upstream: support for requiring user verified FIDO keys in sshd

This adds a "verify-required" authorized_keys flag and a corresponding
sshd_config option that tells sshd to require that FIDO keys verify the
user identity before completing the signing/authentication attempt.
Whether or not user verification was performed is already baked into the
signature made on the FIDO token, so this is just plumbing that flag
through and adding ways to require it.

feedback and ok markus@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a2313aae153e043d57763d766bb6d55c4e276e6

1 files changed, 15 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
index 696ba6ac6..98afdf5fe 100644
--- a/auth-options.c
+++ b/auth-options.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.92 2020/03/06 18:15:38 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.93 2020/08/27 01:07:09 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
  *
@@ -119,7 +119,10 @@ cert_option_list(struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *oblob,
 			}
 		}
 		if (!found && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0) {
-			if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) {
+			if (strcmp(name, "verify-required") == 0) {
+				opts->require_verify = 1;
+				found = 1;
+			} else if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) {
 				if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &command,
 				    NULL)) != 0) {
 					error("Unable to parse \"%s\" "
@@ -134,8 +137,7 @@ cert_option_list(struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *oblob,
 				}
 				opts->force_command = command;
 				found = 1;
-			}
-			if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) {
+			} else if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) {
 				if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &allowed,
 				    NULL)) != 0) {
 					error("Unable to parse \"%s\" "
@@ -351,6 +353,8 @@ sshauthopt_parse(const char *opts, const char **errstrp)
 			ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = r == 1;
 		} else if ((r = opt_flag("touch-required", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
 			ret->no_require_user_presence = r != 1; /* NB. flip */
+		} else if ((r = opt_flag("verify-required", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
+			ret->require_verify = r == 1;
 		} else if ((r = opt_flag("pty", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
 			ret->permit_pty_flag = r == 1;
 		} else if ((r = opt_flag("user-rc", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
@@ -572,6 +576,7 @@ sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary,
 	}
 
 #define OPTFLAG_AND(x) ret->x = (primary->x == 1) && (additional->x == 1)
+#define OPTFLAG_OR(x) ret->x = (primary->x == 1) || (additional->x == 1)
 	/* Permissive flags are logical-AND (i.e. must be set in both) */
 	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
 	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
@@ -579,6 +584,8 @@ sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary,
 	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_pty_flag);
 	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_user_rc);
 	OPTFLAG_AND(no_require_user_presence);
+	/* Restrictive flags are logical-OR (i.e. must be set in either) */
+	OPTFLAG_OR(require_verify);
 #undef OPTFLAG_AND
 
 	/* Earliest expiry time should win */
@@ -649,6 +656,7 @@ sshauthopt_copy(const struct sshauthopt *orig)
 	OPTSCALAR(force_tun_device);
 	OPTSCALAR(valid_before);
 	OPTSCALAR(no_require_user_presence);
+	OPTSCALAR(require_verify);
 #undef OPTSCALAR
 #define OPTSTRING(x) \
 	do { \
@@ -781,7 +789,8 @@ sshauthopt_serialise(const struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *m,
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_user_rc)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->restricted)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->cert_authority)) != 0 ||
-	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->no_require_user_presence)) != 0)
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->no_require_user_presence)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->require_verify)) != 0)
 		return r;
 
 	/* Simple integer options */
@@ -844,6 +853,7 @@ sshauthopt_deserialise(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshauthopt **optsp)
 	OPT_FLAG(restricted);
 	OPT_FLAG(cert_authority);
 	OPT_FLAG(no_require_user_presence);
+	OPT_FLAG(require_verify);
 #undef OPT_FLAG
 
 	/* Simple integer options */