From ab48576c4298f7d8cd93e78f085841a05967e125 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: peter enderborg Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:09:00 +0200 Subject: selinux: Cleanup printk logging in conditional Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c index c91543a617ac..f49e522e932d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node) if (new_state != node->cur_state) { node->cur_state = new_state; if (new_state == -1) - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n"); /* turn the rules on or off */ for (cur = node->true_list; cur; cur = cur->next) { if (new_state <= 0) @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum */ if (k->specified & AVTAB_TYPE) { if (avtab_search(&p->te_avtab, k)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.\n"); goto err; } /* @@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum node_ptr = avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, k); if (node_ptr) { if (avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr, k->specified)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: too many conflicting type rules.\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: too many conflicting type rules.\n"); goto err; } found = 0; @@ -313,13 +313,13 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum } } if (!found) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: conflicting type rules.\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules.\n"); goto err; } } } else { if (avtab_search(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n"); goto err; } } @@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, k, d); if (!node_ptr) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: could not insert rule.\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: could not insert rule.\n"); rc = -ENOMEM; goto err; } @@ -387,12 +387,12 @@ static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list * static int expr_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr) { if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n"); return 0; } if (expr->bool > p->p_bools.nprim) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n"); return 0; } return 1; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 180cfc58cd9a8bf836dccde0c9e8af0d3073e4bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: peter enderborg Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:09:01 +0200 Subject: selinux: Cleanup printk logging in ebitmap Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c | 15 +++++++-------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c index 5ae8c61b75bf..8f624f80055b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c @@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp) count = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]); if (mapunit != BITS_PER_U64) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap: map size %u does not " + pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: map size %u does not " "match my size %zd (high bit was %d)\n", mapunit, BITS_PER_U64, e->highbit); goto bad; @@ -383,19 +383,19 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp) for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { rc = next_entry(&startbit, fp, sizeof(u32)); if (rc < 0) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n"); goto bad; } startbit = le32_to_cpu(startbit); if (startbit & (mapunit - 1)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%d) is " + pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%d) is " "not a multiple of the map unit size (%u)\n", startbit, mapunit); goto bad; } if (startbit > e->highbit - mapunit) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%d) is " + pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%d) is " "beyond the end of the bitmap (%u)\n", startbit, (e->highbit - mapunit)); goto bad; @@ -405,8 +405,7 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp) struct ebitmap_node *tmp; tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); if (!tmp) { - printk(KERN_ERR - "SELinux: ebitmap: out of memory\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: out of memory\n"); rc = -ENOMEM; goto bad; } @@ -418,7 +417,7 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp) e->node = tmp; n = tmp; } else if (startbit <= n->startbit) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap: start bit %d" + pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: start bit %d" " comes after start bit %d\n", startbit, n->startbit); goto bad; @@ -426,7 +425,7 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp) rc = next_entry(&map, fp, sizeof(u64)); if (rc < 0) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n"); goto bad; } map = le64_to_cpu(map); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9ffdd49e3d735a5d12b5b31151893049e7075332 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: peter enderborg Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:09:02 +0200 Subject: selinux: Cleanup printk logging in policydb Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings and replace KERN_CONT with 2 longer prints. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg [PM: fixed some missing newlines identified by Joe Perches] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index 6e8c8056d7ad..e9394e7adc84 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ static void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name) struct hashtab_info info; hashtab_stat(h, &info); - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, " + pr_debug("SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, " "longest chain length %d\n", hash_name, h->nel, info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len); } @@ -533,15 +533,17 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p) { int i, rc; - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools", - p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim, p->p_bools.nprim); if (p->mls_enabled) - printk(KERN_CONT ", %d sens, %d cats", p->p_levels.nprim, - p->p_cats.nprim); - printk(KERN_CONT "\n"); + pr_debug("SELinux: %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools, %d sens, %d cats\n", + p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim, + p->p_bools.nprim, p->p_levels.nprim, p->p_cats.nprim); + else + pr_debug("SELinux: %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools\n", + p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim, + p->p_bools.nprim); - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %d classes, %d rules\n", - p->p_classes.nprim, p->te_avtab.nel); + pr_debug("SELinux: %d classes, %d rules\n", + p->p_classes.nprim, p->te_avtab.nel); #ifdef DEBUG_HASHES avtab_hash_eval(&p->te_avtab, "rules"); @@ -897,7 +899,7 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s) rc = sidtab_init(s); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: out of memory on SID table init\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: out of memory on SID table init\n"); goto out; } @@ -905,14 +907,14 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s) for (c = head; c; c = c->next) { rc = -EINVAL; if (!c->context[0].user) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: SID %s was never defined.\n", + pr_err("SELinux: SID %s was never defined.\n", c->u.name); goto out; } rc = sidtab_insert(s, c->sid[0], &c->context[0]); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load initial SID %s.\n", + pr_err("SELinux: unable to load initial SID %s.\n", c->u.name); goto out; } @@ -1005,13 +1007,13 @@ static int mls_read_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp) rc = -EINVAL; items = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); if (items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: range overflow\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: mls: range overflow\n"); goto out; } rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * items); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: truncated range\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: mls: truncated range\n"); goto out; } @@ -1023,19 +1025,19 @@ static int mls_read_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp) rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[0].cat, fp); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: error reading low categories\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: mls: error reading low categories\n"); goto out; } if (items > 1) { rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[1].cat, fp); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: error reading high categories\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: mls: error reading high categories\n"); goto bad_high; } } else { rc = ebitmap_cpy(&r->level[1].cat, &r->level[0].cat); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: out of memory\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: mls: out of memory\n"); goto bad_high; } } @@ -1060,7 +1062,7 @@ static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c, rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: context truncated\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: context truncated\n"); goto out; } c->user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); @@ -1069,14 +1071,14 @@ static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c, if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) { rc = mls_read_range_helper(&c->range, fp); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: error reading MLS range of context\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: error reading MLS range of context\n"); goto out; } } rc = -EINVAL; if (!policydb_context_isvalid(p, c)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: invalid security context\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: invalid security context\n"); context_destroy(c); goto out; } @@ -1352,7 +1354,8 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) rc = -EINVAL; cladatum->comdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_commons.table, cladatum->comkey); if (!cladatum->comdatum) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unknown common %s\n", cladatum->comkey); + pr_err("SELinux: unknown common %s\n", + cladatum->comkey); goto bad; } } @@ -1444,7 +1447,7 @@ static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) if (strcmp(key, OBJECT_R) == 0) { rc = -EINVAL; if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Role %s has wrong value %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: Role %s has wrong value %d\n", OBJECT_R, role->value); goto bad; } @@ -1522,14 +1525,14 @@ static int mls_read_level(struct mls_level *lp, void *fp) rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: truncated level\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: mls: truncated level\n"); return rc; } lp->sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); rc = ebitmap_read(&lp->cat, fp); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: error reading level categories\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: mls: error reading level categories\n"); return rc; } return 0; @@ -1683,7 +1686,7 @@ static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) unsigned long bit; if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: user %s: " + pr_err("SELinux: user %s: " "too deep or looped boundary", (char *) key); return -EINVAL; @@ -1694,8 +1697,7 @@ static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->roles, bit)) continue; - printk(KERN_ERR - "SELinux: boundary violated policy: " + pr_err("SELinux: boundary violated policy: " "user=%s role=%s bounds=%s\n", sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, user->value - 1), sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, bit), @@ -1720,7 +1722,7 @@ static int role_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) unsigned long bit; if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: role %s: " + pr_err("SELinux: role %s: " "too deep or looped bounds\n", (char *) key); return -EINVAL; @@ -1731,8 +1733,7 @@ static int role_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->types, bit)) continue; - printk(KERN_ERR - "SELinux: boundary violated policy: " + pr_err("SELinux: boundary violated policy: " "role=%s type=%s bounds=%s\n", sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, role->value - 1), sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, bit), @@ -1754,7 +1755,7 @@ static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) upper = datum; while (upper->bounds) { if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: type %s: " + pr_err("SELinux: type %s: " "too deep or looped boundary\n", (char *) key); return -EINVAL; @@ -1765,7 +1766,7 @@ static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) BUG_ON(!upper); if (upper->attribute) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: type %s: " + pr_err("SELinux: type %s: " "bounded by attribute %s", (char *) key, sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, upper->value - 1)); @@ -1888,7 +1889,7 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) rc = -EINVAL; if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, r)) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: rangetrans: invalid range\n"); + pr_warn("SELinux: rangetrans: invalid range\n"); goto out; } @@ -2023,7 +2024,7 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) { rc = -EINVAL; if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) == 0) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: dup genfs fstype %s\n", + pr_err("SELinux: dup genfs fstype %s\n", newgenfs->fstype); goto out; } @@ -2073,7 +2074,7 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) && (!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass || newc->v.sclass == c->v.sclass)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: dup genfs entry (%s,%s)\n", + pr_err("SELinux: dup genfs entry (%s,%s)\n", genfs->fstype, c->u.name); goto out; } @@ -2295,7 +2296,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) rc = -EINVAL; if (le32_to_cpu(buf[0]) != POLICYDB_MAGIC) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb magic number 0x%x does " + pr_err("SELinux: policydb magic number 0x%x does " "not match expected magic number 0x%x\n", le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_MAGIC); goto bad; @@ -2304,7 +2305,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) rc = -EINVAL; len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); if (len != strlen(POLICYDB_STRING)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb string length %d does not " + pr_err("SELinux: policydb string length %d does not " "match expected length %zu\n", len, strlen(POLICYDB_STRING)); goto bad; @@ -2313,14 +2314,14 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) rc = -ENOMEM; policydb_str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (!policydb_str) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to allocate memory for policydb " + pr_err("SELinux: unable to allocate memory for policydb " "string of length %d\n", len); goto bad; } rc = next_entry(policydb_str, fp, len); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: truncated policydb string identifier\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: truncated policydb string identifier\n"); kfree(policydb_str); goto bad; } @@ -2328,7 +2329,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) rc = -EINVAL; policydb_str[len] = '\0'; if (strcmp(policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb string %s does not match " + pr_err("SELinux: policydb string %s does not match " "my string %s\n", policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING); kfree(policydb_str); goto bad; @@ -2346,7 +2347,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) p->policyvers = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN || p->policyvers > POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb version %d does not match " + pr_err("SELinux: policydb version %d does not match " "my version range %d-%d\n", le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN, POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX); goto bad; @@ -2357,7 +2358,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) rc = -EINVAL; if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: security policydb version %d " + pr_err("SELinux: security policydb version %d " "(MLS) not backwards compatible\n", p->policyvers); goto bad; @@ -2381,7 +2382,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) rc = -EINVAL; info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers); if (!info) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to find policy compat info " + pr_err("SELinux: unable to find policy compat info " "for version %d\n", p->policyvers); goto bad; } @@ -2389,7 +2390,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) rc = -EINVAL; if (le32_to_cpu(buf[2]) != info->sym_num || le32_to_cpu(buf[3]) != info->ocon_num) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do " + pr_err("SELinux: policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do " "not match mine (%d,%d)\n", le32_to_cpu(buf[2]), le32_to_cpu(buf[3]), info->sym_num, info->ocon_num); @@ -3417,7 +3418,7 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp) * careful if you ever try to remove this restriction */ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: refusing to write policy version %d." + pr_err("SELinux: refusing to write policy version %d." " Because it is less than version %d\n", p->policyvers, POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB); return -EINVAL; @@ -3446,7 +3447,7 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp) /* Write the version, config, and table sizes. */ info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers); if (!info) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy " + pr_err("SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy " "version %d", p->policyvers); return -EINVAL; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From c103a91e8916540c774805af11ed4bc3ba75f874 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: peter enderborg Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:09:03 +0200 Subject: selinux: Cleanup printk logging in hooks Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 2b5ee5fbd652..f78318af8254 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " + pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; goto out; @@ -539,11 +539,11 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " + pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type " "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); else - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " + pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type " "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc); goto out; @@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, goto out; } rc = -EINVAL; - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options " + pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options " "before the security server is initialized\n"); goto out; } @@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid" + pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc); goto out; @@ -860,8 +860,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, */ rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_WARNING - "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", + pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc); goto out; } @@ -947,7 +946,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) { rc = -EINVAL; - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is " + pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is " "invalid for this filesystem type\n"); goto out; } @@ -969,7 +968,7 @@ out: return rc; out_double_mount: rc = -EINVAL; - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different " + pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different " "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name); goto out; } @@ -998,7 +997,7 @@ static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb, } return 0; mismatch: - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, " + pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, " "different security settings for (dev %s, " "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name); return -EBUSY; @@ -1106,7 +1105,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options, case Opt_context: if (context || defcontext) { rc = -EINVAL; - printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); + pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); goto out_err; } context = match_strdup(&args[0]); @@ -1119,7 +1118,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options, case Opt_fscontext: if (fscontext) { rc = -EINVAL; - printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); + pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); goto out_err; } fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); @@ -1132,7 +1131,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options, case Opt_rootcontext: if (rootcontext) { rc = -EINVAL; - printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); + pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); goto out_err; } rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); @@ -1145,7 +1144,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options, case Opt_defcontext: if (context || defcontext) { rc = -EINVAL; - printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); + pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); goto out_err; } defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); @@ -1158,7 +1157,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options, break; default: rc = -EINVAL; - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n"); + pr_warn("SELinux: unknown mount option\n"); goto out_err; } @@ -1623,7 +1622,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent dput(dentry); if (rc < 0) { if (rc != -ENODATA) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned " + pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned " "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); kfree(context); @@ -1643,11 +1642,11 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent if (rc == -EINVAL) { if (printk_ratelimit()) - printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid " + pr_notice("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid " "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the " "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context); } else { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) " + pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) " "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); } @@ -1785,8 +1784,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS; break; default: - printk(KERN_ERR - "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap); + pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap); BUG(); return -EINVAL; } @@ -2029,7 +2027,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir, av = DIR__RMDIR; break; default: - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n", + pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n", __func__, kind); return 0; } @@ -2875,7 +2873,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid" + pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc); goto out_free_opts; @@ -2914,7 +2912,7 @@ out_free_secdata: free_secdata(secdata); return rc; out_bad_option: - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options " + pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options " "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); goto out_free_opts; @@ -3357,7 +3355,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID" + pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID" "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n", inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc); return; @@ -4420,7 +4418,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, } parse_error: - printk(KERN_WARNING + pr_warn( "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb()," " unable to parse packet\n"); return ret; @@ -4463,7 +4461,7 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); if (unlikely(err)) { - printk(KERN_WARNING + pr_warn( "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid()," " unable to determine packet's peer label\n"); return -EACCES; @@ -7126,11 +7124,11 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) } if (!selinux_enabled) { - printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n"); + pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n"); return 0; } - printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n"); + pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n"); memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state)); enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot); @@ -7166,9 +7164,9 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n"); if (selinux_enforcing_boot) - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n"); + pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n"); else - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n"); + pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n"); return 0; } @@ -7180,10 +7178,10 @@ static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused) void selinux_complete_init(void) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n"); + pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n"); /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */ - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n"); + pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n"); iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL); } @@ -7258,7 +7256,7 @@ static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) if (!selinux_enabled) return 0; - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n"); + pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n"); err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops); if (err) @@ -7271,7 +7269,7 @@ __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n"); + pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n"); unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops); } @@ -7300,7 +7298,7 @@ int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state) state->disabled = 1; - printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); + pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); selinux_enabled = 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From c87a7e75a3e2180a15df1c76343ee1a2d477b224 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: peter enderborg Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:09:04 +0200 Subject: selinux: Cleanup printk logging in avtab Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c index a2c9148b0662..c0417cf17fee 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules) h->nel = 0; h->nslot = nslot; h->mask = mask; - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n", + pr_debug("SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n", h->nslot, nrules); return 0; } @@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag) } } - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, " + pr_debug("SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, " "longest chain length %d sum of chain length^2 %llu\n", tag, h->nel, slots_used, h->nslot, max_chain_len, chain2_len_sum); @@ -407,18 +407,18 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, if (vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) { rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); return rc; } items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf32[0]); if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n"); return -EINVAL; } rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*items2); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); return rc; } items = 0; @@ -426,19 +426,19 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]); key.source_type = (u16)val; if (key.source_type != val) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated source type\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated source type\n"); return -EINVAL; } val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]); key.target_type = (u16)val; if (key.target_type != val) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated target type\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated target type\n"); return -EINVAL; } val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]); key.target_class = (u16)val; if (key.target_class != val) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated target class\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated target class\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -446,16 +446,16 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, enabled = (val & AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD) ? AVTAB_ENABLED : 0; if (!(val & (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE))) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: null entry\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: null entry\n"); return -EINVAL; } if ((val & AVTAB_AV) && (val & AVTAB_TYPE)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n"); return -EINVAL; } if (val & AVTAB_XPERMS) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has extended permissions\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has extended permissions\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -470,7 +470,8 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, } if (items != items2) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n", items2, items); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n", + items2, items); return -EINVAL; } return 0; @@ -478,7 +479,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, rc = next_entry(buf16, fp, sizeof(u16)*4); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); return rc; } @@ -491,7 +492,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, if (!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.source_type) || !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) || !policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -501,13 +502,13 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, set++; } if (!set || set > 1) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: more than one specifier\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: more than one specifier\n"); return -EINVAL; } if ((vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL) && (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: policy version %u does not " + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: policy version %u does not " "support extended permissions rules and one " "was specified\n", vers); return -EINVAL; @@ -515,17 +516,17 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, memset(&xperms, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms)); rc = next_entry(&xperms.specified, fp, sizeof(u8)); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); return rc; } rc = next_entry(&xperms.driver, fp, sizeof(u8)); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); return rc; } rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); return rc; } for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p); i++) @@ -534,14 +535,14 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, } else { rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); return rc; } datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32); } if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) && !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.u.data)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n"); return -EINVAL; } return insertf(a, &key, &datum, p); @@ -562,12 +563,12 @@ int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol) rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); if (rc < 0) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated table\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated table\n"); goto bad; } nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); if (!nel) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: table is empty\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: table is empty\n"); rc = -EINVAL; goto bad; } @@ -580,9 +581,9 @@ int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol) rc = avtab_read_item(a, fp, pol, avtab_insertf, NULL); if (rc) { if (rc == -ENOMEM) - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: out of memory\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: out of memory\n"); else if (rc == -EEXIST) - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: duplicate entry\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: avtab: duplicate entry\n"); goto bad; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b54c85c15a7bf1a34b14f23eb186e4a737ac3447 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: peter enderborg Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:09:05 +0200 Subject: selinux: Cleanup printk logging in services Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index dd2ceec06fef..f3def298a90e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -136,8 +136,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol, p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name); if (!p_out->value) { - printk(KERN_INFO - "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n", + pr_info("SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n", p_in->name); if (pol->reject_unknown) goto err; @@ -156,8 +155,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol, p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value, p_in->perms[k]); if (!p_out->perms[k]) { - printk(KERN_INFO - "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n", + pr_info("SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n", p_in->perms[k], p_in->name); if (pol->reject_unknown) goto err; @@ -170,7 +168,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol, } if (print_unknown_handle) - printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n", + pr_info("SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n", pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied"); out_map->size = i; @@ -644,7 +642,7 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb, if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) { if (printk_ratelimit()) - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass); + pr_warn("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass); return; } @@ -793,7 +791,7 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state, ocontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, oldsid); if (!ocontext) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, oldsid); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; @@ -801,7 +799,7 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state, ncontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, newsid); if (!ncontext) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, newsid); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; @@ -809,7 +807,7 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state, tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tasksid); if (!tcontext) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, tasksid); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; @@ -883,7 +881,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state, rc = -EINVAL; old_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, old_sid); if (!old_context) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n", __func__, old_sid); goto out; } @@ -891,7 +889,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state, rc = -EINVAL; new_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, new_sid); if (!new_context) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n", __func__, new_sid); goto out; } @@ -1040,14 +1038,14 @@ void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state, scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, ssid); goto out; } tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid); if (!tcontext) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, tsid); goto out; } @@ -1129,7 +1127,7 @@ void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state, scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, ssid); goto out; } @@ -1140,7 +1138,7 @@ void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state, tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid); if (!tcontext) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, tsid); goto out; } @@ -1183,7 +1181,7 @@ void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state, scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, ssid); goto out; } @@ -1194,7 +1192,7 @@ void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state, tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid); if (!tcontext) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, tsid); goto out; } @@ -1310,7 +1308,7 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state, *scontext = scontextp; goto out; } - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: called before initial " + pr_err("SELinux: %s: called before initial " "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid); rc = -EINVAL; goto out; @@ -1323,7 +1321,7 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state, else context = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid); if (!context) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, sid); rc = -EINVAL; goto out_unlock; @@ -1678,14 +1676,14 @@ static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state, scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, ssid); rc = -EINVAL; goto out_unlock; } tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid); if (!tcontext) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, tsid); rc = -EINVAL; goto out_unlock; @@ -1911,7 +1909,8 @@ static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context( return -EINVAL; if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, &s, &len)) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s); + pr_warn("SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", + s); kfree(s); } return 0; @@ -1962,7 +1961,7 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key, c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL); kfree(s); if (!rc) { - printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n", + pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n", c->str); /* Replace string with mapped representation. */ kfree(c->str); @@ -1974,7 +1973,7 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key, goto out; } else { /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */ - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n", + pr_err("SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n", c->str, -rc); goto out; } @@ -2033,7 +2032,7 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key, oc = oc->next; rc = -EINVAL; if (!oc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to look up" + pr_err("SELinux: unable to look up" " the initial SIDs list\n"); goto bad; } @@ -2065,7 +2064,7 @@ bad: context_destroy(c); c->str = s; c->len = len; - printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n", + pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n", c->str); rc = 0; goto out; @@ -2170,13 +2169,13 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len) newpolicydb->len = len; /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */ if (policydb->mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled) - printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n"); + pr_info("SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n"); else if (!policydb->mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled) - printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n"); + pr_info("SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n"); rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n"); policydb_destroy(newpolicydb); goto out; } @@ -2187,7 +2186,7 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len) rc = security_preserve_bools(state, newpolicydb); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n"); + pr_err("SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n"); goto err; } @@ -2207,7 +2206,7 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len) args.newp = newpolicydb; rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to convert the internal" + pr_err("SELinux: unable to convert the internal" " representation of contexts in the new SID" " table\n"); goto err; @@ -2999,7 +2998,7 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state, rc = -EINVAL; context1 = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid); if (!context1) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, sid); goto out_unlock; } @@ -3007,7 +3006,7 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state, rc = -EINVAL; context2 = sidtab_search(sidtab, mls_sid); if (!context2) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, mls_sid); goto out_unlock; } @@ -3104,14 +3103,14 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state, rc = -EINVAL; nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, nlbl_sid); if (!nlbl_ctx) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, nlbl_sid); goto out; } rc = -EINVAL; xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, xfrm_sid); if (!xfrm_ctx) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, xfrm_sid); goto out; } @@ -3202,7 +3201,7 @@ int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state, rc = -EINVAL; match = hashtab_search(policydb->p_classes.table, class); if (!match) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n", __func__, class); goto out; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From f8b69a5f00ee0a8e71555fdbd77f79db9c0769f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: peter enderborg Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:09:06 +0200 Subject: selinux: Cleanup printk logging in selinuxfs Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index f3d374d2ca04..d64a06e84eec 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -620,7 +620,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) length = -ERANGE; if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds " + pr_err("SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds " "payload max\n", __func__, len); goto out; } @@ -956,7 +956,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) length = -ERANGE; if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds " + pr_err("SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds " "payload max\n", __func__, len); goto out; } @@ -1147,7 +1147,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) length = -ERANGE; if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds " + pr_err("SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds " "payload max\n", __func__, len); goto out; } @@ -1996,7 +1996,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) goto err; return 0; err: - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: failed while creating inodes\n", + pr_err("SELinux: %s: failed while creating inodes\n", __func__); selinux_fs_info_free(sb); @@ -2046,7 +2046,7 @@ static int __init init_sel_fs(void) selinux_null.mnt = selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type); if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "selinuxfs: could not mount!\n"); + pr_err("selinuxfs: could not mount!\n"); err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount); selinuxfs_mount = NULL; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From d85a78334e7b67292834cd222962e010142905ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: peter enderborg Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:09:07 +0200 Subject: selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netlink Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/netlink.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/netlink.c b/security/selinux/netlink.c index 828fb6a4e941..8a8a72507437 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netlink.c +++ b/security/selinux/netlink.c @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ out: out_kfree_skb: kfree_skb(skb); oom: - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: OOM in %s\n", __func__); + pr_err("SELinux: OOM in %s\n", __func__); goto out; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b21a695d9cba3a144cc833961457bdc6c987226e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: peter enderborg Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:09:08 +0200 Subject: selinux: Cleanup printk logging in sidtab Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c index 5be31b7af225..fd75a12fa8fc 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c @@ -214,8 +214,7 @@ int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, } sid = s->next_sid++; if (context->len) - printk(KERN_INFO - "SELinux: Context %s is not valid (left unmapped).\n", + pr_info("SELinux: Context %s is not valid (left unmapped).\n", context->str); ret = sidtab_insert(s, sid, context); if (ret) @@ -253,7 +252,7 @@ void sidtab_hash_eval(struct sidtab *h, char *tag) } } - printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest " + pr_debug("%s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest " "chain length %d\n", tag, h->nel, slots_used, SIDTAB_SIZE, max_chain_len); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From d006469d3fac547743612170756ed1571edcf97e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: peter enderborg Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:09:09 +0200 Subject: selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netport Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/netport.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c index 9ed4c5064a5e..7a141cadbffc 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netport.c +++ b/security/selinux/netport.c @@ -173,9 +173,8 @@ static int sel_netport_sid_slow(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid) out: spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock); if (unlikely(ret)) { - printk(KERN_WARNING - "SELinux: failure in sel_netport_sid_slow()," - " unable to determine network port label\n"); + pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network port label\n", + __func__); kfree(new); } return ret; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0d3a115429e98997b6d12cbd0670059501f4ce71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: peter enderborg Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:09:10 +0200 Subject: selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netif Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/netif.c | 11 ++++------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c index ac65f7417413..8c738c189942 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netif.c +++ b/security/selinux/netif.c @@ -145,9 +145,8 @@ static int sel_netif_sid_slow(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid) dev = dev_get_by_index(ns, ifindex); if (unlikely(dev == NULL)) { - printk(KERN_WARNING - "SELinux: failure in sel_netif_sid_slow()," - " invalid network interface (%d)\n", ifindex); + pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), invalid network interface (%d)\n", + __func__, ifindex); return -ENOENT; } @@ -177,10 +176,8 @@ out: spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock); dev_put(dev); if (unlikely(ret)) { - printk(KERN_WARNING - "SELinux: failure in sel_netif_sid_slow()," - " unable to determine network interface label (%d)\n", - ifindex); + pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network interface label (%d)\n", + __func__, ifindex); kfree(new); } return ret; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 07c81ac2adccbdfe8cc48fe4ad347cd37520c504 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: peter enderborg Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:09:11 +0200 Subject: selinux: Cleanup printk logging in avc Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/avc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index f3aedf077509..635e5c1e3e48 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(struct selinux_avc *avc, spin_lock_irqsave(¬if_lock, flag); if (is_insert) { if (seqno < avc->avc_cache.latest_notif) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: avc: seqno %d < latest_notif %d\n", + pr_warn("SELinux: avc: seqno %d < latest_notif %d\n", seqno, avc->avc_cache.latest_notif); ret = -EAGAIN; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 67b0b4e4988f296ecc69fc8d09a2ce2741653ee0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: peter enderborg Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:09:12 +0200 Subject: selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netnode Replace printk with pr_* to avoid checkpatch warnings. Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/netnode.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c index 6dd89b89bc1f..afa0d432436b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netnode.c +++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c @@ -238,9 +238,8 @@ static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid) out: spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock); if (unlikely(ret)) { - printk(KERN_WARNING - "SELinux: failure in sel_netnode_sid_slow()," - " unable to determine network node label\n"); + pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network node label\n", + __func__); kfree(new); } return ret; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7b4e88434c4e7982fb053c49657e1c8bbb8692d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2018 10:54:45 -0700 Subject: Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inode Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inode /proc clean-up in commit 1bbc55131e59bd099fdc568d3aa0b42634dbd188 resulted in smack_task_to_inode() being called before smack_d_instantiate. This resulted in the smk_inode value being ignored, even while present for files in /proc/self. Marking the inode as instant here fixes that. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 7ad226018f51..19de675d4504 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2296,6 +2296,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p); isp->smk_inode = skp; + isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT; } /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3619dec5103dd999a777e3e4ea08c8f40a6ddc57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 16:59:46 +0100 Subject: dh key: fix rounding up KDF output length Commit 383203eff718 ("dh key: get rid of stack allocated array") changed kdf_ctr() to assume that the length of key material to derive is a multiple of the digest size. The length was supposed to be rounded up accordingly. However, the round_up() macro was used which only gives the correct result on power-of-2 arguments, whereas not all hash algorithms have power-of-2 digest sizes. In some cases this resulted in a write past the end of the 'outbuf' buffer. Fix it by switching to roundup(), which works for non-power-of-2 inputs. Reported-by: syzbot+486f97f892efeb2075a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+29d17b7898b41ee120a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+8a608baf8751184ec727@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d04e58bd384f1fe0b112@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 383203eff718 ("dh key: get rid of stack allocated array") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Acked-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Tycho Andersen Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/keys/dh.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c index f7403821db7f..b203f7758f97 100644 --- a/security/keys/dh.c +++ b/security/keys/dh.c @@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ static void kdf_dealloc(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc) * The src pointer is defined as Z || other info where Z is the shared secret * from DH and other info is an arbitrary string (see SP800-56A section * 5.8.1.2). + * + * 'dlen' must be a multiple of the digest size. */ static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen, u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen, unsigned int zlen) @@ -205,8 +207,8 @@ static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, { uint8_t *outbuf = NULL; int ret; - size_t outbuf_len = round_up(buflen, - crypto_shash_digestsize(sdesc->shash.tfm)); + size_t outbuf_len = roundup(buflen, + crypto_shash_digestsize(sdesc->shash.tfm)); outbuf = kmalloc(outbuf_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!outbuf) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0da74120c5341389b97c4ee27487a97224999ee1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2018 20:39:54 -0400 Subject: selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked regions If a user is accessing a file in selinuxfs with a pointer to a userspace buffer that is backed by e.g. a userfaultfd, the userspace access can stall indefinitely, which can block fsi->mutex if it is held. For sel_read_policy(), remove the locking, since this method doesn't seem to access anything that requires locking. For sel_read_bool(), move the user access below the locked region. For sel_write_bool() and sel_commit_bools_write(), move the user access up above the locked region. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Acked-by: Stephen Smalley [PM: removed an unused variable in sel_read_policy()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index c0cadbc5f85c..19e35dd695d7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -441,22 +441,16 @@ static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info; struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data; int ret; - mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); - ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY, SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL); if (ret) - goto out; + return ret; - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); -out: - mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); - return ret; + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); } static vm_fault_t sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) @@ -1188,25 +1182,29 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, ret = -EINVAL; if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; ret = -ENOMEM; page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!page) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(fsi->state, index); if (cur_enforcing < 0) { ret = cur_enforcing; - goto out; + goto out_unlock; } length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing, fsi->bool_pending_values[index]); - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); -out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); +out_free: free_page((unsigned long)page); return ret; + +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + goto out_free; } static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, @@ -1219,6 +1217,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1233,22 +1242,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out; @@ -1280,6 +1273,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, ssize_t length; int new_value; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1289,22 +1293,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, if (length) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6aa56f44253a6dd802e45d8ab1b48847feaf063a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kamal Mostafa Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2018 13:04:21 -0700 Subject: usercopy: Do not select BUG with HARDENED_USERCOPY There is no need to "select BUG" when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled. The kernel thread will always die, regardless of the CONFIG_BUG. Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa [kees: tweak commit log] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- security/Kconfig | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index c4302067a3ad..766777406ca8 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -153,7 +153,6 @@ config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR config HARDENED_USERCOPY bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR - select BUG imply STRICT_DEVMEM help This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when -- cgit v1.2.3 From 85d7311f1908b9ca20c10c2c23f5dbb93875f0c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Sat, 30 Jun 2018 15:16:16 -0700 Subject: crypto: remove redundant type flags from tfm allocation Some crypto API users allocating a tfm with crypto_alloc_$FOO() are also specifying the type flags for $FOO, e.g. crypto_alloc_shash() with CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH. But, that's redundant since the crypto API will override any specified type flag/mask with the correct ones. So, remove the unneeded flags. This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- Documentation/crypto/api-samples.rst | 2 +- drivers/crypto/atmel-sha.c | 4 +--- drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c | 3 +-- drivers/crypto/marvell/hash.c | 3 +-- drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c | 3 +-- security/keys/dh.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/api-samples.rst b/Documentation/crypto/api-samples.rst index 006827e30d06..0f6ca8b7261e 100644 --- a/Documentation/crypto/api-samples.rst +++ b/Documentation/crypto/api-samples.rst @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ Code Example For Use of Operational State Memory With SHASH char *hash_alg_name = "sha1-padlock-nano"; int ret; - alg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg_name, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH, 0); + alg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg_name, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(alg)) { pr_info("can't alloc alg %s\n", hash_alg_name); return PTR_ERR(alg); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/atmel-sha.c b/drivers/crypto/atmel-sha.c index 4d43081120db..8a19df2fba6a 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/atmel-sha.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/atmel-sha.c @@ -2316,9 +2316,7 @@ struct atmel_sha_authenc_ctx *atmel_sha_authenc_spawn(unsigned long mode) goto error; } - tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(name, - CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH, - CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH_MASK); + tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(name, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { err = PTR_ERR(tfm); goto error; diff --git a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c index 83bd49d1249b..6a790f069ebf 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c @@ -941,8 +941,7 @@ int safexcel_hmac_setkey(const char *alg, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen, u8 *ipad, *opad; int ret; - tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(alg, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH, - CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH_MASK); + tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(alg, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) return PTR_ERR(tfm); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/marvell/hash.c b/drivers/crypto/marvell/hash.c index e34d80b6b7e5..99ff54cc8a15 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/marvell/hash.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/marvell/hash.c @@ -1183,8 +1183,7 @@ static int mv_cesa_ahmac_setkey(const char *hash_alg_name, u8 *opad; int ret; - tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(hash_alg_name, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH, - CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH_MASK); + tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(hash_alg_name, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) return PTR_ERR(tfm); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c b/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c index 53227d70d397..d8a5db11b7ea 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c @@ -378,8 +378,7 @@ static int qce_ahash_hmac_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key, else return -EINVAL; - ahash_tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(alg_name, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH, - CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH_MASK); + ahash_tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(alg_name, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(ahash_tfm)) return PTR_ERR(ahash_tfm); diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c index f7403821db7f..04072cb59a98 100644 --- a/security/keys/dh.c +++ b/security/keys/dh.c @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params, if (ret) goto out3; - tfm = crypto_alloc_kpp("dh", CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_KPP, 0); + tfm = crypto_alloc_kpp("dh", 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { ret = PTR_ERR(tfm); goto out3; -- cgit v1.2.3 From e3f20ae21079ecac282df65d83865c5771f4bca0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 13:25:29 -0400 Subject: security_file_open(): lose cred argument Acked-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- fs/open.c | 2 +- include/linux/security.h | 5 ++--- security/security.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index 0a9f00b7f3d5..4c65edefa487 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c @@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ static int do_dentry_open(struct file *f, goto cleanup_all; } - error = security_file_open(f, f->f_cred); + error = security_file_open(f); if (error) goto cleanup_all; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 63030c85ee19..88d30fc975e7 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file); int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, struct fown_struct *fown, int sig); int security_file_receive(struct file *file); -int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred); +int security_file_open(struct file *file); int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags); void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task); int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); @@ -858,8 +858,7 @@ static inline int security_file_receive(struct file *file) return 0; } -static inline int security_file_open(struct file *file, - const struct cred *cred) +static inline int security_file_open(struct file *file) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 68f46d849abe..235b35f58a65 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -970,11 +970,11 @@ int security_file_receive(struct file *file) return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file); } -int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +int security_file_open(struct file *file) { int ret; - ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file, cred); + ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file, file->f_cred); if (ret) return ret; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9481769208b5e39b871ae4e89f5328c776ec38dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 14:13:18 -0400 Subject: ->file_open(): lose cred argument Acked-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 4 ++-- security/security.c | 2 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 +++--- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 8f1131c8dd54..a8ee106b865d 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -1569,7 +1569,7 @@ union security_list_options { int (*file_send_sigiotask)(struct task_struct *tsk, struct fown_struct *fown, int sig); int (*file_receive)(struct file *file); - int (*file_open)(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred); + int (*file_open)(struct file *file); int (*task_alloc)(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags); void (*task_free)(struct task_struct *task); diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 74f17376202b..8b8b70620bbe 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR); } -static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file) { struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file); struct aa_label *label; @@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) return 0; } - label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); + label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(file->f_cred); if (!unconfined(label)) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode }; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 235b35f58a65..5dce67070cdf 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file) { int ret; - ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file, file->f_cred); + ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file); if (ret) return ret; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 2b5ee5fbd652..18006be15713 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3862,7 +3862,7 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file)); } -static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; @@ -3886,7 +3886,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) * new inode label or new policy. * This check is not redundant - do not remove. */ - return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file)); + return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file)); } /* task security operations */ diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 7ad226018f51..e7b6c012431d 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1927,9 +1927,9 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) * * Returns 0 */ -static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int smack_file_open(struct file *file) { - struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security; + struct task_smack *tsp = file->f_cred->security; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct smk_audit_info ad; int rc; @@ -1937,7 +1937,7 @@ static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad); - rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc); + rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc); return rc; } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index 213b8c593668..9f932e2d6852 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, * * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. */ -static int tomoyo_file_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred) +static int tomoyo_file_open(struct file *f) { int flags = f->f_flags; /* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6035a27b25ab9dadc8c3d5c5df5eae3fca62fc95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2018 13:40:10 -0400 Subject: IMA: don't propagate opened through the entire thing just check ->f_mode in ima_appraise_measurement() Acked-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Al Viro --- fs/namei.c | 3 +-- fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 2 +- include/linux/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 6 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 4bd7cc0d7522..d2aeb282ed05 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -3400,8 +3400,7 @@ finish_open_created: if (error) goto out; opened: - error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode, - file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED ? FILE_CREATED : 0); + error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode); if (!error && will_truncate) error = handle_truncate(file); out: diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c index b0555d7d8200..55a099e47ba2 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c @@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, umode_t type, goto out_nfserr; } - host_err = ima_file_check(file, may_flags, 0); + host_err = ima_file_check(file, may_flags); if (host_err) { fput(file); goto out_nfserr; diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 0e4647e0eb60..d9ba3fc363b7 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ struct linux_binprm; #ifdef CONFIG_IMA extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); -extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened); +extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask); extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot); extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return 0; } -static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened) +static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 354bb5716ce3..e4c1a236976c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, int opened); + int xattr_len); int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, @@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, int opened) + int xattr_len) { return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 8bd7a0733e51..deec1804a00a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, int opened) + int xattr_len) { static const char op[] = "appraise_data"; const char *cause = "unknown"; @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, cause = iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ? "IMA-signature-required" : "missing-hash"; status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; - if (opened & FILE_CREATED) + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED) iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE; if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) && (!(iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) || diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index dca44cf7838e..b286f37712d5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func, int opened) + enum ima_hooks func) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; @@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) { inode_lock(inode); rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname, - xattr_value, xattr_len, opened); + xattr_value, xattr_len); inode_unlock(inode); } if (action & IMA_AUDIT) @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0); + 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); } return 0; @@ -364,13 +364,13 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0); + MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret; security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid); return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK, 0); + MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); } /** @@ -383,14 +383,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ -int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened) +int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { u32 secid; security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | - MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, opened); + MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); @@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, - MAY_READ, func, 0); + MAY_READ, func); } static int __init init_ima(void) -- cgit v1.2.3 From c417fbce98722ad7e384caa8ba6f2e7c5f8672d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 01:40:23 +0900 Subject: kbuild: move bin2c back to scripts/ from scripts/basic/ Commit 8370edea81e3 ("bin2c: move bin2c in scripts/basic") moved bin2c to the scripts/basic/ directory, incorrectly stating "Kexec wants to use bin2c and it wants to use it really early in the build process. See arch/x86/purgatory/ code in later patches." Commit bdab125c9301 ("Revert "kexec/purgatory: Add clean-up for purgatory directory"") and commit d6605b6bbee8 ("x86/build: Remove unnecessary preparation for purgatory") removed the redundant purgatory build magic entirely. That means that the move of bin2c was unnecessary in the first place. fixdep is the only host program that deserves to sit in the scripts/basic/ directory. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada --- arch/powerpc/purgatory/Makefile | 3 +-- arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile | 3 +-- arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile | 3 +-- kernel/Makefile | 2 +- scripts/.gitignore | 1 + scripts/Makefile | 1 + scripts/basic/.gitignore | 1 - scripts/basic/Makefile | 1 - scripts/basic/bin2c.c | 36 ------------------------------------ scripts/bin2c.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/tomoyo/Makefile | 2 +- 11 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 scripts/basic/bin2c.c create mode 100644 scripts/bin2c.c (limited to 'security') diff --git a/arch/powerpc/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/purgatory/Makefile index 30e05decbb4c..4314ba5baf43 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/purgatory/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/purgatory/Makefile @@ -6,9 +6,8 @@ LDFLAGS_purgatory.ro := -e purgatory_start -r --no-undefined $(obj)/purgatory.ro: $(obj)/trampoline.o FORCE $(call if_changed,ld) -CMD_BIN2C = $(objtree)/scripts/basic/bin2c quiet_cmd_bin2c = BIN2C $@ - cmd_bin2c = $(CMD_BIN2C) kexec_purgatory < $< > $@ + cmd_bin2c = $(objtree)/scripts/bin2c kexec_purgatory < $< > $@ $(obj)/kexec-purgatory.c: $(obj)/purgatory.ro FORCE $(call if_changed,bin2c) diff --git a/arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile index 1ace023cbdce..445c4603ce02 100644 --- a/arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile +++ b/arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile @@ -27,9 +27,8 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fno-PIE) $(obj)/purgatory.ro: $(PURGATORY_OBJS) FORCE $(call if_changed,ld) -CMD_BIN2C = $(objtree)/scripts/basic/bin2c quiet_cmd_bin2c = BIN2C $@ - cmd_bin2c = $(CMD_BIN2C) kexec_purgatory < $< > $@ + cmd_bin2c = $(objtree)/scripts/bin2c kexec_purgatory < $< > $@ $(obj)/kexec-purgatory.c: $(obj)/purgatory.ro FORCE $(call if_changed,bin2c) diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile index 81a8e33115ad..3cf302b26332 100644 --- a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile @@ -28,9 +28,8 @@ $(obj)/purgatory.ro: $(PURGATORY_OBJS) FORCE targets += kexec-purgatory.c -CMD_BIN2C = $(objtree)/scripts/basic/bin2c quiet_cmd_bin2c = BIN2C $@ - cmd_bin2c = $(CMD_BIN2C) kexec_purgatory < $< > $@ + cmd_bin2c = $(objtree)/scripts/bin2c kexec_purgatory < $< > $@ $(obj)/kexec-purgatory.c: $(obj)/purgatory.ro FORCE $(call if_changed,bin2c) diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile index 04bc07c2b42a..7a63d567fdb5 100644 --- a/kernel/Makefile +++ b/kernel/Makefile @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ targets += config_data.gz $(obj)/config_data.gz: $(KCONFIG_CONFIG) FORCE $(call if_changed,gzip) - filechk_ikconfiggz = (echo "static const char kernel_config_data[] __used = MAGIC_START"; cat $< | scripts/basic/bin2c; echo "MAGIC_END;") + filechk_ikconfiggz = (echo "static const char kernel_config_data[] __used = MAGIC_START"; cat $< | scripts/bin2c; echo "MAGIC_END;") targets += config_data.h $(obj)/config_data.h: $(obj)/config_data.gz FORCE $(call filechk,ikconfiggz) diff --git a/scripts/.gitignore b/scripts/.gitignore index 0442c06eefcb..12d302d70128 100644 --- a/scripts/.gitignore +++ b/scripts/.gitignore @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ # # Generated files # +bin2c conmakehash kallsyms pnmtologo diff --git a/scripts/Makefile b/scripts/Makefile index 25ab143cbe14..59c21ec49b84 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile +++ b/scripts/Makefile @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += -I$(srctree)/tools/include +hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILD_BIN2C) += bin2c hostprogs-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms hostprogs-$(CONFIG_LOGO) += pnmtologo hostprogs-$(CONFIG_VT) += conmakehash diff --git a/scripts/basic/.gitignore b/scripts/basic/.gitignore index 9528ec9e5adc..a776371a3502 100644 --- a/scripts/basic/.gitignore +++ b/scripts/basic/.gitignore @@ -1,2 +1 @@ fixdep -bin2c diff --git a/scripts/basic/Makefile b/scripts/basic/Makefile index 0372b33febe5..af49b446f17d 100644 --- a/scripts/basic/Makefile +++ b/scripts/basic/Makefile @@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ # fixdep: Used to generate dependency information during build process hostprogs-y := fixdep -hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILD_BIN2C) += bin2c always := $(hostprogs-y) # fixdep is needed to compile other host programs diff --git a/scripts/basic/bin2c.c b/scripts/basic/bin2c.c deleted file mode 100644 index c3d7eef3ad06..000000000000 --- a/scripts/basic/bin2c.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,36 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Unloved program to convert a binary on stdin to a C include on stdout - * - * Jan 1999 Matt Mackall - * - * This software may be used and distributed according to the terms - * of the GNU General Public License, incorporated herein by reference. - */ - -#include - -int main(int argc, char *argv[]) -{ - int ch, total = 0; - - if (argc > 1) - printf("const char %s[] %s=\n", - argv[1], argc > 2 ? argv[2] : ""); - - do { - printf("\t\""); - while ((ch = getchar()) != EOF) { - total++; - printf("\\x%02x", ch); - if (total % 16 == 0) - break; - } - printf("\"\n"); - } while (ch != EOF); - - if (argc > 1) - printf("\t;\n\n#include \n\nconst size_t %s_size = %d;\n", - argv[1], total); - - return 0; -} diff --git a/scripts/bin2c.c b/scripts/bin2c.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c3d7eef3ad06 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/bin2c.c @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* + * Unloved program to convert a binary on stdin to a C include on stdout + * + * Jan 1999 Matt Mackall + * + * This software may be used and distributed according to the terms + * of the GNU General Public License, incorporated herein by reference. + */ + +#include + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + int ch, total = 0; + + if (argc > 1) + printf("const char %s[] %s=\n", + argv[1], argc > 2 ? argv[2] : ""); + + do { + printf("\t\""); + while ((ch = getchar()) != EOF) { + total++; + printf("\\x%02x", ch); + if (total % 16 == 0) + break; + } + printf("\"\n"); + } while (ch != EOF); + + if (argc > 1) + printf("\t;\n\n#include \n\nconst size_t %s_size = %d;\n", + argv[1], total); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Makefile b/security/tomoyo/Makefile index b7c6a7ffc058..cca5a3012fee 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/Makefile +++ b/security/tomoyo/Makefile @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-y = audit.o common.o condition.o domain.o environ.o file.o gc.o group.o load targets += builtin-policy.h define do_policy echo "static char tomoyo_builtin_$(1)[] __initdata ="; \ -$(objtree)/scripts/basic/bin2c <$(firstword $(wildcard $(obj)/policy/$(1).conf $(srctree)/$(src)/policy/$(1).conf.default) /dev/null); \ +$(objtree)/scripts/bin2c <$(firstword $(wildcard $(obj)/policy/$(1).conf $(srctree)/$(src)/policy/$(1).conf.default) /dev/null); \ echo ";" endef quiet_cmd_policy = POLICY $@ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 631d2b490569118c5e4d4e35983efe36d9798cb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2018 10:43:56 -0700 Subject: selinux: constify write_op[] write_op[] is never modified, so make it 'const'. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index d64a06e84eec..eb7f12ab5c33 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -773,7 +773,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size); static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size); static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size); -static ssize_t (*write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = { +static ssize_t (*const write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = { [SEL_ACCESS] = sel_write_access, [SEL_CREATE] = sel_write_create, [SEL_RELABEL] = sel_write_relabel, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8a3bcaf6ecd37fee326cd30732192ef2a09e5b07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Berger Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2018 16:54:52 -0400 Subject: ima: Call audit_log_string() rather than logging it untrusted The parameters passed to this logging function are all provided by a privileged user and therefore we can call audit_log_string() rather than audit_log_untrustedstring(). Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger Suggested-by: Steve Grubb Acked-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 1659abb344f9..f45768469003 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value, audit_log_format(ab, "%s<", key); else audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value); + audit_log_string(ab, value); audit_log_format(ab, " "); } static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3d2859d5d4c33b12327764b887039bca15a37e57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Berger Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2018 16:54:53 -0400 Subject: ima: Use audit_log_format() rather than audit_log_string() Remove the usage of audit_log_string() and replace it with audit_log_format(). Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger Suggested-by: Steve Grubb Acked-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 3 +-- security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 6 +----- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index f45768469003..50ead724ba23 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -663,8 +663,7 @@ static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value, audit_log_format(ab, "%s<", key); else audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key); - audit_log_string(ab, value); - audit_log_format(ab, " "); + audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", value); } static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value) { diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c index ab10a25310a1..82c98f7d217e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c +++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c @@ -45,11 +45,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); audit_log_task_context(ab); - audit_log_format(ab, " op="); - audit_log_string(ab, op); - audit_log_format(ab, " cause="); - audit_log_string(ab, cause); - audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); + audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s cause=%s comm=", op, cause); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(name, current)); if (fname) { audit_log_format(ab, " name="); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2afd020aaeeefacb7711b47e3afb0cfb50db3f13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Berger Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2018 16:54:54 -0400 Subject: ima: Do not audit if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT is not set If Integrity is not auditing, IMA shouldn't audit, either. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger Acked-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 6 +++++- security/integrity/integrity.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 004919d9bf09..13b446328dda 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config IMA select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86 select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC_PSERIES + select INTEGRITY_AUDIT if AUDIT help The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 50ead724ba23..0178bdaa40aa 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -657,6 +657,9 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value, bool (*rule_operator)(kuid_t, kuid_t)) { + if (!ab) + return; + if (rule_operator == &uid_gt) audit_log_format(ab, "%s>", key); else if (rule_operator == &uid_lt) @@ -678,7 +681,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) bool uid_token; int result = 0; - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE); + ab = integrity_audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, + AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE); entry->uid = INVALID_UID; entry->fowner = INVALID_UID; diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 0bb372eed62a..e60473b13a8d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* iint action cache flags */ #define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001 @@ -199,6 +200,13 @@ static inline void evm_load_x509(void) void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, const char *cause, int result, int info); + +static inline struct audit_buffer * +integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type) +{ + return audit_log_start(ctx, gfp_mask, type); +} + #else static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *fname, @@ -206,4 +214,11 @@ static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, int result, int info) { } + +static inline struct audit_buffer * +integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type) +{ + return NULL; +} + #endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From dba31ee759417ef1a952e929524b0cca1751c036 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Berger Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2018 16:54:55 -0400 Subject: ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and the IMA "audit" policy action. This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules. Since we defined a new message type we can now also pass the audit_context and get an associated SYSCALL record. This now produces the following records when parsing IMA policy's rules: type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \ func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC res=1 type=UNKNOWN[1807] msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): action=audit \ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ res=1 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1527888965.738:320): arch=c000003e syscall=1 \ success=yes exit=17 a0=1 a1=55bcfcca9030 a2=11 a3=7fcc1b55fb38 \ items=0 ppid=1567 pid=1601 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 \ fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=tty2 ses=2 comm="echo" \ exe="/usr/bin/echo" \ subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null) Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger Acked-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h index c35aee9ad4a6..cf2bad8d7873 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR 1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */ #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* policy rule */ #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR 1806 /* New EVM-covered xattr */ +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE 1807 /* IMA policy rules */ #define AUDIT_KERNEL 2000 /* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 0178bdaa40aa..8c9499867c91 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -681,8 +681,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) bool uid_token; int result = 0; - ab = integrity_audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, - AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE); + ab = integrity_audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, + AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE); entry->uid = INVALID_UID; entry->fowner = INVALID_UID; -- cgit v1.2.3 From ac2409a521f7ec5978fd582567398d19f4a2fdbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sudeep Holla Date: Tue, 5 Jun 2018 11:25:45 +0100 Subject: integrity: silence warning when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabled When CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabled, securityfs_create_dir returns -ENODEV which throws the following error: "Unable to create integrity sysfs dir: -19" However, if the feature is disabled, it can't be warning and hence we need to silence the error. This patch checks for the error -ENODEV which is returned when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is disabled to stop the error being thrown. Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla Acked-by: Matthew Garrett Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/iint.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 149faa81f6f0..5a6810041e5c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -219,10 +219,13 @@ static int __init integrity_fs_init(void) { integrity_dir = securityfs_create_dir("integrity", NULL); if (IS_ERR(integrity_dir)) { - pr_err("Unable to create integrity sysfs dir: %ld\n", - PTR_ERR(integrity_dir)); + int ret = PTR_ERR(integrity_dir); + + if (ret != -ENODEV) + pr_err("Unable to create integrity sysfs dir: %d\n", + ret); integrity_dir = NULL; - return PTR_ERR(integrity_dir); + return ret; } return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From e2861fa71641c6414831d628a1f4f793b6562580 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2018 14:57:42 -0700 Subject: evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailable When EVM attempts to appraise a file signed with a crypto algorithm the kernel doesn't have support for, it will cause the kernel to trigger a module load. If the EVM policy includes appraisal of kernel modules this will in turn call back into EVM - since EVM is holding a lock until the crypto initialisation is complete, this triggers a deadlock. Add a CRYPTO_NOLOAD flag and skip module loading if it's set, and add that flag in the EVM case in order to fail gracefully with an error message instead of deadlocking. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Acked-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- crypto/api.c | 2 +- include/linux/crypto.h | 5 +++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/crypto/api.c b/crypto/api.c index 0ee632bba064..7aca9f86c5f3 100644 --- a/crypto/api.c +++ b/crypto/api.c @@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static struct crypto_alg *crypto_larval_lookup(const char *name, u32 type, mask &= ~(CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL | CRYPTO_ALG_DEAD); alg = crypto_alg_lookup(name, type, mask); - if (!alg) { + if (!alg && !(mask & CRYPTO_NOLOAD)) { request_module("crypto-%s", name); if (!((type ^ CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK) & mask & diff --git a/include/linux/crypto.h b/include/linux/crypto.h index 6eb06101089f..e8839d3a7559 100644 --- a/include/linux/crypto.h +++ b/include/linux/crypto.h @@ -112,6 +112,11 @@ */ #define CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY 0x00004000 +/* + * Don't trigger module loading + */ +#define CRYPTO_NOLOAD 0x00008000 + /* * Transform masks and values (for crt_flags). */ diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index b60524310855..c20e3142b541 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type) mutex_lock(&mutex); if (*tfm) goto out; - *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_NOLOAD); if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) { rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm); pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5feeb61183dde9d4f4026fd0d5801388c21d61a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2018 14:57:43 -0700 Subject: evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures SHA1 is reasonable in HMAC constructs, but it's desirable to be able to use stronger hashes in digital signatures. Modify the EVM crypto code so the hash type is imported from the digital signature and passed down to the hash calculation code, and return the digest size to higher layers for validation. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 1 + security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 10 ++++++-- security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 19 +++++++++------ 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig index d593346d0bba..60221852b26a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config EVM select ENCRYPTED_KEYS select CRYPTO_HMAC select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO default n help EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index 1257c3c24723..c3f437f5db10 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -47,6 +47,11 @@ extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm; /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */ extern struct list_head evm_config_xattrnames; +struct evm_digest { + struct ima_digest_data hdr; + char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; +} __packed; + int evm_init_key(void); int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, @@ -54,10 +59,11 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, size_t req_xattr_value_len); int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); + size_t req_xattr_value_len, struct evm_digest *data); int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char type, char *digest); + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char type, + struct evm_digest *data); int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr, char *hmac_val); int evm_init_secfs(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index c20e3142b541..8a3905bb02c7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "evm.h" #define EVMKEY "evm-key" @@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE]; static int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE; struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm; -struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm; +static struct crypto_shash *evm_tfm[HASH_ALGO__LAST]; static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex); @@ -38,7 +39,6 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex); static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags; static char * const evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)"; -static char * const evm_hash = "sha1"; /** * evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel @@ -74,10 +74,10 @@ busy: } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_set_key); -static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type) +static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) { long rc; - char *algo; + const char *algo; struct crypto_shash **tfm; struct shash_desc *desc; @@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type) tfm = &hmac_tfm; algo = evm_hmac; } else { - tfm = &hash_tfm; - algo = evm_hash; + tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo]; + algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo]; } if (*tfm == NULL) { @@ -187,10 +187,10 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, * each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory. */ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry, - const char *req_xattr_name, - const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len, - char type, char *digest) + const char *req_xattr_name, + const char *req_xattr_value, + size_t req_xattr_value_len, + uint8_t type, struct evm_digest *data) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct xattr_list *xattr; @@ -205,10 +205,12 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry, inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - desc = init_desc(type); + desc = init_desc(type, data->hdr.algo); if (IS_ERR(desc)) return PTR_ERR(desc); + data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm); + error = -ENODATA; list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { bool is_ima = false; @@ -240,7 +242,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry, if (is_ima) ima_present = true; } - hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, digest); + hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, data->digest); /* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */ if (type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !ima_present) @@ -253,18 +255,18 @@ out: int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len, - char *digest) + struct evm_digest *data) { return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value, - req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest); + req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, data); } int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len, - char type, char *digest) + char type, struct evm_digest *data) { return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value, - req_xattr_value_len, type, digest); + req_xattr_value_len, type, data); } static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) @@ -304,7 +306,7 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); - struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data; + struct evm_digest data; int rc = 0; /* @@ -317,13 +319,14 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (rc) return -EPERM; + data.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, - xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest); + xattr_value_len, &data); if (rc == 0) { - xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; + data.hdr.xattr.sha1.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, - &xattr_data, - sizeof(xattr_data), 0); + &data.hdr.xattr.data[1], + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0); } else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { rc = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM); } @@ -335,7 +338,7 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, { struct shash_desc *desc; - desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC); + desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, HASH_ALGO_SHA1); if (IS_ERR(desc)) { pr_info("init_desc failed\n"); return PTR_ERR(desc); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index f9eff5041e4c..7f3f54d89a6e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include "evm.h" @@ -134,8 +135,9 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; - struct evm_ima_xattr_data calc; + struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr; enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; + struct evm_digest digest; struct inode *inode; int rc, xattr_len; @@ -171,25 +173,28 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; goto out; } + + digest.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, - xattr_value_len, calc.digest); + xattr_value_len, &digest); if (rc) break; - rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest, - sizeof(calc.digest)); + rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, digest.digest, + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); if (rc) rc = -EINVAL; break; case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG: + hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)xattr_data; + digest.hdr.algo = hdr->hash_algo; rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, - xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type, - calc.digest); + xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type, &digest); if (rc) break; rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, (const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len, - calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest)); + digest.digest, digest.hdr.length); if (!rc) { inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6eb864c1d9dd1ef32b88e03c3f49d8be0dab7dcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikhail Kurinnoi Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2018 16:33:42 +0300 Subject: integrity: prevent deadlock during digsig verification. This patch aimed to prevent deadlock during digsig verification.The point of issue - user space utility modprobe and/or it's dependencies (ld-*.so, libz.so.*, libc-*.so and /lib/modules/ files) that could be used for kernel modules load during digsig verification and could be signed by digsig in the same time. First at all, look at crypto_alloc_tfm() work algorithm: crypto_alloc_tfm() will first attempt to locate an already loaded algorithm. If that fails and the kernel supports dynamically loadable modules, it will then attempt to load a module of the same name or alias. If that fails it will send a query to any loaded crypto manager to construct an algorithm on the fly. We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name. 1) we can't do anything with crypto module work, since it designed to work exactly in this way; 2) we can't globally filter module requests for modprobe, since it designed to work with any requests. In this patch, I propose add an exception for "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" module requests only in case of enabled integrity asymmetric keys support. Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules for sure, we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(). In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies also signed with digsig. Requested "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel module name formed by: 1) "pkcs1pad(rsa,%s)" in public_key_verify_signature(); 2) "crypto-%s" / "crypto-%s-all" in crypto_larval_lookup(). "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa," part of request is a constant and unique and could be used as filter. Signed-off-by: Mikhail Kurinnoi Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar include/linux/integrity.h | 13 +++++++++++++ security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- include/linux/integrity.h | 13 +++++++++++++ security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h index 858d3f4a2241..54c853ec2fd1 100644 --- a/include/linux/integrity.h +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h @@ -44,4 +44,17 @@ static inline void integrity_load_keys(void) } #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + +extern int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); + +#else + +static inline int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) +{ + return 0; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS */ + #endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */ diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index ab6a029062a1..6dc075144508 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -115,3 +115,26 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); return ret; } + +/** + * integrity_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests + * @kmod_name: kernel module name + * + * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA + * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to + * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try + * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name. + * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules, + * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(). + * + * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification + * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies + * also signed with digsig. + */ +int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) +{ + if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index b49ee810371b..dbca03d3629b 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1032,7 +1032,12 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { - return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name); + if (ret) + return ret; + return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); } int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7757d607c6b31867777de42e1fb0210b9c5d8b70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joerg Roedel Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2018 11:41:14 +0200 Subject: x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32 Allow PTI to be compiled on x86_32. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Pavel Machek Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Juergen Gross Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Boris Ostrovsky Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: David Laight Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: Eduardo Valentin Cc: Greg KH Cc: Will Deacon Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Waiman Long Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-38-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org --- security/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index c4302067a3ad..afa91c6f06bb 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode" default y - depends on X86_64 && !UML + depends on X86 && !UML help This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7f3ebcf2b1395e0248e56146041e1e5625fd2f23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tyler Hicks Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2018 05:25:00 +0000 Subject: apparmor: Check buffer bounds when mapping permissions mask Don't read past the end of the buffer containing permissions characters or write past the end of the destination string. Detected by CoverityScan CID#1415361, 1415376 ("Out-of-bounds access") Fixes: e53cfe6c7caa ("apparmor: rework perm mapping to a slightly broader set") Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: John Johansen --- security/apparmor/file.c | 3 ++- security/apparmor/include/perms.h | 3 ++- security/apparmor/lib.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index 224b2fef93ca..4285943f7260 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ static void audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask) { char str[10]; - aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, aa_file_perm_chrs, map_mask_to_chr_mask(mask)); + aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, sizeof(str), aa_file_perm_chrs, + map_mask_to_chr_mask(mask)); audit_log_string(ab, str); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h index 38aa6247d00f..b94ec114d1a4 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h @@ -137,7 +137,8 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms; xcheck(fn_for_each((L1), (P), (FN1)), fn_for_each((L2), (P), (FN2))) -void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask); +void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, size_t str_size, const char *chrs, + u32 mask); void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names, u32 mask); void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs, diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c index a7b3f681b80e..974affe50531 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lib.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -198,15 +198,24 @@ const char *aa_file_perm_names[] = { /** * aa_perm_mask_to_str - convert a perm mask to its short string * @str: character buffer to store string in (at least 10 characters) + * @str_size: size of the @str buffer + * @chrs: NUL-terminated character buffer of permission characters * @mask: permission mask to convert */ -void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask) +void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, size_t str_size, const char *chrs, u32 mask) { unsigned int i, perm = 1; + size_t num_chrs = strlen(chrs); + + for (i = 0; i < num_chrs; perm <<= 1, i++) { + if (mask & perm) { + /* Ensure that one byte is left for NUL-termination */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(str_size <= 1)) + break; - for (i = 0; i < 32; perm <<= 1, i++) { - if (mask & perm) *str++ = chrs[i]; + str_size--; + } } *str = '\0'; } @@ -236,7 +245,7 @@ void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs, audit_log_format(ab, "\""); if ((mask & chrsmask) && chrs) { - aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, chrs, mask & chrsmask); + aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, sizeof(str), chrs, mask & chrsmask); mask &= ~chrsmask; audit_log_format(ab, "%s", str); if (mask & namesmask) -- cgit v1.2.3 From f4585bc20fc785d94192cf780ee925e25891ddfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tyler Hicks Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2018 05:25:01 +0000 Subject: apparmor: Fully initialize aa_perms struct when answering userspace query Fully initialize the aa_perms struct in profile_query_cb() to avoid the potential of using an uninitialized struct member's value in a response to a query from userspace. Detected by CoverityScan CID#1415126 ("Uninitialized scalar variable") Fixes: 4f3b3f2d79a4 ("apparmor: add profile permission query ability") Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: John Johansen --- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 949dd8a48164..e09fe4d7307c 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ static const struct file_operations aa_fs_ns_revision_fops = { static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, const char *match_str, size_t match_len) { - struct aa_perms tmp; + struct aa_perms tmp = { }; struct aa_dfa *dfa; unsigned int state = 0; @@ -613,7 +613,6 @@ static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, dfa = profile->file.dfa; state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, profile->file.start, match_str + 1, match_len - 1); - tmp = nullperms; if (state) { struct path_cond cond = { }; @@ -627,8 +626,6 @@ static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, match_str, match_len); if (state) aa_compute_perms(dfa, state, &tmp); - else - tmp = nullperms; } aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp); aa_perms_accum_raw(perms, &tmp); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 24b87a16fee0ebd49b66e8523186ace7ea09ad12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Johansen Date: Fri, 20 Jul 2018 03:25:25 -0700 Subject: apparmor: Fix failure to audit context info in build_change_hat Cleans up clang warning: warning: variable 'info' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] Fixes: 89dbf1962aa63 ("apparmor: move change_hat mediation to using labels") Reported-by: Colin Ian King Signed-off-by: John Johansen --- security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index 098d546d8253..08c88de0ffda 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -1036,7 +1036,7 @@ static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, audit: aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, name, hat ? hat->base.hname : NULL, - hat ? &hat->label : NULL, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, NULL, + hat ? &hat->label : NULL, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error); if (!hat || (error && error != -ENOENT)) return ERR_PTR(error); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3dd0f18c70d94ca2432c78c5735744429f071b0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wei Yongjun Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2018 13:28:40 +0000 Subject: EVM: fix return value check in evm_write_xattrs() In case of error, the function audit_log_start() returns NULL pointer not ERR_PTR(). The IS_ERR() test in the return value check should be replaced with NULL test. Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs") Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index 637eb999e340..77de71b7794c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -193,8 +193,8 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, return -E2BIG; ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR); - if (IS_ERR(ab)) - return PTR_ERR(ab); + if (!ab) + return -ENOMEM; xattr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct xattr_list), GFP_KERNEL); if (!xattr) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 129a99890936766f4b69b9da7ed88366313a9210 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Piotr Sawicki Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 11:42:58 +0200 Subject: Smack: Fix handling of IPv4 traffic received by PF_INET6 sockets A socket which has sk_family set to PF_INET6 is able to receive not only IPv6 but also IPv4 traffic (IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses). Prior to this patch, the smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6() could have been called for socket buffers containing IPv4 packets, in result such traffic was allowed. Signed-off-by: Piotr Sawicki Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 7ad226018f51..c4feb954d53f 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -3923,15 +3923,19 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) struct smack_known *skp = NULL; int rc = 0; struct smk_audit_info ad; + u16 family = sk->sk_family; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT struct lsm_network_audit net; #endif #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) struct sockaddr_in6 sadd; int proto; + + if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) + family = PF_INET; #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ - switch (sk->sk_family) { + switch (family) { case PF_INET: #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER /* @@ -3949,7 +3953,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) */ netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); - rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr); + rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr); if (rc == 0) skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp); else @@ -3962,7 +3966,7 @@ access_check: #endif #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); - ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family; + ad.a.u.net->family = family; ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL); #endif @@ -3976,7 +3980,7 @@ access_check: rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc); if (rc != 0) - netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, sk->sk_family, rc, 0); + netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0); break; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) case PF_INET6: @@ -3992,7 +3996,7 @@ access_check: skp = smack_net_ambient; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); - ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family; + ad.a.u.net->family = family; ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL); #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From a07ef9516477aef2d052d75129a48f9f94d3b3f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Piotr Sawicki Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 11:45:16 +0200 Subject: Smack: Check UDP-Lite and DCCP protocols during IPv6 handling The smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb() function is checking smack labels only for UDP and TCP frames carried in IPv6 packets. From now on, it is able also to handle UDP-Lite and DCCP protocols. Signed-off-by: Piotr Sawicki Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index c4feb954d53f..aff8397e8c7e 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -3895,6 +3895,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip) sip->sin6_port = th->source; break; case IPPROTO_UDP: + case IPPROTO_UDPLITE: uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); if (uh != NULL) sip->sin6_port = uh->source; @@ -3985,7 +3986,8 @@ access_check: #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) case PF_INET6: proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd); - if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP) + if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_UDPLITE && + proto != IPPROTO_TCP && proto != IPPROTO_DCCP) break; #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) -- cgit v1.2.3 From d66a8acbda926fa2398ae930f50787e8663bce96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Piotr Sawicki Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 11:47:31 +0200 Subject: Smack: Inform peer that IPv6 traffic has been blocked In this patch we're sending an ICMPv6 message to a peer to immediately inform it that making a connection is not possible. In case of TCP connections, without this change, the peer will be waiting until a connection timeout is exceeded. Signed-off-by: Piotr Sawicki Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index aff8397e8c7e..91750205a5de 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -4009,6 +4010,9 @@ access_check: #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING); #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */ + if (rc != 0) + icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, + ICMPV6_ADM_PROHIBITED, 0); break; #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 32a4f5ecd7381f30ae3bb36dea77a150ba68af2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Pirko Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2018 09:23:06 +0200 Subject: net: sched: introduce chain object to uapi Allow user to create, destroy, get and dump chain objects. Do that by extending rtnl commands by the chain-specific ones. User will now be able to explicitly create or destroy chains (so far this was done only automatically according the filter/act needs and refcounting). Also, the user will receive notification about any chain creation or destuction. Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/sch_generic.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/rtnetlink.h | 7 + net/sched/cls_api.c | 308 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 309 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/include/net/sch_generic.h b/include/net/sch_generic.h index 86f4651784e8..81ec8276db9c 100644 --- a/include/net/sch_generic.h +++ b/include/net/sch_generic.h @@ -304,6 +304,7 @@ struct tcf_chain { struct tcf_block *block; u32 index; /* chain index */ unsigned int refcnt; + bool explicitly_created; }; struct tcf_block { diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/rtnetlink.h b/include/uapi/linux/rtnetlink.h index 7d8502313c99..46399367627f 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/rtnetlink.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/rtnetlink.h @@ -150,6 +150,13 @@ enum { RTM_NEWCACHEREPORT = 96, #define RTM_NEWCACHEREPORT RTM_NEWCACHEREPORT + RTM_NEWCHAIN = 100, +#define RTM_NEWCHAIN RTM_NEWCHAIN + RTM_DELCHAIN, +#define RTM_DELCHAIN RTM_DELCHAIN + RTM_GETCHAIN, +#define RTM_GETCHAIN RTM_GETCHAIN + __RTM_MAX, #define RTM_MAX (((__RTM_MAX + 3) & ~3) - 1) }; diff --git a/net/sched/cls_api.c b/net/sched/cls_api.c index eb0bf9037ef9..e65b390336aa 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_api.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_api.c @@ -262,29 +262,57 @@ static void tcf_chain_hold(struct tcf_chain *chain) ++chain->refcnt; } -struct tcf_chain *tcf_chain_get(struct tcf_block *block, u32 chain_index, - bool create) +static struct tcf_chain *tcf_chain_lookup(struct tcf_block *block, + u32 chain_index) { struct tcf_chain *chain; list_for_each_entry(chain, &block->chain_list, list) { - if (chain->index == chain_index) { - tcf_chain_hold(chain); + if (chain->index == chain_index) return chain; - } + } + return NULL; +} + +static int tc_chain_notify(struct tcf_chain *chain, struct sk_buff *oskb, + u32 seq, u16 flags, int event, bool unicast); + +struct tcf_chain *tcf_chain_get(struct tcf_block *block, u32 chain_index, + bool create) +{ + struct tcf_chain *chain = tcf_chain_lookup(block, chain_index); + + if (chain) { + tcf_chain_hold(chain); + return chain; } - return create ? tcf_chain_create(block, chain_index) : NULL; + if (!create) + return NULL; + chain = tcf_chain_create(block, chain_index); + if (!chain) + return NULL; + tc_chain_notify(chain, NULL, 0, NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL, + RTM_NEWCHAIN, false); + return chain; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcf_chain_get); void tcf_chain_put(struct tcf_chain *chain) { - if (--chain->refcnt == 0) + if (--chain->refcnt == 0) { + tc_chain_notify(chain, NULL, 0, 0, RTM_DELCHAIN, false); tcf_chain_destroy(chain); + } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcf_chain_put); +static void tcf_chain_put_explicitly_created(struct tcf_chain *chain) +{ + if (chain->explicitly_created) + tcf_chain_put(chain); +} + static bool tcf_block_offload_in_use(struct tcf_block *block) { return block->offloadcnt; @@ -694,8 +722,10 @@ void tcf_block_put_ext(struct tcf_block *block, struct Qdisc *q, if (block->refcnt == 1) { /* At this point, all the chains should have refcnt >= 1. */ - list_for_each_entry_safe(chain, tmp, &block->chain_list, list) + list_for_each_entry_safe(chain, tmp, &block->chain_list, list) { + tcf_chain_put_explicitly_created(chain); tcf_chain_put(chain); + } block->refcnt--; if (list_empty(&block->chain_list)) @@ -1609,6 +1639,264 @@ out: return skb->len; } +static int tc_chain_fill_node(struct tcf_chain *chain, struct net *net, + struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcf_block *block, + u32 portid, u32 seq, u16 flags, int event) +{ + unsigned char *b = skb_tail_pointer(skb); + struct nlmsghdr *nlh; + struct tcmsg *tcm; + + nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, event, sizeof(*tcm), flags); + if (!nlh) + goto out_nlmsg_trim; + tcm = nlmsg_data(nlh); + tcm->tcm_family = AF_UNSPEC; + tcm->tcm__pad1 = 0; + tcm->tcm__pad2 = 0; + tcm->tcm_handle = 0; + if (block->q) { + tcm->tcm_ifindex = qdisc_dev(block->q)->ifindex; + tcm->tcm_parent = block->q->handle; + } else { + tcm->tcm_ifindex = TCM_IFINDEX_MAGIC_BLOCK; + tcm->tcm_block_index = block->index; + } + + if (nla_put_u32(skb, TCA_CHAIN, chain->index)) + goto nla_put_failure; + + nlh->nlmsg_len = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - b; + return skb->len; + +out_nlmsg_trim: +nla_put_failure: + nlmsg_trim(skb, b); + return -EMSGSIZE; +} + +static int tc_chain_notify(struct tcf_chain *chain, struct sk_buff *oskb, + u32 seq, u16 flags, int event, bool unicast) +{ + u32 portid = oskb ? NETLINK_CB(oskb).portid : 0; + struct tcf_block *block = chain->block; + struct net *net = block->net; + struct sk_buff *skb; + + skb = alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!skb) + return -ENOBUFS; + + if (tc_chain_fill_node(chain, net, skb, block, portid, + seq, flags, event) <= 0) { + kfree_skb(skb); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (unicast) + return netlink_unicast(net->rtnl, skb, portid, MSG_DONTWAIT); + + return rtnetlink_send(skb, net, portid, RTNLGRP_TC, flags & NLM_F_ECHO); +} + +/* Add/delete/get a chain */ + +static int tc_ctl_chain(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n, + struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) +{ + struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk); + struct nlattr *tca[TCA_MAX + 1]; + struct tcmsg *t; + u32 parent; + u32 chain_index; + struct Qdisc *q = NULL; + struct tcf_chain *chain = NULL; + struct tcf_block *block; + unsigned long cl; + int err; + + if (n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETCHAIN && + !netlink_ns_capable(skb, net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + +replay: + err = nlmsg_parse(n, sizeof(*t), tca, TCA_MAX, NULL, extack); + if (err < 0) + return err; + + t = nlmsg_data(n); + parent = t->tcm_parent; + cl = 0; + + block = tcf_block_find(net, &q, &parent, &cl, + t->tcm_ifindex, t->tcm_block_index, extack); + if (IS_ERR(block)) + return PTR_ERR(block); + + chain_index = tca[TCA_CHAIN] ? nla_get_u32(tca[TCA_CHAIN]) : 0; + if (chain_index > TC_ACT_EXT_VAL_MASK) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Specified chain index exceeds upper limit"); + return -EINVAL; + } + chain = tcf_chain_lookup(block, chain_index); + if (n->nlmsg_type == RTM_NEWCHAIN) { + if (chain) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Filter chain already exists"); + return -EEXIST; + } + if (!(n->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE)) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Need both RTM_NEWCHAIN and NLM_F_CREATE to create a new chain"); + return -ENOENT; + } + chain = tcf_chain_create(block, chain_index); + if (!chain) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Failed to create filter chain"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + } else { + if (!chain) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Cannot find specified filter chain"); + return -EINVAL; + } + tcf_chain_hold(chain); + } + + switch (n->nlmsg_type) { + case RTM_NEWCHAIN: + /* In case the chain was successfully added, take a reference + * to the chain. This ensures that an empty chain + * does not disappear at the end of this function. + */ + tcf_chain_hold(chain); + chain->explicitly_created = true; + tc_chain_notify(chain, NULL, 0, NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_EXCL, + RTM_NEWCHAIN, false); + break; + case RTM_DELCHAIN: + /* Flush the chain first as the user requested chain removal. */ + tcf_chain_flush(chain); + /* In case the chain was successfully deleted, put a reference + * to the chain previously taken during addition. + */ + tcf_chain_put_explicitly_created(chain); + break; + case RTM_GETCHAIN: + break; + err = tc_chain_notify(chain, skb, n->nlmsg_seq, + n->nlmsg_seq, n->nlmsg_type, true); + if (err < 0) + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Failed to send chain notify message"); + break; + default: + err = -EOPNOTSUPP; + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Unsupported message type"); + goto errout; + } + +errout: + tcf_chain_put(chain); + if (err == -EAGAIN) + /* Replay the request. */ + goto replay; + return err; +} + +/* called with RTNL */ +static int tc_dump_chain(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) +{ + struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk); + struct nlattr *tca[TCA_MAX + 1]; + struct Qdisc *q = NULL; + struct tcf_block *block; + struct tcf_chain *chain; + struct tcmsg *tcm = nlmsg_data(cb->nlh); + long index_start; + long index; + u32 parent; + int err; + + if (nlmsg_len(cb->nlh) < sizeof(*tcm)) + return skb->len; + + err = nlmsg_parse(cb->nlh, sizeof(*tcm), tca, TCA_MAX, NULL, NULL); + if (err) + return err; + + if (tcm->tcm_ifindex == TCM_IFINDEX_MAGIC_BLOCK) { + block = tcf_block_lookup(net, tcm->tcm_block_index); + if (!block) + goto out; + /* If we work with block index, q is NULL and parent value + * will never be used in the following code. The check + * in tcf_fill_node prevents it. However, compiler does not + * see that far, so set parent to zero to silence the warning + * about parent being uninitialized. + */ + parent = 0; + } else { + const struct Qdisc_class_ops *cops; + struct net_device *dev; + unsigned long cl = 0; + + dev = __dev_get_by_index(net, tcm->tcm_ifindex); + if (!dev) + return skb->len; + + parent = tcm->tcm_parent; + if (!parent) { + q = dev->qdisc; + parent = q->handle; + } else { + q = qdisc_lookup(dev, TC_H_MAJ(tcm->tcm_parent)); + } + if (!q) + goto out; + cops = q->ops->cl_ops; + if (!cops) + goto out; + if (!cops->tcf_block) + goto out; + if (TC_H_MIN(tcm->tcm_parent)) { + cl = cops->find(q, tcm->tcm_parent); + if (cl == 0) + goto out; + } + block = cops->tcf_block(q, cl, NULL); + if (!block) + goto out; + if (tcf_block_shared(block)) + q = NULL; + } + + index_start = cb->args[0]; + index = 0; + + list_for_each_entry(chain, &block->chain_list, list) { + if ((tca[TCA_CHAIN] && + nla_get_u32(tca[TCA_CHAIN]) != chain->index)) + continue; + if (index < index_start) { + index++; + continue; + } + err = tc_chain_fill_node(chain, net, skb, block, + NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid, + cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, NLM_F_MULTI, + RTM_NEWCHAIN); + if (err <= 0) + break; + index++; + } + + cb->args[0] = index; + +out: + /* If we did no progress, the error (EMSGSIZE) is real */ + if (skb->len == 0 && err) + return err; + return skb->len; +} + void tcf_exts_destroy(struct tcf_exts *exts) { #ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT @@ -1825,6 +2113,10 @@ static int __init tc_filter_init(void) rtnl_register(PF_UNSPEC, RTM_DELTFILTER, tc_del_tfilter, NULL, 0); rtnl_register(PF_UNSPEC, RTM_GETTFILTER, tc_get_tfilter, tc_dump_tfilter, 0); + rtnl_register(PF_UNSPEC, RTM_NEWCHAIN, tc_ctl_chain, NULL, 0); + rtnl_register(PF_UNSPEC, RTM_DELCHAIN, tc_ctl_chain, NULL, 0); + rtnl_register(PF_UNSPEC, RTM_GETCHAIN, tc_ctl_chain, + tc_dump_chain, 0); return 0; diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c index 7b7433a1a34c..74b951f55608 100644 --- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm) switch (sclass) { case SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET: /* RTM_MAX always point to RTM_SETxxxx, ie RTM_NEWxxx + 3 */ - BUILD_BUG_ON(RTM_MAX != (RTM_NEWCACHEREPORT + 3)); + BUILD_BUG_ON(RTM_MAX != (RTM_NEWCHAIN + 3)); err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_route_perms, sizeof(nlmsg_route_perms)); break; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5c2a640aff73914e11ac0db310b32d3b7a1b87ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Berger Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 15:09:32 -0400 Subject: ima: Use tpm_default_chip() and call TPM functions with a tpm_chip Rather than accessing the TPM functions by passing a NULL pointer for the tpm_chip, which causes a lookup for a suitable chip every time, get a hold of a tpm_chip and access the TPM functions using it. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 11 ++++------- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 78c15264b17b..dc212c59d4d6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ extern int ima_policy_flag; extern int ima_used_chip; extern int ima_hash_algo; extern int ima_appraise; +extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip; /* IMA event related data */ struct ima_event_data { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index 4e085a17124f..88082f35adb2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr) if (!ima_used_chip) return; - if (tpm_pcr_read(NULL, idx, pcr) != 0) + if (tpm_pcr_read(ima_tpm_chip, idx, pcr) != 0) pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n"); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 29b72cd2502e..1437ed3dbccc 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ /* name for boot aggregate entry */ static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate"; int ima_used_chip; +struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip; /* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend * the PCR register. @@ -106,17 +107,13 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void) int __init ima_init(void) { - u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; int rc; - ima_used_chip = 0; - rc = tpm_pcr_read(NULL, 0, pcr_i); - if (rc == 0) - ima_used_chip = 1; + ima_tpm_chip = tpm_default_chip(); + ima_used_chip = ima_tpm_chip != NULL; if (!ima_used_chip) - pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=%d)\n", - rc); + pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n"); rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA); if (rc) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c index 418f35e38015..c6303fa19a49 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr) if (!ima_used_chip) return result; - result = tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcr, hash); + result = tpm_pcr_extend(ima_tpm_chip, pcr, hash); if (result != 0) pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result); return result; -- cgit v1.2.3 From ec403d8ed08c8272cfeeeea154fdebcd289988c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Berger Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 15:09:33 -0400 Subject: ima: Get rid of ima_used_chip and use ima_tpm_chip != NULL instead Get rid of ima_used_chip and use ima_tpm_chip variable instead for determining whether to use the TPM chip. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 - security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 7 ++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index dc212c59d4d6..588e4813370c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 }; extern int ima_policy_flag; /* set during initialization */ -extern int ima_used_chip; extern int ima_hash_algo; extern int ima_appraise; extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index 88082f35adb2..7e7e7e7c250a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len, static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr) { - if (!ima_used_chip) + if (!ima_tpm_chip) return; if (tpm_pcr_read(ima_tpm_chip, idx, pcr) != 0) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 1437ed3dbccc..faac9ecaa0ae 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ /* name for boot aggregate entry */ static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate"; -int ima_used_chip; struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip; /* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend @@ -65,7 +64,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) iint->ima_hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; iint->ima_hash->length = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; - if (ima_used_chip) { + if (ima_tpm_chip) { result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr); if (result < 0) { audit_cause = "hashing_error"; @@ -110,9 +109,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void) int rc; ima_tpm_chip = tpm_default_chip(); - - ima_used_chip = ima_tpm_chip != NULL; - if (!ima_used_chip) + if (!ima_tpm_chip) pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n"); rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c index c6303fa19a49..b186819bd5aa 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr) { int result = 0; - if (!ima_used_chip) + if (!ima_tpm_chip) return result; result = tpm_pcr_extend(ima_tpm_chip, pcr, hash); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7e4237faa7213c1cc1d0aa65a44c67ba4729ce9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: nixiaoming Date: Sun, 5 Aug 2018 17:10:36 +0800 Subject: selinux: cleanup dentry and inodes on error in selinuxfs If the resource requested by d_alloc_name is not added to the linked list through d_add, then dput needs to be called to release the subsequent abnormal branch to avoid resource leakage. Add missing dput to selinuxfs.c Signed-off-by: nixiaoming [PM: tweak the subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index eb7f12ab5c33..5cc9101ab79b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -1377,13 +1377,18 @@ static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi) ret = -ENOMEM; inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR); - if (!inode) + if (!inode) { + dput(dentry); goto out; + } ret = -ENAMETOOLONG; len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]); - if (len >= PAGE_SIZE) + if (len >= PAGE_SIZE) { + dput(dentry); + iput(inode); goto out; + } isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security; ret = security_genfs_sid(fsi->state, "selinuxfs", page, @@ -1598,8 +1603,10 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir) return -ENOMEM; inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|files[i].mode); - if (!inode) + if (!inode) { + dput(dentry); return -ENOMEM; + } inode->i_fop = files[i].ops; inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino; @@ -1644,8 +1651,10 @@ static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir) return -ENOMEM; inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO); - if (!inode) + if (!inode) { + dput(dentry); return -ENOMEM; + } inode->i_fop = &sel_initcon_ops; inode->i_ino = i|SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET; @@ -1745,8 +1754,10 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue, rc = -ENOMEM; inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO); - if (!inode) + if (!inode) { + dput(dentry); goto out; + } inode->i_fop = &sel_perm_ops; /* i+1 since perm values are 1-indexed */ @@ -1775,8 +1786,10 @@ static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index, return -ENOMEM; inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO); - if (!inode) + if (!inode) { + dput(dentry); return -ENOMEM; + } inode->i_fop = &sel_class_ops; inode->i_ino = sel_class_to_ino(index); @@ -1850,8 +1863,10 @@ static int sel_make_policycap(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi) return -ENOMEM; inode = sel_make_inode(fsi->sb, S_IFREG | 0444); - if (inode == NULL) + if (inode == NULL) { + dput(dentry); return -ENOMEM; + } inode->i_fop = &sel_policycap_ops; inode->i_ino = iter | SEL_POLICYCAP_INO_OFFSET; @@ -1944,8 +1959,10 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) ret = -ENOMEM; inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO); - if (!inode) + if (!inode) { + dput(dentry); goto err; + } inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino; isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 355139a8dba446cc11a424cddbf7afebc3041ba1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Eddie.Horng" Date: Fri, 20 Jul 2018 15:30:00 +0800 Subject: cap_inode_getsecurity: use d_find_any_alias() instead of d_find_alias() The code in cap_inode_getsecurity(), introduced by commit 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities"), should use d_find_any_alias() instead of d_find_alias() do handle unhashed dentry correctly. This is needed, for example, if execveat() is called with an open but unlinked overlayfs file, because overlayfs unhashes dentry on unlink. This is a regression of real life application, first reported at https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-unionfs/msg05363.html Below reproducer and setup can reproduce the case. const char* exec="echo"; const char *newargv[] = { "echo", "hello", NULL}; const char *newenviron[] = { NULL }; int fd, err; fd = open(exec, O_PATH); unlink(exec); err = syscall(322/*SYS_execveat*/, fd, "", newargv, newenviron, AT_EMPTY_PATH); if(err<0) fprintf(stderr, "execveat: %s\n", strerror(errno)); gcc compile into ~/test/a.out mount -t overlay -orw,lowerdir=/mnt/l,upperdir=/mnt/u,workdir=/mnt/w none /mnt/m cd /mnt/m cp /bin/echo . ~/test/a.out Expected result: hello Actually result: execveat: Invalid argument dmesg: Invalid argument reading file caps for /dev/fd/3 The 2nd reproducer and setup emulates similar case but for regular filesystem: const char* exec="echo"; int fd, err; char buf[256]; fd = open(exec, O_RDONLY); unlink(exec); err = fgetxattr(fd, "security.capability", buf, 256); if(err<0) fprintf(stderr, "fgetxattr: %s\n", strerror(errno)); gcc compile into ~/test_fgetxattr cd /tmp cp /bin/echo . ~/test_fgetxattr Result: fgetxattr: Invalid argument On regular filesystem, for example, ext4 read xattr from disk and return to execveat(), will not trigger this issue, however, the overlay attr handler pass real dentry to vfs_getxattr() will. This reproducer calls fgetxattr() with an unlinked fd, involkes vfs_getxattr() then reproduced the case that d_find_alias() in cap_inode_getsecurity() can't find the unlinked dentry. Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein Acked-by: Amir Goldstein Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Cc: # v4.14 Signed-off-by: Eddie Horng Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman --- security/commoncap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index f4c33abd9959..2e489d6a3ac8 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - dentry = d_find_alias(inode); + dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode); if (!dentry) return -EINVAL; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0a6b29230ec336189bab32498df3f06c8a6944d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Thu, 2 Aug 2018 11:38:23 +0300 Subject: apparmor: fix an error code in __aa_create_ns() We should return error pointers in this function. Returning NULL results in a NULL dereference in the caller. Fixes: 73688d1ed0b8 ("apparmor: refactor prepare_ns() and make usable from different views") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: John Johansen --- security/apparmor/policy_ns.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c index b0f9dc3f765a..1a7cec5d9cac 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ static struct aa_ns *__aa_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name, ns = alloc_ns(parent->base.hname, name); if (!ns) - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); ns->level = parent->level + 1; mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); error = __aafs_ns_mkdir(ns, ns_subns_dir(parent), name, dir); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1b1eeca7e4c19fa76d409d4c7b338dba21f2df45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2018 21:56:13 -0700 Subject: init: allow initcall tables to be emitted using relative references Allow the initcall tables to be emitted using relative references that are only half the size on 64-bit architectures and don't require fixups at runtime on relocatable kernels. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180704083651.24360-5-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Acked-by: James Morris Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky Acked-by: Petr Mladek Acked-by: Michael Ellerman Acked-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Cc: Bjorn Helgaas Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: James Morris Cc: Jessica Yu Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Nicolas Pitre Cc: Paul Mackerras Cc: Russell King Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: Thomas Garnier Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- include/linux/init.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- init/main.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++---------------- kernel/printk/printk.c | 16 +++++++++------- security/security.c | 17 ++++++++++------- 4 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/include/linux/init.h b/include/linux/init.h index bc27cf03c41e..2538d176dd1f 100644 --- a/include/linux/init.h +++ b/include/linux/init.h @@ -116,8 +116,24 @@ typedef int (*initcall_t)(void); typedef void (*exitcall_t)(void); -extern initcall_t __con_initcall_start[], __con_initcall_end[]; -extern initcall_t __security_initcall_start[], __security_initcall_end[]; +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS +typedef int initcall_entry_t; + +static inline initcall_t initcall_from_entry(initcall_entry_t *entry) +{ + return offset_to_ptr(entry); +} +#else +typedef initcall_t initcall_entry_t; + +static inline initcall_t initcall_from_entry(initcall_entry_t *entry) +{ + return *entry; +} +#endif + +extern initcall_entry_t __con_initcall_start[], __con_initcall_end[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __security_initcall_start[], __security_initcall_end[]; /* Used for contructor calls. */ typedef void (*ctor_fn_t)(void); @@ -167,9 +183,20 @@ extern bool initcall_debug; * as KEEP() in the linker script. */ -#define __define_initcall(fn, id) \ +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS +#define ___define_initcall(fn, id, __sec) \ + __ADDRESSABLE(fn) \ + asm(".section \"" #__sec ".init\", \"a\" \n" \ + "__initcall_" #fn #id ": \n" \ + ".long " #fn " - . \n" \ + ".previous \n"); +#else +#define ___define_initcall(fn, id, __sec) \ static initcall_t __initcall_##fn##id __used \ - __attribute__((__section__(".initcall" #id ".init"))) = fn; + __attribute__((__section__(#__sec ".init"))) = fn; +#endif + +#define __define_initcall(fn, id) ___define_initcall(fn, id, .initcall##id) /* * Early initcalls run before initializing SMP. @@ -208,13 +235,8 @@ extern bool initcall_debug; #define __exitcall(fn) \ static exitcall_t __exitcall_##fn __exit_call = fn -#define console_initcall(fn) \ - static initcall_t __initcall_##fn \ - __used __section(.con_initcall.init) = fn - -#define security_initcall(fn) \ - static initcall_t __initcall_##fn \ - __used __section(.security_initcall.init) = fn +#define console_initcall(fn) ___define_initcall(fn,, .con_initcall) +#define security_initcall(fn) ___define_initcall(fn,, .security_initcall) struct obs_kernel_param { const char *str; diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c index b729e1f22838..3a6ce89e128f 100644 --- a/init/main.c +++ b/init/main.c @@ -902,18 +902,18 @@ int __init_or_module do_one_initcall(initcall_t fn) } -extern initcall_t __initcall_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall0_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall1_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall2_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall3_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall4_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall5_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall6_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall7_start[]; -extern initcall_t __initcall_end[]; - -static initcall_t *initcall_levels[] __initdata = { +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall0_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall1_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall2_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall3_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall4_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall5_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall6_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall7_start[]; +extern initcall_entry_t __initcall_end[]; + +static initcall_entry_t *initcall_levels[] __initdata = { __initcall0_start, __initcall1_start, __initcall2_start, @@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ static char *initcall_level_names[] __initdata = { static void __init do_initcall_level(int level) { - initcall_t *fn; + initcall_entry_t *fn; strcpy(initcall_command_line, saved_command_line); parse_args(initcall_level_names[level], @@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ static void __init do_initcall_level(int level) trace_initcall_level(initcall_level_names[level]); for (fn = initcall_levels[level]; fn < initcall_levels[level+1]; fn++) - do_one_initcall(*fn); + do_one_initcall(initcall_from_entry(fn)); } static void __init do_initcalls(void) @@ -981,11 +981,11 @@ static void __init do_basic_setup(void) static void __init do_pre_smp_initcalls(void) { - initcall_t *fn; + initcall_entry_t *fn; trace_initcall_level("early"); for (fn = __initcall_start; fn < __initcall0_start; fn++) - do_one_initcall(*fn); + do_one_initcall(initcall_from_entry(fn)); } /* diff --git a/kernel/printk/printk.c b/kernel/printk/printk.c index 90b6ab01db59..918f386b2f6e 100644 --- a/kernel/printk/printk.c +++ b/kernel/printk/printk.c @@ -2788,7 +2788,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_console); void __init console_init(void) { int ret; - initcall_t *call; + initcall_t call; + initcall_entry_t *ce; /* Setup the default TTY line discipline. */ n_tty_init(); @@ -2797,13 +2798,14 @@ void __init console_init(void) * set up the console device so that later boot sequences can * inform about problems etc.. */ - call = __con_initcall_start; + ce = __con_initcall_start; trace_initcall_level("console"); - while (call < __con_initcall_end) { - trace_initcall_start((*call)); - ret = (*call)(); - trace_initcall_finish((*call), ret); - call++; + while (ce < __con_initcall_end) { + call = initcall_from_entry(ce); + trace_initcall_start(call); + ret = call(); + trace_initcall_finish(call, ret); + ce++; } } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 47cfff01d7ec..736e78da1ab9 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -48,14 +48,17 @@ static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] = static void __init do_security_initcalls(void) { int ret; - initcall_t *call; - call = __security_initcall_start; + initcall_t call; + initcall_entry_t *ce; + + ce = __security_initcall_start; trace_initcall_level("security"); - while (call < __security_initcall_end) { - trace_initcall_start((*call)); - ret = (*call) (); - trace_initcall_finish((*call), ret); - call++; + while (ce < __security_initcall_end) { + call = initcall_from_entry(ce); + trace_initcall_start(call); + ret = call(); + trace_initcall_finish(call, ret); + ce++; } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From c037bd615885f1d9d3bdb48531bace79fae1505d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Johansen Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2018 17:19:53 -0700 Subject: apparmor: remove no-op permission check in policy_unpack The patch 736ec752d95e: "AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy" from Jul 29, 2010, leads to the following static checker warning: security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:410 verify_accept() warn: bitwise AND condition is false here security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:413 verify_accept() warn: bitwise AND condition is false here security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c 392 #define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK 0xffffffff 393 #define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK 0xffffffff 394 395 /** 396 * verify_accept - verify the accept tables of a dfa 397 * @dfa: dfa to verify accept tables of (NOT NULL) 398 * @flags: flags governing dfa 399 * 400 * Returns: 1 if valid accept tables else 0 if error 401 */ 402 static bool verify_accept(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags) 403 { 404 int i; 405 406 /* verify accept permissions */ 407 for (i = 0; i < dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen; i++) { 408 int mode = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[i]; 409 410 if (mode & ~DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK) 411 return 0; 412 413 if (ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[i] & ~DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK) 414 return 0; fixes: 736ec752d95e ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: John Johansen --- security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 32 -------------------------------- 1 file changed, 32 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 0e566a01d217..21cb384d712a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -389,32 +389,6 @@ static int unpack_strdup(struct aa_ext *e, char **string, const char *name) return res; } -#define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK 0xffffffff -#define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK 0xffffffff - -/** - * verify_accept - verify the accept tables of a dfa - * @dfa: dfa to verify accept tables of (NOT NULL) - * @flags: flags governing dfa - * - * Returns: 1 if valid accept tables else 0 if error - */ -static bool verify_accept(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags) -{ - int i; - - /* verify accept permissions */ - for (i = 0; i < dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen; i++) { - int mode = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[i]; - - if (mode & ~DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK) - return 0; - - if (ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[i] & ~DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK) - return 0; - } - return 1; -} /** * unpack_dfa - unpack a file rule dfa @@ -445,15 +419,9 @@ static struct aa_dfa *unpack_dfa(struct aa_ext *e) if (IS_ERR(dfa)) return dfa; - if (!verify_accept(dfa, flags)) - goto fail; } return dfa; - -fail: - aa_put_dfa(dfa); - return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO); } /** -- cgit v1.2.3