From 5bacd7805ab4f07a69c7ef4b1d45ce553d2b1c3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexei Starovoitov Date: Tue, 19 May 2015 16:59:05 -0700 Subject: samples/bpf: bpf_tail_call example for tracing kprobe example that demonstrates how future seccomp programs may look like. It attaches to seccomp_phase1() function and tail-calls other BPF programs depending on syscall number. Existing optimized classic BPF seccomp programs generated by Chrome look like: if (sd.nr < 121) { if (sd.nr < 57) { if (sd.nr < 22) { if (sd.nr < 7) { if (sd.nr < 4) { if (sd.nr < 1) { check sys_read } else { if (sd.nr < 3) { check sys_write and sys_open } else { check sys_close } } } else { } else { } else { } else { } else { } the future seccomp using native eBPF may look like: bpf_tail_call(&sd, &syscall_jmp_table, sd.nr); which is simpler, faster and leaves more room for per-syscall checks. Usage: $ sudo ./tracex5 <...>-366 [001] d... 4.870033: : read(fd=1, buf=00007f6d5bebf000, size=771) <...>-369 [003] d... 4.870066: : mmap <...>-369 [003] d... 4.870077: : syscall=110 (one of get/set uid/pid/gid) <...>-369 [003] d... 4.870089: : syscall=107 (one of get/set uid/pid/gid) sh-369 [000] d... 4.891740: : read(fd=0, buf=00000000023d1000, size=512) sh-369 [000] d... 4.891747: : write(fd=1, buf=00000000023d3000, size=512) sh-369 [000] d... 4.891747: : read(fd=1, buf=00000000023d3000, size=512) Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- samples/bpf/tracex5_user.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+) create mode 100644 samples/bpf/tracex5_user.c (limited to 'samples/bpf/tracex5_user.c') diff --git a/samples/bpf/tracex5_user.c b/samples/bpf/tracex5_user.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a04dd3cd4358 --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/bpf/tracex5_user.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "libbpf.h" +#include "bpf_load.h" + +/* install fake seccomp program to enable seccomp code path inside the kernel, + * so that our kprobe attached to seccomp_phase1() can be triggered + */ +static void install_accept_all_seccomp(void) +{ + struct sock_filter filter[] = { + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), + }; + struct sock_fprog prog = { + .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])), + .filter = filter, + }; + if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, &prog)) + perror("prctl"); +} + +int main(int ac, char **argv) +{ + FILE *f; + char filename[256]; + + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s_kern.o", argv[0]); + + if (load_bpf_file(filename)) { + printf("%s", bpf_log_buf); + return 1; + } + + install_accept_all_seccomp(); + + f = popen("dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/null count=5", "r"); + (void) f; + + read_trace_pipe(); + + return 0; +} -- cgit v1.2.3