| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d899c13b0e8061d209298eaf58fe53e3643e967c
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Simpler and removes some code with the old-style BSD license.
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implementation in SUPERCOP 20201130 to the "compact" implementation in
SUPERCOP 20240808. The new version is substantially faster. Thanks to Daniel
J Bernstein for pointing out the new implementation (and of course for
writing it).
tested in snaps/ok deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bf1a77924c125ecdbf03e2f3df8ad13bd3dafdcb
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c84a9b517283e9711e2812c1f268081dcb02081
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options.
This allows writing Match conditions that trigger for invalid username.
E.g.
PerSourcePenalties refuseconnection:90s
Match invalid-user
RefuseConnection yes
Will effectively penalise bots try to guess passwords for bogus accounts,
at the cost of implicitly revealing which accounts are invalid.
feedback markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93d3a46ca04bbd9d84a94d1e1d9d3a21073fbb07
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PerSourcePenalties
This allows penalising connection sources that have had connections
dropped by the RefuseConnection option. ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c8443c427470bb3eac1880aa075cb4864463cb6
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If set, this will terminate the connection at the first authentication
request (this is the earliest we can evaluate sshd_config Match blocks)
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43cc2533984074c44d0d2f92eb93f661e7a0b09c
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too; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b74b5b0385f2e0379670e2b869318a65b0bc3923
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string tokeniser, making it possible to use shell-like quoting in Match
directives, particularly "Match exec". ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0877309650b76f624b2194c35dbacaf065e769a5
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prompts. Helps the user know what's going on when ssh-keygen is invoked via
other tools. Requested in GHPR503
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 613b0bb6cf845b7e787d69a5b314057ceda6a8b6
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verification fails. Prevents restrictive key options being incorrectly
applied to subsequent keys in authorized_keys. bz3733, ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba3776d9da4642443c19dbc015a1333622eb5a4e
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In Fedora systems, %{?rhel} is empty. In RHEL systems, %{?fedora} is
empty. Therefore, the original code always sets without_openssl to 1.
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OpenSSH 9.8, which incorrectly required that sshd was started with an
absolute path in inetd mode. bz3717, patch from Colin Wilson
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25c57f22764897242d942853f8cccc5e991ea058
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa18dccdd9753dd287e62ecab189b3de45672521
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used for C89 compilers
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I can't find a reliable way to detect the features the ML-KEM code
requires in configure. Give up for now and use VLA support (that we
can detect) as a proxy for "old compiler" and turn off ML-KEM if
it isn't supported.
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The previous commit was incorrect (or at least insufficient), the
ML-KEM code is actually using compound literals, so test for them.
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The ML-KEM implementation we uses need the compiler to support
C99-style named struct initialisers (e.g foo = {.bar = 1}). We
still support (barely) building OpenSSH with older compilers, so
add a configure test for this.
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OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7baf6bc39ae55648db1a2bfdc55a624954847611
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compile-time flag now than an IANA codepoint has been assigned for the
algorithm.
Add mlkem768x25519-sha256 in 2nd KexAlgorithms preference slot.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f50a0fae7d7ae8b27fcca11f8dc6f979207451a
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the string rather than the first. This makes it possible to use usernames
that contain '@' characters.
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Prompted by Max Zettlmeißl; feedback/ok millert@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0b16eec246cda15469ebdcf3b1e2479810e394c5
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shortnames (e.g "rsa") in user-interface code and require full SSH protocol
names (e.g. "ssh-rsa") everywhere else.
Prompted by bz3725; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b3d8de9dac37992eab78adbf84fab2fe0d84b187
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 889ae07f2d2193ddc4351711919134664951dd76
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b719f39c20e8c671ec6135c832d6cc67a595af9c
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OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 35477da3ba1abd9ca64bc49080c50a9c1350c6ca
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%-tokens that "Match Exec" and environment variables.
ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12ef521eaa966a9241e684258564f52f1f3c5d37
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85f09da957dd39fd0abe08fe5ee19393f25c2021
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ML-KEM768 with ECDH/X25519 from the Internet-draft:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kampanakis-curdle-ssh-pq-ke-03
This is based on previous patches from markus@ but adapted to use the
final FIPS203 standard ML-KEM using a formally-verified implementation
from libcrux.
Note this key exchange method is still a draft and thus subject to
change. It is therefore disabled by default; set MLKEM=yes to build it.
We're making it available now to make it easy for other SSH
implementations to test against it.
ok markus@ deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 02a8730a570b63fa8acd9913ec66353735dea42c
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This fixes an issue where the SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON event is not
audited because cleanup_exit overrides the regular _exit too soon and
as a result, failed auth attempts are not logged correctly.
The problem was introduced in 81c1099d22b81ebfd20a334ce986c4f753b0db29
where the code from upstream was merged before the audit_event call when
it should have been merged right before the _exit call in order to honor
the comment that just mentions an override of the exit value.
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ssh_config, not -f (this is sadly not a new bug)
OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 45a7bda4cf33f2cea218507d8b6a55cddbcfb322
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compression support (which is requested as the name "zlib"). Compression
starts very early in the session. Relative early in OpenSSH lifetime, privsep
was added to sshd, and this required a shared-memory hack so the two
processes could see what was going on in the dataflow. This shared-memory
hack was soon recognized as a tremendous complexity risk, because it put libz
(which very much trusts it's memory) in a dangerous place, and a new option
("zlib@openssh.com") was added begins compression after authentication (aka
delayed-compression). That change also permitted removal of the
shared-memory hack. Despite removal from the server, the old "zlib" support
remained in the client, to allow negotiation with non-OpenSSH daemons which
lack the delayed-compression option. This commit deletes support for the
older "zlib" option in the client. It reduces our featureset in a small way,
and encourages other servers to move to a better design. The SSH protocol is
different enough that compressed-key-material attacks like BEAST are
unlikely, but who wants to take the chance? We encourage other ssh servers
who care about optional compression support to add delayed-zlib support.
(Some already do "zlib@openssh.com") ok djm markus
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6df986f38e4ab389f795a6e39e7c6857a763ba72
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we can make the algorithm available without the @openssh.com suffix too. ok
markus@ deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eeed8fcde688143a737729d3d56d20ab4353770f
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Now that the rekey test has been optimized it's fast enough to not be in
its own valgrind test, so move it into valgrind-2, which is currently
the quickest of the others, bringing all of them to roughly the same
runtime of ~1.1 hours.
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Also verify that the Cipher or MAC we intended to use is actually the one
selected during the test.
OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ff43fed30552afe23d1364526fe8cf88cbfafe1d
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merge botch spotted by gsgleason
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regress in portable on, eg Solaris.
OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 44a96d6d2f8341d89b7d5fff777502b92ac9e9ba
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5db7049ad5558dee5b2079d3422e8ddab187c1cc
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Except where we're explicitly testing a different kex, use
curve25519-sha256 since it's faster than the default and supported even
when configured without OpenSSL. Add a check to ensure that the kex we
intended to test is the one we actually tested. Speeds test up by ~5%.
OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3b27fcc2ae953cb08fd82a0d3155c498b226d6e0
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up tests by about 10% in the common case, hopefully more when instrumented
with something like valgrind.
OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7bf9292b4803357efcf0baf7cfbdc8521f212da1
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Removes 3 duplicate tests and speeds overall test up by about 1%.
OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5e5c9ff3f7588091ed369e34ac28520490ad2619
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Used unless overridden by a command-line flag, which simplifies some of
the ssh command lines.
OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e7cffa57027088e10336e412b34113969f88cb87
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All of the rekey tests use it (otherwise the encrypted byte counts would
not match) so this lets us simplify the command lines.
OpenBSD-Regress-ID: dab7ce10f4cf6c68827eb8658141272aab3ea262
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curve25519-sha256@libssh.org is the pre-standardization name for the same
thing, so remove it as a duplicate. Speeds up test by a tiny amount.
OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5a5ee5fa1595a6e140b1cc16040bedf5996a5715
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