From c6d3aaa4e35c71a32a86ececacd4eea7ecfc316c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Smalley Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2009 13:37:50 -0400 Subject: selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private class and permission indices used outside the security server and the policy values used within the security server. The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations; similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user suffix. The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes; thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the classmap.h definitions. The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic. The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1. avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the class and permission names from the kernel-private indices. The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match the kernel-private indices). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h | 21 ++++----------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h') diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h index bb1ec801bdfe..4677aa519b04 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h @@ -10,26 +10,13 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno); -struct av_perm_to_string { - u16 tclass; - u32 value; +/* Class/perm mapping support */ +struct security_class_mapping { const char *name; + const char *perms[sizeof(u32) * 8 + 1]; }; -struct av_inherit { - const char **common_pts; - u32 common_base; - u16 tclass; -}; - -struct selinux_class_perm { - const struct av_perm_to_string *av_perm_to_string; - u32 av_pts_len; - u32 cts_len; - const char **class_to_string; - const struct av_inherit *av_inherit; - u32 av_inherit_len; -}; +extern struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[]; #endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_ */ -- cgit v1.2.3