Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2011 12:05:00 +0100 Subject: mac80211: fix the skb cloned check in the tx path Using skb_header_cloned to check if it's safe to write to the skb is not enough - mac80211 also touches the tailroom of the skb. Initially this check was only used to increase a counter, however this commit changed the code to also skip skb data reallocation if no extra head/tailroom was needed: commit 4cd06a344db752f513437138953af191cbe9a691 mac80211: skip unnecessary pskb_expand_head calls It added a regression at least with iwl3945, which is fixed by this patch. Reported-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Tested-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: John W. Linville --- net/mac80211/tx.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c index b64b42bc774b..b0beaa58246b 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/tx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c @@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ static int ieee80211_skb_resize(struct ieee80211_local *local, skb_orphan(skb); } - if (skb_header_cloned(skb)) + if (skb_cloned(skb)) I802_DEBUG_INC(local->tx_expand_skb_head_cloned); else if (head_need || tail_need) I802_DEBUG_INC(local->tx_expand_skb_head); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 95c3043008ca8449feb96aba5481fe31c2ea750b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: andrew hendry Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2011 00:08:15 +0000 Subject: x25: possible skb leak on bad facilities Originally x25_parse_facilities returned -1 for an error 0 meaning 0 length facilities >0 the length of the facilities parsed. 5ef41308f94dc ("x25: Prevent crashing when parsing bad X.25 facilities") introduced more error checking in x25_parse_facilities however used 0 to indicate bad parsing a6331d6f9a429 ("memory corruption in X.25 facilities parsing") followed this further for DTE facilities, again using 0 for bad parsing. The meaning of 0 got confused in the callers. If the facilities are messed up we can't determine where the data starts. So patch makes all parsing errors return -1 and ensures callers close and don't use the skb further. Reported-by: Andy Whitcroft Signed-off-by: Andrew Hendry Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/x25/x25_facilities.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++--------- net/x25/x25_in.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/x25/x25_facilities.c b/net/x25/x25_facilities.c index 55187c8f6420..406207515b5e 100644 --- a/net/x25/x25_facilities.c +++ b/net/x25/x25_facilities.c @@ -27,9 +27,19 @@ #include #include -/* - * Parse a set of facilities into the facilities structures. Unrecognised - * facilities are written to the debug log file. +/** + * x25_parse_facilities - Parse facilities from skb into the facilities structs + * + * @skb: sk_buff to parse + * @facilities: Regular facilites, updated as facilities are found + * @dte_facs: ITU DTE facilities, updated as DTE facilities are found + * @vc_fac_mask: mask is updated with all facilities found + * + * Return codes: + * -1 - Parsing error, caller should drop call and clean up + * 0 - Parse OK, this skb has no facilities + * >0 - Parse OK, returns the length of the facilities header + * */ int x25_parse_facilities(struct sk_buff *skb, struct x25_facilities *facilities, struct x25_dte_facilities *dte_facs, unsigned long *vc_fac_mask) @@ -62,7 +72,7 @@ int x25_parse_facilities(struct sk_buff *skb, struct x25_facilities *facilities, switch (*p & X25_FAC_CLASS_MASK) { case X25_FAC_CLASS_A: if (len < 2) - return 0; + return -1; switch (*p) { case X25_FAC_REVERSE: if((p[1] & 0x81) == 0x81) { @@ -107,7 +117,7 @@ int x25_parse_facilities(struct sk_buff *skb, struct x25_facilities *facilities, break; case X25_FAC_CLASS_B: if (len < 3) - return 0; + return -1; switch (*p) { case X25_FAC_PACKET_SIZE: facilities->pacsize_in = p[1]; @@ -130,7 +140,7 @@ int x25_parse_facilities(struct sk_buff *skb, struct x25_facilities *facilities, break; case X25_FAC_CLASS_C: if (len < 4) - return 0; + return -1; printk(KERN_DEBUG "X.25: unknown facility %02X, " "values %02X, %02X, %02X\n", p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3]); @@ -139,18 +149,18 @@ int x25_parse_facilities(struct sk_buff *skb, struct x25_facilities *facilities, break; case X25_FAC_CLASS_D: if (len < p[1] + 2) - return 0; + return -1; switch (*p) { case X25_FAC_CALLING_AE: if (p[1] > X25_MAX_DTE_FACIL_LEN || p[1] <= 1) - return 0; + return -1; dte_facs->calling_len = p[2]; memcpy(dte_facs->calling_ae, &p[3], p[1] - 1); *vc_fac_mask |= X25_MASK_CALLING_AE; break; case X25_FAC_CALLED_AE: if (p[1] > X25_MAX_DTE_FACIL_LEN || p[1] <= 1) - return 0; + return -1; dte_facs->called_len = p[2]; memcpy(dte_facs->called_ae, &p[3], p[1] - 1); *vc_fac_mask |= X25_MASK_CALLED_AE; diff --git a/net/x25/x25_in.c b/net/x25/x25_in.c index f729f022be69..15de65f04719 100644 --- a/net/x25/x25_in.c +++ b/net/x25/x25_in.c @@ -91,10 +91,10 @@ static int x25_state1_machine(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int frametyp { struct x25_address source_addr, dest_addr; int len; + struct x25_sock *x25 = x25_sk(sk); switch (frametype) { case X25_CALL_ACCEPTED: { - struct x25_sock *x25 = x25_sk(sk); x25_stop_timer(sk); x25->condition = 0x00; @@ -113,14 +113,16 @@ static int x25_state1_machine(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int frametyp &dest_addr); if (len > 0) skb_pull(skb, len); + else if (len < 0) + goto out_clear; len = x25_parse_facilities(skb, &x25->facilities, &x25->dte_facilities, &x25->vc_facil_mask); if (len > 0) skb_pull(skb, len); - else - return -1; + else if (len < 0) + goto out_clear; /* * Copy any Call User Data. */ @@ -144,6 +146,12 @@ static int x25_state1_machine(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int frametyp } return 0; + +out_clear: + x25_write_internal(sk, X25_CLEAR_REQUEST); + x25->state = X25_STATE_2; + x25_start_t23timer(sk); + return 0; } /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From 531c9da8c854c5b075383253a57fdd4e0be82e99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Sun, 6 Feb 2011 23:26:43 +0000 Subject: batman-adv: Linearize fragment packets before merge We access the data inside the skbs of two fragments directly using memmove during the merge. The data of the skb could span over multiple skb pages. An direct access without knowledge about the pages would lead to an invalid memory access. Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann [lindner_marek@yahoo.de: Move return from function to the end] Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner --- net/batman-adv/unicast.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/batman-adv/unicast.c b/net/batman-adv/unicast.c index ee41fef04b21..d1a611322549 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/unicast.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/unicast.c @@ -50,12 +50,12 @@ static struct sk_buff *frag_merge_packet(struct list_head *head, skb = tfp->skb; } + if (skb_linearize(skb) < 0 || skb_linearize(tmp_skb) < 0) + goto err; + skb_pull(tmp_skb, sizeof(struct unicast_frag_packet)); - if (pskb_expand_head(skb, 0, tmp_skb->len, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0) { - /* free buffered skb, skb will be freed later */ - kfree_skb(tfp->skb); - return NULL; - } + if (pskb_expand_head(skb, 0, tmp_skb->len, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0) + goto err; /* move free entry to end */ tfp->skb = NULL; @@ -70,6 +70,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *frag_merge_packet(struct list_head *head, unicast_packet->packet_type = BAT_UNICAST; return skb; + +err: + /* free buffered skb, skb will be freed later */ + kfree_skb(tfp->skb); + return NULL; } static void frag_create_entry(struct list_head *head, struct sk_buff *skb) -- cgit v1.2.3 From b2df5a8446e135f7648736b8bec8179c88ce360d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2011 14:31:31 -0800 Subject: net/caif: Fix dangling list pointer in freed object on error. rtnl_link_ops->setup(), and the "setup" callback passed to alloc_netdev*(), cannot make state changes which need to be undone on failure. There is no cleanup mechanism available at this point. So we have to add the caif private instance to the global list once we are sure that register_netdev() has succedded in ->newlink(). Otherwise, if register_netdev() fails, the caller will invoke free_netdev() and we will have a reference to freed up memory on the chnl_net_list. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/caif/chnl_net.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/caif/chnl_net.c b/net/caif/chnl_net.c index fa9dab372b68..6008d6dc18a0 100644 --- a/net/caif/chnl_net.c +++ b/net/caif/chnl_net.c @@ -394,9 +394,7 @@ static void ipcaif_net_setup(struct net_device *dev) priv->conn_req.sockaddr.u.dgm.connection_id = -1; priv->flowenabled = false; - ASSERT_RTNL(); init_waitqueue_head(&priv->netmgmt_wq); - list_add(&priv->list_field, &chnl_net_list); } @@ -453,6 +451,8 @@ static int ipcaif_newlink(struct net *src_net, struct net_device *dev, ret = register_netdevice(dev); if (ret) pr_warn("device rtml registration failed\n"); + else + list_add(&caifdev->list_field, &chnl_net_list); return ret; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8d3bdbd55a7e2a3f2c148a4830aa26dd682b21c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2011 15:02:50 -0800 Subject: net: Fix lockdep regression caused by initializing netdev queues too early. In commit aa9421041128abb4d269ee1dc502ff65fb3b7d69 ("net: init ingress queue") we moved the allocation and lock initialization of the queues into alloc_netdev_mq() since register_netdevice() is way too late. The problem is that dev->type is not setup until the setup() callback is invoked by alloc_netdev_mq(), and the dev->type is what determines the lockdep class to use for the locks in the queues. Fix this by doing the queue allocation after the setup() callback runs. This is safe because the setup() callback is not allowed to make any state changes that need to be undone on error (memory allocations, etc.). It may, however, make state changes that are undone by free_netdev() (such as netif_napi_add(), which is done by the ipoib driver's setup routine). The previous code also leaked a reference to the &init_net namespace object on RX/TX queue allocation failures. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/dev.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index b6d0bf875a8e..8e726cb47ed7 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -5660,30 +5660,35 @@ struct net_device *alloc_netdev_mqs(int sizeof_priv, const char *name, dev_net_set(dev, &init_net); + dev->gso_max_size = GSO_MAX_SIZE; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->ethtool_ntuple_list.list); + dev->ethtool_ntuple_list.count = 0; + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->napi_list); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->unreg_list); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->link_watch_list); + dev->priv_flags = IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE; + setup(dev); + dev->num_tx_queues = txqs; dev->real_num_tx_queues = txqs; if (netif_alloc_netdev_queues(dev)) - goto free_pcpu; + goto free_all; #ifdef CONFIG_RPS dev->num_rx_queues = rxqs; dev->real_num_rx_queues = rxqs; if (netif_alloc_rx_queues(dev)) - goto free_pcpu; + goto free_all; #endif - dev->gso_max_size = GSO_MAX_SIZE; - - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->ethtool_ntuple_list.list); - dev->ethtool_ntuple_list.count = 0; - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->napi_list); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->unreg_list); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->link_watch_list); - dev->priv_flags = IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE; - setup(dev); strcpy(dev->name, name); return dev; +free_all: + free_netdev(dev); + return NULL; + free_pcpu: free_percpu(dev->pcpu_refcnt); kfree(dev->_tx); -- cgit v1.2.3 From c317428644c0af137d80069ab178cd797da3be45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2011 08:08:20 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_conntrack: set conntrack templates again if we return NF_REPEAT The TCP tracking code has a special case that allows to return NF_REPEAT if we receive a new SYN packet while in TIME_WAIT state. In this situation, the TCP tracking code destroys the existing conntrack to start a new clean session. [DESTROY] tcp 6 src=192.168.0.2 dst=192.168.1.2 sport=38925 dport=8000 src=192.168.1.2 dst=192.168.1.100 sport=8000 dport=38925 [ASSURED] [NEW] tcp 6 120 SYN_SENT src=192.168.0.2 dst=192.168.1.2 sport=38925 dport=8000 [UNREPLIED] src=192.168.1.2 dst=192.168.1.100 sport=8000 dport=38925 However, this is a problem for the iptables' CT target event filtering which will not work in this case since the conntrack template will not be there for the new session. To fix this, we reassign the conntrack template to the packet if we return NF_REPEAT. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index e61511929c66..84f4fcc5884b 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -942,8 +942,15 @@ nf_conntrack_in(struct net *net, u_int8_t pf, unsigned int hooknum, if (set_reply && !test_and_set_bit(IPS_SEEN_REPLY_BIT, &ct->status)) nf_conntrack_event_cache(IPCT_REPLY, ct); out: - if (tmpl) - nf_ct_put(tmpl); + if (tmpl) { + /* Special case: we have to repeat this hook, assign the + * template again to this packet. We assume that this packet + * has no conntrack assigned. This is used by nf_ct_tcp. */ + if (ret == NF_REPEAT) + skb->nfct = (struct nf_conntrack *)tmpl; + else + nf_ct_put(tmpl); + } return ret; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 96642d42f076101ba98866363d908cab706d156c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David S. Miller" Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2011 21:48:36 -0800 Subject: x25: Do not reference freed memory. In x25_link_free(), we destroy 'nb' before dereferencing 'nb->dev'. Don't do this, because 'nb' might be freed by then. Reported-by: Randy Dunlap Tested-by: Randy Dunlap Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/x25/x25_link.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/x25/x25_link.c b/net/x25/x25_link.c index 4cbc942f762a..21306928d47f 100644 --- a/net/x25/x25_link.c +++ b/net/x25/x25_link.c @@ -396,9 +396,12 @@ void __exit x25_link_free(void) write_lock_bh(&x25_neigh_list_lock); list_for_each_safe(entry, tmp, &x25_neigh_list) { + struct net_device *dev; + nb = list_entry(entry, struct x25_neigh, node); + dev = nb->dev; __x25_remove_neigh(nb); - dev_put(nb->dev); + dev_put(dev); } write_unlock_bh(&x25_neigh_list_lock); } -- cgit v1.2.3