| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 81869ee6356fdbff19dae6ff757095e6b24de712
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None of the existing callers seem to do that, but it's worth checking.
From Coverity CID 291834, ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0a97113f192a7cb1a2c97b932f677f573cda7a4
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error.
ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e384c4e05d5521e7866b3d53ca59acd2a86eef99
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfc7ba74c22c928de2e257328b3f1274a3dfdf19
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sshd can load a private key but no public counterpart; with & ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0713cbdf9aa1ff8ac7b1f78b09ac911af510f81b
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based on patch from loic AT venez.fr, ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5eff2476b0d8d0614924c55e350fb7bb9c84f45e
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unencrypted envelope of private key files if not sidecar public key file is
present.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 252a0a580e10b9a6311632530d63b5ac76592040
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ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 05a5d46562aafcd70736c792208b1856064f40ad
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functions; feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc09e5f1950b7acc91b8fdf8015347782d2ecd3d
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markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5d6f96a966d10d7fa689ff9aa9e1d6767ad5a076
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public; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edda2fbba2c5b1f48e60f857a2010479e80c5f3c
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sshkey_load_private_type will now return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS in that
case. Patch from jitendra.sharma at intel.com, ok djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07916a17ed0a252591b71e7fb4be2599cb5b0c77
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private keys, enabled via "ssh-keygen -m PKCS8" on operations that save
private keys to disk.
The OpenSSH native key format remains the default, but PKCS8 is a
superior format to PEM if interoperability with non-OpenSSH software
is required, as it may use a less terrible KDF (IIRC PEM uses a single
round of MD5 as a KDF).
adapted from patch by Jakub Jelen via bz3013; ok markus
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 027824e3bc0b1c243dc5188504526d73a55accb1
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some arbitrary value < 0. errno is only updated in this case. Change all
(most?) callers of syscalls to follow this better, and let's see if this
strictness helps us in the future.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48081f00db7518e3b712a49dca06efc2a5428075
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being too short (i.e. SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH). These keys will not be considered
to be "in the file". This allows key revocation lists to contain short keys
without the entire revocation list being considered invalid.
bz#2897; ok dtucker
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9f3d857d07194a42ad7e62889a74dc3f9d9924b
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OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4dfe9d29fa93d9231645c89084f7217304f7ba29
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static limits noted by gerhard@; ok dtucker@, djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6d702eabef0fa12e5a1d75c334a8c8b325298b5c
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Hash-Based Signatures) The code is not compiled in by default (see WITH_XMSS
in Makefile.inc) Joint work with stefan-lukas_gazdag at genua.eu See
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-12 ok
djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef3eccb96762a5d6f135d7daeef608df7776a7ac
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remove post-SSHv1 removal dead code from rsa.c and merge
the remaining bit that it still used into ssh-rsa.c; ok markus
Upstream-ID: ac8a048d24dcd89594b0052ea5e3404b473bfa2f
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Switch to recallocarray() for a few operations. Both
growth and shrinkage are handled safely, and there also is no need for
preallocation dances. Future changes in this area will be less error prone.
Review and one bug found by markus
Upstream-ID: 822d664d6a5a1d10eccb23acdd53578a679d5065
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revise sshkey_load_public(): remove ssh1 related
comments, remove extra open()/close() on keyfile, prevent leak of 'pub' if
'keyp' is NULL, replace strlcpy+cat with asprintf; ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 6175e47cab5b4794dcd99c1175549a483ec673ca
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unifdef WITH_SSH1 ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 9716e62a883ef8826c57f4d33b4a81a9cc7755c7
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incorrect renditions of this quote bother me
Upstream-ID: 1662be3ebb7a71d543da088119c31d4d463a9e49
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use sshbuf_allocate() to pre-allocate the buffer used for
loading keys. This avoids implicit realloc inside the buffer code, which
might theoretically leave fragments of the key on the heap. This doesn't
appear to happen in practice for normal sized keys, but was observed for
novelty oversize ones.
Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: d620e1d46a29fdea56aeadeda120879eddc60ab1
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make private key loading functions consistently handle NULL
key pointer arguments; ok markus@
Upstream-ID: 92038726ef4a338169c35dacc9c5a07fcc7fa761
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Remove NULL-checks before sshbuf_free().
ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 5ebed00ed5f9f03b119a345085e8774565466917
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Remove NULL-checks before sshkey_free().
ok djm@
Upstream-ID: 3e35afe8a25e021216696b5d6cde7f5d2e5e3f52
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Remove NULL-checks before free().
ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: e3d3cb1ce900179906af36517b5eea0fb15e6ef8
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- Fix error message: passphrase needs to be at least 5
characters, not 4. - Remove unused function argument. - Remove two
unnecessary variables.
OK djm@
Upstream-ID: 13010c05bfa8b523da1c0dc19e81dd180662bc30
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re-enable ed25519-certs if compiled w/o openssl; ok djm
Upstream-ID: e10c90808b001fd2c7a93778418e9b318f5c4c49
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delete support for legacy v00 certificates; "sure"
markus@ dtucker@
Upstream-ID: b5b9bb5f9202d09e88f912989d74928601b6636f
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s/recommended/required/ that private keys be og-r this
wording change was made a while ago but got accidentally reverted
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fd leak for !ssh1 case; found by unittests; ok markus@
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KRL support doesn't need OpenSSL anymore, remove #ifdefs
from around call
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add an XXX to remind me to improve sshkey_load_public
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Reduce use of <sys/param.h> and transition to <limits.h>
throughout. ok djm markus
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fix some regressions caused by upstream merges
enable KRLs now that they no longer require BIGNUMs
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deprecate key_load_private_pem() and
sshkey_load_private_pem() interfaces. Refactor the generic key loading API to
not require pathnames to be specified (they weren't really used).
Fixes a few other things en passant:
Makes ed25519 keys work for hostbased authentication (ssh-keysign
previously used the PEM-only routines).
Fixes key comment regression bz#2306: key pathnames were being lost as
comment fields.
ok markus@
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add RevokedHostKeys option for the client
Allow textfile or KRL-based revocation of hostkeys.
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[Makefile.in auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-rsa.c
[auth2-none.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c authfile.h cipher-3des1.c
[cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h
[digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c digest.h dns.c entropy.c hmac.h
[hostfile.c key.c key.h krl.c monitor.c packet.c rsa.c rsa.h
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c
[ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-pkcs11.c
[ssh-rsa.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.h sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c
[sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshkey.c sshkey.h
[openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h]
New key API: refactor key-related functions to be more library-like,
existing API is offered as a set of wrappers.
with and ok markus@
Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew
Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago.
NB. This commit also removes portable OpenSSH support for OpenSSL
<0.9.8e.
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[auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c]
[kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c]
[roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c]
[ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no);
reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519;
allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm
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[authfile.c bufaux.c buffer.h channels.c krl.c mux.c packet.c packet.h]
[ssh-keygen.c]
buffer_get_string_ptr's return should be const to remind
callers that futzing with it will futz with the actual buffer
contents
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[authfile.c]
correct test that kdf name is not "none" or "bcrypt"
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[auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-passwd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c]
[buffer.c cipher-3des1.c cipher.c clientloop.c gss-serv.c kex.c]
[kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexecdhc.c kexgexc.c kexecdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c]
[monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c readpass.c rsa.c serverloop.c]
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c]
[ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
[sshd.c]
convert memset of potentially-private data to explicit_bzero()
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[auth2-chall.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufec.c canohost.c]
[channels.c cipher-chachapoly.c clientloop.c configure.ac hostfile.c]
[kexc25519.c krl.c monitor.c sandbox-systrace.c session.c]
[sftp-client.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c]
[openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h]
replace most bzero with explicit_bzero, except a few that cna be memset
ok djm dtucker
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[authfile.c]
don't refuse to load Ed25519 certificates
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[authfd.c authfile.c key.c key.h myproposal.h pathnames.h readconf.c]
[servconf.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c]
[ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd.c verify.c ssh-ed25519.c]
[sc25519.h sc25519.c hash.c ge25519_base.data ge25519.h ge25519.c]
[fe25519.h fe25519.c ed25519.c crypto_api.h blocks.c]
support ed25519 keys (hostkeys and user identities) using the public
domain ed25519 reference code from SUPERCOP, see
http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html
feedback, help & ok djm@
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[authfile.c authfile.h cipher.c cipher.h key.c packet.c ssh-agent.c]
[ssh-keygen.c PROTOCOL.key] new private key format, bcrypt as KDF by
default; details in PROTOCOL.key; feedback and lots help from djm;
ok djm@
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[Makefile.in PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 authfile.c chacha.c]
[chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h]
[dh.c myproposal.h packet.c poly1305.c poly1305.h servconf.c ssh.1]
[ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] Add a new protocol 2 transport
cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" that combines Daniel
Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an
authenticated encryption mode.
Inspired by and similar to Adam Langley's proposal for TLS:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
but differs in layout used for the MAC calculation and the use of a
second ChaCha20 instance to separately encrypt packet lengths.
Details are in the PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 file.
Feedback markus@, naddy@; manpage bits Loganden Velvindron @ AfriNIC
ok markus@ naddy@
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